Panic attacks without fear: An overview*

‘Non-fearful panic disorder’ (NFPD) is a condition that meets DSM III-R criteria for panic disorder but lacks a report of subjective fear or anxiety. Presenting the first comprehensive overview of this issue, the authors describe studies investigating a wide range of apparently overlapping phenomena including NFPD, ‘somatically expressed panic’, ‘non-cognitive panic’, ‘alexithymic panic’, ‘non-clinical panic’, and ‘masked anxiety’. The review shows that such conditions account for from 20 to 40% of the panic disorder found in various medical populations, and that this group resembles conventional panic disorder in cross-sectional comparisons. We emphasize that a ‘triple-response’ model of anxiety is consistent with our conclusion that NFPD should be conceptualized as a panic disorder subtype. Finally, we discuss unresolved issues regarding the construct and predictive diagnostic validity of NFPD.     

Perfectionism and self-consciousness in social phobia and panic disorder with agoraphobia.

Social phobics were compared to patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia and normal controls on perfectionism and self-consciousness. On concern over mistakes and doubts about action, social phobics scored higher than patients with panic disorder. Social phobics also demonstrated a higher level of public self-consciousness than patients with panic disorder and when this difference was controlled for the significant differences on perfectionism disappeared. Within each patient group, however, perfectionism was more robustly related to social anxiety than was public self-consciousness, which replicates the findings of Saboonchi and Lundh [Saboonchi, F. & Lundh, L. G. (1997). Perfectionism, self-consciousness and anxiety. Personality and Individual Differences, 22, 921-928.] from a non-clinical sample. The results are discussed in terms of public self-consciousness being a differentiating characteristic of the more severe kind of social anxiety which is typical of social phobia.     

Cognitions related to anxiety: a pilot study of treatment

In general, where anxiety appears to have a specific external focus, such as the situations which are avoided by phobic patients, treatment involving systematic exposure to those situations seems to be effective. This is less appropriate, or even impossible, where anxiety is not dependent on any external circumstance, but is described by the patient as occurring at any time or place, either chronically over long periods, or acutely in the form of ‘panic attacks’. These patients with ‘generalised’ anxiety often describe internal cues for anxiety either in the form of thoughts (e.g. worry over a current problem) or somatic (e.g. chest sensations interpreted as possible heart disease). Beck et al. (1974) has suggested that on interview, all patients diagnosed as suffering from diffuse or generalised anxiety can report specific ideas or other cognitive cues which are associated with anxiety. These usually concern possible traumatic events, such as illness and death, or social rejection. Clearly Beck has in mind the possibility that these cognitions have the effect of inducing anxiety, although even if the validity of the subjective reports were to be accepted, the problem remains of whether the relationship between mood state and cognitions is causal and if so, in which direction it operates. Obviously a causal relationship may also operate in both directions simultaneously, to form a ‘vicious circle’ in which each exacerbates the other. To establish whether there is a sense in which particular cognitions contribute causally to anxious mood, it would be necessary to find a method of manipulating the type or frequency of cognitions thought to be operating in this way.

One obvious possibility is that of ‘thought-stopping’: that is, patients could be taught to identify thoughts which are associated with anxiety and stop them in the usual way (Wolpe, 1973, p. 211) e.g. by' shouting stop, and substituting an alternative thought. The present study was planned as a pilot experiment to determine (i) if appropriate anxiety related cognitions could be elicited from a series of patients with generalised anxiety, (ii) if the reported frequency of such thoughts could be modified by a thought-stopping technique, and (iii) if any changes in thought frequency were associated with improvements in mood.

Clearly there are many ‘non-specific’ features involved in thought-stopping which could also have therapeutic effects on mood. For this reason it was necessary to include an alternative procedure, not directed at reducing thought frequency, but having the same degree of plausibility to patients, and preferably to therapists. The control procedure chosen for this purpose was modelled on desensitisation, in which patients were encouraged to allow the supposedly anxiety-provoking thoughts into their mind and tolerate them, rather than attempt to stop them. In summary, the study employed a relaxation training phase as a base-line, followed by a cross-over design in which the two treatment phases of thought-stopping and ‘cognitive desensitisation’ were given to each patient, in balanced order.     

Emotion- and intrusion-based reasoning in Vietnam veterans with and without chronic posttraumatic stress disorder.

Patients suffering from anxiety disorders other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) interpret anxiety responses themselves as evidence that threat is impending: "if anxiety, then threat" (Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 917-925). This "emotion-based reasoning" (ER) may render a disorder self-perpetuating. Analogous to ER, danger might also be inferred from the presence of intrusions: "intrusion-based reasoning" (IR). The aims of this study were to test whether ER and IR are involved in chronic PTSD. Vietnam combat veterans with or without PTSD or other anxiety disorders rated perceived danger of brief scenarios in which information about objective danger (danger vs safety) and response (anxiety/intrusions vs non-distressing emotion) was systematically varied. Two series were administered: ER-scenarios were non-specific for PTSD and IR-scenarios were specific for PTSD. Relative to control participants, PTSD patients engaged in both ER and IR: whereas veterans without PTSD inferred the danger of scenarios from objective stimulus information, veterans with PTSD also inferred danger from the presence of anxiety or intrusions. Further analyses showed that these effects were largely mediated by perceived uncontrollability.     

Public and private heart rate feedback in social phobia: a manipulation of anxiety visibility

According to cognitive behavioural models of social phobia, bodily symptoms are the main source of information concerning social evaluation for social phobics. Experience and perception of bodily symptoms therefore play an important role in social anxiety. In this study we evaluated the effects of anxiety visibility on patients and controls using feedback of veridical heart sounds. A total of 32 social phobics and 32 controls were asked twice to sit in a chair and appear relaxed while being evaluated. Half of the participants heard their heart sounds first via headphones and then via loudspeakers which were also audible to observers. The presentation order of the heart sound was reversed for the other half of the subjects. Social phobics reported substantially more anxiety than controls. Both groups showed habituation in heart rate from the first to the second presentation, and both groups reported perception of a higher heart rate, but only social phobics reported significantly more anxiety and were more worried about their heart rates in the public than in the private condition. These effects were in excess of actual heart rate differences. In conclusion, social phobics worried about the broadcast of a bodily anxiety symptom, whereas controls did not. Information about arousal made public has a strong potential to increase anxiety levels in social phobics.     

Public and private heart rate feedback in social phobia: a manipulation of anxiety visibility

According to cognitive behavioural models of social phobia, bodily symptoms are the main source of information concerning social evaluation for social phobics. Experience and perception of bodily symptoms therefore play an important role in social anxiety. In this study we evaluated the effects of anxiety visibility on patients and controls using feedback of veridical heart sounds. A total of 32 social phobics and 32 controls were asked twice to sit in a chair and appear relaxed while being evaluated. Half of the participants heard their heart sounds first via headphones and then via loudspeakers which were also audible to observers. The presentation order of the heart sound was reversed for the other half of the subjects. Social phobics reported substantially more anxiety than controls. Both groups showed habituation in heart rate from the first to the second presentation, and both groups reported perception of a higher heart rate, but only social phobics reported significantly more anxiety and were more worried about their heart rates in the public than in the private condition. These effects were in excess of actual heart rate differences. In conclusion, social phobics worried about the broadcast of a bodily anxiety symptom, whereas controls did not. Information about arousal made public has a strong potential to increase anxiety levels in social phobics.     

Public and private self-consciousness as specific psychopathological features

Public self-consciousness (PUBSC) and private self-consciousness (PRISC) represent aspects of dispositional self-directed attention. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether four clinical groups, namely patients with a diagnosis of social phobia, panic disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder or bulimia nervosa, and normal controls differentiated on the basis of their PUBSC and PRISC scores. Results indicated that both PUBSC and PRISC are extremely elevated in patients with social phobia. Patients with panic disorder and patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder score somewhere between social phobics and normal controls on PUBSC and PRISC scales. Bulimics had significantly higher PUBSC values than both controls and patients with panic disorder, but had lower values than social phobics. Compared to normal controls, bulimics showed no elevated PRISC scores. In addition, contrary to the other groups, PUBSC and PRISC seem to be unrelated in bulimics. Thus, PUBSC and PRISC appear to be specific psychopathological features for German females when comparing groups with different mental disorders and normal controls.     

Stability of Cognitive Bias for Threat Cues in Phobia

The present study examined whether the cognitive bias for threat is a stable phenomenon in spider phobics and not in nonphobic controls. The rationale of this study was that the use of emotional bias for individual assessment in clinical practice requires stability of this phenomenon. In order to assess the stability of the emotional bias, the spider Stroop task was administered twice to spider phobics and controls, with a time lag of 3 weeks. In two experiments, spider phobics (n_{exp. 1} = 20; n_{exp. 2} = 33) and controls (n_{exp. 1} = 24; n_{exp. 2} = 25) were selected on basis of a structured interview. In the second experiment, subjects anticipated exposure to a real-life spider. Emotional bias was inferred from color-naming latencies on spider words versus control words. In line with our prediction, the bias for threat was stable in spider phobic individuals but not in controls. This stability could not be attributed to a general cognitive characteristic because a standard Stroop task did not differentiate between the spider phobics and the controls. The results support the view that cognitive processing of threat in anxiety is stable. It is proposed to use both the emotional bias and its stability as measures of the constraints on the flexibility of the cognitive fear-network.     

The Impact of Anxiety on Memory for Details in Spider Phobics

According to the attentional narrowing account of emotional memory, physiological arousal results in attention being directed towards central rather than peripheral characteristics of the situation. Consequently, memory for central details would be relatively good, whereas memory for peripheral information would be impaired. The present experiment sought to test this attentional narrowing hypothesis under highly stressful conditions. Spider phobics and low-fear controls were confronted with a large live spider, eliciting high levels of emotion in the phobic group. Afterwards, subjects' memory for the experimental situation was tested. On a cued recall test, phobics displayed a poor memory for peripheral detail information relative to control subjects. There were no differences between phobics and controls with respect to central detail information. Thus, the present data provide partial support for the attentional narrowing account of emotional memory. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A longitudinal study of "intrusion-based reasoning" and posttraumatic stress disorder after exposure to a train disaster

Previously, we found that chronic PTSD relates to “intrusion-based reasoning” (IR), i.e. the tendency to interpret distressing intrusions themselves as evidence that danger is impending, regardless of objective danger information (Engelhard et al., Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 1139). This study was intended to elucidate the causal status of this relation. Twenty-nine residents of a Belgian town witnessed a train crash and were assessed for IR and PTSD symptoms within 1 month and were re-assessed for PTSD at 3.5 months. Fourteen control residents did not witness the crash and were also tested for IR. The IR paradigm involved rating the danger of brief scenarios in which objective danger and presence of intrusions about the crash were systematically varied. The directly exposed residents showed greater danger ratings to scenarios in which intrusions were included than did the controls. IR was strongly related to both acute and chronic PTSD symptoms. It did not significantly predict chronic PTSD symptoms after controlling for acute symptoms, although the partial correlation (r=0.26, p=0.09) was in the expected direction. The data suggest that IR is involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, but more clarity about causality awaits future larger and experimental studies.     

The effects of voluntary hyperventilation on patients with chest pain without coronary artery disease

The present investigation was designed to examine panic symptom experience in patients with chest pain of nonorganic etiology, using a hyperventilation provocation procedure. Given the recent focus on panic disorder in patients with nonorganic chest pain, we assessed three indices of physiological arousal, subjective anxiety, and endorsement of DSM-III-R panic symptomatology in response to 3 min of voluntary hyperventilation. Subjects included 23 patients with nonorganic chest pain (CP sample) and matched normal controls (NC sample). The results indicate that hyperventilation produced significant increases in skin conductance, heart rate, and upper trapezious EMG in both CP and NC samples. Despite equivalent levels of physiological arousal and subjective anxiety, the CP sample endorsed a greater number of DSM-III-R panic symptoms relative to the NC sample. Examination of post-hyperventilation symptoms indicated that a greater percentage of the CP sample reported palpitations, nausea, and chest pain when compared with normals. Comparison of CP patients with and without Panic Disorder revealed no significant differences on any measure. The results suggests that hyperventilation plays a role in symptom experience in patients with nonorganic chest pain, although anxiety does not appear central in moderating this effect.     

Reaction time to threat stimuli in panic disorder and social phobia

Two studies assessed response time among clinically anxious subjects and normal controls when presented with threat, positive and neutral stimuli under perceptual (lexical decision) and semantic (category decision) task conditions. In Study 1, panic disorder subjects' (n = 14) performance was compared to that of matched normal controls (n = 14) while in Study 2 social phobic subjects (n = 24) were compared to matched normal controls (n = 24). Relative to matched normal controls, panic disorder subjects but not social phobics tended to show greater slowing in performance on the more cognitively complex (category) task. A second finding, consistent across both studies was that, compared to the normal control groups, both panic and social phobic groups showed significantly slowed responses to threat words in both the perceptual and semantic tasks. Such findings are directly counter to the predictions of a mood congruence hypothesis. This apparent contradiction is resolved by a review of the literature which indicates that mood-related facilitation effects are obtained only in tasks which tap awareness of threat information rather than speed of response. It is suggested that while anxiety may produce enhanced awareness of threat, it may inhibit responsiveness to it. The results of these studies are seen as consistent with ethological theories of inhibited motoric responses under certain threat conditions. Furthermore, the findings suggest that caution is indicated in interpreting slowed reaction time to threat stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop color naming task as purely the result of attentional processes.     

Emotional avoidance: an experimental test of individual differences and response suppression using biological challenge

The present study examined the affective consequences of response inhibition during a state of anxiety-related physical stress. Forty-eight non-clinical participants were selected on the basis of pre-experimental differences in emotional avoidance (high versus low) and subjected to four inhalations of 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air. Half of the participants were instructed to inhibit the challenge-induced aversive emotional state, whereas the other half was instructed to simply observe their emotional response. Participants high in emotional avoidance compared to those low in emotional avoidance responded with greater levels of anxiety and affective distress but not physiological arousal. Individuals high in emotional avoidance also reported greater levels of anxiety relative to the low emotional avoidance group when suppressing compared to observing bodily sensations. These findings are discussed in terms of the significance of emotional avoidance processes during physical stress, with implications for better understanding the nature of panic disorder.     

Emotional responding to fearful and disgusting stimuli in specific phobics

Individuals with small animal and blood-injection-injury (BII) phobias respond to phobia-relevant stimuli with both fear and disgust. However, recent studies suggest that fear is the dominant emotional response in animal phobics whereas disgust is the primary emotional response in BII phobics. The present study examined emotional responding toward pictures of spiders, surgical procedures, and two categories of general disgust elicitors (rotting food and body products) among analogue spider phobics, BII phobics, and nonphobics. Dominant emotional responses to phobia-relevant stimuli clearly differentiated the groups. as spider phobics were more likely to be classified as primarily fearful when rating pictures of spiders (74%), whereas BII phobics were more likely to be classified as primarily disgusted when rating pictures of surgical procedures (78%). Discriminant function analyses revealed that disgust ratings, but not fear ratings, of the phobic pictures were significant predictors of phobic group membership. Both phobic groups were characterized by elevated disgust sensitivity toward video and pictorial general disgust elicitors. Implications and suggestions for continued research examining fearful and disgusting stimuli in specific phobia are outlined.     

Response to hyperventilation and inhalation of 5.5% carbon dioxide-enriched air across the DSM-III-R anxiety disorders.

Anxiety disorder patients (n = 198; under criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; rev. 3rd ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and nonanxious control subjects (n = 25) underwent challenges of 90 s of voluntary hyperventilation and 15 min of 5.5% carbon dioxide in air. Panic disorder subjects showed a greater subjective response to both challenges than did subjects with other anxiety disorders, who in turn responded more than did control subjects. Furthermore, subjects with panic disorder as an additional diagnosis tended to report more subjective response than did anxiety disorder subjects without panic disorder. The best prechallenge predictor of response to each procedure was a measure of fear of physical symptoms. The findings support previous results that have pointed to a greater fear or anxiety-inducing effect of these challenge procedures in panic disorder patients, as compared with other subjects.     

Associations between emotional avoidance,anxiety sensitivity,and reactions to an observational fear challenge procedure

Research has shown that emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity are associated with more self-reported fear and distress in response to laboratory fear challenge procedures. The present study aimed to expand upon this work and examined how emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity are related to emotional and physiological responses to an observational fear challenge procedure. To accomplish this aim, a carefully screened, non-clinical sample (N = 43) was administered the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ), a measure of emotional avoidance, and the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI). Participants then engaged in an observational fear challenge paradigm. During the fear challenge, participants watched mock panic attacks while emotional (e.g., fear and panic) and skin conductance levels were assessed. Consistent with expectation, emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity were positively associated with more self-reported fear and more severe panic symptoms to the challenge procedure. However, anxiety sensitivity was more highly associated with self-reported fear and panic symptoms in response to the challenge procedure than emotional avoidance. Emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity were not associated with levels of physiological arousal to the observational fear challenge procedure. Discussion focuses on the interplay between emotional avoidance, anxiety sensitivity, and the development of vicarious fear responses and how these constructs may contribute to the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders.     

Depersonalisation disorder: a cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation

Depersonalisation (DP) and derealisation (DR) are subjective experiences of unreality in, respectively, one’s sense of self and the outside world. These experiences occur on a continuum from transient episodes that are frequently reported in healthy individuals under certain situational conditions to a chronic psychiatric disorder that causes considerable distress (depersonalisation disorder, DPD). Despite the relatively high rates of reporting these symptoms, little research has been conducted into psychological treatments for this disorder. We suggest that there is compelling evidence to link DPD with the anxiety disorders, particularly panic. This paper proposes that it is the catastrophic appraisal of the normally transient symptoms of DP/DR that results in the development of a chronic disorder. We suggest that if DP/DR symptoms are misinterpreted as indicative of severe mental illness or brain dysfunction, a vicious cycle of increasing anxiety and consequently increased DP/DR symptoms will result. Moreover, cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms such as specific avoidances, ‘safety behaviours’ and cognitive biases serve to maintain the disorder by increasing awareness of the symptoms, heightening the perceived threat and preventing disconfirmation of the catastrophic misinterpretations. A coherent model facilitates the development of potentially effective cognitive and behavioural interventions.     

Blood phobics and nonphobics: psychological differences and affect during exposure.

This study compared psychological dimensions of blood phobics and nonphobic controls, examined affect in response to phobic and neutral stimuli, and investigated the relationship between reported feelings of faintness and blood pressure. Blood phobics (24 adults with extreme Mutilation Questionnaire scores) and 24 nonphobics completed several psychological measures and viewed one of two 60 sec surgery scenes and a 60 sec neutral scene in counterbalanced order. Subjective, psychophysiologic, and motoric measures of affect were assessed. On questionnaires, phobics reported greater anxiety sensitivity, empathic distress, fear and insecurity, and nightmares, but no difference in autonomic arousal, muscle tension, motion sickness, or other empathy domains. During surgery scenes, phobics had more negative affect than controls; however, phobics were more anxious during only one of the two surgeries, and often only when the surgery was presented prior to the neutral scene. Fainting did not occur, and self-reported feelings of faintness were unrelated to blood pressure changes. The findings highlight the lack of information on blood phobic stimulus properties, fainting's relationship to self-reports and blood pressure, and the specific emotion experienced in blood phobia.     

Emotional processing and panic

In this paper Rachman's concept of emotional processing was extended and a model highlighting the psychological operations underpinning processing was specified. Using this model, the aim was to investigate, by means of a questionnaire, whether patients with panic disorder (n=50) have more emotional processing difficulties than two samples of healthy controls (London, n=406; Aberdeen, n=125). The panic disorder group did have significantly more emotional processing difficulties than the control groups, showing a marked tendency to control feelings of anger, unhappiness and anxiety. Three emotional processing dimensions distinguished the panic from the control groups: greater control of emotional experiences ('smothering' or 'bottling up' emotions), greater awareness of feelings and more difficulties in labelling emotions. The authors hypothesise that emotional processing deficits act as a vulnerability factor for developing panic attacks.