Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Anxiety and expectancy violations: Neural response to false feedback is exaggerated in worriers

This study investigated how individual differences in anxiety modulate the neural response to errors and performance feedback. The design included false feedback on some trials in order to test the hypothesis that anxious people show stronger neural reactions to feedback that is worse than expected. Participants completed a trial-and-error learning task that required learning the correct key to press in response to face images. EEG was recorded during the task, and the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN) and feedback-locked ERN were computed to measure neural responses to error commission and feedback. As expected, errors produced a response-locked ERN and false feedback produced a feedback-locked ERN in the group as a whole. High levels of trait worry predicted a disproportionately larger ERN following false feedback, but did not predict the magnitude of the response-locked ERN following errors. These results imply that worry-prone people react more strongly to violations of expectations, rather than to errors themselves.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

The impact of feedback from job and task autonomy in the relationship between dispositional resistance to change and innovative work behaviour

Building on an interactionist approach, the present study investigated the moderating role of two task design characteristics, namely task autonomy and feedback from job, in the relationship between dispositional resistance to change and innovative work behaviour. Consistent with a trait activation perspective, it was specifically hypothesized that dispositional resistance to change would have a stronger, positive association with innovative performance when autonomy and feedback were high than when they were low. In a sample of 270 employees from the public sector, task autonomy was found to significantly interact with both composite resistance to change and with three of the four dimensions (routine seeking, short-term thinking, and emotional reaction). Simple slope analyses specifically revealed that individuals high in short-term thinking and emotional reaction exhibited positive relationships with innovative behaviour only in the case of high task autonomy, whereas in the case of low autonomy the relationship was nonsignificant. Furthermore, feedback from job was found to moderate the relationship between overarching dispositional resistance to change, short-term thinking, and emotional reaction, on one hand, and innovative performance, on the other, such that a positive and significant association emerged only in the case of high feedback.     

A heart rate analysis of developmental change in feedback processing and rule shifting from childhood to early adulthood

Over the course of development, the ability to switch between different tasks on the basis of feedback cues increases profoundly, but the role of performance monitoring remains unclear. Heart rate indexes can provide critical information about how individuals monitor feedback cues indicating that performance should be adjusted. In this study, children of three age groups (8-10, 12-14, and 16-18 years) performed a rule change task in which sorting rules needed to be detected following positive or negative feedback. The number of perseverative errors was lower for 16- to 18-year-olds than for 8- to 10-year-olds, and 12- to 14-year-olds performed at an intermediate level. Consistent with previous findings, heart rate slowed following feedback indicating a rule change, and the magnitude of slowing was similar for all age groups. Thus, 8- to 10-year-olds are already able to analyze feedback cues. In contrast, 12- to 14-year-olds and 16- to 18-year-olds, but not 8- to 10-year-olds, showed heart rate slowing following performance errors, suggesting that with age children are increasingly able to monitor their performance online. Performance monitoring may therefore be an important contributor to set-shifting ability.     

The alternative explanation to the alternative‐outcome effect and the detection of the focal outcome effect

Abstract: Previous studies on subjective probability judgment indicate that pair‐wise comparison between the focal and the strongest alternative outcome plays an important role in probability judgment. This study, however, found that the randomness of alternative outcomes affected probability judgment for focal outcome. In the present study, 182 participants provided probability estimates for winning on hypothetical slot machines where both successes and losses were composed of multiple outcomes. The randomness of both the focal and alternative outcomes were defined by the expression used in Rappoport and Budescu (1997 ). The analysis indicated that the more random the distributions of both focal and alternative outcomes, the higher the estimated probability for focal outcome. Some theoretical suggestions are discussed.     

Age differences in the neural response to negative feedback

Affective processing is one domain that remains relatively intact in healthy aging. Investigations into the neural responses associated with reward anticipation have revealed that older and younger adults recruit the same midbrain reward regions, but other evidence suggests this recruitment may differ depending on the valence (gain, loss) of the incentive cue. The goal of the current study was to examine functional covariance during gain and loss feedback in younger and healthy older adults. A group of 15 older adults (mean age = 68.5) and 16 younger adults (mean age = 25.4) completed a revised Monetary Incentive Delay task (rMID; Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, &; Hommer, 2000) while in the fMRI scanner. The rMID is a reaction time task where successful performance, either gaining a reward or avoiding a loss, is defined by hitting a button during the brief presentation of a visual target. Participants receive gain and loss anticipation cues before each trial and feedback after each trial with four possible outcomes: +$5.00, +0.00, -$5.00, and -Affective processing is one domain that remains relatively intact in healthy aging. Investigations into the neural responses associated with reward anticipation have revealed that older and younger adults recruit the same midbrain reward regions, but other evidence suggests this recruitment may differ depending on the valence (gain, loss) of the incentive cue. The goal of the current study was to examine functional covariance during gain and loss feedback in younger and healthy older adults. A group of 15 older adults (mean age = 68.5) and 16 younger adults (mean age = 25.4) completed a revised Monetary Incentive Delay task (rMID; Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000) while in the fMRI scanner. The rMID is a reaction time task where successful performance, either gaining a reward or avoiding a loss, is defined by hitting a button during the brief presentation of a visual target. Participants receive gain and loss anticipation cues before each trial and feedback after each trial with four possible outcomes: +$5.00, +0.00, -$5.00, and -$0.00. Using seed-voxel partial least squares analyses, with seed voxels in the caudate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whole-brain functional covariance revealed that younger and older adults engage the same network of regions to support general feedback processing. However, older adults engaged two additional networks to support processing of negative feedback, gain_miss (+0), loss_miss (-$5), and loss_hit (?0), specifically. These findings are in line with theories of a positivity effect in aging and may have implications for reward-stimulus learning and decision making following performance-contingent negative feedback.     

Resistance to change of forgetting functions and response rates

This experiment examined the effects of reinforcement probability on resistance to change of remembering and response rate. Pigeons responded on a two-component multiple schedule in which completion of a variable-interval 20-s schedule produced delayed matching-to-sample trials in both components. Each session included four delays (0.1 s, 2 s, 4 s, and 8 s) between sample termination and presentation of comparison stimuli in both components. The two components differed in the probability of reinforcement arranged for correct matches (i.e., rich, p = .9; lean, p = .1). Response rates during the variable-interval portion of the procedure were higher in the rich component during baseline and more resistant to the disruptive effects of intercomponent food and extinction. Forgetting functions were constructed by examining matching accuracy as a function of delay duration. Baseline accuracy was higher in the rich component than in the lean component as measured by differences in the gamma-intercept of the forgetting functions (i.e., initial discrimination), rather than from differences in the slope of the forgetting function (i.e., rate of forgetting). Intercomponent food increased the rate of forgetting relatively more in the lean component than in the rich component, but initial discrimination was not systematically affected. Extinction reduced initial discrimination relatively more in the lean component than in the rich component, but did not systematically affect rate of forgetting. These results are consistent with our previous data suggesting that, as for response rate, accuracy and resistance to change of discriminating are positively related to rate of reinforcement. These data also suggest that the disruptability of remembering depends on the conditions of reinforcement, but the way in which remembering is disrupted depends on the nature of the disruptor.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

How to stop and change a response: the role of goal activation in multitasking

Multitasking was studied in the stop-change paradigm, in which the response for a primary GO1 task had to be stopped and replaced by a response for a secondary GO2 task on some trials. In 2 experiments, the delay between the stop signal and the change signal was manipulated to determine which task goals (GO1, GO2, or STOP) were involved in performance and to determine whether the goals were activated in series or in parallel. As the delay increased, the probability of responding on stop trials changed very little, but GO2 task reaction times decreased substantially. Such effects are consistent with both a nondeterministic serial model (in which the GO1 goal is replaced by the STOP goal, which is subsequently replaced by the GO2 goal) and a limited-capacity parallel model (in which stopping and GO2 processing occur concurrently) with a capacity-sharing proportion that resembles serial processing.     

Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task

While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.     

Changes in optimism and pessimism in response to life events: Evidence from three large panel studies

Although individuals vary in how optimistic they are about the future, one assumption that researchers make is that optimism is sensitive to changes in life events and circumstances. We examined how optimism and pessimism changed across the lifespan and in response to life events in three large panel studies (combined N = 74,886). In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood. In the German sample, there were inconsistent results with respect to age differences and mean level changes in optimism. Associations between life events and changes in optimism/pessimism were inconsistent across samples. We discuss our results in the context of life events and lifespan development.     

On the effects of signaling reinforcer probability and magnitude in delayed matching to sample

Two experiments examined whether postsample signals of reinforcer probability or magnitude affected the accuracy of delayed matching to sample in pigeons. On each trial, red or green choice responses that matched red or green stimuli seen shortly before a variable retention interval were reinforced with wheat access. In Experiment 1, the reinforcer probability was either 0.2 or 1.0 for both red and green responses. Reinforcer probability was signaled by line or cross symbols that appeared after the sample had been presented. In Experiment 2, all correct responses were reinforced, and the signaled reinforcer durations were 1.0 s and 4.5 s. Matching was more accurate when larger or more probable reinforcers were signaled, independently of retention interval duration. Because signals were presented postsample, the effects were not the result of differential attention to the sample.     

Response-dependent point loss and response force as disrupting operations on behavioral resistance to change in humans

Behavioral momentum theory (BMT) provides a theoretical and methodological framework for understanding how differentially maintained operant responding resists disruption. A common way to test operant resistance involves contingencies with suppressive effects, such as extinction or prefeeding. Other contingencies with known suppressive effects, such as response-cost procedures arranged as point-loss or increases in response force, remain untested as disruptive events within the BMT framework. In the present set of three experiments, responding of humans was maintained by point accumulation programmed according to a multiple variable-interval (VI) VI schedule with different reinforcement rates in either of two components. Subsequently, subtracting a point following each response (Experiment 1) or increasing the force required for the response to be registered (Experiments 2 and 3 decreased response rates, but responding was less disrupted in the component associated with the higher reinforcement rate. The point-loss contingency and increased response force similarly affected response rates by suppressing responding and human persistence, replicating previous findings with humans and nonhuman animals when other types of disruptive events (e.g., extinction and prefeeding) were investigated. The present findings moreover extend the generality of the effects of reinforcement rate on persistence, and thus BMT, extending the analysis of resistance to two well-known manipulations used to reduce responding in the experimental analysis of behavior.     

What gaze adds to arrows: Changes in attentional response to gaze versus arrows in childhood and adolescence

From early ages, gaze acts as a cue to infer the interests, behaviours, thoughts and emotions of social partners. Despite sharing attentional properties with other non-social directional stimuli, such as arrows, gaze produces unique effects. A spatial interference task revealed this dissociation. The direction of arrows was identified faster on congruent than on incongruent direction-location trials. Conversely, gaze produced a reversed congruency effect (RCE), with faster identifications on incongruent than congruent trials. To determine the emergence of these gaze-specific attentional mechanisms, 214 Spanish children (4–17 years) divided into 6 age groups, performed the aforementioned task across three experiments. Results showed stimulus-specific developmental trajectories. Whereas the standard effect of arrows was unaffected by age, gaze shifted from an arrow-like effect at age 4 to a gaze-specific RCE at age 12. The orienting mechanisms shared by gaze and arrows are already present in 4-year olds and, throughout childhood, gaze becomes a special social cue with additional attentional properties. Besides orienting attention to a direction, as arrows would do, gaze might orient attention towards a specific object that would be attentionally selected. Such additional components may not fully develop until adolescence. Understanding gaze-specific attentional mechanisms may be crucial for children with atypical socio-cognitive development.     

Anchoring Effects in Simulated Academic Promotion Decisions: How the Promotion Criterion Affects Ratings and the Decision to Support an Application

Six experiments investigated the effect of the promotion criterion in simulated academic promotion decisions. In total, 547 undergraduate students and 33 university faculty members rated a promotion application, and some also indicated their decisions to support or to reject it. Performance ratings were reliably affected by the criterion, with a high criterion resulting in higher ratings than a low criterion, and this criterion effect was found regardless of the evaluator's expertise, whether he or she took the role of an independent assessor or the line manager to the applicant, or whether the criterion was provided by the experimenter or randomly generated by the participant. The criterion also affected the level of support for a candidate when the position applied for was perceived to be extremely competitive, or when a lesser position was considered at a later time. These results provide evidence that the use of a criterion, a fairly common practice in decision‐making processes, may bias performance evaluations, which in turn may have ripple effects that affect the outcome of a chain of events. Our results also shed light on the possible mechanisms that underlie the rating biases in performance appraisal. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to address the caveat of avoiding direct contact: Reducing prejudice towards gay and lesbian people in five Balkan countries

ABSTRACT

In the Balkans, contact with gays and lesbians is typically hostile or avoided. Drawing from probability samples of young people from five Balkan countries (N = 1046), we examined whether it is possible to transfer the effects of contact with other marginalized outgroups (largest ethnic minority in every country, Roma, the extremely poor and physically disabled) to acceptance of gays and lesbians (secondary outgroup), and whether this relationship could be explained by attitude generalization and increased intergroup trust. Path analyses supported the secondary transfer effect: it confirmed that, while controlling for direct contact, contact with other marginalized groups was related to more acceptance of a secondary group; this relationship was mediated by trust. This was found across all primary groups in the combined samples, while the effect varied for different groups in country samples. The results add to the value of intergroup contact as a mean of prejudice-reduction.