Keeping the collectivity in mind?

The key question in this three way debate is the role of the collectivity and of agency. Collins and Shrager debate whether cognitive psychology has, like the sociology of knowledge, always taken the mind to extend beyond the individual. They agree that irrespective of the history, socialization is key to understanding the mind and that this is compatible with Clark’s position; the novelty in Clark’s “extended mind” position appears to be the role of the material rather than the role of other minds. Collins and Clark debate the relationship between self, agency, and the human collectivity. Collins argues that the Clark’s extended mind fails to stress the asymmetry of the relationship between the self and its material “scaffolding.” Clark accepts that there is asymmetry but that an asymmetrical ensemble is sufficient to explain the self. Collins says that we know too little about the material world to pursue such a model to the exclusion of other approaches including that both the collectivity and language have agency. The collectivity must be kept in mind! (Though what follows is a robust exchange of views it is also a cooperative effort, authors communicating “backstage” with each other to try to make the disagreements as clear and to the point as possible.)

Is logic in the mind or in the world?

The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?     

Motivating meta-awareness of mind wandering: A way to catch the mind in flight?

Given the negative effects of mind wandering on performance, it may be profitable to be aware of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) as they occur. The present study investigated whether motivating people to catch TUTs increases meta-awareness. We offered incentives for increased self-catching during reading. To enhance the veracity of these self-reports, we used a “bogus-pipeline” procedure; we convinced participants that their mental states were being covertly monitored using physiological measures. In reality, mind wandering was assessed covertly by a secondary task (“gibberish detection”), and overtly by experience sampling. The results showed that incentives increased the number of self-catches without increasing overall mind wandering. Moreover, both the bogus pipeline and the opportunity for incentives increased the validity of self-reports, evidenced by significantly increased correlations between self-caught and behaviorally assessed mind wandering. We discuss the relevance of this methodological approach for research on mind wandering and research building on introspective reports more generally.     

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.     

Interactionism for the discerning mind?

Philosophical Studies - Jaegwon Kim has developed an argument that interactionist dualists cannot account for the causal relations between minds and brains. This paper develops a closely related...     

Being in two minds: The divided mind in the Nyāyasūtras

In this paper I suggest that the division between manas and atman in Nyaya philosophy can be interpreted in the light of Western discussions about irrationality. In Western philosophy irrationality has been explained by postulating a divided mind. This helps to account for a generally rational mind that is nevertheless sometimes prone to irrationality. I argue that the division of the mind bears similarities to the division between manas and ātman. Looking at the arguments of the Naiyāyikas Gautama and Vātsyāyana for the existence of a permanent self, I do not find any of them convincing in the light of Buddhist criticism. However, by arguing for the division between manas and ātman, the Naiyāyikas have inadvertently provided their strongest argument for the existence of a self because they have managed to account for irrationality.     

True to oneself? Broad and narrow ideas on authenticity in the enhancement debate

Our knowledge of the human brain and the influence of pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new possibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions concerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to humanity. Identity and authenticity are central in the debate on psychopharmacological enhancers. In this paper, I first describe the concerns at issue here as extensively propounded by Carl Elliott. Next, I address David DeGrazia’s theory, which holds that there are no fundamental identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against enhancement technologies. I argue, however, that DeGrazia’s line of reasoning does not succeed in settling these concerns. His conception of identity does not seem able to account for the importance we attach to personal identity in␣cases where personal identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his conception of authenticity does not explain the reason why we find inauthentic values objectionable. A broader approach to authenticity can make sense of concerns about changes in personal identity by means of enhancement technologies.     

Why did Bodhidharma go to the east? Buddhism’s struggle with the mind in the world

This question—why did Bodhidharma come from the West?— is ubiquitous in Chinese Ch’an Buddhist literature. Though some see it as an arbitrary question intended merely as an opener to obscure puzzles, I think it represents a genuine intellectual puzzle: Why did Bodhidharma come from theWest—that is, fromIndia? Why couldn’tChina with its rich literary and philosophical tradition have given rise to Buddhism? We will approach that question, but I prefer to do so backwards. I want to ask instead, “why was it so fortuitous for the development of Buddhist philosophy that Bodhidharma wentEast? I will argue that by doing so he gave a trajectory to Buddhist thought about the mind and knowledge that allows certain issues that are obscure in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, despite their centrality to the Buddhist critique of Indian orthodoxy, to come into sharper relief, and hence to complete a project begun, but not completable, in that Indo-European context.     

Motion in the mind’s eye: Comparing mental and visual rotation

Mental rotation is among the most widely studied visuospatial skills in humans. The processes involved in mental rotation have been described as analogous to seeing an object physically rotate. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging of the whole brain and localized motion-sensitive hV5/MT1 to compare brain activation for stimuli when they were mentally or visually rotated. The results provided clear evidence for activation in hV5/MT1 during both mental and visual rotation of figures, with increased activation for larger rotations. Combined with the overall similarities between mental and visual rotation in this study, these results suggest that mental rotation recruits many of the same neural substrates as observing motion.     

Parapsychology and the mind‐body problem

The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind‐brain relationship: ‘epiphenomenalism’ and ‘radical dualism’ (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic.     

The illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?

We reference self-ratings and clinician ratings of childhood anxious symptoms to a third data source well delineated with regard to the pathophysiology of anxiety. A total of 36 children with anxiety disorders and other children were administered yohimbine, an alpha-sub-2-adrenoreceptor antagonist, in response to which anxiety-prone children have blunted output of growth hormone. We assessed neuroendocrine reactions. In general, participants who claimed anxiety that was unconfirmed by clinicians displayed anxiotypic neuroendocrine profiles, whereas those who denied anxiety detected by clinicians did not, suggesting self-report may have had the advantage over clinician ratings in some instances. Nuanced and contextualized conclusions in this area of work are needed. In response to the question "the illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?," we answer "it depends on the sample and the syndrome under study."     

The dual role of ‘emergence’ in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science

The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.     

For the mind’s eye the world is two-dimensional

The nature of visual mental images is a topic that has puzzled neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers alike. On the one hand, mental images might preserve the 3-D properties of our perceptual world. On the other hand, they might be akin to 2-D pictures, such as photographs, paintings, or drawings. In the present study, 16 observers judged where real objects (Experiment 1) or photographs thereof (Experiment 2) were pointing. Both experiments contained a perception condition and an imagery condition. In Experiment 1, there was a significant difference between the pointing errors in the perception and the imagery conditions, whereas there was no such difference in Experiment 2. In imagined objects, actual photographs, and imagined photographs, the direction in which the objects pointed followed the observer, regardless of his or her vantage point. The results from this study extend the rotation effect, typically found in pictures, to the domain of mental imagery. We found the rotation effect in pictures and mental images alike, but not in direct perception of 3-D objects; thus, we provide evidence that mental images share main characteristics of 2-D pictures.     

How to get radical creative ideas into a leader’s mind? Leader’s achievement goals and subordinates’ voice of creative ideas

In the present research we investigated when and why leaders tend to oppose or adopt radical creative ideas voiced by their subordinates. In a field study (Study 1, N = 127) we showed that leaders’ performance goals were positively related to their tendency to oppose radical creative ideas, whereas leaders’ mastery goals were positively related to their tendency to adopt them. We replicated these findings in an experimental study (Study 2, N = 90), in which we showed that performance goal leaders were more likely to oppose radical creative ideas voiced by their subordinates than mastery goal leaders, whereas mastery goal leaders were more likely to adopt those ideas than performance goal leaders. In Study 2, we further showed that the effects of leaders’ achievement goals on their oppose and adopt responses were mediated by the leaders’ interest in exploration. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 91), we experimentally demonstrated that oppose and adopt responses of performance goal leaders, rather than mastery goal leaders, were sensitive to the behavioural mode by which subordinates voiced their radical creative ideas. That is, performance goal leaders were less likely to oppose and more likely to adopt radical creative ideas when subordinates voiced them in a considerate mode rather than an aggressive mode.     

Perceptual comparisons through the mind’s eye

Memory & Cognition - Four experiments tested a theory of memory and cognition which assumes that verbal and nonverbal information are processed in functionally distinct LTM systems. Subjects...     

Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis

The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.