Visual illusions classified

Visual illusions provide evidence of perceptual processes, especially the use of knowledge about objects and the working rules for seeing. The classification of phenomena is necessary for any science because it facilitates induction and deduction. The phenomena of illusions are no exception. It is hoped that the tentative classification presented here may stimulate further research and raise new questions by revealing gaps in the conceptual structure of how perception proceeds. Finally, a speculation is offered for the functional use of sensations, the qualia of consciousness.     

Demonstrative induction,old and new evidence and the accuracy of the electrostatic inverse square law

Maxwell claimed that the electrostatic inverse square law could be deduced from Cavendish's spherical condenser experiment. This is true only if the accuracy claims made by Cavendish and Maxwell are ignored, for both used the inverse square law as a premise in their analyses of experimental accuracy. By so doing, they assumed the very law the accuracy of which the Cavendish experiment was supposed to test. This paper attempts to make rational sense of this apparently circular procedure and to relate it to some variants of traditional problems concerning old and new evidence.My interest in demonstrative induction developed as the result of being given the opportunity by Joseph Pitt to comment on an earlier version of John Norton's Science and Certainty (1994) at a conference held at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I want to thank Joe and John for much stimulating discussion and John specifically for sharing his work on demonstrative induction with me. My gratitude also goes to the National Science Foundation (DIR-8920699) and Ohio State University for providing funding for a larger project of which this paper forms a part.     

归纳推论—演绎推论的不对称性在中国文化背景下的表现

归纳推论-演绎推论的不对称性是指人们在社会交往中会做出较多的归纳推论,而较少做出演绎推论,但这种社会推论倾向亦受到了文化及语言的影响.本研究目的是检验该现象在中国文化背景下的表现.采用Maass等人提出的研究范式,在一个实验中同时引发被试做出归纳和演绎两种推论,使用特别选取的特质形容词和相应的行为信息,用录音呈现实验材料.因变量为: (1)正确再认实际呈现过的材料; (2)正确拒绝没有呈现过的材料; (3)虚报没有呈现过的材料; (4)从已呈现的材料中做出推论的数量.统计被试做出各类反应的次数及反应时间.结果表明,中国被试并没有表现出对归纳推论的偏向,研究讨论了这一现象的文化影响.     

Mental models and probabilistic thinking

This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states of affairs consistent with the premises in which the conclusion is true, that is, the probability that the conclusion is true given that the premises are true. Since there are infinitely many possible states of affairs consistent with any set of premises, the paper then characterizes how individuals estimate the strength of an argument. They construct mental models, which each correspond to an infinite set of possibilities (or, in some cases, a finite set of infinite sets of possibilities). The construction of models is guided by knowledge and beliefs, including lay conceptions of such matters as the “law of large numbers”. The paper illustrates how this theory can account for phenomena of probabilistic reasoning.     

A model theory of induction

Theories of induction in psychology and artificial intelligence assume that the process leads from observation and knowledge to the formulation of linguistic conjectures. This paper proposes instead that the process yields mental models of phenomena. It uses this hypothesis to distinguish between deduction, induction, and creative forms of thought. It shows how models could underlie inductions about specific matters. In the domain of linguistic conjectures, there are many possible inductive generalizations of a conjecture. In the domain of models, however, generalization calls for only a single operation: the addition of information to a model. If the information to be added is inconsistent with the model, then it eliminates the model as false: this operation suffices for all generalizations in a Boolean domain. Otherwise, the information that is added may have effects equivalent (a) to the replacement of an existential quantifier by a universal quantifier, or (b) to the promotion of an existential quantifier from inside to outside the scope of a universal quantifier. The latter operation is novel, and does not seem to have been used in any linguistic theory of induction. Finally, the paper describes a set of constraints on human induction, and outlines the evidence in favor of a model theory of induction.     

Time, trace, memory

Objections to a trace hypothesis for interval timing do not apply to the multiple-time-scale (MTS) theory, which incorporates a dynamic trace tuned by the system history and can easily accommodate interval timing over a 1,000:1 range. The MTS model can also account for Weber's law as well as systematic deviations from it. Contrary to our critics, we contend that patterns of variance in interval timing experiments are not fully described by scalar expectancy theory, and that attempting to understand timing by assigning variance to different elements of a flexible model that lacks inductive support is a flawed strategy, because the attempt may be successful even if the model is wrong. We further argue that biological plausibility is an unreliable guide to the development of behavioral theory, that prediction is not the same as test, that induction should precede deduction, and that a rat is not a clock.     

The effect of luminance variation on the apparent position of an edge

A gray outline against a white (or black) ground appears to deviate when one of the divided regions turns into black (white). The direction of shift is not predictable on the basis of luminance profile and polarity contrast of this part of contour, called gray edge (to indicate a stepwise gradient from black to gray and from gray to white). Rather, it appears to depend on the luminance profiles of the collinear regions: A gray edge shifts toward the dark side whenever collinear with a gray line traversing a white ground. The same gray edge takes the opposite direction whenever it extends against a black ground. This rule proved to be successful in predicting the illusory convergence of the sides of a square that formed the stimuli of the first experiment, but the magnitude of the phenomenon was affected by luminance ratios and polarity contrasts of the gray edges, in agreement with the findings of the experiments on gray or blurred edge misalignment. A second experiment tested some hypotheses predicting the combined effects of two or more distorting sources. These hypotheses, suggested by the physical theory of vector sum, were partially disproved. A new model is proposed that assumes different ways of integrating local distortions. The third experiment tested predictions of how distorting pulses in opposite directions combine. The illusory misplacement of edge studied in this experiment is proposed as the underlying phenomena of the café wall illusion, the hollow square illusion, and other illusory phenomena observed with blurred areas. A connection with the induction grid phenomena is hypothesized.     

Method and Explanation in History and in Social Representations

A commonly held point of view defines a discipline as a science if it uses inductive and/or deductive methods in studying phenomena in question, because these methods, it is believed, will enable generalization of findings. Both history and theory of social representations study unique phenomena and therefore, for these disciplines, induction and deduction are unsuitable methods of exploration. History and theory of social representations treat a historical event and a social psychological phenomenon, respectively, as dynamic, systemic and one of its kind. Using relational epistemologies, these disciplines produce context-dependent and context-specific knowledge. Whilst similarities among historical, as well as among social psychological occurrences do exist, they do not yield themselves to inductive generalization. Studies of unique cases require different kinds of generalization; rather than generalising to populations, they pose questions about generalizability, or transferability, with respect to theories of other historical events or social psychological phenomena.     

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context. But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking. My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention. My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication. To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria. Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics.”     

Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Self-Contradiction, and the Format of Deductive Reasoning

From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics, it is argued that the sequent calculus with introduction rules on the assertion and on the assumption side represents deductive reasoning more appropriately than natural deduction. In taking consequence to be conceptually prior to truth, it can cope with non-well-founded phenomena such as contradictory reasoning. The fact that, in its typed variant, the sequent calculus has an explicit and separable substitution schema in form of the cut rule, is seen as a crucial advantage over natural deduction, where substitution is built into the general framework.     

社会认知中归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性现象

在社会知觉中,人们会较多的根据个体的行为表现推论其所具有的人格特质（归纳推论）,较少根据人格特质来推论个体的行为表现（演绎推论）,Maass将这一现象命名为归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性,并在西方文化下验证了这一现象。刻板印象在这一不对称性现象中起着调节作用,行为信息与刻板印象是否一致影响了归纳推论,对与刻板印象一致的信息更易做出归纳推论,而对演绎推论没有影响。在不同的文化背景下,归纳推论－演绎推论的不对称性表现存在差异,东方文化下的个体对两种推论过程没有表现出明显的倾向性。本文介绍了这一现象的表现,并总结了产生这一社会现象的内在原因及相关的研究进展。     

MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION AND INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENTS

We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to 'index' quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.     

'DEMONSTRATIVE' COLOUR CONCEPTS: RECOGNITION VERSUS PRESERVATION

Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as colour universals. Shade a is different from shade b iff it is possible to distinguish a from b visually. In this paper I will argue that the standard argument is based on a mistaken view of inference. We can correctly draw inferences from a demonstrative judgement about something x , even if we are not able to recognise or re-identify the previously demonstrated x during our reasoning. We are prima facie entitled to rely on our preservative memory as retaining our initial demonstrative apprehension of x . The fact that preservative memory entitles us to assume sameness of referent over time is linguistically manifest in the use of anaphoric pronouns: if we can no longer recognise and demonstrate our original demonstratum, we can use anaphoric expressions to pick it up, thereby ensuring sameness of reference. ('That is a nice bird. Now it has vanished. So there is a nice bird that has just vanished.') Since preservation of the initial episode of apprehending x grounds our reasoning from demonstrative judgements, there is no longer a reason to require demonstrative concepts to be recognitional capacities. The standard argument does not get off the ground. ¹     

概称句推理与排序

概称句推理可分为主要通过演绎方式的和主要通过归纳方式的。对于演绎方式进行的推理又可根据研究关注点的不同分为结论是事实句的推理和结论是概称旬的推理。由于概称句的作用,这三种类型的推理都是非单调推理。通过分别的考察,本文指出,这三种类型的概称句推理要想真正得以刻画,都需要引入前提集的排序的概念。进而,排序将是融合这三种类型推理的纽带。     

On classifying abduction

We can witness the recent surge of interest in classifying different patterns or types of abduction. Many philosophers have suggested their own classifications emphasizing different aspects of abduction. Such a development is remarkable, in view of the fact that until quite recently the focus of the research on Peircean abduction was to identify its logical form. Another agenda in the recent attempts to classify abduction is whether to allow non-explanatory abductions. In order to resolve these two closely related issues, I propose to examine how Peirce would have responded to them. In particular, I suggest to do this in connection with Peirce's another life-long project, the classification of sciences. In this examination, it will be shown that Peirce struggled with the problem of conflating induction and abduction. I shall discuss how this problem influenced both Peirce's views on the interrelationship between abduction, deduction, and induction on the one hand, and his many classifications of sciences on the other. Also, the implication of the fundamental change in Peirce's views of abduction, deduction, and induction to the problem of the classification of sciences will be uncovered. Finally, I shall discuss whether inference to the best explanation is abduction. Insofar as this problem has bearing on the two controversial issues in classifying abduction, my negative answer will demonstrate that classifying abduction is yet to get off the ground.     

"实践"的内在张力与话语转换契机的开启--当代马克思主义法律理论研究新探

当代马克思主义法律理论的研究面临着从批判性导向向建设性导向的话语转换的需要。而传统马克思主义法律理论对法律规范意义的一贯抛弃态度,是实现话语转换的困难所在。本文通过回溯马克思的实践思想,发现否弃法律的规范意义并非马克思思想的固有逻辑。而籍由马克思实践思想中所蕴涵着的实践的内在张力性框架,可以把法律的规范意义容纳进来,并在此基础上开启出马克思主义法律理论研究谋求自身内部话语转换的可能和契机。     

Peirce Knew Why Abduction Isn’t IBE—A Scheme and Critical Questions for Abductive Argument

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE (or understanding them as inseparable parts) unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction as a third reasoning mode (besides deduction and induction). We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories.     

What Demonstrative Induction Can Do Against the Threat of Underdetermination: Bohr,Heisenberg, and Pauli on Spectroscopic Anomalies (1921–24)

In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem ofthe underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case studyof spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theorieswas apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkalidoublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episodewithin the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the localunderdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories isresolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.