Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account

This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core—distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate—and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism.     

Kuhn's Account Of Family Resemblance: A Solution To The Problem Of Wide-Open Texture

It is a commonly raised argument against thefamily resemblance account of concepts that, on thisaccount, there is no limit to a concept's extension.An account of family resemblance which attempts toprovide a solution to this problem by including bothsimilarity among instances and dissimilarity tonon-instances has been developed by the philosopher ofscience Thomas Kuhn. Similar solutions have beenhinted at in the literature on family resemblanceconcepts, but the solution has never received adetailed investigation. I shall provide areconstruction of Kuhn's theory and argue that hissolution necessitates a developmental perspective withbuilds on both the transmission of taxonomies betweengenerations and a progressive development throughhistory.     

In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism

Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness.     

Morality: An Evolutionary Account

ABSTRACT— Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic "social instincts," or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is.     

Berkeleian Principles in Ecological Realism: An Ontological Analysis

Three experiments are reported, which examined the relation between the percep- tion of the distance reachable with a hand-held rod that can be wielded but not seen and the rod's resistance to having its rotational speed changed by application of a torque. In these experiments, subjects wielded any given rod about an axis intermediate between its endpoints. The subject's task was to adjust a visible, movable surface to coincide with where he or she could reach with the given rod if allowed to hold it at its proximal end. Two experiments considered the effects of wielding a rod at different orientations to the pull of gravity. Rods were wielded either within a plane roughly perpendicular to the ground or within a plane roughly parallel to the ground. Plane of wielding did not affect the patterning of perceived reachable distances as a function of the various conditions, which included variations in the positioning of grasp and the positioning of a mass affixed to the rods. The patterning of the moments of inertia associated with the various conditions determined the patterning of perceived reachable distances. The third experiment restricted wielding to a plane roughly parallel to the ground and varied how the rods were grasped, either overhand or underhand. The variation in grasp amounted to a variation in the neuromuscular patterning associated with the wielding of any given rod. Perceived reachable distances proved to be indifferent to the overhand versus underhand contrast.     

The Higgs Boson: An Adventure in Critical Realism

Abstract

The search for the Higgs boson has been like the search of a pirate for buried gold. Like the pirate, the physicist has a map, a conceptual map—the Standard Model (SM) made up of mathematical formulas. Without the Higgs boson in the SM, fundamental particles would be massless. Where could the mass mechanism be? The conceptual map pointed in the right direction. On July 4, 2012 the pirates found their treasure with the help of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. In this article a physicist and theologian ask: could this be critical realism (CR) at work? Could CR constitute a set of presuppositions shared by both physicists and theologians who cannot see the object of their inquiry but employ conceptual models that presuppose the reality of its referent? What role could shared CR play in the creative mutual interaction between science and theology?     

An Argument For Metaphysical Realism

This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via assertibility conditions or truth conditions – and what sorts of beings are included in the `we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame

Abstract: This paper argues that instances of what are typically called ‘epistemic irresponsibility’ are better understood as instances of moral or prudenial failure. This hypothesis covers the data and is simpler than postulating a new sui generis form of normativitiy. The irresponsibility alleged is that embeded in charges of ‘You should have known better!’ However, I argue, either there is some interest at stake in knowing or there is not. If there is not, then there is no irresponsibility. If there is, it is either the inquirer's interests—in which case it is a prudential shortcoming—or someone else's interests are at stake—in which case it is a moral shortcoming. In no case, I argue, is there any need to postulate a form of normativity in epistemology other than the traditional epistemological norm that one's attitudes should fit the evidence one has.     

Unfair Discrimination in the Selection Interview: An Attributional Account

The selection interview remains the most popular method by which organizations select employees, yet it is also widely criticized for being vulnerable to bias and unfair discrimination. This paper draws upon two specific areas of attribution research: cross-cultural studies of attributional processes and studies of intergroup attributional bias in order to discuss how attributional processes can contribute to unfair discrimination in selection interviews. It is argued that unfair discrimination can arise in two ways: first, as a consequence of ethnocentric attributional biases on the part of interviewers when explaining the behaviour of candidates associated with in-group or out-group status; second, as a result of different patterns of attributions manifest by candidates from diverse cultural groups.     

Resemblance and investment in children

According to evolutionary explanations men hardly ever are absolutely certain about their biological fatherhood therefore they must seek various sources of information to subjectively establish whether they are the genetic fathers of the children they raise. Apicella and Marlowe (2004) showed that fathers who perceived greater similarity between their children and themselves were willing to invest more resources (e.g., time, money, care) in their offspring presumably because the perceived resemblance indicated to the fathers their genetic relatedness with their children. The present study extended the design of Apicella and Marlowe's original study and included both fathers and mothers as participants. Parents were recruited by a female confederate at the airport and at the railway station in Wroclaw (Poland). Multiple regression analyses showed that perceived resemblance predicted parental investment in the child for both men and women. The fact that mothers' declarations of investment in their children also depended on the perceived resemblance factor is not consistent with evolutionary formulations delineated by Apicella and Marlowe (2004; 2007). Future studies must resolve the issue of whether the resemblance‐investment relation in fathers results from men relaying on child's resemblance to themselves as an indicator of their own biological paternity, or whether it results from the more parsimonious phenomenon that people in general are attracted more to other people who are similar to them.     

Resemblance theories of properties

The paper aims to develop a resemblance theory of properties that technically improves on past versions. The theory is based on a comparative resemblance predicate. In combination with other resources, it solves the various technical problems besetting resemblance nominalism. The paper’s second main aim is to indicate that previously proposed resemblance theories that solve the technical problems, including the comparative theory, are nominalistically unacceptable and have controversial philosophical commitments.     

An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge

The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.