Missional Discipleship

Most communities of the world, and particularly in the continent of Africa, are multi‐faith and multicultural. Christianity is a major religion in the continent that has succeeded in persuading adherents of African traditional religions to switch off from their indigenous belief and switch on to Christian belief. 1 Christianity is not the only religious faith in Africa. It has other sibling monotheistic religions and other religious expressions. Christianity, being a mission‐oriented religious faith, has a mandate to bring about transformation as reflected in its sacred text, the Bible. This article will explore how the transformation is stimulated and sustained. Meanwhile, it is necessary to state that African people were religious people even before the advent of Christianity and Islam. As a result, religion plays a critical role in their public engagements. Nevertheless, what may be investigated further would be whether religion, and Christian faith in particular, influences the people to be good citizens/disciples as they engage in the socio‐political and economic life of the society. The article seeks to use the notion of missional discipleship as a compelling stimulus for inclusive transformation in African societies.     

Religious Addiction: The Subtle Destruction of the Soul

This paper acquaints one with and examines critically the reality of religious addiction. It describes some of the defining characteristics and symptoms. Rigidity, black and white thinking, low self-esteem, magical thinking, judgmental attitudes are but a few of the symptoms of this complex phenomenon described by myself as destructive soul work. The religious addict seeks to avoid pain and overcome shame by becoming involved in a belief system which offers security through its rigidity and its absolute values. This paper is not definitive in its scope. It's purpose is to explore and examine with the goal of gaining insight and awareness into the topic of religious addiction. private practice in     

RESCUING RELIGIOUS NON‐REALISM FROM CUPITT

Don Cupitt's version of religious non‐realism based as it is on linguistic constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that there is another strand in Cupitt's thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a different version of religious non‐realism and that he failed to see this possibility because of his global non‐realism and commitment to the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Cupitt's biological naturalism should have led smoothly into evolutionary psychology, which has an account of religious belief that supports a non‐realist interpretation. Evolutionary psychology shows that religious beliefs are natural, normal and about matters of the deepest significance to humans. They gain their character from the operation of evolved structures of the mind and cannot be reduced to other sorts of belief. I argue that the form of religious non‐realism that emerges from taking biological naturalism seriously has a future because it respects the nature of religious belief and seeks to build on its capacity as a unique source of meaning in people's lives. There is also enough common ground with religious realism for there to be genuine dialogue between the two.     

Quest Religion and the Problem of Limited Compassion

Is the religious questing orientation an unprejudiced orientation that shows tolerance for people to a degree that suggests universal, rather than circumscribed, compassion? To answer this question, 90 undergraduates were given the opportunity to help either of two peers win a monetary prize. The identity of one of the peers was manipulated across two conditions: he or she was presented as holding a religious fundamentalist belief style or belief style unspecified. The purpose of the monetary prize was also varied across two conditions: an activity that either would or would not promote religious fundamentalist behavior. Participants scoring high in religious questing helped the discloser who held a religious fundamentalist belief style less than the discloser who did not, irrespective of whether they promoted religious fundamentalist behavior or not. These results suggest that the questing orientation is associated with prejudice toward the value‐violating person when the salient person value violates the open‐minded belief style of the questing orientation.     

Terror management and religion: evidence that intrinsic religiousness mitigates worldview defense following mortality salience

Terror management theory suggests that people cope with awareness of death by investing in some kind of literal or symbolic immortality. Given the centrality of death transcendence beliefs in most religions, the authors hypothesized that religious beliefs play a protective role in managing terror of death. The authors report three studies suggesting that affirming intrinsic religiousness reduces both death-thought accessibility following mortality salience and the use of terror management defenses with regard to a secular belief system. Study 1 showed that after a naturally occurring reminder of mortality, people who scored high on intrinsic religiousness did not react with worldview defense, whereas people low on intrinsic religiousness did. Study 2 specified that intrinsic religious belief mitigated worldview defense only if participants had the opportunity to affirm their religious beliefs. Study 3 illustrated that affirmation of religious belief decreased death-thought accessibility following mortality salience only for those participants who scored high on the intrinsic religiousness scale. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that only those people who are intrinsically vested in their religion derive terror management benefits from religious beliefs.     

Normativity in Comparative Religious Ethics

This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend to view the justification of moral belief to be a matter of process (that is, discursive social practice) rather than evidence‐possession, thus overlooking crucial differences between the two. They also run the risk of confusing motivating and explanatory reasons with normative reasons for moral belief and action. Consequently, their account of normativity would be insufficient for determining the rationality of moral beliefs and actions as well as for justifying moral beliefs.     

Dialogue for Accountability: Pedagogical Proficiency and Religious Scholarship

The author believes that the value of teaching in the academy will continue to be diminished as long as teaching and scholarship are viewed as separate and unequal. Thus, pedagogical proficiency is a fundamentally important component of religious and theological scholarship. Pedagogical skills allow scholars to be in dialogue with people outside of their content specialization and outside of the academy; therefore, they enable dialogue with the people of a religious tradition who are not scholarly specialists, but who are the living community of the religious tradition. The article seeks first to articulate a clear understanding of teaching competency, drawing on the concept of pedagogical proficiency. The case is then made for the role of teaching in scholarly research and, finally, its specific role in religious and theological research, showing that research accountability to a living religious tradition necessarily demands teaching competency.     

Disbelief in belief: On the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs

Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embrace a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to, like invulnerability to refutation and incoherence, are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief.”     

The psychological implications of believing that everything is one

ABSTRACT

A variety of philosophical, religious, spiritual, and scientific perspectives converge on the notion that everything that exists is part of some fundamental entity, substance, or process. People differ in the degree to which they believe that everything is one, but we know little about the psychological or social implications of holding this belief. In two studies, believing in oneness was associated with having an identity that includes distal people and the natural world, feeling connected to humanity and nature, and having values that focus on other people’s welfare. However, the belief was not associated with a lower focus on oneself or one’s concerns. Participants who believed in oneness tended to view themselves as spiritual but not necessarily religious, and reported experiences in which they directly perceived everything as one. The belief in oneness is a meaningful existential belief that has numerous implications for people’s self-views, experiences, values, relationships, and behavior.     

Islamic Mission and Inter-religious Dialogue in a Minority Context: The Jama 'at-i-Islami of India

This article seeks to examine how the Jama 'at-i-Islami Hind (JIH), the Indian unit of the Jama'at, has sought to come to terms with a situation of considerable religious pluralism, despite its firm belief in Islam as the only true and perfect religion and its commitment to a vision of Islam as an all-embracing socio-political system. In particular, it focuses on the JIH's own missionary agenda and examines how attempts have been made to mould it in order to take into account the imperative of building bridges with people of other faiths, by critically examining some of the writings of key JIH ideologues as well as recent initiatives made by the JIH to promote inter-faith dialogue in India.     

Searching for certainty: Religious beliefs and intolerance toward value-violating groups

Religiosity has been consistently linked to prejudice toward a variety of outgroups. This article proposes that this is the case only when religiosity reflects a specific aspect of seeking guidance and security in daily practices and complex sociocultural norms. Outgroups that challenge the epistemic certainty that belief in God provides are rejected in an effort to protect this certainty. The results from two studies found that uncertainty avoidance was related to belief in God and this belief mediated the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and intolerance within the context of general human rights (Study 1), and the derogation of value-violating groups (e.g., homosexuals or followers of other religions) but not of groups that pose no threat to religious values (old or poor people) (Study 2). The interpretative dimension of religiosity (i.e., the way in which people process religious content) is not connected to security seeking, as reflected in the lack of a correlation with uncertainty avoidance and with different prejudice measures. The results are discussed in relation to past research on religiosity and prejudice, and suggest that for people who avoid uncertainty, only those types of religious beliefs that provide a sense of certainty are linked with intolerance toward value-violating groups.     

Liberation as a Correlate of Religiosity: a Christian–Muslim Perspective on Fundamental Trust

This article explores the dialectical relationship between liberating trust in reality and religious faith in God, interpreted from a Christian–Muslim perspective. An underlying conviction is that liberation constitutes a necessary mutual correlate of a “true” religiosity, i.e. liberation is to be conceived as both prerequisite for and realization of a genuine religiosity, and vice versa. As opposed to a “true” religiosity, born from liberating trust and finding its fulfilment in prophetic action aimed at liberation of human realities, religious belief and practice that stem from fundamental mistrust are likely to deteriorate into either religious fundamentalism or indifferentism. The article focuses on fundamental trust in reality as capable of evoking the liberating and uniting force of religious theory and praxis. It aims to render explicit the religious and ecumenical potential (hitherto not fully realized) of the theological–ethical considerations of Hans Küng, in particular within a Christian–Muslim framework. The first part of the article, more conceptual in character, examines Küng's views on fundamental (mis)trust and its religious implications. The second part seeks to identify theological insights that shed light on the specifically Christian and specifically Muslim interpretations of liberating trust. My hope is that this study may contribute to a truly global ecumenism whose objective is to render religion an instrument of liberation, not oppression.     

“I don't reject the Catholic Church—the Catholic Church rejects me”: How Twenty- and Thirty-somethings in Poland Re-evaluate their Religion

Abstract

Given measures of religious belief and participation, young adults in Poland are becoming increasingly disengaged from the Catholic Church. Broad theories of secularisation are less useful for making sense of this trend than an analysis of the role of Catholicism in Polish society in the twentieth century, which demonstrates the ways in which forms of belief are contingent upon wider social and political transformations. This article argues that, since 1989, attempts by the Catholic Church in Poland to influence public life through conservative social and political interventions have alienated young people who are looking for religious resources with which to make sense of their lives in a rapidly changing social milieu. Alongside disengagement from conservative, propositional forms of Catholic truth and rejection of direct authority, young people still possess ‘religious capital’ and look upon religious ideas to orientate their personal lives. However, disaffection from the propositional truths offered by the Church and disengagement from rituals and practices of ‘folk Catholicism’ at the level of the family and local parish have not led to widespread expressions of atheism among young people. Instead, there is a sacralisation of everyday life and there are attempts to use ‘religious capital’ to help young people make choices for life. The reconfigured ‘religious capital’ is often expressed through diffuse Catholic symbols and sentiment as well as the periodic use of major religious festivals as a means of finding access to some form of collective religious experience. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of these changes for the future religious landscape of Polish society.     

National Context,Parental Socialization,and the Varying Relationship Between Religious Belief and Practice

Parents are crucial agents of religious socialization, but the broader social environment is also influential. A key question is whether parents are more or less influential when their religious beliefs and practices are not shared by people around them. Current thinking on the issue has largely been shaped by Kelley and De Graaf, who argued that parental religious socialization matters most in secular countries. We maintain that that conclusion is mistaken: levels of parental and national religiosity are both important, but their effects are largely independent of each other. Kelley and De Graaf's findings rely on the assumption that religious belief and practice are different expressions of the same underlying phenomenon (religiosity) and vary in the same way across time and space. These measures are not equivalent, however. In relatively religious societies, belief in God is widespread even among those who do not attend services, whereas in societies where religious involvement is low, nonchurchgoers tend to be nonbelievers.     

Reasons and religious belief

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ‘(good) reasons’ for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ‘reasonable’, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable.     

Introduction: Belief as Cultural Performance

Abstract

Although the concept of belief has become a focus of critical discussion in other disciplines, sociologists of religion have tended to assume that belief is a universal phenomenon, structured around cognitive propositions which can be made explicit in the context of research surveys and interviews The articles in this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Religion explore belief in the lives of young people in different religious, cultural, and national contexts to suggest more complex ways in which belief might be conceptualised and researched. While the ‘authenticity’ of belief is a significant value for young people across these cases, the authors show how belief can, in different contexts, be a marker of identity, an expression of socially significant relationships or an organising centre for the lives of individuals and groups. Belief can also be understood as the performance of embodied practices shaped by one’s spatial and cultural environment. In this wider context, training young people in propositional forms of belief is shown to be a particular kind of religious project, which can be unstable and have unintended consequences.     

Are religious ‘nones’ secular? The case of the nones in Australia

The number of people with no religious affiliation (religious ‘nones’) is growing in the west. However, little is known about the religiosity – or non-religiosity – of these people. Using representative survey data, this report examines the levels of religious belief and practice among Australian religious nones and compares this with those who identify with a religion. It is found that there is a deep congruence with no religious affiliation and other ways of being considered non-religious.     

Desiderata for a Viable Secular Humanism

Philip Kitcher has recently worried that the New Atheists, by mounting an attack against religion tout court, risk alienating a large swath of ‘religious’ people whose way of life is, to Kitcher's mind, innocuous. Encouraging a more moderate response, Kitcher thinks certain non‐threatening modes of religious existence should be protected. In this article, I argue that while Kitcher's attempt to provide balance to the secularism debate is a great service, he ultimately fails to distinguish innocuous modes of religious belief from more threatening modes, a failing that allows the debate to return to its previous extremes. In drawing attention to the shortcomings of Kitcher's approach, I make the humanist's argumentative burden explicit: the defender of a ‘moderate’ secular humanism must show that people who arrange their lives around belief in a transcendent being are more likely to do ethical harm than those that don't.     

Fear of Death and Supernatural Beliefs: Developing a New Supernatural Belief Scale to Test the Relationship

Fear of death features in both historical and contemporary theories of religion, but the relationship between death anxiety and religious belief is still ambiguous, largely due to the use of inappropriate or imprecise measures. The current studies therefore aimed to develop a valid, targeted measure of respondents' tendency towards religious belief, the ‘Supernatural Belief Scale’ (SBS), and to use the SBS to examine the relation between death anxiety and religious belief. Results indicate that the SBS shows high reliability and convergent validity and that its relation to death anxiety depends on participants' religious identification: ‘religious’ participants fear death less the stronger their religious beliefs, whereas ‘non‐religious’ participants are more inclined towards religious belief the more they fear death. These studies contribute a new measurement tool for research on religious belief and provide a starting point for an experimental integration of discrepant research findings. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Social Perceptions of Religiosity: Dogmatism Tarnishes the Religious Halo

Researchers have provided much evidence in support of a religious halo effect—the tendency for people to evaluate a religious target more favorably than a nonreligious counterpart. This experimental study (N = 361 U.S. adults) extended previous work beyond the dichotomy of religious versus nonreligious by varying a fictional target's degree of belief. Only religious participants exhibited a nonspecific pro-religious bias consistent with the religious halo effect, favoring religious over not religious and very over somewhat religious targets. However, indicators of dogmatic thinking (e.g., I am so sure I am right about the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me otherwise) degraded target evaluations by religious and nonreligious participants alike. Results suggest that religiosity's positive associations depend upon an assumption of strong but flexible belief and underscore the importance of studying social perceptions of religious fundamentalists.