Secularism,Fundamentalism, or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043

We provide a cohort‐component projection of the religious composition of the United States, considering differences in fertility, migration, intergenerational religious transmission, and switching among 11 ethnoreligious groups. If fertility and migration trends continue, Hispanic Catholics will experience rapid growth and expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043. Protestants are projected to decrease from 47 to 39 percent over the same period, while Catholicism emerges as the largest religion among the youngest age cohorts. Liberal Protestants decline relative to other groups due to low fertility and losses from religious switching. Immigration drives growth among Hindus and Muslims, while low fertility and a mature age structure causes Jewish decline. The low fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of immigrants provide a countervailing force to secularization, causing the nonreligious population share to peak before 2043.     

The Effects of Switching on Denominational Subcultures

For many years, sociologists have examined the role of religious collectivities in shaping individual attitudes and behaviors. This research has assumed that religious groups are the "locus of subcultural differences" in social attitudes. However, scholars have not addressed how denominational mobility or switching affects denominational subcultures. Our research uses data from the General Social Surveys to examine the consequences of switching on denominational subcultures. Our analysis investigates denominational differences in central tendencies and differences in homogeneity for "switchers" and those who remain affiliated with the same religious group over the life course. Further, comparisons of both types of religious group differences are adjusted to account for sociodemographic characteristics. Several promising directions for future research on religious variations in social values and attitudes are discussed.     

The End of Secularisation through Demography? Projections of Spanish Religiosity

This article presents the first projection, to our knowledge, of the intensity of religiosity in a population, which has a strong bearing on the critical question of the religious future of Europe. Spain has, in recent decades, simultaneously experienced rapid religious decline and marked demographic change through high immigration and declining fertility. To investigate future trends, we carry out population projections by religion and religiosity to the year 2050. We find that both fertility and immigration increase the share of the highly religious, as the more religious tend to have more children and immigrants tend to be more religious than non-immigrants. The non-religious population grows because people switch from religion to no-religion and because they are younger. Our findings suggest that in the longer term (2050), there may be growth in the no-religion population, a decline in the share of highly religious Christians, and moderate development of low religious Christians. The Muslim population would substantially increase, unless there is an end to migration and fertility differentials.     

African–American Religious Affiliation in the Late 20th Century: Cohort Variations and Patterns of Switching, 1973–1998

This article investigates shifts in religious affiliation among African Americans over the last three decades and across cohorts. I examine data from the 1973–1998 General Social Surveys to analyze denominational growth and decline, and patterns of religious switching. I compare variations in religious loyalty/switching and patterns of mobility across eight salient religious groupings; cohort variations are tested across pre– and post–civil rights cohorts. I examine a range of log–linear and log–multiplicative models to summarize patterns of switching and to see whether patterns vary across cohorts. I find that the "black mainline" Methodist and Baptist denominations lose members from switching and have lower market share because of the ascendance of conservative sects. Further, nonaffiliation is growing, particularly in the post–civil rights cohort. I found no variations in patterns of mobility over time or across cohorts—only in the rates of switching that drive the levels of mobility.     

The Ismaili sect in London: Religious institutions and social change

The Ismailis in London are a community attempting to adapt the stock of Ismaili theoretical concepts to the explanation and control of events in a changed and changing social situation. This article is concerned with assessing the role of Ismaili religious institutions in this process of adaptation. It will be argued that because the Ismaili belief system emphasizes the irrelevant and transitory nature of Ismaili religious institutions, the true role, paradoxically, of these religious institutions is preserved, and as a consequence they remain relevant to Ismailis.     

The Ismaili sect in London: Religious institutions and social change

The Ismailis in London are a community attempting to adapt the stock of Ismaili theoretical concepts to the explanation and control of events in a changed and changing social situation. This article is concerned with assessing the role of Ismaili religious institutions in this process of adaptation. It will be argued that because the Ismaili belief system emphasizes the irrelevant and transitory nature of Ismaili religious institutions, the true role, paradoxically, of these religious institutions is preserved, and as a consequence they remain relevant to Ismailis.     

Religious Decline in Scotland: New Evidence on Timing and Spatial Patterns

The 2001 population census in Scotland—the first to include questions on religion—provides important evidence on religious mobility and the effect of local context on religious disaffection. The amount of denominational switching is small both in absolute terms and relative to the incidence of complete defection. The trend toward disaffiliation dates from before World War II, but religious decline has been especially steep since the 1960s. While there are important geographical variations in religious adherence, the absolute size of the swing to no religion has been quite uniform across the country. These approximately constant reductions in affiliation imply, somewhat counterintuitively, the existence of neighborhood differences, with denominational identification being most likely to wane in areas where the denomination is weak. No association was found between the proportion of the local population affiliated with a religious group and the level of participation in that denomination.     

FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS AMONG SERBIAN JEWS

Recent studies tend to validate the important role played by culture and especially religion in fertility behaviours. This paper investigates a link between religiosity and fertility among Serbian Jewish populations, namely the Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews. It is found that among Serbian Jews, in spite of general low levels of fertility, religiousness (measured by time devoted to religious activities) and ethnic origin contribute to the fertility differentials. This paper sets out to explore the relationship between religiosity and fertility among Jews in Serbia and whether religiosity has contributed to the fertility differential between the main branches of the Serbian Jewry, namely the Sephardim and Ashkenazim.     

Dynamics of Religious Group Growth and Survival

We model and analyze the dynamics of religious group membership and size. A group is distinguished by its strictness, which determines how much time group members are expected to spend contributing to the group. Individuals differ in their rate of return for time spent outside of their religious group. We construct a utility function that individuals attempt to maximize, then find a Nash equilibrium for religious group participation with a heterogeneous population. We then model dynamics of group size by including birth, death, and switching of individuals between groups. Group switching depends on the strictness preferences of individuals and their probability of encountering members of other groups. We show that in the case of only two groups—one with finite strictness and the other with zero—there is a parameter combination that determines whether the nonzero strictness group can survive over time, which is more difficult at higher strictness levels. We also show that a high birth rate can allow even the strictest groups to survive. Finally, we consider cases of several groups, gaining insight into strategic choices of strictness values and displaying the rich behavior of the model.     

Religion,religiosity, and South Korean consumer switching behaviors

• This study investigated the relationship between religious affiliation and level of religiosity and consumer product‐ and store‐switching behavior among South Korean consumers. Comparisons in switching behavior are reported for three different denominational groups prevalent in South Korea (Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism), non‐religious affiliated respondents, and among persons exhibiting different levels of religiosity. Religious affiliation, including non‐affiliation, was not found to be significantly related to switching behavior. However, consumers reporting high levels of religiosity were found to be significantly less likely to engage in product purchase‐ and store‐switching behaviors than those reporting lower levels of religiosity. Consumers reporting high levels of religiosity are also less likely to engage in product purchase switching behavior than non‐religious affiliated consumers (i.e., no religiosity consumers). This pattern held across denominations. Statistically significant differences in switching behavior were not obtained between consumers reporting low levels of religiosity and those respondents who expressed no religious affiliation.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Family Physician in an Ultraorthodox Jewish Village

The ultraorthodox Jewish community of Kfar Habbad Village is a special minority community in the Israeli context, one with particular needs because of its special religious and social commitments. This paper gives a personal account of a family physician's work in treating this population. It emphasizes the unique role of the doctor in her ongoing interaction with the rabbis of the Village and the doctor's use of community resources in order to meet the special needs of the group.     

Fitting in with the flock: Social attractiveness as a mechanism for well‐being in religious groups

For most people, religion is practiced and experienced within a social group of believers who interact regularly. Yet the role of social psychological intergroup processes has largely been ignored with respect to religious phenomena. The present study explores social attraction as a mechanism by which religious groups affect the psychological well‐being of their members. Data were taken from a large survey of the members of 411 religious congregations in the United States. Linear mixed modeling analyses were conducted predicting two aspects of well‐being in the religious context from a range of variables at the levels of the individual, of the group, and of individual–group fit. Fit measures between individual characteristics and norms within congregations were found to be significant predictors of well‐being for a variety of measures across domains of demographics, religious beliefs, religious behavior, and group integration. These results support the view that the intragroup process of social attraction is a mechanism by which people obtain some benefits from belonging to religious groups. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of International Migration on the Size and Composition of Religious Groups in Austria

Scientific knowledge on a population’s religious composition is essential to understand the challenges faced by societies today. It arises in opposition to speculations about the actual size of religious groups that have been increasingly present in the public discourse in Europe for many years. This is particularly the case in Austria where the flows of refugees and migrants coming from the Middle East and Afghanistan have intensified since 2011 and culminated in 2015. These sparked a debate on the actual size of the Muslim population in Austria. This study fills the gap by presenting estimates of the religious composition for 2016 and projections until 2046 based on several scenarios related to the three major forces affecting the religious composition: migration (including asylum seekers), differential fertility and secularisation. The projections demonstrate that religious diversity is bound to increase, mostly through immigration and fertility. We further focus on the role and implications of international migration on the age and sex composition within the six religious groups: Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims, other religions and unaffiliated. We find that the volume and composition of international migrants can maintain youthful age compositions in minority religions—Muslims and Orthodox. Sustained immigration leads to slower ageing but does not stop or reverse the process. The disparity between older majority and younger minority religious groups will further increase the cultural generation gap.     

Parental Divorce,Parental Religious Characteristics,and Religious Outcomes in Adulthood

Parental divorce has been linked to religious outcomes in adulthood. Previous research, however, has not adequately accounted for parental religious characteristics, which may render the association spurious and/or moderate the relationship. Many studies also do not consider subsequent family context, namely, whether one's custodial parent remarries. Using pooled data from three waves of the General Social Survey, we examine the nature of the relationships among parental divorce, subsequent family structure, and religiosity in adulthood. Growing up in a single‐parent family—but not a stepparent family—is positively associated with religious disaffiliation and religious switching and negatively associated with regular religious service attendance. Accounting for parental religious characteristics, however, explains sizable proportions of these relationships. In fact, after accounting for parental religious affiliation and service attendance, growing up with a single parent does not have a significant effect on religious service attendance. Parental religiosity also moderates the relationship between growing up with a single parent and religious service attendance: being raised in a single‐parent home does have a negative effect on religious service attendance among adults who had two religiously involved parents. There is modest evidence of this moderating relationship for other religious outcomes. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Towards an anthropology of doubt: the case of religious reproduction in Orthodox Judaism

As Israel’s Orthodox Jews struggle to live up to high fertility norms rooted in religious and Zionist ideals, an obscured model of stratified critique has emerged. Based on an ethnography of Israel’s reproductive landscape, I demonstrate how critique of high fertility standards is based on particular social and cultural capital only available to the religious elite. While well-established, knowledgeable and assertive religious members find private ways to bypass the almost unachievable levels of fertility, a veil of secrecy leaves less privileged groups, particularly ba`aley teshuva (returnees) to carry most of the fertility load. Whereas scholars of religious transformation have demonstrated how religious elites act as actors and leaders of resistance, my findings illustrate an opposite pattern. Instead of disseminating this critique publicly, religious elites engage in private strategies of secrecy and creative performances of failure that enable these individuals to diverge from norms without publicly contesting them. I argue that not only is stratified critique based on social and cultural capital, it also reproduces social inequalities. By focusing on doubt, struggles, and failures engendered in “everyday Judaism,” these findings require us to refocus our inquiry on power structures within different sub-groups of Israel’s Orthodox Jews. Further, this unique case study highlights how stratified reproduction takes new shape as social and religious convictions gain and lose their force at a particular moment in history.     

Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20th-Century Britain

This article analyzes the best available evidence from the major British social surveys to describe and explain the continuous decline of religion throughout the 20th century. This decline is overwhelmingly generational in nature rather than a product of particular periods such as World War II or the 1960s. Measures of religious affiliation, regular attendance at worship, and religious belief show nearly identical rates of intergenerational decline. Decline has not been offset by any positive age effects in an aging society: Britons do not get more religious as they get older. The intergenerational decline follows clear patterns of transmission of parental religious characteristics to children. Two potential modulators of decline are identified and investigated: immigration of people who are more religious than the existing population and higher fertility rates among the religiously active population. Of these only the former appears of importance. The nonwhite ethnic minority immigrant population is far more religious than the white population; however, the rates of intergenerational decline (between immigrant parents and native-born children) are almost as high as for the white population, leading to an intergenerational convergence of levels of religiosity. Although ethnic minority populations tend to be more religious and have higher fertility rates, there is no differential fertility by religiosity among the population as a whole.     

Alternative Schooling Strategies and the Religious Lives of American Adolescents

I analyze the effects of Catholic schooling, Protestant schooling, and homeschooling on adolescents' religious lives and test three mechanisms through which these schooling strategies might influence religiosity: friendship networks, network closure, and adult mentors. Data from Wave 1 of the National Survey of Youth and Religion suggest that Catholic schoolers attend religious services more frequently and value their faith more highly than public schoolers, but attend religious education classes and youth group less often. Protestant schoolers' involvement in their local congregation is similar to public schoolers', but their faith plays a more salient role in their life and they are more active in private religious activities. Homeschoolers do not differ significantly from public schoolers on any outcome considered. Moreover, friendship networks, network closure, and adult mentors play a very limited role in mediating the relationships between schooling strategies and adolescent religiosity. Interpretations of these findings are presented and discussed.     

The Influence of Religion and Ethnicity on Family Planning Approval: A Case for Women in Rural Western Kenya

The role of sociocultural factors such as religion and ethnicity in aiding or hampering family planning (FP) uptake in rural Western Kenya, a region with persistently high fertility rates, is not well established. We explored whether attitudes towards FP can be attributed to religious affiliation and/or ethnicity among women in the region. Findings show that religion and ethnicity have no impact; the most significant factors are level of education and knowledge about the benefits of FP for the mother. FP interventions ought to include strategies aimed at enhancing women’s knowledge about the positive impacts of family planning.     

Bilingual Language Mixing: Why Do Bilinguals Code-Switch?

Bilingual speakers often code-switch from one language to another, especially when both languages are used in the environment. This article explores the potential theoretical explanations for this language behavior, the costs and benefits associated with language switching, and the role of language dominance in the direction of the switch. In short, code switching follows functional and grammatical principles and is a complex, rule-governed phenomenon. Although significant progress has been made in understanding the psycholinguistics of code switching, research is needed to examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying the bilingual's ability to integrate and separate two languages during the communicative process.     

Attendance Matters: Religion and Ethical Affirmation of Gay and Lesbian Sexuality

This paper uses data from the 1974–2010 General Social Surveys to analyze the relationship between religion and ethical affirmation of gay and lesbian sexuality. Religion has become increasingly important in understanding the greater variation in ethical affirmation of same-sex sexuality over this time period. Yet in contrast to previous studies which have emphasized denominational affiliation, orthodoxy of religious belief, or alignment along a left–right political or theological spectrum as the key predictors, this study emphasizes the role of social isolation. With the sole exception of recent Mainline Protestants, religious service attendance is found to be a strong predictor of levels of affirmation regardless of denominational affiliation or level of conservatism, with liberal Christians who attend weekly religious services looking very similar to conservative Evangelicals who attend fewer services. A potential argument explaining this finding is put forth: Weekly attenders of religious services are more likely to be isolated into a narrower institutional field while more occasional attenders may hold identical theological and political beliefs but are more likely to have a breadth of perspective that comes from multiple institutional connections. As such, the barriers to greater affirmation of gay and lesbian sexuality may be less about religion than about social isolation.