Making sense of self-conscious emotion: linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment and shame are associated with 2 aspects of theory of mind (ToM): (a) the ability to understand that behavior has social consequences in the eyes of others and (b) an understanding of social norms violations. The present study aimed to link ToM with the recognition of self-conscious emotion. Children with and without autism identified facial expressions conscious of self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions from photographs. ToM was also measured. Children with autism performed more poorly than comparison children at identifying self-conscious emotions, though they did not differ in the recognition of non-self-conscious emotions. When ToM ability was statistically controlled, group differences in the recognition of self-conscious emotion disappeared. Discussion focused on the links between ToM and self-conscious emotion.     

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.     

Conscious behavior explained.

Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness.     

Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.     

Loss of Cells—Loss of Self: Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration and Human Emotion

ABSTRACT— Frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) is a devastating disease that profoundly changes emotion, self, and personality while initially sparing many aspects of cognitive functioning. This article reviews research that applies methods from basic affective science to obtain a more precise view of FTLD's impact on emotional functioning. This research indicates that simple forms of emotional reactivity are relatively preserved in the early stages of the disease. In contrast, more complex emotional processes, such as those involved with self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment), emotion regulation, and recognizing emotions in others, are severely impaired. FTLD provides rich opportunities for increasing our understanding of the nature of emotion and of the emotional and social brain.     

Critical hermeneutics and higher education: a perspective on texts,meaning and institutional culture

This paper is a discussion of critical hermeneutics as a research methodology employed in a conceptual analytic study of the concept ‘institutional culture’ within the context of higher education. The research was undertaken to develop an understanding of the concept and to explore its construction in university policy documents. The aim of this paper is to motivate the choice of critical hermeneutics as a research methodology for the mentioned study. I explore both aspects of critical hermeneutics, namely hermeneutics and critical theory. The interpretive nature of hermeneutics enabled me to expose the hidden meanings of institutional culture, while its context-specific nature was beneficial for pointing out the nature of institutional culture in the university setting. Critical theory, on the other hand, was appropriate because it is a theory that is self-conscious about historicity and the role of the social environment. In combination, the merits of these two aspects of critical hermeneutics facilitated the understanding of the university setting as a social reality. Employing critical hermeneutics as a research methodology furthermore assisted in analysing the construction of institutional culture within university policy documents, taking into account the important role of history in interpretation. In essence, critical hermeneutics facilitated my understanding of the difficult-to-explain concept ‘institutional culture’ in the higher education setting.     

The Compatibility Between Sociological and Cognitive Neuroscientific Ideas on Consciousness: Is a Neurosociology of Consciousness Possible?

This article considers the possibility of integrating sociological and cognitive neuroscience ideas on consciousness and developing a new research area: neurosociology of consciousnesses. Research was conducted taking into account the limited knowledge on consciousness produced in these disciplines and the necessity of finding ways to study the social roles concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. Applying several ideas on consciousness from these disciplines (intersubjectivity, close connection with collective forms representations, deriving awareness from the brain’s processes, and so on), I show that it is difficult to reconcile the differences in the treatment of consciousness through the simple combination of the different ideas. The integration should be pursued in light of the neuroscientific findings concerning consciousness in different social contexts (role behavior, social interactions, and so on). In integrating the concepts, I predicted the role of time delay in conscious awareness in decision making, synchronization of neural oscillations under conscious perception, and the activations of certain brain zones in correspondence to different conscious cognitive processes for understanding in face-to-face situations. The study reveals that the optimal path for neurosociological research on consciousness is in its primary development without a rigid binding to either sociology or neuroscience.     

简论里贝特的意识理论

里贝特是人类意识和自由意志的实验研究领域的一个卓越的、先驱性的神经科学家。里贝特的意识研究工作涉及如下四个方面：（1）关于意识研究的认识论原则;（2）对意识现象本性的界定;（3）意识机制的时控理论;（4）对自由意志的阐释和有意识的心智场理论。里贝特的意识研究独树一帜,其时控理论具有坚实可信的实验证据,它从时间维度揭示了有意识的主观体验以及无意识的心智功能与神经活动之间的时间机制。     

The self and depression: Four psychological theories and their potential neural correlates

We review theory and research pertaining to psychodynamic, social, humanistic, and ethological models of the self and depression and examine research into the neurobiological bases of the self and depression. We provide a narrative review of classic and recent empirical evidence pertaining to these four models of the relation of the self to depression as well as exemplar relevant neurobiological research. Evidence stemming from each of the four theories reviewed here shows a robust relationship between deficits in the sense of self and depressive symptoms, as well as increases in depressive symptoms over time. A smaller body of literature has linked one’s sense of self to onsets of depressive episodes. A growing body of literature has linked self-relevant variables to functioning in various prefrontal and cortical midline brain regions as well as emotion and reward processing brain regions which have in turn been linked to depression. Evidence has therefore converged across all four theories and confirmed that a deficit in one’s sense of self confers risk for depression and that there is substantial overlap in the brain areas associated with one’s sense of self and depression.     

The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis

While the philosophical puzzles about “life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the “mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple “explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the “explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the “experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain.     

The Role of Basic, Self-Conscious and Self-Conscious Evaluative Emotions in Children’s Memory and Understanding of Emotion

In past research, emotion has been classified as basic, self-conscious or self-conscious evaluative, with each type of emotion being progressively more difficult for children to understand (Lewis, M. (2000a). In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 265–280), New York, NY: The Guilford Press). Although researchers have examined children’s understanding of individual emotions (e.g., guilt), researchers have not assessed children’s understanding and memory for emotions based on this classification. In the present research, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children’s memory and understanding of basic, self-conscious and self-conscious evaluative emotions were examined. Although a memory advantage was found for emotions, this effect was less so for the younger children and less so for non-basic emotions. In fact, 6-year-old children and, to a lesser extent 8-year-old children, were more likely than older children to recall self-conscious and self-conscious evaluative emotions with basic emotion labels, and were more likely to explain them using basic emotion labels. Overall, negative emotions (e.g., mad, guilt) were better recalled than positive emotions (e.g., happy, pride), regardless of type of emotion. Gender differences were found as girls were more likely to remember emotion than boys, especially when the emotion action was specifically labeled and a female character experienced it. Proportions of this research were presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development (2005), Atlanta, Georgia and the meeting of the Cognitive Development Society (2005), San Diego, CA.     

Defensive Sexualization: A Neurobiologically Informed Explanatory Model

Sexualization is a defense mechanism frequently referred to in clinical psychoanalytic literature. Despite this, there is no research linking the theoretical nature of this observed phenomenon to social or neurobiological theory. This discussion paper proposes an interaction between social learning and neural maturation in the development of sexualized tendencies. When anxiety within peer interactions is alleviated repeatedly through sexualized behavior, learned associations develop. This explanation allows understanding and empathy for individuals demonstrating a broad spectrum of sexualized responses since such learning is argued to be functional within their historic social climate.     

Single-case experimental designs for behavioral neuroscience

Single-case experimental designs (SCEDs) are commonly used in behavior analytic research but rarely used in behavioral neuroscience research. The recent development of technologies that allow control of the timing of neurobiological events such as gene expression and neuronal firing enable the fruitful application of SCEDs for the study of brain–behavior relations. There are at least 3 benefits expected from applying SCEDs to study how neurobiological events affect behavior. First, SCEDs entail direct within- and across-subject assessments of reliability, likely increasing the probability of replication across studies and encouraging a search for the causes of replication failure when they occur. Second, SCEDs focus on behavior in individual organisms producing a body of knowledge that applies to individuals rather than population parameters. Finally, SCEDs require fewer animals, decreasing costs and effort and addressing the ethical obligation to reduce the number of animals used for research. Examples are provided using hypothetical data generated based on published research. Collaborations between behavior analysts and behavioral neuroscientists will bring the world within the skin under direct experimental control and broaden our understanding of the determinants of behavior.     

Neuroscience and the Embodiment of Psychoanalysis—With an Appreciation of Damasio’s Contribution

ABSTRACT

This article contends that psychoanalysis benefits from a neurobiological perspective. It is suggested that Antonio Damasio’s view on the neurobiology of mind and self is particularly useful in this regard. The article presents a review and discussion of Damasio’s basic assumptions on body, emotion, feeling, unconscious and conscious mind, and embodied self. It explains how Freud’s hypotheses that ego is first and foremost a bodily ego is underpinned by contemporary neurobiological research and theory. A clinical illustration highlights that changes in sense of self encompasses changes throughout the whole body, as felt from the inside and as observed from the outside.     

Emerging Insights Into the Nature and Function of Pride

ABSTRACT— Pride, a "self-conscious" emotion involving complex self-evaluative processes, is a fundamental human emotion. Recent research provides new insights into its nature and function. Like the "basic" emotions, pride is associated with a distinct, universally recognized, nonverbal expression, which is spontaneously displayed during pride experiences. Yet, pride differs from the basic emotions in its dependency on self-evaluations and in its complex structure, which is comprised of two theoretically and conceptually distinct facets that have divergent personality correlates and cognitive antecedents. In this article, we summarize findings from the growing body of research on pride and highlight the implications of this research for a broader understanding of emotions and social behavior.     

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

The paper proposes a process-based model for an ontology that encompasses the emergence of process systems generated by increasingly complex levels of organization. Starting with a division of processes into those that are persistent and those that are fleeting, the model builds through a series of exclusive and exhaustive disjunctions. The crucial distinction is between those persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from-equilibrium. The latter are necessarily open; they can persist only by interaction with their environments. Further distinctions, developed by means of the notions of self-maintenance and error detection, lead to the identification of complex biological organisms that are flexible learners, some of which are self-conscious and form themselves into social institutions. This model provides a non-reductive model for understanding human beings as both embodied and yet emergent. In particular, it provides a way of characterizing action as ‘metaphysically deep’, not an ontological embarrassment within an otherwise physicalist world.     

A few thoughts about the mind,the brain,and a child with early deprivation

Infant brain research is having an increasing impact on child psychotherapy and our understanding of the neurobiological effects of trauma and neglect. This paper outlines the 'experience-dependent' nature of brain development in infancy and the concept of critical periods in such development. The effects of deprivation on child development are illustrated and case material from a child who was institutionalized during his second year is used as a basis for posing questions about the nature of the mind and the brain. In spite of his deprivation, he was able to communicate imaginatively. Schore's proposal for the use of early interventions is put forward to counter discouragement that can be engendered by work with severely deprived children.     

Cybersemiotics and the Question of Semiotic and Informational Thresholds

The present article discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a transdisciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analyzed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between either a cybernetic-informational or a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics and information science is suggested in a five-leveled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information and signal, 4) a level of sign games in living systems, and 5) a level of conscious language games in self-conscious social humans.     

The family and the bonds of recognition

I draw upon the resources of the philosophy of recognition, as well as recent research associated with existentialist, psychoanalytic and family-therapy forms of psychotherapy, to develop an account of the family as a distinctive and relatively autonomous system of affective recognition. Those forms of recognition that are most essential in the broader social and political spheres—for instance, those found in law and in contractual relations—generally concern our recognition of each other as discrete, self-conscious, individual agents who are at bottom independent of each other. In contrast, it is argued that familial recognition is founded upon a rather different conception of selfhood, one that emphasizes our inherent porosity with respect to other selves, and so on our incapacity to set ourselves apart from others. Moreover, familial recognition is enacted primarily at the affective, preconscious level, such that members find themselves implicated in each other's self-identities prior to their being in a position to fully appreciate, in a more self-conscious and independent manner, the nature and extent of their involvement. I follow Hegel in arguing that, for these reasons, familial recognition is not only autonomous with respect to certain of the forms of recognition governing the wider social world, but that it is in certain respects at odds with them.