The Television Situation Comedy and Children's Prosocial Behavior

The moral lessons of television situation comedies were explored as possible contributors to children's prosocial development. In order to determine if children comprehend the moral lessons of adult sitcoms, children in small groups watched sitcoms and then were individually interviewed to determine if they comprehended the moral lesson. An over-whelming majority of 1st, 3rd, and 5th graders understood moral lessons contained in an episode of The Cosby Show. Similarly, one third of the 1st graders and half of the 3rd graders were able to identify an overarching moral lesson in an episode of Full House. Finally, a correlational analysis was undertaken between the frequency with which the children viewed prosocial sitcoms and the frequency of their prosocial behavior. As anticipated, viewing emerged as a predictor variable, particularly for those subjects who evidenced understanding of the moral lessons of sitcoms.     

维特根斯坦和传统

维特根斯坦在奥地利-维也纳传统中长大,并坚定地植根于这一传统之中。任何理解他的人格的尝试都必须设法把他置于这一背景中加以考察。但维特根斯坦作为哲学家的工作,几乎完全是在他并不分享其文化传统、并且对他本人是非常不相宜的环境中完成的。     

Wittgenstein and criteria

An essay to develop some of Wittgenstein's remarks about the notion of ‘criteria’ and to give the concept clarity even at the expense of some features Wittgenstein claimed for it. This effort was made because of the important role ‘criteria’ plays in Wittgenstein's discussions of feelings and mental states, and it is hoped that a defense of ‘criteria’ will make those discussions more coherent. An attempt is made to relate this notion of ‘criteria’ to the definition and expression of mental states, following some of Wittgenstein's suggestions, and to rebut skepticism about other minds.     

Wittgenstein and Ebersole

Frank B. Ebersole died recently. Here I remind philosophers of the thinking of this reclusive philosopher who brought out the value of Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophers should “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” I illustrate Ebersole's singular thinking by focusing on his philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor.     

维特根斯坦与宗教

维特根斯坦是一个伟大的分析哲学家,但是一生与宗教有非常密切的联系。本文分为两部分。第一部分从维特根斯坦的家庭背景、成长经历、性格特征、所受影响等方面分析了维特根斯坦与宗教(基督教)的联系;第二部分从“关于宗教的本质是否可以言说”、“为什么会有宗教?”“宗教与激情”、“上帝是谁?”“信仰上帝是为了给人生寻找意义”等五个方面分析和评论了维特根斯坦的宗教观点。     

Wittgenstein and Friendship

In his article “It's a Wonderful Life,” Ronald Hall connects Wittgenstein's last words with Frank Capra's 1946 film. His analysis focuses on the concept of wonder, but he misses one of the most important aspects of both the film and Wittgenstein's last words: the significance of friendship. This is philosophically (and biographically) important because it raises questions about aspect‐seeing, friendship and everyday life. Wittgenstein's final words provide a striking example of the philosophical complexity of his life and work.     

Wittgenstein and logic

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental.     

Wittgenstein and Brouwer

In this paper, I present a summary of the philosophical relationship betweenWittgenstein and Brouwer, taking as my point of departure Brouwer's lecture onMarch 10, 1928 in Vienna. I argue that Wittgenstein having at that stage not doneserious philosophical work for years, if one is to understand the impact of thatlecture on him, it is better to compare its content with the remarks on logics andmathematics in the Tractactus. I thus show that Wittgenstein's position, in theTractactus, was already quite close to Brouwer's and that the points of divergence are the basis to Wittgenstein's later criticisms of intuitionism. Among the topics of comparison are the role of intuition in mathematics, rule following, choice sequences, the Law of Excluded Middle, and the primacy of arithmetic over logic.     

Improvisation and Stand-Up Comedy

In this article, I investigate the ways in which improvisation occurs and works in stand-up comedy. I introduce a continuum model of composing and improvising and for understanding and classifying generative and nongenerative performances. The model reflects the fact that cognitive neuroscience research on creativity and improvisation provides evidence for the claim that composing and improvising are two species of the same genus (selective creation), and the differences between generative and nongenerative performance are not categorical but vague, admitting of a continuum model. The model is applied to standard cases of stand-up comedy to illuminate the specific ways in which improvisation and composition are present in stand-up comedy, and the ways in which stand-up comedy performances are mixtures of generative and nongenerative elements. In addition, I address some of the reasons why such understanding is important and useful.     

Wittgenstein and logical necessity

An attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic is not the kind of conventionalism which is often ascribed to him. On the contrary, Wittgenstein gives expression to a “mixed” theory which is not only interesting but tends to resolve the perplexities usually associated with the question of the a priori character of logical truth. I try to show that Wittgenstein is better understood not as denying that there are such things as “logical rules” nor as denying that the results of applying such rules are “logically necessary,” but as trying to understand what it is to appeal to a logical rule and what it means to say that the results of applying such a rule are “necessary.” He is not so much overthrowing standard accounts of logical necessity as discovering the limits of the concept.     

Wittgenstein and not-just-in-the-head cognition

Wittgenstein's later writings criticize the idea that the mind is an intrinsically representational device. More or less clearly apprehending certain limitations of identifying all aspects of cognition with ‘internal representation’, certain theorists in a variety of disciplines have mostly independently reached similar conclusions, which are reflected in notions like ‘distributed,’ ‘extended,’ and ‘situated’ cognition. We explore the variety of purposes for which these terms have been introduced into psychological theorizing and relate these to Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology.