Measurement Theoretic Semantics And The Semantics Of Necessity

In the first two sections I present and motivate a formal semantics program that is modeled after the application of numbers in measurement (e.g., of length). Then, in the main part of the paper, I use the suggested framework to give an account of the semantics of necessity and possibility: (i) I show thatthe measurement theoretic framework is consistent with a robust (non-Quinean) view of modal logic, (ii) I give an account of the semantics of the modal notions within this framework, and (iii) I defend the suggested account against various objections.     

The Semantics of Anchoring

Previous research has demonstrated that judgmental anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate to a previously considered standard—are semantic in nature. They result because the semantic knowledge about the target object that is activated during the comparison with the anchor influences the absolute judgment. In addition to this semantic influence, the numeric anchor value itself may also yield an effect under specific conditions. The present research was designed to examine the relative strength of both mechanisms and explore their boundary conditions. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that semantic anchoring effects are more potent than purely numeric effects. Study 3 further suggests that purely numeric effects only operate if accessible semantic knowledge is inapplicable to the critical judgment so that semantic influences are incapacitated. The implications of these findings are discussed from the perspective of an integrative model which differentiates between two stages of anchoring. Whereas purely numeric influences appear to be limited to the stage of anchor selection, the actual comparison with the target involves more elaborate semantic processes.     

The Semantics of Fictional Names

Abstract: In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons across fictions. We then defend our theory against objections and compare our view to the views of Currie, Walton, and others.     

The Semantics of Rigid Designation

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators.     

The Semantics of Kind Terms

Philosophical Studies -     

The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics

Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with a hidden contextual parameter. But such a ternary construal raises problems of its own.     

Kripke Bundle Semantics and C-set Semantics

Kripke bundle [3] and C-set semantics [1] [2] are known as semantics which generalize standard Kripke semantics. In [3] and in [1], [2] it is shown that Kripke bundle and C-set semantics are stronger than standard Kripke semantics. Also it is true that C-set semantics for superintuitionistic logics is stronger than Kripke bundle semantics [5].In this paper, we show that Q-S4.1 is not Kripke bundle complete via C-set models. As a corollary we can give a simple proof showing that C-set semantics for modal logics are stronger than Kripke bundle semantics.     

The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics

This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913–1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945–1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947–1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953–1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955–1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958–1959; Drake, 1959–1961; Kripke, 1958–1965.     

Wittgensteinian Semantics

Wittgenstein emphasizes two points concerning his notion of family resemblance. One is that the use of a family resemblance expression resists characterization by certain kinds of rules; the other is that due to the prevalence of family resemblance in the philosophical lexicon, philosophical inquiry must in many cases proceed differently from how it traditionally has. This paper develops an interpretation of family resemblance that seeks to do justice to these claims. I argue that what is characteristic about family resemblance expressions is not that they exhibit a basic semantic feature unique to themselves, but that they combine a number of semantic properties that happen not to be coinstantiated elsewhere. These features include (1) content variability (also a property of ambiguous expressions, polysemes, and standard indexicals), (2) a feature I call "topicality" (which is also a characteristic of polysemes), and (3) "semantic openness" (a feature of many ordinary indexicals). The notions of topicality and semantic openness are explained, and certain terms of natural language are shown to be family resemblance expressions. I conclude by indicating some of the potential philosophical ramifications of these results.     

Anti-Realist Semantics

I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying to specify suitableintuitionistic notions of semantic value,truth-conditions, and validity, taking into accountthe so-called ``defeasibility of evidence' forassertions in empirical discourses.     

The psychological physician: Semantics and survival

The calls for change in three areas of professional psychology are briefly reviewed, along with the reasons why such changes would be in the best interest of not only psychology but also the consumers of mental health services. Psychology's survival is linked to the implementation of these changes. It is argued that psychology must (1) standardize its education, training, and doctoral degree; (2) expand its scope of practice; and (3) become, legally and otherwise, psychological physicians, or risk being rolled-over by history. The importance of terminology and semantics is also discussed. Conclusions are drawn and discussed.The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not in any way represent the opinions of the Department of Defense or the United States Air Force.     

The Troublesome Semantics of Conflict of Interest

The sensible response to conflicts of interest is impaired by misconceptions and sloppy usage of terminology. Apparent and potential are widely misused modifiers for conflicts. Excessive legislative focus on financial interests limits understanding of the scope and significance of researchers' conflicts of interest. There is no moral or ethical failing in having a conflict of interest; the problem occurs when conflicts are not disclosed appropriately and when conflicts are allowed to bias research, teaching, or practice. Avoidance and prevention should be applied to bias, not conflicts.