The Correlational Structure of Natural Images and the Calibration of Spatial Representations

Physiologists have long proposed that correlated input activity is important in normal sensory development. Here it is postulated that the visual system is sensitive to the correlation in image intensity across the visual field, and that these correlations are used to help calibrate spatial representations. Since measurements made near to each other in the visual field are more correlated than measurements made at a distance, the degree of correlation can be used as an estimate of the distance between two measurements and can therefore be used to calibrate a roughly organized spatial representation. We therefore explored the hypothesis that low level spatial representations are calibrated using a signal based on image intensity correlation. If the visual system uses input statistics to calibrate its spatial representation, then any distortions and anisotropies in these input statistics should be mirrored by distortions in the representation of space. To test the psychological implications of this hypothesis, a collection of 81 images of open and urban landscapes were used to estimate the degree of correlation between image intensity measurement pairs as a function of both distance and orientation. Doing this we show that a system that used the statistics measured to calibrate its representation would show: (1) a horizontal-vertical illusion;(2) the magnitude of this illusion would depend on the amount of open and urban landscapes in the environment;(3) there would be a nontrivial relationship between line orientation and judged length. Analogues of all these distortions and regularities can be found in the psychophysical literature on distance estimation. This gives strength to the proposal that spatial representations are calibrated using input statistics.     

Visualized Collective Memories: Social Representations of History in Images Found in Finnish History Textbooks

This study focuses on visual collective memory, a topic that has long been neglected in the social sciences and particularly in social psychological research on social representations of history. It explores the contents and meanings of images in the construction of Finnish national history. Through examination of official history writing, a better understanding is sought of how collective memory is constructed as part of history politics. The data for the present study consist of images (N = 541) included in recent textbooks on Finnish history. Barthes' three‐meaning approach is used in combination with qualitative content analysis to examine a large corpus of images. The visualized collective memory is approached from five perspectives: (i) the years of memory; (ii) the places of memory; (iii) the themes of memory; (iv) the main actors and (v) the silence of memory. The investigation shows that, in official discourse, politics, culture and war are the main contents of Finnish visual collective memory. The key actors in the narrative are politicians, especially the eighth president of Finland, Urho Kekkonen. The most important moments in time are situated in the war years 1918 and 1939, while the geographical focus is the central square in the capital, Helsinki. The result is a national history that is positive, homogeneous and exclusive. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ecological Representations

Abstract

Representations feature heavily in cognitive science theories about our behavioral repertoire. Their critical feature is its ability to designate (stand in for) spatially or temporally distant properties, so that organizing our behavior with respect to mental/neural representations means organizing our behavior with respect to the otherwise unavailable property they designate. Representations are a powerful tool, but serious problems (grounding, system-detectable error) remain unsolved. Ecological explanations reject representations. However, this has left us without a straightforward vocabulary to engage with “representation-hungry” problems involving spatial or temporal distance, nor the role of the nervous system in cognition. To develop such a vocabulary, here we show that ecological information functions to designate the ecologically scaled dynamical world to an organism. We then show that this designation analysis of information leads to an ecological conceptualization of the neural activity caused by information, and finally we argue these together can support intentional behavior with respect to spatially and temporally distal properties. The way they do so (via designation) does mean information and the related neural activity can be conceptualized as representations; but they do so in a grounded way that remains true to key ecological ontological commitments. We advocate this path for expanding the ecological approach.     

Policy Attitudes,Ideological Values and Social Representations

This article reviews research on policy attitudes and ideological values from the perspective of social representations theory. In the first part of the paper, key features of lay political thinking are presented, its pragmatic imperative, its focus on communication and the social functions of shared knowledge. Objectification transforms abstract and group‐neutral ideological values into concrete and socially useful knowledge, in particular stereotypes of value‐conforming and value‐violating groups. Such shared understandings of intergroup relations provide citizens with common reference knowledge which provides the cognitive and cultural basis of policy attitudes. Social representations theory further suggests that lay knowledge reflects the social context in which it has been elaborated (anchoring), an aspect which allows conceptualising aggregate‐level differences in policy attitudes. In the second part of the paper, a model of lay conceptions of social order is outlined which organises four shared conceptions of social order, along with the stereotype‐based thinking associated with each conception: Moral order, Free Market, Social diversity and Structural inequality. We conclude by arguing that policy attitudes are symbolic devices expressed to justify or to challenge existing social arrangements.     

Women, AIDS, and Theatre: Representations and Resistances

The plays written about AIDS in the past dozen years form a radical canon establishing gay men as the locus for public attention. These plays have been all but silent in their representation of women with AIDS. This article examines the marginalized women in early plays such as The Normal Heart and As Is, and the women more central to later plays such as The Baltimore Waltz, Before It Hits Home, and Patient A. It foregrounds some of the most problematic issues surrounding the AIDS virus: the perception of women as vectors of disease for men and unborn children, the insistent representation of women as mothers and caregivers, and the denial of patterns of abuse, sexual exploitation, and poverty which contribute to the marginalization of woman and people of color.     

Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

Real Interval Representations

This paper presents several necessary and sufficient conditions for real interval representability of biorders, interval orders, and semiorders. Let A and X be nonempty sets. We consider two types of interval representations for P⊂A×X. The first concerns the existence of two mappings, F: A→J_↓ and F: X→J_↑, such that, for all (a, x)∈A×X, (a, x)∈P⇔F(a)∩F (x)= ∅, where J_↓ and J_↑ respectively denote the set of all real intervals that are unbounded below and the set of all real intervals that are unbounded above. The second yields two mappings, F: A→J_↓ and G: X→J_↓, such that, for all (a, x)∈A×X, (a, x)∈P⇔F(a)⊂G(x). Specializations of those representations include the cases of A=X for interval orders and semiorders.     

Favor Referential Representations

Avrutin and Hickok (1993) argue that agrammatic patients have the ability to represent nonreferential or "government" chains ("who... e") but not referential or "binding" chains ("which girl... e"). By contrast, we propose the "referential representation hypothesis," which suggests that agrammatics attempt to cope with their well-known capacity limitations by favoring referential or content-based representations. This predicts that agrammatic patients′ performance should degrade noticeably as task demands increase, and referential demands should take priority over computational ones. In a semantic task, referential phrases should lead to better or more accurate performances. In syntactic tasks, the availability of a referential or content-based representation will interfere with the development of a syntactic representation, resulting in worse syntactic performance on the referential phrases than on nonreferential ones. This predicts that agrammatic patients should incorrectly accept (resumptive) pronoun sentences with a referential wh-phrase because the pronouns will find the semantic or discourse referent of the referential wh-phrase and take it as an antecedent for the pronoun. However, they should reject a (resumptive) pronoun in a sentence with the nonreferential question constituent "who" or "what." "Who" and "what" will remain in syntactic form, since they have only grammatical content and therefore will have only a "nonreferential" syntactic representation. Consequently, they cannot serve as the antecedent of the pronoun. These predictions were largely confirmed by the results of a grammaticality judgement study. Agrammatics performed well on questions with pragmatic biases but failed to distinguish reliably between grammatical and ungrammatical questions where pragmatic biases were neutralized. They assigned especially low ratings to object gap sentences with referential wh-constituents, as predicted. They assigned relatively high ratings to ungrammatical subject pronoun sentences with either type of wh-constituent. The agrammatics accepted ungrammatical reflexive sentences even though syntactic number and gender features alone could have been used to correctly judge the sentences. We attribute this, too, to the unavailability of a reliable syntactic representation of those phrases with referential or extragrammatical semantic content.     

Parental Representations,Self-View,and Interpersonal Functioning of Older Adolescents

This study examines the relationship between parental object representations, self-representations, and interpersonal relations in a nonclinical sample of older adolescents. It was hypothesized that individuals with parental representations that are conceptually low, hostile, and rejecting would be significantly related to a negative view of self and poor interpersonal relations. The results suggest that parental benevolence, ambitiousness, and conceptual level are significantly related to interpersonal functioning. Parental representations that are qualitatively poor were found to be associated with a negative view of self. However, a high conceptual level of mother was noted to be significantly related to a negative self-representation. The findings generally confirm the nature of the relationship between object representations and self, but also suggest that the structural component of parental representations may reflect a cognitive component of the self rather than an affective one. The difficulties of controlling for depression and method variance issues are also discussed.     

Representations without rules,connectionism and the syntactic argument

Terry Horgan and John Tienson have suggested that connectionism might provide a framework within which to articulate a theory of cognition according to which there are mental representations without rules (RWR) (Horgan and Tienson 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). In essence, RWR states that cognition involves representations in a language of thought, but that these representations are not manipulated by the sort of rules that have traditionally been posited. In the development of RWR, Horgan and Tienson attempt to forestall a particular line of criticism, theSyntactic Argument, which would show RWR to be inconsistent with connectionism. In essence, the argument claims that the node-level rules of connectionist networks, along with the semantic interpretations assigned to patterns of activation, serve to determine a set of representation-level rules incompatible with the RWR conception of cognition. The present paper argues that the Syntactic Argument can be made to show that RWR is inconsistent with connectionism.The present paper has been improved by conversations with Terry Horgan and John Tienson. Thanks are also due to Gary Fuller, John Heil, Terry Horgan and Bob Stecker for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

要点表征与字词表征在错误再认中的作用

关键诱词是指在学习中没有出现的、跟所学单词有一定关联的词。学习者对关键诱词提取时错误再认率(即虚报率)较高,这被称之为错误再认现象。有人认为是要点表征导致了错误记忆,但也有人认为记忆中是字词表征起主要作用。本研究针对要点表征和字词表征对中学生英语单词学习中错误再认的影响进行了2×7的混合设计,分别考查了分类分组呈现单词和随机呈现单词对中学生英语单词再认的影响,同时考查了关键诱词的虚报率与学习次数的关系。发现:(1)学习分类分组呈现单词的被试,对关键诱词的虚报率明显高于学习随机呈现单词的被试,说明要点表征在错误再认中起着重要作用;(2)对关键诱词的虚报率与学习次数之间呈现倒V型的关系,说明在学习初始阶段,要点表征在错误再认中起主要作用;但在学习的后期,字词表征在再认中的作用占据了主要地位。