Brueckner and Fischer on the Evil of Death

A primary argument against the badness of death (known as the Symmetry Argument) appeals to an alleged symmetry between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. The Symmetry Argument has posed a serious threat to those who hold that death is bad because it deprives us of life’s goods that would have been available had we died later. Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer develop an influential strategy to cope with the Symmetry Argument. In their attempt to break the symmetry, they claim that due to our preference of future experiential goods over past ones, posthumous nonexistence is bad for us, whereas prenatal nonexistence is not. Granting their presumption about our preference, however, it is questionable that prenatal nonexistence is not bad. This consideration does not necessarily indicate their defeat against the Symmetry Argument. I present a better response to the Symmetry Argument: the symmetry is broken, not because posthumous nonexistence is bad while prenatal nonexistence is not, but because (regardless as to whether prenatal nonexistence is bad) posthumous nonexistence is even worse.     

Self-defining memories in complicated grief

There is increasing attention to the mechanisms underpinning maladaptive responses to bereavement. This study indexed self-defining memories in bereaved individuals with and without complicated grief (CG). Participants with and without complicated grief (N = 40) were asked to describe three self-defining memories. Results showed that CG participants provided more self-defining memories involving the deceased. Both groups were equally likely to report their loved one's death as a self-defining moment, however, the no-CG group showed more evidence of benefit finding in their memory narratives and experienced less negative emotion on recall. The findings suggest that CG is associated with distinctive patterns of autobiographical memory that are linked to self-identity. The pattern is consistent with self-memory system models of autobiographical remembering, and suggests that grieving individuals who experience ongoing yearning for their loved one view their self-identity as more closely linked to the deceased are more distressed by memories involving the loss.     

Schopenhauer on the ethics of suicide

The concept of death is of special importance in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of appearance and Will. Death for Schopenhauer is the aim and purpose of life, that toward which life is directed, and the denial of the individual will to life. Despite his profound pessimism, Schopenhauer vehemently rejects suicide as an unworthy affirmation of the will to life by those who seek to escape rather than seek nondiscursive knowledge of Will in suffering. The only manner of self-destruction Schopenhauer finds philosophically acceptable is the ascetic saint's death by starvation. Here the individual will to life is so completely mastered as to refuse even the most basic desire for nourishment, and thereby passes into nonexistence in complete renunciation of the individual will. Schopenhauer's attitude toward suicide nevertheless embodies an inconsistency. If, as Schopenhauer believes, the aim of life is death, and death is an unreal aspect of the world as appearance, then there appears to be no justification why the philosopher should not rush headlong into it - not to affirm the will to life in an abject effort to avoid suffering, but in order to fulfill life's purpose by ending it for distinctly philosophical reasons immediately upon arriving at an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction.     

Melancholic Psychosis—A Lacanian Approach

Drawing on the conceptual resources provided by Lacanian accounts of melancholia and the death drive, and by means of reference to a clinical case summary and the film Into the Wild, this paper hopes to open up new ways of thinking about melancholic psychosis. The paper foregrounds a series of clinical themes that may be grouped under the rubric of “problems in symbolic fixit”: difficulties in receiving gifts, inability to mediate relations of intimacy, yearning for anonymity/disappearance, and the condition of the twilight world. These themes, while not obviously associated with Freud’s account of melancholia, represent areas of diagnostic priority for a Lacanian approach attuned to the role of symbolic processes and the traumatic “real” object.     

Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life

In this paper, I offer an original account of meaning in life, which I call the passionate yearning theory. Within the framework of the passionate yearning theory, meaning is understood as the intrinsically derived yearning, and passionate striving, for something (an ideal, or a state of affairs) that possesses some plausible objective claim to truth or facticity, which makes it worth pursuing for its own sake. To properly delineate the view, I present the various criteria that serve as the foundation for the passionate yearning view. These include the truth/facticity criterion, the lack of immorality, intrinsic subjectivity, passion, yearning and striving. I then show how these criteria coalesce into the passionate yearning theory and how exactly the theory works. Finally, I motivate the passionate yearning theory by addressing some possible criticisms and objections that can be raised against the view and also differentiate it from similar competing views.

     

„Affektlose Zustände?“

In clinical work psychoanalysts are confronted with phenomena that are marked by affectless states and an apparent non-existence of affects. The author refers to patients who are addicted to near-death, dwell in states of confusion and inhibition in which affects are not found to be attached to thoughts, where splitting dominates and containment for fragmentation is sought. Instead of the latter it comes to pulverization and atomization and therefore to the annihilation of affects: affects seem to be unperceivable. Such phenomena allow considerations concerning the concept of the death drive. The questions are considered whether the apparent non-existence of affects is an expression of a silent death drive, what the function of these affectless states is and what the object relationship, which is expressed and communicated within these states looks like. Three concepts are taken into consideration: whether these affectless states are manifestations of a developmental state in which splitting is yet not an issue (Fairbairn), or must they be seen under a defensive aspect as a protection against persecutory tantalizing affects (Klein), or are these states the pure manifestations of the death drive (Green). By means of a clinical vignette of a patient suffering from an inhibition of thought processes, an inability to work on the basis of a borderline pathology and treated with high-frequency psychoanalysis, the phenomenon of ?affectless states“ is elaborated on the basis of the three aforementioned theoretical concepts and the dynamic unconscious fantasy associated with these seemingly affectless states is discussed.     

Why aggression?2

On the basis of a formalised view of metapsychology, the author briefly considers the problems inherent in the Freudian notion of a death drive or aggressive drive and then goes on to develop a new theoretical conception of aggression. Aggression is understood as an affect, action or affective action and, in relation to these, as an expression of the intensity with which a drive'whether it be the sexual drive with its libidinal cathexes or the self‐preservative drive with its lethic cathexes'seeks to attain its object. In this context the author regards the regulation of closeness and distance with respect to the ‘psychogeometric locus’ of the relevant drive object as being of central importance. She contends that neurotic personalities suffer from specific distortions in the perception of the psychogeometric locus of their drive objects, which may give rise to an intensification of the drive tendencies prevailing in these individuals at any given time so that these tendencies take on an aggressive character. The author presents two clinical vignettes to show how her approach allows aggression and its occurrence to be conceptualised without resorting to the idea of a primary aggressive drive, and draws attention to the resulting technical consequences for interpretation.     

延长哀伤障碍的概念、流行病学和病理机制

延长哀伤障碍是一种由亲近的人去世引发的病理性哀伤反应, 即死亡发生6个月后, 个体对死者的想念影响到了生活各方面, 且社会功能受损, 其最近20年才开始受到临床心理学研究者关注和探讨。本文首先回顾了概念提出及后续发展, 并讨论了其与持续性复杂哀伤相关障碍的区别与联系。随后, 本文综述了其独立的诊断标准、评估工具和流行病学调查、以及与正常哀伤、抑郁症和创伤后应激障碍的区别。接下来, 本文对其病理机制的理论思考和实证研究进行了讨论。最后, 本文指出未来可考察诊断标准的跨文化适用性、丰富病理机制的理论与研究。     

On the reception of the concept of the death drive in Germany: expressing and resisting an ‘evil principle’?

With Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attempted ‘to describe and to account for the facts of daily observation in our field of study’ (1920, p. 7), in particular concerning destructive clinical phenomena that confront us in the analytic situation: traumatic neuroses, melancholic states, negative‐therapeutic reactions, masochism, repetition compulsion and so on. The author demonstrates in the first section how Freud's own resistance – later self‐diagnosed – to recognizing these unwelcome facts was expressed in the terminological and conceptual ambiguities of the death drive hypothesis then introduced, ambiguities that to some extent continue to impede the reception of its clinical usefulness to this day. As soon as Freud had demonstrated the connection with clinical practice more directly in The Ego and the Id (1923), some contemporaries adopted it as a helpful clinical concept, while others believed that they could (and must) refute it. The second part outlines its reception in the 1920s and 1930s, which was part of an international discussion that was, of course, initially conducted mainly in German. The beginnings of an important further development of the death drive hypothesis are described in a separate section because it originated from Melanie Klein's earliest experiences in analysing children in Berlin in the early to mid‐1920s. She referred at that time to an ‘evil principle’, and in 1932 published her view of the death drive hypothesis, which was further developed in subsequent decades by her and her followers in London. In this period, conditions changed dramatically: in Germany Freud's books (among others) were burnt, crimes against humanity were instigated and psychoanalysis ceased to exist in this country. Almost all the analysts who published on the death drive had to emigrate. From then on, entirely different discourses took place in the various regions. In Germany, the death drive hypothesis was (largely) disregarded or rejected for decades after the Holocaust. Frank demonstrates how the uncritical recourse in relevant works to this day to an article by Brun in 1953 that considered the death drive to have been comprehensively refuted on the basis of (apparently) comprehensive literature research can be understood as a symptom. Pursuing some reflections by Beland (1988) and Cycon (1995), the author expounds her thesis that in Germany the clinical usefulness of the death drive hypothesis could not be considered as long as destructive impulses were still an immediate social reality. According to the author's observations, in stating that there had been a ‘definite reaction formation against death drive hypotheses’, Brun had unintentionally made an accurate diagnosis. It was not until the realization of inevitable perpetrator identifications (‘Hitler in us’) in this country became (more widely) possible that a concern with the death drive hypothesis could also resume. In the final section, the author takes up one line of this development and traces how some German analysts in the 1980s came into contact with Kleinian developments that had since occurred and how these found and find their way into their analytic working. She closes by asking whether it might be appropriate to consider Melanie Klein's concept of an evil principle – along with the pleasure and reality principles – as a less ambiguous one for the phenomena under consideration.     

Yearning and Its Measurement in Complicated Grief

Persistent intense yearning for the deceased is a core clinical feature of complicated grief (CG) that distinguishes it from other mental disorders that develop following loss. The Yearning in Situations of Loss Scale (YSL) is a recently developed assessment of yearning. To assess the psychometric properties of the YSL in those with CG, we administered the YSL, Inventory of Complicated Grief, and Quick Inventory of Depression Symptomatology to 303 treatment-seeking bereaved adults with CG. Our results suggest the YSL is a reliable assessment with acceptable convergent and discriminant validity as a measure of yearning in those with CG.     

Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr’s incoherence claim.     

Slavoj Žižek,the Death Drive,and Zombies: A Theological Account

In this article, I discuss the question of the hybridity of the religious and the secular through the example of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj ?i?ek and his psychoanalytically inspired notion of the undead. The undead is ?i?ek's rendering of the Freudian death drive, and as the undead is instantiated in the popular culture cliché of the zombies, we need to look no further than to George A. Romero's classic zombie movie Night of the Living Dead from 1968. Thus, this article proceeds in three steps: first, I trace the concept of the death drive from Freud to ?i?ek, supplemented, for their theological importance, by two contemporary philosophers, Jonathan Lear and Eric Santner. Second, I discuss the zombie in contemporary popular culture, with a focus on Romero's movies, and whether such cinematic representations can function as a kind of cultural critique. In conclusion, I return to the question of theology by showing what ?i?ek means by theology and contrasting as well as comparing his philosophy to Augustine's anthropology. Despite ?i?ek's atheistic confession and his dismissal of all pre‐modern philosophy and theology, I show that Augustine's anthropology is structurally similar to ?i?ek's, thus suggesting that the relationship is more complex than ?i?ek allows. Both are united in rejecting any superficial and transparent understanding of self, and become, consequently, an example of the ambiguous relationship between religion and secularity in contemporary times.     

Nothing or the opposite: intersecting terror management and objective self‐awareness

The human capacity for self‐awareness allows people to envision their eventual death and thus creates the potential for debilitating anxiety. Terror management research has shown that self‐awareness exacerbates the experience of mortality salience. I suggest that self‐awareness alone can induce mortality salience through dialectical thinking. If constructs include a concept and its opposite, then focusing on one aspect should also increase awareness of the opposite. Focusing on the existing object self should thus lead to the recognition of the non‐existent self that is implied. In study 1, participants experienced one of two self‐awareness manipulations (exposure to a mirror, perceiving the self as distinctive) or no manipulation; mortality salience was measured using a death‐relevant word completion task. Both self‐awareness conditions reported significantly higher mortality salience than the control condition. In study 2, participants exposed to their reflection reported increased death salience and life salience (as measured by death‐ and life‐relevant word completion tasks) than a control group, which directly suggests that self‐awareness leads people to dialectically consider opposing facets of the self. Terror management and objective self‐awareness theories might thus be more intimately tied than was previously thought. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The desire to be remembered: A review and analysis of legacy motivations and behaviors

The psychological motivations and mechanisms underlying a desire to be remembered after death is an understudied area in the social sciences. While previous research has indirectly investigated the pursuit of legacy as a means of coping with death anxiety, little attention has been paid to other potential factors involved in the appeal of leaving an individualistic (usually positive) mark in society that will outlive the self. In the present paper, we broaden the theoretical examination of the human drive for legacy, considering proximate motivations (e.g., alleviating death anxiety, concluding one's “life story” well, etc.) and ultimate causes (i.e., the direct or indirect reproductive effects that post-mortem reputations confer to surviving relatives). Additionally, we consider cognitive factors related to afterlife beliefs and perceptions of post-mortem consciousness, and their potential role in legacy-related desires. We conclude by discussing areas for further empirical investigations of the legacy drive.     

Existential, theological, and psychological concepts of death: a personal retrospective

Before Freud, the study of death belonged strictly in the contexts of religion and philosophy, but in the 20th Century, death and dying began to enter into dialogue with the social sciences of psychology and sociology. The existentialists began to portray death differently in their literary-based philosophy, and by the end of the century four major American writers had dealt squarely with death in a theological framework. The author's own personal experiences and academic endeavors frame this evolution in theories about death and dying, beginning with a Master's thesis in college and ending with a unit of Clinical Pastoral Education in a shock trauma hospital. In this article the mystery of death is examined from three distinct points of view: literary (including existentialism, a philosophy as literature), theological and psychological, based upon the author's career as a professor of literature, as seminary student, and as a recent participant in Clinical Pastoral Education. An attempt at a synthesis of these three strands of inquiry is made at the end of this personal and academic journey.     

Mary Magdalene: Lover of the Dying and Resurrecting God-Man

Like Isis, Ishtar, and Inanna, Mary Magdalene mourns the death of the god she loves, and when he resurrects, she celebrates his renewal. Through her intense feeling experience of personal and spiritual love, she represents the feminine side of the death and resurrection phenomenon that plays a realizing role in the humanization of the god-image and likewise of individuation.

Although the Judeo-Christian fathers excluded any sign in their orthodoxy that Yahweh and Christ may have had love partners, archeological evidence and Gnostic texts point to the possibility that they did. In our era, with the psychological perspective that C. G. Jung heralded, we can reconsider and integrate the role of the Eros principle that was split off from our god-image, concretized, and banned along with the “evil” of the flesh.

The emergence of Mary Magdalene in popular culture as the “Holy Grail” or vessel of Christ's child reflects the intense yearning in the psyche for the feminine principle to participate in the continuing incarnation of the god-image, and for the divine feminine–masculine partnership to realize itself in personal, human experience.     

Surviving in absence--on the preservative and death drives and their clinical utility

This paper offers a new theoretical and clinical look at the death drive in connection with the preservative drive. The author elaborates the flaws she sees in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and reformulates the transition between Freud's first drive theory and his second one within an implicit object relations theory. Simultaneously with this revised version of drive theory, a structural theory for the realm of healthy self- and object preservation and for pathological or deadened self and object parts is developed, including the devastating effects of trauma. Clinical material from an extended psychoanalysis shows how these concepts can help us understand these patients' absence and "deadness" and rethink the technical challenges they provide.     

Separation and Traumatic Distress in Prolonged Grief: The Role of Cause of Death and Relationship to the Deceased

A distinction has been drawn between symptoms of separation distress (e.g., yearning/longing for the lost relationship) and traumatic distress (e.g., numbness, anger/bitterness) in prolonged grief disorder (PGD), a chronic and severe form of grieving that has been shown to predict a range of negative mental and physical health outcomes. The present study relied upon information from 947 recently bereaved young adults and tested the hypothesis that levels of separation distress primarily would be influenced by aspects of the relationship with the deceased (i.e., primary attachment figures vs. more distant relationships), whereas levels of traumatic distress would be influenced more by situational factors surrounding the death itself (i.e., cause of death). Results generally supported this hypothesis with a few important qualifications. Implications for the assessment and treatment of bereaved individuals are discussed.     

Presumed consent for organ preservation in uncontrolled donation after cardiac death in the United States: a public policy with serious consequences

Organ donation after cessation of circulation and respiration, both controlled and uncontrolled, has been proposed by the Institute of Medicine as a way to increase opportunities for organ procurement. Despite claims to the contrary, both forms of controlled and uncontrolled donation after cardiac death raise significant ethical and legal issues. Identified causes for concern include absence of agreement on criteria for the declaration of death, nonexistence of universal guidelines for duration before stopping resuscitation efforts and techniques, and assumption of presumed intent to donate for the purpose of initiating temporary organ-preservation interventions when no expressed consent to donate is present. From a legal point of view, not having scientifically valid criteria of cessation of circulation and respiration for declaring death could lead to a conclusion that organ procurement itself is the proximate cause of death. Although the revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 provides broad immunity to those involved in organ-procurement activities, courts have yet to provide an opinion on whether persons can be held liable for injuries arising from the determination of death itself. Preserving organs in uncontrolled donation after cardiac death requires the administration of life-support systems such as extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. These life-support systems can lead to return of signs of life that, in turn, have to be deliberately suppressed by the administration of pharmacological agents. Finally, allowing temporary organ-preservation interventions without expressed consent is inherently a violation of the principle of respect for a person's autonomy. Proponents of organ donation from uncontrolled donation after cardiac death, on the other hand, claim that these nonconsensual interventions enhance respect for autonomy by allowing people, through surrogate decision making, to execute their right to donate organs. However, the lack of transparency and the absence of protection of individual autonomy, for the sake of maximizing procurement opportunities, have placed the current organ-donation system of opting-in in great jeopardy. Equally as important, current policies enabling and enhancing organ procurement practices, pose challenges to the constitutional rights of individuals in a pluralistic society as these policies are founded on flawed medical standards for declaring death.