TOWARD AN EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY OF MEANING

Abstract. I will discuss some of the implications of the ongoing Darwinian revolution for theology as a constructor and interpreter of human meaning. Focus will be directed toward the following issues: How should we best understand ourselves in the new, evolutionary cosmos? What are the problems with the kind of genetic reductionism espoused by neo-Darwinism? How are those problems resolved by the “relational” understanding of life made available by thermodynamics and ecology? How do we generate meaning-structures in this relationally-constituted cosmos? Finally, how do these developments enrich our understandings of responsibility—to each other and to our private conceptions of God?     

Is the Divide a Chasm?: Bridging Affective Science with Clinical Practice

This special section endeavors to facilitate the integration of biologically-based assessments of emotion into the clinical setting. This goal is consistent with the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, which aims to identify transdiagnostic biobehavioral mechanisms that underlie mental disorders. We focus on four challenges to applying biologically-informed research on emotion and emotion regulation to clinical contexts: (1) How do we assess emotion in an RDoC framework? (2) How do we integrate measures of emotion with other systems in a wider context? (3) What do physiological indices of emotion tell us about clinical phenomena? and (4) How do we integrate physiological assessments into clinical practice? Throughout this comment, we refer to the articles in this special section to make our points, and, when possible, offer suggestions for future work to continue to address these challenges.     

Making Nature,Making Energy,Making Humans: Two Exhibitions at the Wellcome Trust

This article reviews the Wellcome Collection exhibitions ‘Making Nature: How We See Animals’ and ‘Electricity: The Spark of Life’. While the two exhibitions appear to have disparate topics—one exhibition speaks about our co-existence with animals, the other about energy futures—they speak to each other in thought-provoking ways around the questions: how are we human in these times, and what possible trajectories are available to us?     

Culture and perceptions of self—other similarity

In testing possible cultural effects of the use of the self as an habitual reference point to which others are compared, we expected that: (a) individualistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to personal goals) would rate self—other similarity higher when asked “How similar is X to you?” than when asked “How similar are you to X?”, whereas nondirectional similarity judgements (“How similar are these two people?”) would resemble the former directional comparison; (b) collectivistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to in‐group goals) would show a weaker or, possibly, reversed pattern, especially using in‐group comparison others. Neither hypothesis was upheld. However, the individualists perceived the in‐group to be relatively more similar to themselves as compared to the collectivists. This difference cannot be explained by response bias, status asymmetry, or role differentiation. We propose an explanation in terms of the differential relationship between self and other representations for people from collectivist versus individualist cultures.     

Treating Scrupulosity in Religious Individuals Using Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

Scrupulosity, the obsessional fear of thinking or behaving immorally or against one's religious beliefs, is a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder that has been relatively understudied to date. Treating religious patients with scrupulosity raises a number of unique clinical challenges for many clinicians. For example, how does one distinguish normal beliefs from pathological scrupulosity? How does one adapt exposures to a religious patient whose fears are related to sinning? How far should one go in exposures in such cases? How and when does one include clergy in treatment? We address these issues and report a case example of the successful treatment of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish woman using the treatment principles that we recommend for religious individuals with scrupulosity.     

Discussing Racial Justice in Light of 2016: Black Lives Matter,a Trump Presidency,and the Continued Struggle for Justice

The broad fields of ethical reflection on racialization, racial justice, black liberation theology, and queer theology of color must come to terms with the year 2016, which can be framed on one side with the Black Lives Matter movement, and on the other side with a presidential election cycle in which racism and racial justice played particularly salient roles. Against this backdrop, this book discussion looks at recent literature on racial justice asking three questions. How does historical consciousness shape contemporary ethical thought on racial justice? In what ways do the intersectionalities of gender and sexuality, immigration and transnationality, class, and contemporary culture present particular challenges and new possibilities? And how do the ethical frameworks of religious traditions contribute to the development of public theology for racial justice? The conclusion considers how religious ethics concerned with racial justice does harm or contributes to religiously grounded responses to racial injustice. Reflection on these questions points to the need for ongoing engagement with the black experience—broadly construed and within the context of multiple intersections—in the United States and globally in ethical analysis. However, this in turn makes particular and critical demands on how it is that we are to both teach and read religious ethics and political theology at our institutions, as well as in the churches.     

Make‐or‐Break: Chasing Risky Goals or Settling for Safe Rewards?

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between such make‐or‐break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving‐up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality.     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.     

HUMAN UNIQUENESS FROM A BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

This article seeks to provide some genetic perspectives on the question “Just How Special Are Humans—Really?” It begins with an introduction to how genetic variation can provide information about the past. It continues by discussing two ways in which genetic analyses has, on multiple occasions, shown that humans are less unique than we thought we are. We have a cognitive bias to toward thinking we are special. Our species has colonized an ecological niche not exploited by any other species on our earth, but how much of our adaptation to that niche is cultural rather than genetic?     

Mindful Virtue, Mindful Reverence

How does one talk about moral thought and moral action as a religious naturalist? We explore this question by considering two human capacities: the capacity for mindfulness, and the capacity for virtue. We suggest that mindfulness is deeply enhanced by an understanding of the scientific worldview and that the four cardinal virtues—courage, fairmindedness, humaneness, and reverence—are rendered coherent by mindful reflection. We focus on the concept of mindful reverence and propose that the mindful reverence elicited by the evolutionary narrative is at the heart of religious naturalism. Religious education, we suggest, entails the cultivation of mindful virtue, in ourselves and in our children.     

Thinking,Acting, Considering

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show (1) that such examples are not easily resisted; (2) that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and (3) that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through?     

The Elusive Notion of “Argument Quality”

We all seem to have a sense of what good and bad arguments are, and there is a long history—focusing on fallacies—of trying to provide objective standards that would allow a clear separation of good and bad arguments. This contribution discusses the limits of attempts to determine the quality of arguments. It begins with defining bad arguments as those that deviate from an established standard of good arguments. Since there are different conceptualizations of “argument”—as controversy, as debate, and as justification—and since arguments in each of these senses can be used for different purposes, a first problem is that we would need a large variety of standards for “good” arguments. After this, the contribution focuses in particular on proposals made in the literature on how to assess the quality of arguments in the sense of justification. It distinguishes three problems of assessment: How to determine (1) whether reasons are acceptable, (2) whether reasons are sufficient to justify the conclusion, and (3) how to identify arguments in real-world speech acts and texts? It is argued that limitations of argument assessment result from unavoidable relativism: The assessment of many—if not most—arguments depends on the epistemic situation of the evaluator.     

Analysis of recent empirical challenges to an account of interceptive timing.

How do we perceive how long it will be before we reach a certain place when running, driving, or skiing? How do we perceive how long it will be before a moving object reaches us or will arrive at a place where it can be hit or caught? These are questions of how we temporally coordinate our actions with a dynamic environment so as to control collision events. Much of the theoretical work on the control of these interceptive actions has been united in supposing that (1) timing is functionally separable from positioning and the two are controlled using different types of information; (2) timing is controlled using special-purpose time-to-arrival information; (3) the time-to-arrival information used for the timing of fast interceptive actions is a first-order approximation to the actual time-to-arrival, which does not take accelerations into account. Challenges to each of these suppositions have recently emerged, suggesting that a complete rethinking of how interceptions are controlled may be necessary. These challenges are analyzed in detail and it is shown that they are readily accommodated by a recent theory of interceptive timing based on the points just noted.     

Analysis of recent empirical challenges to an account of interceptive timing

How do we perceive how long it will be before we reach a certain place when running, driving, or skiing? How do we perceive how long it will be before a moving object reaches us or will arrive at a place where it can be hit or caught? These are questions of how we temporally coordinate our actions with a dynamic environment so as to control collision events. Much of the theoretical work on the control of these interceptive actions has been united in supposing that (1) timing is functionally separable from positioning and the two are controlled using different types of information; (2) timing is controlled using special-purpose time-to-arrival information; (3) the time-to-arrival information used for the timing of fast interceptive actions is a first-order approximation to the actual time-to-arrival, which does not take accelerations into account. Challenges to each of these suppositions have recently emerged, suggesting that a complete rethinking of how interceptions are controlled may be necessary. These challenges are analyzed in detail and it is shown that they are readily accommodated by a recent theory of interceptive timing based on the points just noted.     

Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.     

Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics

How might advanced neuroscience—in which perfect neuro‐predictions are possible—interact with ordinary judgments of free will? We propose that peoples' intuitive ideas about indeterminist free will are both imported into and intrude into their representation of neuroscientific scenarios and present six experiments demonstrating intrusion and importing effects in the context of scenarios depicting perfect neuro‐prediction. In light of our findings, we suggest that the intuitive commitment to indeterminist free will may be resilient in the face of scientific evidence against such free will.     

Predicting the Personal Appeal of Marketing Images Using Computational Methods

Images play a central role in digital marketing. They attract attention, trigger emotions, and shape consumers’ first impressions of products and brands. We propose that the shift from one‐to‐many mass communication to highly personalized one‐to‐one communication requires an understanding of image appeal at a personal level. Instead of asking “How appealing is this image?” we ask “How appealing is this image to this particular consumer?” Using the well‐established five‐factor model of personality, we apply machine learning algorithms to predict an image's personality appeal—the personality of consumers to which the image appeals most—from a set of 89 automatically extracted image features (Study 1). We subsequently apply the same algorithm on new images to predict consequential outcomes from the fit between consumer and image personality. We show that image‐person fit adds incremental predictive power over the images’ general appeal when predicting (a) consumers’ liking of new images (Study 2) and (b) consumers’ attitudes and purchase intentions (Study 3).     

Stuck on semantics: Processing of irrelevant object-scene inconsistencies modulates ongoing gaze behavior

People have an amazing ability to identify objects and scenes with only a glimpse. How automatic is this scene and object identification? Are scene and object semantics—let alone their semantic congruity—processed to a degree that modulates ongoing gaze behavior even if they are irrelevant to the task at hand? Objects that do not fit the semantics of the scene (e.g., a toothbrush in an office) are typically fixated longer and more often than objects that are congruent with the scene context. In this study, we overlaid a letter T onto photographs of indoor scenes and instructed participants to search for it. Some of these background images contained scene-incongruent objects. Despite their lack of relevance to the search, we found that participants spent more time in total looking at semantically incongruent compared to congruent objects in the same position of the scene. Subsequent tests of explicit and implicit memory showed that participants did not remember many of the inconsistent objects and no more of the consistent objects. We argue that when we view natural environments, scene and object relationships are processed obligatorily, such that irrelevant semantic mismatches between scene and object identity can modulate ongoing eye-movement behavior.     

Preaching a Risen Christ of Resistance among "Captive" Americans

Abstract: In the midst of the current captivity of Americans to governmental policies which most of the rest of the world finds objectionable, what are the challenges facing those who preach? How can these be addressed biblically and theologically, grounded in what it means to be part of a global communion, and empowered by faith in the Resurrected Christ? How can preaching form faith communities through conversion, confession and conversation so that they might confront and change what is occurring, for the sake of the whole world?