Can you tickle yourself if you swap bodies with someone else?

The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version of the rubber hand illusion exists within the body transfer illusion. We situate our findings within the larger debate over sensory attenuation: (1) there is an attenuation of prediction errors that depends upon the context in which sensory input is predicted (i.e., efference copy), and (2) sensory attenuation is a necessary consequence of self-generated movement irrespective of context (i.e., active inference). The results support the notion of active inference.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Sensory attenuation of action outcomes of varying amplitude and valence

Stimuli caused by self-initiated actions are perceived as less intense than those caused externally; this effect is called sensory attenuation (SA). In two experiments, we aimed to assess the impact of the amplitude of outcomes and its affective valence on SA and explicit ratings of sense of agency. This allowed us to test the predictions of the available SA frameworks and better understand the link between SA, affect, and agency. The results indicated that SA can be reversed, and such sensory amplification is driven by low-amplitude and positive-valence outcomes. We also show that intentional action influences the perceived valence of outcomes, and that modulations of explicit sense of agency are divergent from those of SA. Our study shows that valence influences the processing of the amplitude of intentional action outcomes and suggests that none of the currently available frameworks give full justice to SA’s variability.     

Action observation modulates auditory perception of the consequence of others' actions

We can easily discriminate self-produced from externally generated sensory signals. Recent studies suggest that the prediction of the sensory consequences of one’s own actions made by forward model can be used to attenuate the sensory effects of self-produced movements, thereby enabling a differentiation of the self-produced sensation from the externally generated one. The present study showed that attenuation of sensation occurred both when participants themselves performed a goal-directed action and when they observed experimenter performing the same action, although they clearly reported that the tones were produced by other during action observation and by themselves during their own action. These results suggest that sensory prediction of action modulates ongoing auditory processing irrespective of who produces the sounds and that the explicit judgment of agency does not necessarily rely on the same mechanisms on which implicit perceptual measures such as sensory attenuation rely.     

Having a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership

We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant's hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant's own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant's hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body awareness are local and fragmented: the proprioceptive drift is largely restricted to the stimulated finger. In the present study, we investigated whether active and passive movements, rather than tactile stimulation, would lead to similarly fragmented body awareness. Participants watched a projected image of their hand under three conditions: active finger movement, passive finger movement, and tactile stimulation. Visual feedback was either synchronous or asynchronous with respect to stimulation of the hand. A significant overall RHI, defined as greater drifts following synchronous than asynchronous stimulation, was found in all cases. However, the distribution of the RHI across stimulated and non-stimulated fingers depended on the kind of stimulation. Localised proprioceptive drifts, specific to the stimulated finger, were found for tactile and passive stimulation. Conversely, during active movement of a single digit, the proprioceptive drifts were not localised to that digit, but were spread across the whole hand. Whereas a purely proprioceptive sense of body-ownership is local and fragmented, the motor sense of agency integrates distinct body-parts into a coherent, unified awareness of the body.     

What is embodiment? A psychometric approach

What is it like to have a body? The present study takes a psychometric approach to this question. We collected structured introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion, to systematically investigate the structure of bodily self-consciousness. Participants observed a rubber hand that was stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own hand and then made proprioceptive judgments of the location of their own hand and used Likert scales to rate their agreement or disagreement with 27 statements relating to their subjective experience of the illusion. Principal components analysis of this data revealed four major components of the experience across conditions, which we interpret as: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect. In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, deafference, was found. Secondary analysis of the embodiment of runner hand component revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency. The ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion. These results suggest that psychometric tools may provide a rich method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an empirically rigorous phenomenology.     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) remember agency information from past events and integrate this knowledge with spatial and temporal features in working memory

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether rhesus monkeys remember information about their own agency—along with spatial, temporal and contextual properties—from a previously experienced event. In Experiment 1, rhesus monkeys (n = 4) used symbols to reliably indicate whether they had performed or observed an event on a computer screen. In Experiment 2, naïve and experienced monkeys (n = 8) reported agency information when stringent controls for perceptual and proprioceptive cues were included. In Experiment 3, five of the monkeys completed a task in which they reported agency information along with spatial and temporal features of events. Two monkeys performed this agency discrimination when they could not anticipate which memory test they would receive. There was also evidence that these features were integrated in memory. Implications of this research are discussed in relation to working memory, episodic memory and self-awareness in nonhuman animals.     

Interactions Between Tactile and Proprioceptive Representations in Haptics

ABSTRACT

Neuroprosthetic limbs, regardless of their sophisticated motor control, require sensory feedback to viably interact with the environment. Toward that aim, the authors examined interrelationships between tactile and proprioceptive sensations. Through human psychophysics experiments, they evaluated error patterns of subjects estimating hand location in a horizontal 2-dimensional workspace under 3 tactile conditions. While tactile cues did not significantly affect the structure of the pattern of errors, touching the workspace reduced estimation errors. During neurophysiological experiments, a macaque grasped textured objects using 2 hand postures. Sensory coding showed dependence on both roughness of the manipulandum and posture. In summary, the authors suggest that tactile sensations underlying haptics are processed in a stable spatial reference frame provided by a proprioceptive system, and that tactile and proprioceptive inputs can be encoded simultaneously by individual cells. Such insights will be useful for providing stable, adaptive sensory feedback for neuroprosthetics.     

Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain–computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.     

The moving rubber hand illusion revisited: Comparing movements and visuotactile stimulation to induce illusory ownership

The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which a model hand is experienced as part of one’s own body. In the present study we directly compared the classical illusion, based on visuotactile stimulation, with a rubber hand illusion based on active and passive movements. We examined the question of which combinations of sensory and motor cues are the most potent in inducing the illusion by subjective ratings and an objective measure (proprioceptive drift). In particular, we were interested in whether the combination of afferent and efferent signals in active movements results in the same illusion as in the purely passive modes. Our results show that the illusion is equally strong in all three cases. This demonstrates that different combinations of sensory input can lead to a very similar phenomenological experience and indicates that the illusion can be induced by any combination of multisensory information.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

Vertical-horizontal illusion present for sighted but not early blind humans using auditory substitution of vision

This experiment was undertaken to investigate the effect of sensory modality (vision vs. audition) and of visual status (early blind vs. sighted) on susceptibility to the vertical-horizontal illusion. Early blind volunteers and blindfolded sighted subjects explored variants of the vertical-horizontal illusion using a device that substituted audition for vision, whereas sighted subjects from an independent group inspected the same stimuli visually. Sensitivity to the vertical-horizontal illusion, including an illusion of moderate strength when using the sensory substitution device, was observed only in the two sighted groups. The existence of an illusion effect when using such a device supports the idea of a visual perception provided by sensory substitution, whereas the attenuation of the vertical-horizontal illusion strength is consistent with the visual field shape theory (Künnapas, 1955a). The absence of the illusion effect in early blind subjects suggests that the sensory experience influences the nature of perception and that the visual experience plays a crucial role in the vertical-horizontal illusion, in accordance with the size-constancy scaling theory (Gregory, 1963).     

An electroencephalographic examination of the autonomous sensory meridian response (ASMR)

Autonomous sensory meridian response (ASMR) is a perceptual phenomenon characterized by pleasurable tingling sensations in the head and neck, as well as pleasurable feelings of relaxation, that reliably arise while attending to a specific triggering stimulus (e.g., whispering or tapping sounds). Currently, little is known about the neutral substrates underlying these experiences. In this study, 14 participants who experience ASMR, along with 14 control participants, were presented with four video stimuli and four auditory stimuli. Half of these stimuli were designed to elicit ASMR and half were non-ASMR control stimuli. Brain activity was measured using a 32-channel EEG system. The results indicated that ASMR stimuli—particularly auditory stimuli—elicited increased alpha wave activity in participants with self-reported ASMR, but not in matched control participants. Similar increases were also observed in frequency bands associated with movement (gamma waves and sensorimotor rhythm). These results are consistent with the reported phenomenology of ASMR, which involves both attentional and sensorimotor characteristics.     

自我表征的可塑性:基于橡胶手错觉的研究

自我识别是人类自我觉知的行为标记。传统方法认为稳定的自我表征是自我识别的基础。随着对橡胶手错觉及一系列自我表征和自我识别错觉的揭示,这一能让人将外部客体感知为自身一部分的错觉研究使得我们能够以多感官整合的方式来研究自我表征和自我识别。拥有感和自主感被认为是我们进行自我识别的两类基本体验,本文对一系列橡胶手错觉范式研究的系统回顾表明,拥有感和自主感会发生改变,这说明人的自我表征是可变的和可塑的。     

Rubber hands feel the touch of light

Two experiments involving a total of 220 subjects are reported. The experiments document that "stroking" a false hand with the bright beam of light from a laser pointer can produce tactile and thermal sensations when the hand can be seen as one's own. Overall, 66% of subjects reported somatic sensations from the light. Felt hand location was recalibrated toward the location of the false hand for those subjects who felt the light. Moreover, the proprioceptive recalibration from the laser experience was comparable to that produced by actual coordinated brushing of the false hand and of the unseen real hand after 2 min of stimulation. The illusion may be experienced on one's real hand as well. The results are discussed in terms of multisensory integration.     

The spatial distance rule in the moving and classical rubber hand illusions

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion in which participants perceive a model hand as part of their own body. Here, through the use of one questionnaire experiment and two proprioceptive drift experiments, we investigated the effect of distance (12, 27.5, and 43 cm) in the vertical plane on both the moving and classical RHI. In both versions of the illusion, we found an effect of distance on ownership of the rubber hand for both measures tested. Our results further suggested that the moving RHI might follow a narrower spatial rule. Finally, whereas ownership of the moving rubber hand was affected by distance, this was not the case for agency, which was present at all distances tested. In sum, the present results generalize the spatial distance rule in terms of ownership to the vertical plane of space and demonstrate that also the moving RHI obeys this rule.     

Tough and tender: embodied categorization of gender

Emerging evidence has shown that human thought can be embodied within physical sensations and actions. Indeed, abstract concepts such as morality, time, and interpersonal warmth can be based on metaphors that are grounded in bodily experiences (e.g., physical temperature can signal interpersonal warmth). We hypothesized that social-category knowledge is similarly embodied, and we tested this hypothesis by examining a sensory metaphor related to categorical judgments of gender. We chose the dimension of "toughness" (ranging from tough to tender), which is often used to characterize differences between males and females. Across two studies, the proprioceptive experience of toughness (vs. tenderness) was manipulated as participants categorized sex-ambiguous faces as male or female. Two different manipulations of proprioceptive toughness predictably biased the categorization of faces toward "male." These findings suggest that social-category knowledge is at least partially embodied.     

Visual determinants of a cross-modal illusion

Contrary to the predictions of established theory, Schutz and Lipscomb (2007) have shown that visual information can influence the perceived duration of concurrent sounds. In the present study, we deconstruct the visual component of their illusion, showing that (1) cross-modal influence depends on visible cues signaling an impact event (namely, a sudden change of direction concurrent with tone onset) and (2) the illusion is controlled primarily by the duration of post-impact motion. Other aspects of the post-impact motion—distance traveled, velocity, acceleration, and the rate of its change (i.e., its derivative, jerk)—play a minor role, if any. Together, these results demonstrate that visual event duration can influence the perception of auditory event duration, but only when stimulus cues are sufficient to give rise to the perception of a causal cross-modal relationship. This refined understanding of the illusion’s visual aspects is helpful in comprehending why it contrasts so markedly with previous research on cross-modal integration, demonstrating that vision does not appreciably influence auditory judgments of event duration (Walker & Scott, 1981).     

Roughness perception during the rubber hand illusion

Watching a rubber hand being stroked by a paintbrush while feeling identical stroking of one’s own occluded hand can create a compelling illusion that the seen hand becomes part of one’s own body. It has been suggested that this so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI) does not simply reflect a bottom–up multisensory integration process but that the illusion is also modulated by top–down, cognitive factors. Here we investigated for the first time whether the conceptual interpretation of the sensory quality of the visuotactile stimulation in terms of roughness can influence the occurrence of the illusion and vice versa, whether the presence of the RHI can modulate the perceived sensory quality of a given tactile stimulus (i.e., in terms of roughness). We used a classical RHI paradigm in which participants watched a rubber hand being stroked by either a piece of soft or rough fabric while they received synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation that was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the sensory quality of the material touching the rubber hand. (In)congruencies between the visual and tactile stimulation did neither affect the RHI on an implicit level nor on an explicit level, and the experience of the RHI in turn did not cause any modulations of the felt sensory quality of touch on participant’s own hand. These findings first suggest that the RHI seems to be resistant to top–down knowledge in terms of a conceptual interpretation of tactile sensations. Second, they argue against the hypothesis that participants own hand tends to disappear during the illusion and that the rubber hand actively replaces it.