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Stephen Read 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):363-375
In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things.
This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles
such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed
under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition
signifying its own falsity, he showed, also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain,
it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its
defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the
fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate
as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded
and plausible.
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Stephen ReadEmail: Email: |
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The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Adam Rieger 《Erkenntnis》2001,54(2):195-203
A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski. 相似文献
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Aristotle on the Liar 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Topoi - The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions:... 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - 相似文献
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Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes. 相似文献
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Greg Ray 《Philosophical Studies》2003,115(1):55-80
I offer an interpretation of a familiar, but poorly understood portion of Tarskis work on truth – bringing to light a number of unnoticed aspects of Tarskis work. A serious misreading of this part of Tarski to be found in Scott Soames Understanding Truth is treated in detail. Soamesreading vies with the textual evidence, and would make Tarskis position inconsistent in an unsubtle way. I show that Soames does not finally have a coherent interpretation of Tarski. This is unfortunate, since Soames ultimately arrogates to himself a key position that he has denied to Tarski and which is rightfully Tarskis own. 相似文献
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Stamatios Gerogiorgakis 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(4):313-330
An eleventh-century Greek text, in which a fourth-century patristic text is discussed, gives an outline of a solution to the Liar Paradox. The eleventh-century text is probably the first medieval treatment of the Liar. Long passages from both texts are translated in this article. The solution to the Liar Paradox, which they entail, is analysed and compared with the results of modern scholarship on several Latin solutions to this paradox. It is found to be a solution, which bears some analogies to contemporary game semantics. Further, an overview of other Byzantine scholia on the Liar Paradox is provided. The findings and the originality of the discussed solution to the Liar Paradox suggest a change in the way in which Byzantine Logic is traditionally regarded in contemporary scholarship. 相似文献
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Albert Visser 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1984,13(2):181-212
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Yann Benétreau-Dupin 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(1):18-28
Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either (1) this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 (2), 189–218] or else (2) it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 (Chapter 5); Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (242), 58–78]. Against (1), I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity. 相似文献
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This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Keith Simmons 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1990,19(3):277-303