Cerebral organization in adult second language acquisition: Is the right hemisphere more involved?

A Spanish-English dichotic listening study was designed to test the hypothesis that the right hemisphere might be more involved during the initial stages of informal, adult second language acquisition. No evidence was found in support of the hypothesis. Results are discussed within the general theoretical framework of the right hemisphere's role in second language performance and bilingualism.     

Nietzsche on morality as a “sign language of the affects”

Abstract

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism (as opposed to cognitivism), but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s (moral) viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder (and Hegel), and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones.     

What can neuroimaging meta-analyses really tell us about the nature of emotion?

In Vytal and Hamann (2010) we reported a neuroimaging meta-analysis that found that basic emotions can be distinguished by their brain activation correlates, in marked contrast to Lindquist et al.'s conclusions in the target article. Here, I discuss implications of these findings for understanding emotion, outline limitations of using meta-analyses and neuroimaging as the sole basis for deciding between emotion views, and suggest that these views are essentially compatible and could be adapted and combined into an integrated emotion framework.     

What's so special about the average face?

The past few years have seen a marked increase in our understanding of how faces are represented in the brain, with the discovery of new anatomical structures and new algorithms for representing faces. Still, the basic computational mechanism used by the primate visual system to identify faces remains a topic of intense debate. Are faces represented by matching to a set of stored exemplars, or by measuring the distance from a standard prototype along a set of different axes? A recent article by Rhodes and Jeffery provides compelling psychophysical evidence in favor of the latter 'axis' model.     

Self-control and cooperation: different concepts, similar decisions? A question of the right perspective

Conflicts between an individual's long-term and short-term goals (i.e., self-control conflicts) and conflicts between individual and collective interests (mixed-motive situations) share some interesting features. In this article both types of conflicts are approached from a perspective hypothesis. The hypothesis holds that a decision maker's perspective on his or her decision determines whether either the long-term goals (the collective interests) or the short-term goals (the individual interests) will guide behavior. The hypothesis also implies that factors known to enhance cooperative choices in mixed-motive situations should also facilitate self-control. Three such factors are evaluated: group identification, self-efficacy, and mutual trust. We conclude that the perspective in which choice is considered part of an identifiable series of behaviors is most likely to result in cooperation or self-control.     

Who needs control? A cultural perspective on the process of compensatory control

Compensatory control theory (CCT) provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms at play when one's personal control is challenged. The model suggests that believing the world is a structured and predictable place is fundamental, insofar as it provides the foundation upon which people can believe they are able to exert control over their environment and act agentically towards goals. Because of this, CCT suggests, when personal control is threatened people try to reaffirm the more foundational belief in structure/predictability in the world, so that they then have a strong foundation to reestablish feelings of personal control and pursue their goals. This review seeks to understand how the basic assumptions of these compensatory control processes unfold in different cultural contexts. Drawing on research and theorizing from cultural psychology, we propose that cultural models of self and agency, culturally prevalent modes of control, and culture-specific motivations all have implications for compensatory control processes. Culture determines, in part, whether or not personal control deprivation is experienced as a threat to perceiving an orderly world, how/whether individuals respond to low personal control, and the function that responses to restore a sense of order in the world serve. A theoretical model of compensatory control processes across cultures is proposed that has implications for how people cope with a wide range of personal and societal events that potentially threaten their personal control.     

Are psychological studies of religion on the right track?

Researchers in psychology of religion in America and Britain have inherited the theoretical and research traditions established by W. James, S. Freud and J. Dittes. New nomothetic or theoretical frameworks have been called for in order to organize a plethora of idiographic data. A response to the call has been slow, but Paul Pruyser designated at least six areas in which the development of psychology of religion might most fruitfully occur; and the suggestion has been that altered states of consciousness research is perhaps the most important item of all six to consider for research methodology. This particular item, it was broadly suggested, may possibly serve as a bridge between East and West, thereby bringing psychologists of religion out of the darkness of Western methodological ethnocentrism, and into the light of cross-cultural, universally-applicable concerns sought in the spirit of the scientific study of religion. Psychologists of religion must rely on the tradition of Religion-swissenschaft for much of the ‘non-reducible’ data they study. Although the preponderence of general activity in the field is occurring in America, little attention along these lines is evident there. In Britain, the discipline is floundering. Yet, in spite of its quandaries, recognition of the need to encounter Eastern psychologies and religions, perhaps by means of the ‘bridge’ of altered states of consciousness research, appears to be more clearly stated in Britain (though infrequent, often obscure) than it has been elsewhere.     

A right to health care? Participatory politics,progressive policy,and the price of loose language

This article begins by clarifying and noting various limitations on the universal reach of the human right to health care under positive international law. It then argues that irrespective of the human right to health care established by positive international law, any system of positive international law capable of generating legal duties with prima facie moral force necessarily presupposes a universal moral human right to health care. But the language used in contemporary human rights documents or human rights advocacy is not a good guide to the content of this rather more modest universal moral human right to health care. The conclusion reached is that when addressing issues of justice as they inevitably arise with respect to health policy and health care, both within and between states, there is typically little to gain and much to risk by framing deliberation in terms of the human right to health care.     

What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi‐political worry about blame is raised.     

What's so funny about not having money? The effects of power on laughter

Two studies tested the hypothesis that occupying a position of low power increases the likelihood of laughter, presumably as a means of gaining friends and supporters. In Study 1, participants laughed more at an interviewer's jokes when the interviewer controlled their cash rewards than in the absence of monetary contingencies. Study 2 found that low-power participants (manipulated again by expecting that someone else would decide their cash rewards) laughed more than high-power participants even when they were alone. Low power also increased laughing at a fellow low-power coworker. These findings suggest that low power motivates interest in making friends and hence increases behaviors that promote social bonding.     

What's so logical about the “logical” axioms?

Intuitionists and classical logicians use in common a large number of the logical axioms, even though they supposedly mean different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers — conquans for short. But Wittgenstein says The meaning of a word is its use in the language. We prove that in a definite sense the intuitionistic axioms do indeed characterize the logical conquans, both for the intuitionist and the classical logician.     

Does functional neuroimaging solve the questions of neurolinguistics?

Neurolinguistic research has been engaged in evaluating models of language using measures from brain structure and function, and/or in investigating brain structure and function with respect to language representation using proposed models of language. While the aphasiological strategy, which classifies aphasias based on performance modality and a few linguistic variables, has been the most stable, cognitive neurolinguistics has had less success in reliably associating more elaborately proposed levels and units of language models with brain structure. Functional imaging emerged at this stage of neurolinguistic research. In this review article, it is proposed that the often-inconsistent superfluity of outcomes arising from functional imaging studies of language awaits adjustment at both "ends" of the process: model and data. Assumptions that our current language models consistently and reliably represent implicit knowledge within human cerebral processing are in line for major revision; and the promise of functional brain imaging to reveal any such knowledge structures must incorporate stable correlates of the imaging signal as dependent variable.     

What's up? Emotion-specific activation of vertical space during language processing

The relationship between language processing and vertical space has been shown for various groups of words including valence words, implicit location words, and words referring to religious concepts. However, it remains unclear whether these are single phenomena or whether there is an underlying common mechanism. Here, we show that the evaluation of word valence interacts with motor responses in the vertical dimension, with positive (negative) evaluations facilitating upward (downward) responses. When valence evaluation was not required, implicit location words (e.g., bird, shoe) influenced motor responses whereas valence words (e.g., kiss, hate) did not. Importantly, a subset of specific emotional valence words that are commonly associated with particular bodily postures (e.g., proud → upright; sad → slouched) did automatically influence motor responses. Together, this suggests that while the vertical spatial dimension is not directly activated by word valence, it is activated when processing words referring to emotional states with stereotypical bodily-postures. These results provide strong evidence that the activation of spatial associations during language processing is experience-specific in nature and cannot be explained with reference to a general mapping between all valence words and space (i.e., all positive and negative words generally relate to spatial processing). These findings support the experiential view of language comprehension, suggesting that the automatic reactivation of bodily experiences is limited to word groups referring to emotions or entities directly associated with spatial experiences (e.g., posture or location in the world).     

The faculty of language: what's special about it?

We examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic in light of recent suggestions by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific to humans but not to language (e.g. words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g. speech perception). We find the hypothesis problematic. It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments suggesting that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion. The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky's recent approach to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language. The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support claims about evolution. We contest related arguments that language is not an adaptation, namely that it is "perfect," non-redundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems.