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1.
Carsten Ljunggren 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(1):19-33
Agonistic recognition in education has three interlinked modes of aesthetic experience and self-presentation where one is
related to actions in the public realm; one is related to plurality in the way in which it comes into existence in confrontation
with others; and one is related to the subject-self, disclosed by ‘thinking. Arendt’s conception of ‘thinking’ is a way of
getting to grips with aesthetic self-presentation in education. By action, i.e., by disclosing oneself and by taking initiatives,
students and teachers constitute their being. The way Arendt theorizes action (vita activa) makes it essentially unpredictable
and destabilizing, which does not seem to fit into what should be expected from education. In the article I will argue that
it should have a place by virtue of the debate, challenge and contest it offers. But education should also be defined from
a specific kind of contemplation called ‘thinking’ to become the cultivation of a faculty of judgment in education—thinking
(vita contemplativa) as a common virtue in education. Arendt’s demarcation between truth and meaning does from the point of
view of agonistic recognition in education call for ‘thinking’ as a qualification of political and moral meaning–the ‘taste’
to be established in the individual, by individual judgements but always judged in relation to members of a community. 相似文献
2.
An antinomy of political judgment: Kant,Arendt, and the role of purposiveness in reflective judgment
Avery Goldman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):331-352
This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the
Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes
such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the
moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be at odds with the social cohesion
of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of
reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative
principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this
antinomy. 相似文献
3.
Trevor Norris 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2006,25(6):457-477
This paper considers the place of education within our “consumers’ society”, beginning with Hannah Arendt’s account of the
rise of consumerism to a position of political dominance and the resulting eclipse of public life. Connections are then made
between Arendt’s account of this rise and Jean Baudrillard’s account of the postmodern proliferation of signs and the transformation
of the sign into a commodity. This radical “semiurgy” accelerates into a self-referential series of signs which entails the
loss of reality – it contributes to the disappearance of the human subjectivity behind the creation of images. I argue that
Baudrillard does not respond adequately to the dynamic that he describes so well. By contrast, Arendt’s concept of natality,
I suggest, prepares the ground for a response to the forces of commodification that colonize the educational environment and
threaten its critical possibilities. As youth and schools receive more and more attention from advertisers, students are sold
by educational institutions to commercial interests who seek unfettered access to this “captive audience”. Yet education is
profoundly compromised when youths are viewed as consumers and not as a social investment, when education is viewed merely
as an opportunity to secure a new market. 相似文献
4.
Craig Reeves 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):137-164
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer
legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following
Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival
theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy
of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom
provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical
character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s
lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but
actually unfree subject of modernity.
相似文献
Craig ReevesEmail: |
5.
Matteo Bonotti 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):107-123
Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious
political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains
the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction
imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political
liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’
political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily
understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives
on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative
implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to
allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness
and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which
may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to
religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of
reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious
partisanship. 相似文献
6.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
7.
8.
Hermann Schmitz Rudolf Owen M��llan Jan Slaby 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):241-259
The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928).
In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction
with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives
an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process:
A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’)
as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced
to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to
phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for
what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s
philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers
Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects
of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to
its potential applications in science and society. 相似文献
9.
Iain Macdonald 《Continental Philosophy Review》2012,45(1):121-141
This paper addresses the question of normativity in Hegel by examining the role of ‘undialectical’ resistance to dialectical
development. Beginning with a general overview of dialectical normativity and what it might mean to be ‘undialectical,’ the
focus then shifts to a privileged example in Hegel’s writings: Sophocles’ Antigone. The central claim of the paper is the following: The very contradictions that fuel dialectical normativity can also trap
individuals within an obsolete actuality, without immediate hope of escape. Indeed, the irreducible dependence of dialectical
thinking upon the actions and decisions of individual consciousness expose it to the threat of continual stasis or regression.
This ineliminable possibility of failure is what is here called the ‘undialectical’ moment of the dialectic, which Hegel understands
rather as a negative condition of possibility of freedom and rationality. 相似文献
10.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
11.
J. Allister McGregor Laura Camfield Alison Woodcock 《Applied research in quality of life》2009,4(2):135-154
This paper considers the possible contribution of Quality of Life methods in international development policy and practice.
It discusses the role of theories of human needs in how public policy makers and implementors might distinguish between ‘needs’
and ‘wants’. There is a good case for extending theories of human need to encompass social and psychological needs, but when
we do so the ability of theory to distinguish between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ begins to evaporate. Rather, by virtue of the core
relationship between needs denial and harm, it is argued that a theory of human need can provide a framework for reasoning
about what constitute needs. Empirical quality of life data can then assist policy makers to identify what constitute needs
satisfiers in particular societal and cultural contexts. They also can provide important information to enable processes of
public reasoning about the relative societal importance of different needs claims. The paper uses data generated through the
application of two Quality of Life methods in Southern and Northeast Thailand, which were employed as part of a comprehensive
study of the social and cultural construction of wellbeing in developing countries, to illustrate its arguments. The paper
concludes that if routinely incorporated into local policy process, such quality of life methods have a possible contribution
to make to effective democratic governance for development. 相似文献
12.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of
a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that
people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition,
and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model
has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their
moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not
really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation.
Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’
because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical
individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular
moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically.
In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters
of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making
moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
13.
Cohen-Almagor R 《Science and engineering ethics》1995,1(3):261-272
This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration
the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference
should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long
as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not able to comprehend their own interests
in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable.
I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it
is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family.
The author’s research interests include bioethics, free speech, tolerance and ethics in the media. 相似文献
14.
Mechthild Hart 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2013,28(1):49-68
In this essay I describe how my involvement in the political struggles of an immigrant domestic workers' collective inspired me to hang out not only with the workers, but also with the writings of María Lugones and Hannah Arendt. The essay invites the reader to engage in a playful rereading of Arendt's notion of the worldlessness of laboring in the private realm by putting her into dialogue with Lugones's notion of the hangout that defies the public–private split Arendt adamantly insists on in all her writings. By following the complex physical, mental, and emotional itineraries of immigrant domestic workers to, from, and in‐between a number of places and spaces, I demonstrate how their stories blur the line between public and private, and therefore also between the unfreedom of the body and the presumed escape into the political public. I describe the women's experiences as the living promise of a world that allows for an embodied fluid movement between labor, work, and the freedom “inherent in action” (Arendt 193, 153). 相似文献
15.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):15-34
Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s
main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as
objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox
externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have
of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism.
But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting
“hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that
Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own
version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of
Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option. 相似文献
16.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
17.
A. Sierszulska 《Axiomathes》2006,16(4):486-498
It is not a common practice to postulate meaning entities treated as objects of some kind. The paper demonstrates two ways
of introducing meaning-objects in two logics of natural language, Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic and Zalta’s Intensional
Logic of Abstract Objects. Tichy’s theory belongs to the Fregean line of thinking, with what he calls ‘constructions’ as Fregean
senses, and ‘determiners’ as object-like meaning entities constructed by the senses. Zalta’s theory belongs to Meinongian
logics and he postulates a rich realm of abstract Meinongian objects to play the role of meanings. The paper analyses the
mechanisms of reference in both conceptions and it offers a comparison of the mediating meaning-objects and the framework
designed to expose this mediation in both theories. An attempt is made to expose how the treatment of the meaning entities
depends upon the theory of meaning which is assumed. 相似文献
18.
Wynne B 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(4):791-800
Midstream modulation is a form of public engagement with science which benefits from strategic application of science and
technology studies (STS) insights accumulated over nearly 20 years. These have been developed from STS researchers’ involvement
in practical engagement processes and research with scientists, science funders, policy and other public stakeholders. The
strategic aim of this specific method, to develop what is termed second-order reflexivity amongst scientist-technologists,
builds upon and advances earlier more general STS work. However this method is focused and structured so as to help generate
such reflexivity—over the ‘upstream’ questions which have been identified in other STS research as important public issues
for scientific research, development and innovation—amongst practising scientists-technologists in their specialist contexts
(public or private, in principle). This is a different focus from virtually all such previous work, and offers novel opportunities
for those key broader issues to be opened up. The further development of these promising results depends on some important
conditions such as identifying and engaging research funders and other stakeholders like affected publics in similar exercises.
Implementing these conditions could connect the productive impacts of midstream modulation with wider public engagement work,
including with ‘uninvited’ public engagement with science. It would also generate broader institutional and political changes
in the larger networks of institutional actors which constitute contemporary technoscientific innovation and governance processes.
All of these various broader dimensions, far beyond the laboratory alone, need to be appropriately open, committed to democratic
needs, and reflexive, for the aims of midstream modulation to be achieved, whilst allowing specialists to work as specialists. 相似文献
19.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
20.
Huaihong He 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(1):84-94
The more diverse cultures and values a country perceives to be “normal” even “just”, the more it needs to search for a public
philosophy. Having developed only recently, China, which is speedily progressing towards a market economy, can be considered
this kind of country. This article takes Daniel Bell’s concept of modern society and public household as the basis for expatiating
on some chief problems and the ways to solve them. It pays special attention to investigating the public ethic while probing
public philosophy, and it argues that the public ethic is an ethic that deals with public affairs in the public realm, especially
the social political realm; with respect to all people involved, it is a common ethic or an ethic with openness. It is also
an ethic that appeals to public opinion and public reason, and tries to find consensus from the demands of different values.
Furthermore, because it refers to fundamental public benefits, it has to be a normative ethic of universalism and of baseline
holders.
Translated by Su Jing from Zhexue Dongtai 哲学动态 (Philosophical Trends), 2005, (8): 3–8 相似文献