Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.     

Game theory and belief in God

In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions of his book, Superior Beings. I have two main aims in this paper, one specific and one general. My specific aim is to show that Brams’ application of game theory to examine belief in God is, in particular, deeply flawed in two respects. My general aim is to show that any game-theoretic model in which a human being and God are players can only succeed at the cost of abandoning the assumption that God is omnibenevolent.     

Divine self-testimony and the knowledge of God

A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended by Plantinga. Appropriate causal chains and reliable cognitive processes only seem at best to ensure that a belief proposed for acceptance is the belief the testifier wants accepted; they do not ensure that it is rational to accept the belief. This particularly applies where there is much at stake, where it seems rational to seek some form of evidence, if available. Some brief comments are made on Trinitarian self-testimony. Another model of the ‘inner witness’ is briefly sketched out, based on the analogy with conscience. This model may capture some of the features of Plantinga’s approach, but leaves room for a free rejection of divine self-testimony, in a way that the perceptual analogy does not. A point connected to Plantinga’s aims is then made about the link between evidence, value and divine self-testimony, in relation to religious experience. Finally, it is suggested that the earlier proof may apply in a particular sense to all knowledge of God, including that based on natural theology.     

How checking as a cognitive style influences working memory performance

Compulsive checking is known to influence memory, yet there is little consideration of checking as a cognitive style within the typical population. We employed a working memory task where letters had to be remembered in their locations. The key experimental manipulation was to induce repeated checking after encoding by asking about a stimulus that had not been presented. We recorded the effect that such misleading probes had on a subsequent memory test. Participants drawn from the typical population but who scored highly on a checking‐scale had poorer memory and less confidence than low scoring individuals. While thoroughness is regarded as a quality, our results indicate that a cognitive style that favours repeated checking does not always lead to the best performance as it can undermine the authenticity of memory traces. This may affect various aspects of everyday life including the work environment and we discuss its implications and possible counter‐measures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God: Exploring Divine Ideals

This paper presents a feminist intervention into debates concerning the relation between human subjects and a divine ideal. I turn to what Irigarayan feminists challenge as a masculine conception of ‘the God’s eye view’ of reality. This ideal functions not only in philosophy of religion, but in ethics, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science: it is given various names from ‘the competent judge’ to the ‘the ideal observer’ (IO) whose view is either from nowhere or everywhere. The question is whether, as Taliaferro contends, my own philosophical argument inevitably appeals to the impartiality and omni-attributes of the IO. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Isn't belief in God an attitude?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.     

The Divine Triangle: God in the Marital System of Religious Couples

Incoporating both Bowenian and structural approaches, this article offers a constructivist view for dealing with religious belief systems of couples. After exploring the evolving process by which couples mutually define an ongoing triadic relationship with their Deity, different triangular processes from an integrated structural and Bowenian perspective are presented. This view is evaluative in terms of the triangulation process rather than the belief systems themselves, and, as such, it can be useful in marital therapy regardless of the religious beliefs of the therapist. Implications for marital therapy are examined.     

The Divine Essence and the Conception of God in Spinoza

I argue against a prevailing view that the essence of Godis identical with the attributes. I show that given what Spinoza says in 2d2 – Spinoza'spurported definition of the essence of a thing – the attributes cannot be identical withthe essence of God (whether the essence of God is understood as the distinct attributesor as a totality of indistinct attributes). I argue that while the attributes do notsatisfy the stipulations of 2d2 relative to God, absolutely infinite and eternal power does satisfythose stipulations. Hence, I conclude that absolutely infinite and eternal power is God'sessence and that the attributes are expressions of that power.     

Divine Energies or Divine Personhood: Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas on conceiving the transcendent and immanent God

This essay explores a debate between two contemporary Orthodox theolo-gians, Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas, over how to adequately conceive the doctrine of the Trinity as an expression of the realism of divine-human communion, and hence, of the God who is transcendent and immanent. The essay critically analyzes the implications of Zizioulas's reworking of the patristic category of hypostasis . Zizioulas's theology is suggesting a paradigm shift in contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology insofar as it prioritizes hypostasis over energies for expressing the realism of divine-human communion. The implications of this study also extend to debates within contemporary trinitarian theologies over the adequacy of the concept of "person" for conceptualizing the Trinity.     

Sola Gratia as Divine Attribute: Resurrecting the God of the Gospel

Can we speak of sola gratia as a divine attribute so as to affirm that all that God does is grace? Traditionally, Western Christian theology has answered that question negatively, placing God's justice in opposition with God's grace and presenting a God whose love does not seem to be unconditional. This has been especially evident in the ways in which Scripture, the work of Christ, justification by faith, and the distinction between law and gospel commonly have been interpreted. By rethinking those traditional interpretations on the basis of an understanding of divine grace as unconditional love, we can indeed proclaim a God of sola gratia and a gospel capable of transforming human lives and responding effectively to the crisis of faith we face today.     

The need to belong can motivate belief in God

The need to belong can motivate belief in God. In Study 1, 40 undergraduates read bogus astrophysics articles "proving" God's existence or not offering proof. Participants in the proof-for-God condition reported higher belief in God (compared to control) when they chronically imagined God as accepting but lower belief in God when they imagined God as rejecting. Additionally, in Study 2 (72 undergraduates), these effects did not occur when participants' belongingness need was satisfied by priming close others. Study 3 manipulated 79 Internet participants' image of God. Chronic believers in the God-is-rejecting condition reported lower religious behavioral intentions than chronic believers in the God-is-accepting condition, and this effect was mediated by lower desires for closeness with God. In Study 4 (106 Internet participants), chronic believers with an accepting image of God reported that their belief in God is motivated by belongingness needs.