Children's understanding of the transmission of genetic disorders and contagious illnesses

The authors conducted 4 studies suggesting that children attribute different modes of transmission to genetic disorders and contagious illnesses. Study 1 presented preschoolers through 5th graders and adults with "switched-at-birth" scenarios for various disorders. Study 2 presented preschoolers with the same disorders but used contagion links in a contagion context. Studies 3 and 4 presented preschoolers and adults with novel (fictitious) illnesses to determine which cues participants would use to differentiate the modes of transmission. In the presence of kinship cues, children distinguished genetic disorders from contagious illnesses, but in the presence of contagion cues, preschoolers selectively applied contagious links primarily to contagious illnesses. With novel illnesses, preschoolers and adults inferred that permanent illnesses were more likely to be transmitted by birth parents than by contagion. These results suggest that by the preschool years, children recognize that not all disorders are transmitted exclusively through germ contagion.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children's explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N=24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant "explanation advantage" for children's reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Preschoolers’ Compliance With Others’ Violations of Fairness Norms: The Roles of Intentionality and Affective Perspective Taking

ABSTRACT

Young children are remarkably compliant with social norms, especially those governing fairness and equality. Yet children also frequently observe and face opportunities to violate those social norms, particularly in situations in which doing so is self-beneficial. In 3 studies, we investigated the conditions under which children adhere to social norms using a novel resource distribution paradigm in which children met an experimenter who expressed either a norm-consistent (equal distribution) or norm-inconsistent (unequal distribution) intention. In Experiment 1, we found that preschoolers generally complied with an experimenter’s intention, regardless of its norm consistency. In Experiment 2, the experimenter again expressed a norm-consistent or norm-inconsistent intention but accidentally placed resources in the opposite distribution of that intended. Preschoolers mostly defaulted to the social norm of fairness. However, they were less likely to do so (and more likely to comply with the norm-violating experimenter) when the inequality was self-benefitting. The likelihood of norm defiance in the face of self-benefit appeared to relate to children’s affective perspective taking. In Experiment 3, we found that training preschoolers in affective perspective taking increased the likelihood children would defy a norm-violating experimenter’s unfair intention. Thus, although preschoolers were generally compliant, both fairness norms and affective perspective taking served as important mechanisms to help children selectively defy adults’ instructions and intentions.     

Developing domain-specific causal-explanatory frameworks: the role of insides and immanence

Two studies investigate children's knowledge of internal parts and their endorsement of immanent causes for the behaviors of living and non-living things. Study 1, involving 48 preschoolers, showed that domain-specific knowledge of internal parts develops between ages 3 and 4. Study 2 included 43 4-year-olds, 30 8-year-olds, and 35 adults and showed that preschoolers do not endorse these internal parts as causally responsible for familiar biological events (e.g., movement, growth). Like adults and older children, however, preschoolers endorse an abstract cause, “its own energy,” for animals but not for machines. The results suggest that children recognize domain-specific internal parts as early as age 4 but that their causal attributions are not yet anchored in a detailed biological theory. Findings are discussed in terms of theory change and an essentialist assumption.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Preschoolers' understanding of germs as invisible mechanisms

Recent studies have presented conflicting claims regarding whether young children's reasoning about biological content involves a unique set of causal mechanisms and theoretical entities. Three studies examined preschoolers' understanding of nonobservable causal mechanisms in causes of illness. According to traditional accounts, these children know that certain behaviors lead to illness but have no idea why or how. Many of the behaviors children cite as causes are actually mediated by the action of germs (e.g., contamination and contagion). Do children recognize that germs (nonobvious, invisible particles) are the mechanisms involved in some cases of illness causation? Study 1 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds' predictions of who will get sick in cases of contamination and contagion are based on the presence or absence of germs. Study 2 serves as a control and further tests how children generalize this mechanism: Which causes do children think are mediated by germs? Data suggest that preschoolers understand but undergeneralize the role of germs. A final study indicates that younger preschoolers (3-year-olds) recognize that appearances may be deceiving when it comes to judging causes of illness. This understanding would seem to be a precursor to beliefs about specific mechanisms. Results are discussed in terms of commonsense theories and early conceptions of biology.     

Child behavior,maternal depression,and social coercion as factors in the quality of child care

Observational and self-report data were obtained in the homes of 33 mother-child dyads. These volunteer, normal subjects were monitored with respect to their affectionate and aversive interactions, and the mothers were asked to provide three categories of self-report data. Mothers made observational judgments of their children, their own feelings of depression, and the valences of their interactions with adults. Multiple regression analyses were then employed to predict the mothers' child care behaviors, which were composed of observed mother responses and mother observational judgments. In addition, conditional probability analyses were conducted to examine the directionality of correlations between observed mother-child interchanges. Results showed child behavior to be the best single predictor of how the mothers responded to their children, followed by maternal depression and mother coercive interactions with adults. Child behavior was shown to be a significant antecedent cue for the maternal responses. However, the findings also showed that mother observational judgments about their children had little to do with how the children behaved. Rather, the maternal judgments were best predicted by mother depression, mother coercive interchanges with adults, and the mothers' observed aversive responses to their children. Results were interpreted within a systems framework in which maternal care is viewed as a response that is triangulated by adult-and child-produced stimuli.     

What young children think about the relationship between language variation and social difference

Previous work suggests that preschoolers understand that members of some social groups (e.g., based on occupation or gender) speak in distinct ways, but do not understand that members of other social groups (e.g., based on race, culture, or nationality) speak different languages. In these four studies we explored preschool children's inferences about language and social group membership. In Study 1 we found that preschoolers believed that minority race individuals, people wearing unfamiliar clothing, or people living in unfamiliar dwellings were more likely to speak an unfamiliar foreign language than to speak English. Studies 2A and 2B showed that children do not map social group differences to language for all social categories. Specifically, children were more likely to attribute language differences to racial rather than age differences and were more likely to map differences in music preference onto age than racial differences. Results of Study 3 showed children's inferences about language and social group differences were not derived from differences in intelligibility. Study 4 provides insight into why children readily make these language to social kind mappings by identifying a common property that both broad social kinds and distinct languages are thought to share. Together these studies provide evidence that even preschoolers may be coordinating knowledge across content domains in a coherent and meaningful way that underwrites the projection of existing knowledge to unknown instances.     

学前儿童对疾病的认知

通过三个研究分别探查了教育条件不同的两组学前儿童能否以疾病这一生命现象为指标做出生物和非生物的本体区分;他们是否理解疾病的产生和康复不受心理意图控制;以及他们对疾病原因的认识。结果显示,3、4、5岁学前儿童在分类作业中的认知成绩随年龄逐渐提高,他们能够认识疾病不受意图控制。其对疾病原因的解释既不用意图也不用道德准则,而主要是从行为水平,表现出“朴素生物学”的认知,但其认知与成人的认知和科学的生物学概念有明显差距。教育条件影响儿童的疾病认知成绩     

Do children think that inheritance determines height and weight?

Three studies were conducted to investigate if children think that physical growth is determined by inheritance. All three studies employed the “switched‐at‐birth” task. Study 1 investigated if children and adults thought that height and weight were determined by parentage. Study 2 examined preschoolers and elementary school children's and adults' understanding of the role of parentage and nutrition in determining weight. Study 2a examined children's and adults' understanding of the role of parentage and nutrition in determining height. Results indicate that overall, preschoolers and third graders have more of an inheritance bias for height than for weight. However, when nutrition was introduced, apart from third graders, all other grades reasoned that nutrition played a greater role in determining weight. Overall, these results indicate that even young children have a rudimentary but differentiated theory of the role of inheritance in determining height and weight.

Highlights

• Participants were presented with switched‐at‐birth tasks to determine if they thought that parentage and/or nutrition influences height and weight.
• Young children viewed height as determined more by parentage than weight, suggesting that they have a differentiated and autonomous theory for the determination of height.

     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Children's use of mental state information in selecting persuasive arguments

Whether and when children use information about others' mental states to invent or select persuasive strategies were examined. In Study 1, preschoolers, 3rd-graders, and 6th-graders (ns = 11, 12, and 16, respectively; 17 girls) were told about story characters' persuading parents to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story parents' beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Older children, but not preschoolers, used belief information to select arguments. Results were replicated in Study 2 (16 kindergartners, 16 3rd-graders; 19 girls). In Study 3, kindergartners and 1st-graders (N = 16; 6 girls) reasoned well on false-belief tasks but not on persuasion tasks, suggesting that failure to consider mental states in persuasion was not due to lack of a belief concept. Findings suggest that mental state understanding may continue to develop after the preschool years; methodological qualifications are also considered.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Birth,kind and naïve biology

Much recent debate concerning the acquisition of naïve theories of biology and of race has turned on the claim that even preschoolers understand biological inheritance. At issue is what is implied by the belief that offspring will have the characteristic features of their kind. The present paper argues that such an essentialist belief in innate potential need not indicate a domain‐specific understanding of the biological inheritance of human kinds (or race). In Study 1, preschoolers in a Switched‐at‐birth task were found to be as likely to judge an adopted girl to resemble her birth parents on the color of their shirts as on their race. In Study 2, a variant on the task, 4‐year‐olds were found to be more likely to judge the girl to resemble her adoptive parents, suggesting that the concept of birth origin was not central to their reasoning. Though the results are consistent with the claim that preschoolers reason about human kinds in an essentialist manner, they undermine the broader claim that such reasoning is anchored by a naïve theory of biology. The finding is of cultural as well as cognitive consequence.     

TV Viewing Compared to Book Reading and Toy Playing Reduces Responsive Maternal Communication with Toddlers and Preschoolers

This study compared the amount and style of maternal communication with toddlers and preschoolers while mother–child pairs watched TV, read books, and played with toys. We found that mother–child communication was less frequent and less verbally responsive when dyads viewed TV compared with when they read books, and in many cases, when they played with toys. In addition, some forms of maternal responsiveness were positively associated with indicators of youngsters' emergent literacy. Mothers' use of directive language was negatively related to emergent literacy. These findings suggest that TV co‐viewing produces a relatively detrimental communication environment for young children, while shared book reading encourages effective mother–child exchanges.     

Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes prefer child informants over adult informants

Do preschoolers think adults know more about everything than children? Or do they recognize that there are some things that children might know more about than adults? Three‐, four‐, and five‐year olds (N=65) were asked to decide whether an adult or child informant would better be able to answer a variety of questions about the nutritional value of foods and about toys. Children at all ages chose to direct the food questions to the adult and the toy questions to the child. Thus, there are some kinds of information for which preschoolers expect that a child would be a better informant than an adult. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deception by young children following noncompliance

A paradigm devised by M. Lewis, C. Stanger, and M. W. Sullivan (1989) was adapted to study deception and false-belief understanding. In Study 1, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to touch a toy in the experimenter's absence. Just over half of the children touched the toy, and of those children, the majority denied having done so. Of control children who were given permission to touch the toy, all touched it and admitted having done so. In Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to look in a box to identify its contents. Almost all children looked, most denied having looked, and a minority consistently feigned ignorance of the contents. False-belief understanding was linked to denial of looking but not to feigning ignorance. Of control children who were given permission to look, all acknowledged looking, and they almost always revealed their knowledge of the contents. The studies confirm that preschoolers deceive in the context of a minor misdemeanor but are less effective at feigning ignorance.     

Children use nonverbal cues from an adult to evaluate peers

What factors contribute to children’s tendency to view individuals as having different traits and abilities? The present research tested whether young children are influenced by adults’ nonverbal behaviors when making inferences about peers. In Study 1, participants (aged 5–6 years) viewed multiple videos of interactions between a “teacher” and two “students”; all individuals were unfamiliar to participants. In each clip, the students behaved similarly, but the teacher did not: She either smiled, nodded, touched, or shook her head at one student, and she looked at the other student with a neutral expression. In Study 1, children tended to infer that students who received more positive behaviors from the teacher were smarter, nicer, and stronger. Study 2 pitted differences in the teacher’s behavior against differences in the students’ performance. When asked who was smarter, children selected lower-performing students who received more positive nonverbal cues from the teacher rather than higher-performing students who received less positive cues. These findings indicate that an authority figure’s nonverbal behaviors can influence children’s inferences about others and shed light on one mechanism guiding young children’s evaluations of people in their social world.     

Understanding pretence and understanding action

Two studies were carried out in an attempt to replicate an earlier but controversial set of findings that suggested that young children are able to understand pretence in a mentalistic sense (Hickling, Wellman, & Gottfried, 1997). In Study 1, 65 three‐year‐olds and 77 four‐year‐olds were asked to either judge the thoughts of an absent teddy bear, who had not witnessed a change in the original pretence stipulation, or were asked to complete a similar, standard false‐belief task. Study 2 repeated the experimental procedures of the first study with 24 three‐year‐olds and 16 four‐year‐olds, with the difference that all children had to complete both tasks in a single session. The results obtained across both studies showed that 3‐year‐olds were unable to correctly judge the discrepant thoughts of the teddy bear, suggesting that young children do not attribute a false belief to another actor during pretend play, and that instead they view pretence in terms of overt action.