Transworld Similarity and Transworld Belief

Relations of transworld similarity play an essential role in Lewis's system. Analysis reveals that they involve the possibility of detailed transworld belief. Such belief is problematic within Lewis's framework. He has an answer to the problems raised, but it relies on a dubious distinction between natural and mere properties. Replacing that distinction with a respectable one undermines an essential part of his case against one of his chief opponents, the linguistic ersatzist.     

Gross Depravity and Moral Seriousness

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to supply a justification in moral philosophy for considering the grossly depraved criminal to be less than a normally responsible agent. Decisions concerning the responsibility of a person depend upon our ability to act and react morally with that person. The argument is that when we reflect on the implications of (1) the moral role that desires play in excusing or condemning actions and (2) the minimum moral requirements of punishment, we realise that a moral community does not exist between us and the grossly depraved. That is, we cannot apply key moral categories simpliciter , including the notion of guilt.     

Worlds and times

In the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus suggested that the proper analysis of modality required not just moments of time but also ??moments of nature??. In making this suggestion, he broke with an influential view first presented by Diodorus in the early Hellenistic period, and might even be said to have been the inventor of ??possible worlds??. In this essay we take Scotus?? suggestion seriously devising first a double-index logic and then introducing the temporal order. Finally, using the temporal order, we define a modal order. This allows us to present modal logic without the usual interpretive questions arising concerning the relation called variously ??accessibility??, ??alternativeness??, and, ??relative possibility.?? The system in which this analysis is done is one of those which have come to be called a hybrid logic.     

Worlds within Worlds: Kabbalah and the New Scientific Paradigm

Beginning with relativity and quantum theory, the deterministic view that has dominated and shaped Western culture for more than 2,500 years has begun to unravel, leading to the emergence of a new paradigm. This new paradigm effectively reformulates the project of science, conceiving of existence as an interpenetrating web of coevolving, cocreative relationships. By exploring Kabbalah and the new scientific paradigm within the context of shared evolutionary principles, I seek to demonstrate a viable alternative to the prevailing deterministic worldview. By going beyond the limits of determinism and re–visioning existence as an evolutionary, emergent phenomenon, we can establish a new basis for an authentic dialogue between science and religion.     

Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds

It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects – cannot deal adequately with statementsinvolving iterated modality, because such claims require reference, either explicit or surreptitious, to non-actualobjects. If so, actualists would have to reject the standard semantics for quantified modal logic (QML). In this paper I develop an account of modality which allows the actualist tomake sense of iterated modal claims that are ostensibly aboutnon-actual objects. Every occurrence of a modal operatorinvolves the stipulation of a possible world, and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.I provide an actualistically acceptable (AA) semantics for QMLwherein the nesting relation is irreflexive and intransitive and forms a tree. Despite these restrictions, AA models can beshown to be sound and complete for a wide variety of modal logics.     

Impossible Worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds‐based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds‐based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.     

Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction

The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account.     

Worlds,Capabilities and Well-Being

Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is, as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being. According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful, that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs, which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to any objective account of value.