Item-specific adaptation and the conflict-monitoring hypothesis: a computational model

M. M. Botvinick, T. S. Braver, D. M. Barch, C. S. Carter, and J. D. Cohen (2001) implemented their conflict-monitoring hypothesis of cognitive control in a series of computational models. The authors of the current article first demonstrate that M. M. Botvinick et al.'s (2001) conflict-monitoring Stroop model fails to simulate L. L. Jacoby, D. S. Lindsay, and S. Hessels's (2003) report of an item-specific proportion-congruent (ISPC) effect in the Stroop task. The authors then implement a variant of M. M. Botvinick et al.'s model based on the assumption that control must be able to operate at the item level. This model successfully simulates the ISPC effect. In addition, the model provides an alternative to M. M. Botvinick et al.'s explanation of the list-level proportion-congruent effect in terms of an ISPC effect. Implications of the present modeling effort are discussed.     

Dissociating conflict adaptation from feature integration: a multiple regression approach

Congruency effects are typically smaller after incongruent than after congruent trials. One explanation is in terms of higher levels of cognitive control after detection of conflict (conflict adaptation; e.g., M. M. Botvinick, T. S. Braver, D. M. Barch, C. S. Carter, & J. D. Cohen, 2001). An alternative explanation for these results is based on feature repetition and/or integration effects (e.g., B. Hommel, R. W. Proctor, & K.-P. Vu, 2004; U. Mayr, E. Awh, & P. Laurey, 2003). Previous attempts to dissociate feature integration from conflict adaptation focused on a particular subset of the data in which feature transitions were held constant (J. G. Kerns et al., 2004) or in which congruency transitions were held constant (C. Akcay & E. Hazeltine, in press), but this has a number of disadvantages. In this article, the authors present a multiple regression solution for this problem and discuss its possibilities and pitfalls.     

Sequential compatibility effects and cognitive control: does conflict really matter?

Although it is widely accepted that control mechanisms are necessary for human behavior to be adapted, very little is known about how such mechanisms are recruited. A suggestion to fill the gap was put forward by M. M. Botvinick, T. S. Braver, C. S. Carter, D. M. Barch, and J. D. Cohen (2001), who proposed the conflict-loop theory. This theory has been successful in accounting for the reduction of compatibility effects after an incompatible trial: The level of conflict being, on average, higher during an incompatible trial, more control occurs after such a trial. The authors have tested this prediction by sorting the trials on the basis of amount of conflict (quantified by the electromyographic activity) they presented. A reduction of the compatibility effect was observed after incompatible trials, but it was independent of the level of conflict on previous trials, suggesting that the conflict does not trigger changes in executive control. Consequences for the conflict monitoring model are discussed.     

不同任务难度条件下认知老化对冲突适应能力的影响

采用任务冲突范式考察在不同任务难度条件下认知老化对个体冲突适应能力的影响。实验1采用经典Flanker任务考察在需要较少认知资源的低难度任务上,老年人与年轻人的冲突适应能力是否有差异;实验2则进一步采用Flanker与Simon任务的交叉整合任务,探讨在需要更多认知资源的高难度任务上,认知老化对冲突适应能力的影响。结果表明在低难度任务条件下,认知老化并未对冲突适应能力产生影响;而当冲突调控所需认知资源超出老化大脑最大代偿潜能时,老年人的冲突适应能力受损严重,认知老化会显著影响冲突适应能力。本研究最终支持了脑功能代偿说和资源限制理论。     

Modeling behavioral measures of error detection in choice tasks: response monitoring versus conflict monitoring

The present study investigated the mechanisms underlying error detection in the error signaling response. The authors tested between a response monitoring account and a conflict monitoring account. By implementing each account within the neural network model of N. Yeung, M. M. Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen (2004), they demonstrated that both accounts make different predictions as to how error signaling performance is influenced by varying the participants' response criterion. These predictions were tested in an experiment using the Eriksen-flanker task. The qualitative pattern as well as a model fit favored the response monitoring account, which states that error detection is mediated by detecting internal error corrections.     

Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior

Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick and Plaut with their own more traditional hierarchically structured interactive activation model (R. P. Cooper & T. Shallice, 2000). The authors present a range of arguments and additional simulations that demonstrate theoretical and empirical difficulties for both Botvinick and Plaut's model and their theoretical position. The authors conclude that explicit hierarchically organized and causally efficacious schema and goal representations are required to provide an adequate account of the flexibility of sequential behavior.     

The conflict adaptation effect: It’s not just priming

Analyses of trial sequences in flanker tasks have revealed cognitive adaptation, reflected in a reduced interference effect following incompatible trials (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). These effects have been explained on the basis of the response conflict monitoring model of Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001), who proposed that preceding response conflict triggers stronger topdown control, leading to performance improvements on subsequent trials of similar context. A recent study (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003) has challenged this account, suggesting that the behavioral adaptations are confined to trial sequences of exact trial repetitions and can therefore be explained by repetition priming. Here, we present two experiments in which the sequential dependency effect was present even on trial sequences that did not involve stimulus repeats. We discuss the data with respect to the conflict-monitoring and repetition-priming accounts.     

Now you see it, now you don't: controlling for contingencies and stimulus repetitions eliminates the Gratton effect

The Gratton (or sequential congruency) effect is the finding that conflict effects (e.g., Stroop and Eriksen flanker effects) are larger following congruent trials relative to incongruent trials. The standard account given for this is that a cognitive control mechanism detects conflict when it occurs and adapts to this conflict on the following trial. Others, however, have questioned the conflict adaptation account and suggested that sequential biases might account for the Gratton effect. In two experiments, contingency biases were removed from the task and stimulus repetitions were deleted to control for stimulus bindings. This eliminated the Gratton effect in the response times in both experiments, supporting a non-conflict explanation of the Gratton effect. A Gratton effect did persist in the errors of Experiment 1; however, this effect was not produced by the type of errors (word reading errors) that a conflict adaptation account should predict. Instead, tentative support was found for a congruency switch cost hypothesis. In all, the conflict adaptation account failed to account for any of the reported data. Implications for future work on cognitive control are discussed.     

Sequential dependencies in the Eriksen flanker task: A direct comparison of two competing accounts

In the conflict/control loop theory proposed by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001), conflict monitored in a trial leads to an increase in cognitive control on the subsequent trial. The critical data pattern supporting this assertion is the so-called Gratton effect—the decrease in flanker interference following incongruent trials—which was initially observed in the Eriksen flanker task. Recently, however, the validity of the idea that this pattern supports a general conflict/control mechanism has been questioned on the grounds that the Gratton effect is only observed with stimulus repetition. We present an experiment testing whether the Gratton effect reflects a stimulus-independent increase in cognitive control or stimulus-specific repetition priming. Although our results support the latter hypothesis, the priming effect is modulated by the congruency of the previous trial. We discuss a new mechanism through which monitored conflict is used to exert executive control by modulating stimulus-response associations.     

Domain-specific conflict adaptation without feature repetitions

An influential account of how cognitive control deals with conflicting sources of information holds that conflict is monitored by a module that automatically recruits attention to resolve the conflict. This leads to reduced effects of conflict on the subsequent trial, a phenomenon termed conflict adaptation. A prominent question is whether control processes are domain specific—that is, recruited only by the particular type of conflict they resolve. Previous studies that have examined this question used two-choice tasks in which feature repetition effects could be responsible for domain-specific adaptation effects. We report two experiments using four-choice (Experiment 1) and five-choice (Experiment 2) tasks that contain two types of irrelevant sources of potentially conflicting information: stimulus location (Simon conflict) and distractors (flanker conflict). In both experiments, we found within-type conflict adaptation for both types of conflict after eliminating trials on which stimulus features were repeated from one trial to the next. Across-type conflict adaptation, however, was not significant. Thus, conflict adaptation was due to domain-specific recruitment of cognitive control. Our results add converging evidence to the idea that multiple independent control processes are involved in reactive cognitive control, although whether control is always local remains to be determined.     

Conflicts as aversive signals

Theories of human action control deal with the question of how cognitive control is dynamically adjusted to task demands. The conflict monitoring theory of anterior cingulate (ACC) function suggests that the ACC monitors for response conflicts in the ongoing processing stream thereby triggering the mobilization of cognitive control. Alternatively, the outcome evaluation account of ACC function suggests that the ACC monitors for negative performance outcomes, an information that serves as an aversive learning signal for future action selection. Botvinick (2007) recently suggested that both theories might converge on the detection of aversive signals in general. Here, the authors provide first evidence that conflicts are registered as aversive signals. Congruent and incongruent Stroop color-words served as primes, and positive and negative stimuli as targets in an affective priming paradigm. Negative targets were evaluated faster after incongruent than after congruent Stroop primes, and positive targets were evaluated slower after incongruent than after congruent primes. The finding that conflicts are actually registered as aversive signals bridges the gap between competing theories of ACC function and has broad theoretical and behavioral implications as it makes the conflict monitoring theory applicable to a much wider range of situations and tasks.     

Stimulus conflict predicts conflict adaptation in a numerical flanker task

Conflict monitoring theory states that response conflict triggers conflict adaptation, resulting in reduced congruency effects after response-incongruent trials (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, and Vandierendonck (2006) observed conflict adaptation after stimulus-incongruent trials without any response conflict. In this study, we further explore the hypothesis that stimulus conflict is an important trigger for conflict adaptation. We propose a measure for stimulus conflict that adequately explains the data of Verbruggen et al. and new data from a numerical flanker task. We conclude that stimulus conflict and response conflict have dissociable effects on behavior Whereas response conflict is a good predictor of response times, stimulus conflict is a better predictor of the adaptation effect.     

负性情绪在冲突适应中的作用机制：分离与整合视角

负性情绪如何影响冲突适应一直以来受到领域内研究者们的广泛关注。根据负性情绪产生的源头(冲突外部操纵vs.冲突内部固有), 对于该问题的论述可以分别从认知与情绪的分离与整合视角展开。分离视角下, 操纵于冲突之外的负性情绪(外部负性情绪)独立于冲突加工过程, 通过情绪加工系统或个体自身的动机/唤醒水平影响冲突适应。近些年来的研究发现冲突加工自动产生负性情绪(固有负性情绪), 寓示着认知冲突与负性情绪间的内在关联, 固有负性情绪因此可被视作诱发冲突适应的另一个有效来源。整合视角下, 操纵于冲突内部的(固有)负性情绪高度整合于冲突加工过程, 其功能与冲突信息类似, 通过内在地促进目标导向行为直接诱发冲突适应。对这一主题的论述加深了我们对负性情绪如何作用于冲突适应过程的理解, 也为探索认知与情绪系统的整合过程及作用机制提供了一个全新的视角, 在此基础上, 我们也提出一些未来可行的研究方向。     

Event-related potentials as brain correlates of item specific proportion congruent effects

The item-specific proportion congruency (ISPC) effect is consistent with the idea that control processes can be applied rapidly in accord with previously experienced conflict for a particular category. An alternative account of this effect is that it reflects item-specific learning processes unrelated to control at the level of the category. The accounts predict the same behaviour but differ in terms of electrophysiological predictions. Two experiments examined the ISPC effect with a particular focus on neural correlates that might reveal whether, and how early in processing, high and low proportion congruent items are treated as distinct classes of stimuli. For both tasks, the proportion congruency category was distinguished prior to the congruence of the specific stimulus, as early as 100 ms post-stimulus onset for the global/local identification task (Experiment 1) and 150 ms for the Stroop task (Experiment 2). The results support an on-line control account of ISPC effects.     

List-level transfer effects in temporal learning: Further complications for the list-level proportion congruent effect

Congruency effects are larger when most trials are congruent relative to incongruent. According to the conflict adaptation account, this proportion congruent effect is due to the decreased attention to words when most of the trials are conflicting. This paper extends on previous work arguing that list-level (contingency-unbiased) proportion congruent effects might be explainable by temporal learning biases. That is, congruency effects are larger in an easier task (i.e., mostly congruent) due to the faster pace of the task. Two non-conflict analogues of the proportion congruent effect are presented, one with a contrast manipulation and another with a contingency manipulation. Critically, both experiments control for potential item-specific temporal learning biases by intermixing biased context and unbiased transfer items. Results show a proportion congruent-like interaction for both item types, supporting the notion of task-wide temporal learning as an explanation for list-level proportion congruency effects. Distributional analyses lend further credence to the temporal learning account by showing that proportion congruent and proportion congruent-like effects are localised in the fastest and intermediate responses.     

The influence of approach–avoidance motivational orientation on conflict adaptation

To deal effectively with a continuously changing environment, our cognitive system adaptively regulates resource allocation. Earlier findings showed that an avoidance orientation (induced by arm extension), relative to an approach orientation (induced by arm flexion), enhanced sustained cognitive control. In avoidance conditions, performance on a cognitive control task was enhanced, as indicated by a reduced congruency effect, relative to approach conditions. Extending these findings, in the present behavioral studies we investigated dynamic adaptations in cognitive control—that is, conflict adaptation. We proposed that an avoidance state recruits more resources in response to conflicting signals, and thereby increases conflict adaptation. Conversely, in an approach state, conflict processing diminishes, which consequently weakens conflict adaptation. As predicted, approach versus avoidance arm movements affected both behavioral congruency effects and conflict adaptation: As compared to approach, avoidance movements elicited reduced congruency effects and increased conflict adaptation. These results are discussed in line with a possible underlying neuropsychological model.     

Top-down and bottom-up sequential modulations of congruency effects

Several studies have demonstrated reduced congruency effects after incongruent trials. The conflict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) assumes that this sequential modulation is based on top-down cognitive control and suggests that more control is engaged after the detection of conflict. An alternative account is based on repetition effects of stimulus and response features and can be considered bottom up. This study investigates both modulatory sources. In a Stroop task with two response-stimulus intervals (RSIs), we demonstrate that top-down modulation does not occur with a very short RSI, suggesting that it takes some time before the system can be reconfigured. Bottom-up modulation is observed for both RSIs. This finding demonstrates that two different sources simultaneously reduce congruency effects after incongruent trials.     

Cutthroat cooperation: The effects of team role decisions on adaptation to alternative reward structures

Structural Adaptation Theory proposes that it is more difficult for teams to change from competitive to cooperative reward conditions than it is for them to change in the opposite direction, and this has been labeled the cutthroat cooperation effect [Johnson, M. D., Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Humphrey, S. E., Meyer, C. J., & Jundt, D. K. (2006). Cutthroat cooperation: Asymmetrical adaptation of team reward structures. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 103–120]. The current study investigated whether team role discussion can neutralize this effect and promote successful adaptation from competitive to cooperative reward structures. Consistent with our predictions, in a study that involved 75 four-person teams performing a complex task under cooperative reward conditions, we found that teams with a history of competitive rewards performed worse than teams with a history of cooperative rewards in a control condition. However, this effect was neutralized when teams allocated their roles in a team role discussion. This neutralization effect was driven by behavioral coordination and unmet expectations regarding conflict.     

Motivational and cognitive determinants of control during conflict processing

Previous studies suggest that both reward anticipation and expected or experienced conflicts activate cognitive control. The present study investigated how these factors interact during conflict processing. In two experiments, participants performed a variant of the Stroop task, receiving performance-dependent monetary rewards in some blocks. In addition, we manipulated the level of conflict-triggered reactive and expectancy-driven proactive control: In Experiment 1, we compared the Stroop effect after previously congruent and incongruent trials to examine the conflict adaptation effect (reactive control). We found that the level of motivation did not interact with conflict adaptation. In Experiment 2, we varied the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials to manipulate conflict expectancy (proactive control). The data suggest the effects of motivation to be less pronounced under conditions of high conflict expectancy. We conclude that the interaction of motivation with cognitive determinants of control depends on whether these activate proactive or reactive control processes.     

The effect of working memory capacity on conflict monitoring

The conflict adaptation effect, a reduced interference effect upon the detection of a conflict signal (e.g., following an incongruent trial), has been interpreted as evidence for active regulation of top-down cognitive control. We hypothesized that the extent of conflict adaptation should be related to individuals' working memory capacity (WMC), which has been repeatedly demonstrated to reflect the level of cognitive control. Using the Simon task, in Experiment 1, we quantified the conflict adaptation ratio (CAR) transiently as the ratio of the conflict effect following an incongruent trial to the conflict effect following a congruent trial, controlling for the reaction time that often correlates with WMC. We observed that the CAR varied from highly negative with low WMC scores to near-zero with high WMC scores. This result suggests that high WMC individuals, when detecting conflict, adjust the level of cognitive control optimally so that their performance is less susceptible to the presence of a distractor. In Experiment 2, we quantified the CAR in a sustained manner as the ratio of the conflict effect from predominantly incongruent blocks to the conflict effect from predominantly congruent blocks. Again, the CAR varied from negative to zero as WMC increased. These results suggest that WMC may reflect, in addition to the ability to maintain a level of control, the ability to adjust the level of control appropriately to the contextual demands.