Counterfactual Production and Achievement Orientation in Competitive Athletic Settings1

Two studies examined the impact of achievement orientation on counterfactual production in competitive sporting situations. In Study 1, participants created counterfactuals after reading 4 vignettes. Results indicated that participants reading about winners created more subtractive and downward counterfactuals than did participants reading about losers, while participants reading about losers created more additive and upward counterfactuals than did participants reading about winners. In Study 2, using participants in 3-on-3 basketball games, achievement orientation interacted with game outcome to produce adaptive responses for participants who held a mastery orientation and maladaptive responses for participants who held an outcome orientation. In addition to achievement orientation, the margin of victory played an important role in determining the type of counterfactual produced. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Counterfactual thinking and stereotypes: The nonconformity effect

Past research has shown that counterfactual thinking (‘if only…’) is related to judgements of responsibility for negative events. It has also shown that behaviours deviating from the target's own behavioural standard (intrapersonal norm) are likely to trigger counterfactuals—the so‐called exceptional‐routine effect. In the present research, we demonstrate that behaviours deviating from a social category's behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals—what may be called the nonconformity effect. Two studies investigated counterfactual thinking regarding a rape case, classifying counterfactuals according to their conformity versus nonconformity to relevant social norms, and their focus on actions versus inactions. In Study 1, participants with higher endorsement of the rape victim stereotype generated more counterfactuals on the victim's non‐conforming inactions than did participants with lower stereotype endorsement. The presence of a nonconformity effect was confirmed in Study 2, where participants rated their agreement with externally generated counterfactuals. Moreover, in Study 2, counterfactuals focused on the victim's non‐conforming inactions predicted responsibility attribution to the victim through the mediating role of perceived avoidability of the event. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coping with disappointing outcomes: Retroactive pessimism and motivated inhibition of counterfactuals

Having failed to achieve a desired goal, people may use retroactive pessimism as a defense mechanism, concluding that chances of success were not too good to begin with. To make this judgment, one must block counterfactual alternatives suggesting that success was, in fact, quite likely. Facing a bitter disappointment, the perceiver is highly motivated to inhibit upward counterfactuals, thus increasing the perceived inevitability of failure and finding solace in the acceptance of inescapable fate. Two experiments explored the hypothesized link between counterfactuals inhibition and retroactive pessimism. In the first experiment, it was found that participants experiencing grave disappointment, following a near miss, judged their chances of achieving their goal less favorably, compared to participants who had missed their goal by far. An analysis on participants’ counterfactual judgments suggested that this effect was mediated by participants’ perceptions of counterfactual events. The second experiment demonstrated that retroactive pessimism and counterfactual inhibition seem to be unique to situations in which the negative outcome resulted from uncontrollable rather than controllable events, thus corroborating the functional characterization of counterfactual thinking as well as the link between retroactive pessimism and disappointment.     

The importance of contextual variables when judging fairness: An examination of counterfactual thoughts and fairness theory

This research empirically examines the underlying mechanisms of fairness theory (  and ), namely counterfactual thought processes. Study 1 used a policy-capturing design to examine the relative importance of contextual variables in predicting counterfactual thoughts and fairness perceptions. Study 2 utilized a between-subjects design and asked participants to generate their own counterfactuals in response to an unfortunate event. Results of both studies showed that fairness perceptions are influenced by contextual variables (i.e., outcome severity, target knowledge and expertise, sin of commission vs. omission) and counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thoughts partially mediated the effects of contextual variables and fairness perceptions in Study 1. Exploratory analyses from Study 3 revealed that the measurement of counterfactual thoughts (frequency vs. strength) may capture different underlying constructs. Implications are discussed.     

Counterfactual intensity

Counterfactual intensity, the strength with which counterfactuals are experienced, influenced the magnitude of affective and preparative reactions. Intensity influenced reactions when counterfactual numbers were held constant for samples of participants' actual experiences (Study 1) and contributed significantly to responses over counterfactual numbers (Study 2) and reaction times (Study 3) after performing laboratory tasks. This was found when participants spontaneously generated counterfactuals (Study 2), and when participants responded to counterfactual statements (Study 3). As upward counterfactuals became intense, so did greater preparation and worse moods; as downward counterfactuals became intense, so did better moods and lesser preparation. Intense moods also conversely influenced the intensity of counterfactuals (Study 3). Conceptual and methodological implications and possibilities for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effect of Motivational Goals on the Causal Realism of Counterfactual Thoughts

Counterfactual thinking refers to mental comparisons of reality with imagined alternatives of it. The “functional view” of counterfactual thinking suggests that upward counterfactuals (which improve on reality) serve a preparative function and downward counterfactuals (which worsen reality) serve an affective function. This view presumes that people generate counterfactuals that focus on cause(s) that have actually produced the negative outcomes. The two experiments reported here demonstrate that people spontaneously manipulate the causal content of their counterfactuals, depending on their motivational goals. Specifically, it was found that when people aim to feel better about a poor decision they generate less realistic (upward) counterfactuals, experience less negative affect and tend to attribute the outcome to less controllable causes than when they aim to learn from their experience. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Spoilt for choice: The role of counterfactual thinking in the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes

Contrary to popular belief many choice options and the ability to reverse one's initial choice are sometimes associated with decreased chooser satisfaction. Two studies investigated the role of counterfactual thinking in explaining these paradoxes. Participants chose drawing implements from either a limited (6) or extensive (24) choice set (Study 1), or an expected reversible/non-reversible selection (Study 2). Following a drawing task, satisfaction with their chosen implement was rated under either high or low cognitive load to manipulate the availability of counterfactual alternatives. In Study 1 satisfaction was higher with limited vs. extensive choice under low load. The number of counterfactuals generated mediated this effect. Under high load the pattern was reversed. Participants in Study 2 generated more counterfactuals when reversibility was expected under low but not high load and this partially mediated the impact of expected reversibility on revealed satisfaction. Implications for theoretical understanding of these paradoxes are discussed.     

The differential effect of realistic and unrealistic counterfactual thinking on regret

Research has established that realistic counterfactual thinking can determine the intensity and the content of people's affective reactions to decision outcomes and events. Not much is known, however, about the affective consequences of counterfactual thinking that is unrealistic (i.e., that does not correspond to the main causes of a negative outcome). In three experiments, we investigate the influence of realistic and unrealistic counterfactuals on experienced regret after negative outcomes. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who thought unrealistically about a poor outcome reported less regret than those who thought realistically about it. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated this finding and we showed that the decrease in regret was associated with a shift in the causal attributions of the poor outcome. Participants who thought unrealistically attributed it more to external circumstances and less to their own behaviours than those who thought realistically about it. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of counterfactuals as self-serving biases and the functionality of regret as a counterfactual emotion.     

Regulatory mode effects on counterfactual thinking and regret

The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making comparisons [see Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293-344). New York: Academic Press]—on engaging in counterfactual thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual differences in Study 1 and 2, and were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.     

The effects of counterfactual defences on social judgements

Research on counterfactuals (‘If only…’) has seldom considered the effects of counterfactual communication, especially in a defensive context. In three studies, we investigated the effects of counterfactual defences employed by politicians. We assumed that self‐focused upward counterfactuals (‘If only I…, the outcome would have been better’) are a form of concession, other‐focused upward counterfactuals (‘If only they…, the outcome would have been better’) are a form of excuse, and self‐focused downward counterfactuals (‘If only I…, the outcome would have been worse’) are a form of justification. In Study 1, a counterfactual defence led to a more positive evaluation of the politician than a corresponding factual defence. Of the two types of defence, the counterfactual defence reduced the extent to which the politician was held responsible for the past event and was perceived as more convincing. In Study 2, counterfactual excuse and counterfactual justification were equally effective and led to a more positive evaluation of the politician than counterfactual concession. In Study 3, the higher effectiveness of counterfactual justification was independent from perceived ideological similarity with the politician, supporting the strength of this defence. These results show that counterfactual defences provide subtle communication strategies that effectively influence social judgements. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

This research tests the idea that repeatedly generating counterfactual thoughts in response to recurring events can lead to impairments in memory for actual outcomes (i.e., counterfactual inflation hypothesis). Participants (N = 56) played 40 games of blackjack and listed their thoughts after each win. They were instructed to list evaluative counterfactuals, reflective counterfactuals, or any thoughts that came to mind following each loss. Because reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality, and not in addition to reality (like evaluative counterfactuals), they were expected to lead to the greatest degree of overestimations of performance and confidence for future blackjack playing. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and also demonstrated that the relationship between thought-listing instructions and confidence for the future was mediated by overestimations of performance. Thus, repeatedly generating reflective counterfactual thoughts appears to lead to a special case of imagination inflation with dysfunctional implications for future confidence and risk-taking.     

From thinking about what might have been to sharing what we know: The effects of counterfactual mind-sets on information sharing in groups

We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes group decision errors caused by the failure of groups to discuss unshared, uniquely held information. In two experiments, we manipulated the salience of counterfactual thoughts in a pre-task scenario and then had groups of three individuals discuss a murder mystery case. In both experiments, counterfactual mind-sets increased the discussion of unshared information and helped groups to identify the correct murder suspect. These results emerged regardless of whether the direction of the counterfactual thoughts was upward (Experiment 1) or downward (Experiment 2), suggesting that it is the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the content of the counterfactuals, that improves group decision making.     

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

Past research has shown that counterfactual (“If…then…”) thoughts influence causal and responsibility attribution in the judicial context. However, little is known on whether and how the use of counterfactuals in communication affects lay jurors' and judges' evaluations. In two studies, we asked mock lay jurors (Study 1) and actual judges (Study 2) to read a medical malpractice case followed by an expert witness report, which included counterfactuals focused on either the physician, the patient, or external factors. Results showed that counterfactual focus had a strong effect on both lay jurors' and judges' causal and responsibility attributions. Counterfactual focus also moderated the effect of outcome foreseeability on responsibility attribution. Discussion focuses on how counterfactual communication can direct causal and responsibility attribution and reduce the importance of other factors known to influence judicial decision‐making. The potential implications of these findings in training programs and debiasing interventions are also discussed.     

"Blaming the victim" under memory load

When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking, imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim. Thus, counterfactuals sometimes require thought suppression or discounting, potentially resource-demanding tasks. In this study, participants made mock-jury decisions about control and counterfactual versions of simple stories. The judgments of two groups of participants, differing in their respective levels of working memory capacity, were compared. In addition, all participants held memory loads during various stages of the primary task. Lower-span individuals were especially susceptible to bias associated with the counterfactual manipulation, but only when holding memory loads during judgment. The results suggest that counterfactual thoughts arise automatically, and may later require effortful, capacity-demanding suppression.     

幼儿前提反事实推理的发展特点和影响因素

本研究选取90名3~5岁幼儿为被试,采用图片故事法和口语报告法测查幼儿前提反事实推理的发展特点以及结果性质和领域知识的影响。结果表明:(1)幼儿前提反事实推断数量随年龄而增多;(2)幼儿产生的减法式反事实推断数显著多于加法式,但上行和下行反事实推断数之间的差异不显著;(3)对反事实推断的影响因素方面,结果性质主效应不显著,领域知识主效应显著,两者存在交互作用,当控制语言能力后交互作用不显著。     

Looking on the bright side: downward counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events

Past research has found that downward counterfactual thoughts are rarely generated in response to negative life events. However, the authors suggest that under conditions in which self-enhancement motives are prominent, downward counterfactuals will be more frequent than upward counterfactuals. When motives were explicitly manipulated (Study 1), people generated more downward counterfactuals in the self-enhancement than in the self-improvement and control conditions. In Study 2, among those chronically more motivated to self-enhance (i.e., European Canadians), a manipulation of event severity led to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. This finding was mediated by the desire for self-enhancement. In Study 3, cultural background and the opportunity for self-affirmation were related to the generation of downward counterfactuals in expected ways. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

When good decisions have bad outcomes: The impact of affect on switching behavior

Four experiments test the hypothesis that an unfavorable outcome of a good decision leads individuals to switch away from that decision due to negative emotional responses to the outcome. Negative emotional reactions led many participants to abandon the option that they recalled as having been more successful overall in the past (Study 1) and which they expected to perform better in the future (Study 2). A prompt to consider the future success rates of the two alternatives did not eliminate switching (Study 2). An experimental manipulation in Study 3 indicated that individuals switch when they focus on their affective reactions rather than beliefs about the earlier disappointing outcome. In Study 4, individuals with a general tendency to focus on cognitions (i.e., those high in need for cognition) were less likely to switch away from the better option following a disappointing outcome. These results suggest that an emotional reaction to a negative outcome can lead people to switch away from the options that they believe are most likely to be successful on the next occasion.     

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are emotions that can be experienced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a decision. Previous research suggests that both emotions are related to the process of counterfactual thinking. The present research extends this idea by combining it with ideas from regret and disappointment theory. The results show that regret is related to behavior-focused counterfactual thought in which the decision-maker's own actions are changed, whereas disappointment is related to situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of the situation are changed. In Study 1 participants (N= 130) were asked to recall an autobiographical episode of either a regretful or a disappointing event. When asked to undo this event, regret participants predominantly changed their own actions, whereas disappointment participants predominantly changed aspects of the situation. In Study 2 all participants (N= 50) read a scenario in which a person experiences a negative event. Participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing the person's actions reported more regret than disappointment, while participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing aspects of the situation reported more disappointment than regret. Study 3 (N= 140) replicated the findings from Study 2 with a different scenario, and a design in which regret and disappointment were measured between rather than within subjects. In the discussion we address the relation among counterfactual thinking, attributions and affective reactions to decision outcomes, and the implications for decision research.