Predicting Lamaze Childbirth Intentions and Outcomes: An Extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action to a Joint Outcome

Within the framework of the Fishbein/Ajzen Theory of Reasoned Action (1980), 58 respondents were interviewed about their intentions to use the Lamaze method of childbirth. Prenatal interviews were conducted with 20 married couples recruited primarily through Lamaze classes and 18 expectant mothers recruited from a prenatal public health clinic. Outcome information was collected from 15 of the couples during postnatal interviews. Multiple regression analyses showed that behavioral intentions of husbands and of wives could be predicted from the model's terms (p<.01 and p<.06), as could the joint outcome ratings of couples (p<.01). Husbands' attitude toward having a Lamaze birth (A[sub act]) proved to be the best predictor of behavioral intention (BI) and of couples' joint outcome rating. The generality of the model was demonstrated by its ability to predict BI in both samples of women, despite demographic and methodological differences. The effects of variables external to the model were found to be mediated by the model's terms within each sample of women, but to contribute independent variance to prediction for the combined sample. Based on the data and interviewing experience, a theory of Lamaze involvement is proposed.     

Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency.     

Ethical Intentions and the Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior1

This study compares the explanatory power of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1991) theory of reasoned action, Ajzen's (1975) theory of planned behavior, and a modified version of the theory of planned behavior, which includes a measure of moral obligation, to predict insurance agents' e]thical intentions toward their clients. Two hundred and forty-five insurance agents in the U.S. were sent surveys, and with 59% of them responding, results suggest that the modified version of the theory of planned behavior best explains agents' e]thical intentions. Theoretical considerations and suggestions for future research, highlighting the perceived behavioral control and moral obligation constructs, are provided.     

The Solubility of Salt: A Divine Action Account

In the burgeoning literature on dispositions, solubility is a standard example. In this paper we give a rigorous theistic divine action account of the simple mechanism of the dissolving of salt, NaCl, into the ions Na⁺ and Cl^?. We explore this reaction in terms of an alternative view of divine action, Divine Compositionalism, which holds that the functioning of every physical, chemical, and biological mechanism in the universe is a manifesting complex disposition, which is nothing other than ways God acts according to plan.     

Joint Epistemic Action: Some Applications

The notion of a joint action is a familiar one in the philosophical literature. Moreover, the notion of epistemic action has recently been discussed in the literature. Elsewhere I have suggested that these two notions can be brought together to yield the notion of joint epistemic action and provided a relational individualist analysis of joint epistemic actions. In this article I extend this analysis and show how this extended analysis applies to different kinds of important epistemic institutional phenomena: (1) voting in a democracy; (2) financial benchmarks, e.g. LIBOR (the London interbank offered (interest) rate) and; (3) profiling using computer databases. Each of these institutional mechanisms is important in its own right. Moreover, each is a species of a more widespread generic social form that I refer to as joint institutional mechanisms which, I suggest, are ubiquitous yet somewhat diverse in character. Accordingly, there is a need to distinguish them from the more basic phenomenon of joint action but also to taxonomise them. The latter is a large task to which this article is a first step.     

Morality: An Evolutionary Account

ABSTRACT— Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic "social instincts," or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is.     

Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action

Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate.     

Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior: A Study of Women's Participation in Collective Action

The present study tests the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior in the context of women's participation in collective action. Participants were 387 women who completed two questionnaires with an interval of 1 year. In the first questionnaire, participants were asked to provide measures of attitudinal, normative, and control factors, as well as measures of intention to participate in 4 group-related activities over the coming year. One year later in the second questionnaire, the same women provided measures of the degree to which they had actually participated in these behaviors during the course of the year. Findings showed strong relationships between attitudinal factors and intentions, and between intentions and behavior. The addition of perceived behavioral control, as specified by the theory of planned behavior, made little difference in regression analyses. Further analyses focused on the mediating role of identification as an activist. This revealed that attitudinal considerations were only important in the prediction of intention for those individuals with a weaker sense of themselves as activists. It is suggested that expectancy-value calculations may be less important in predicting the intentions of strongly committed individuals to engage in group-relevant acts.     

Motivational and Volitional Processes in Action Initiation: A Field Study of the Role of Implementation Intentions1

A field study tested Gollwitzer's (1993) proposition that the formation of implementation intentions specifying action opportunities accounts for the speed with which intentions are translated into action. Motivation to resume functional activity was assessed among a general population sample of patients prior to joint replacement surgery. At 3 months following surgery. people who had formed implementation intentions were found to have initiated 18 out of 32 activities sooner than people who had not formed implementation intentions. This difference could not be attributed to differences in motivation between the 2 groups. Evidence also showed that the formation of implementation intentions mediated the effects of behavioral expectation on speed of action initiation.     

Is An Agreement An Exchange of Intentions?

Abstract: Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions – in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what they have said – plays all these roles, and so conclude that an agreement is in fact an exchange of intentions.     

Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An Alternative Account

Is the question ‘will you regret it if you do (not do) this?’ helpful when people face difficult life decisions, such as terminating a pregnancy if a disability is detected or deciding to become a parent? Despite the commonness of the question in daily life, several philosophers have argued lately against its usefulness. We reconstruct four arguments from recent literature on regret, transformative experience and the use of imagination in deliberation. After analysis of these arguments we conclude that the prospect of regret remains a useful deliberative heuristic, provided four conditions are fulfilled. If the prospect of (the absence of) regret is arrived at via reflection on one’s values, in a non-coercive context, when well-informed about factual circumstances, and in a process of self-commitment, the question of what one will regret is a helpful device to get in touch with one’s deepest concerns that give reasons to act in a particular way.     

想象积极群际接触对利他型集体行动意愿的影响:系统公正感和群际评价的中介作用

集体行动是维护和实现社会公平正义的有效途径之一。以往研究主要聚焦于弱势群体利己型集体行动,很少有研究考察利他型集体行动的影响因素。本研究采用双随机设计,通过三个实验探讨积极群际接触与利他型集体行动的中介效应因果模型。实验1采用想象性群际接触范式操纵积极群际接触,发现积极群际接触促进利他型集体行动,系统公正感和群际评价中的热情维度起中介作用。实验2与实验3分别操纵系统公正感和热情,检验中介变量与因变量间的因果关系,证实了积极群际接触-系统公正感、热情-利他型集体行动的因果关系链。     

God and Dispositional Essentialism: An Account of the Laws of Nature

It is common to appeal to governing laws of nature in order to explain the existence of natural regularities. Classical theism, however, maintains the sovereignty thesis: everything distinct from God is created by him and is under his guidance and control. It follows from this that God must somehow be responsible for natural laws and regularities. Therefore, theists need an account of the relation between (i) regularities, (ii) laws, and (iii) God. I examine competing accounts of laws of nature and conclude that dispositional essentialism provides the most satisfactory explanation of the relation between (i), (ii) and (iii).