Becoming who you are: An integrative review of self‐determination theory and personality systems interactions theory

One of the enduring missions of personality science is to unravel what it takes to become a fully functioning person. In the present article, the authors address this matter from the perspectives of self‐determination theory (SDT) and personality systems interactions (PSI) theory. SDT (a) is rooted in humanistic psychology; (b) has emphasized a first‐person perspective on motivation and personality; (c) posits that the person, supported by the social environment, naturally moves toward growth through the satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. PSI theory (a) is rooted in German volition psychology; (b) has emphasized a third‐person perspective on motivation and personality; and (c) posits that a fully functioning person can form and enact difficult intentions and integrate new experiences, and that such competencies are facilitated by affect regulation. The authors review empirical support for SDT and PSI theory, their convergences and divergences, and how the theories bear on recent empirical research on internalization, vitality, and achievement flow. The authors conclude that SDT and PSI theory offer complementary insights into developing a person's full potential.     

Employing autobiographical memory perspective to influence self‐congruence and brand preference

This paper advances our understanding of consumer behavior by examining the influence of autobiographical memory perspective on consumer's self‐congruence. While extant research has primarily restricted itself to the consequences of self‐congruence, this work focuses on an antecedent, by examining the psychological processes associated with the consumer's autobiographical memory perspective and the resulting impact on self‐congruence. Through three experiments, we demonstrate that visualizing autobiographical memories from a first‐person versus a third‐person perspective impacts consumers' self‐brand congruence differently under varied circumstances. Specifically, differing degrees of self‐brand congruence are experienced when consumers focus on differences (vs. similarities) between their present and recalled selves, combined with distinct autobiographical memory perspectives. The autobiographical memory perspective is identified as a key determinant of consumers' perceived change in self‐image, which, in turn, has a cascading effect on their self‐brand congruence. Thus, consumers' perceived change in self‐image is identified as the mechanism underlying the main effect. Furthermore, as an important component of self‐image, this research determines and examines a moderating influence of self‐esteem in the relationship between autobiographical memory perspective and self‐congruence. Collectively, these results facilitate our understanding of the autobiographical memory perspective as an antecedent of consumer's self‐congruence, with implications for nostalgia advertising and retro branding.     

Aligning inside and outside perspectives of the self: A cross‐cultural difference in self‐perception

Past research shows that European Americans tend to take a first‐person perspective to understand the self and are unlikely to align the inside look with the outside gaze, whereas Asians tend to take a third‐person perspective and are likely to shift their inside look in the direction of the outsize gaze. In three experiments, we compared Asians and European Americans' self‐perceptions when the presence of their parents in the background of self‐perception was primed or otherwise. Without the priming, both European Americans and Asians viewed themselves more positively from their own perspective than from their parents' perspective. With the priming, only Asians lowered the positivity of their self‐perceptions to match the perceived positivity of the self in the parents' perspective. These results suggest that Asians do not have a static, passive tendency to assimilate their self‐views into the perceived external assessments of the self. Rather, their self‐views are fluid and flexible.     

Within‐person Relationship between Creative Self‐efficacy and Individual Creativity: The Mediator of Creative Process Engagement and the Moderator of Regulatory Focus

Integrating the dynamic self‐regulatory framework with the motivational self‐regulation perspective, we theorize and test how and when creative self‐efficacy increases individual creativity at the within‐person level. Conceptualizing creative process engagement as a self‐regulation effort, we theorize that creative process engagement mediates the within‐person effect of creative self‐efficacy on individual creativity. We further explore how creative self‐efficacy and chronic regulatory focus interact to affect the within‐person mediating effect. A sample of 145 R&D workers provided two monthly reports for their creative activities and experiences over 8 months. The findings provide empirical support for the hypothesized mediating mechanism. At the within‐person level, creative process engagement mediates the relationship between creative self‐efficacy and individual creativity. The results also show that chronic regulatory focus moderated the mediated relationship. Specifically, creative self‐efficacy is positively related to individual creativity for employees with a strong prevention focus and negatively related to individual creativity for employees with a strong promotion focus.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Self–other awareness and peer relationships in toddlers: gender comparisons

Toddlers' growing self–other awareness has been linked with their ability to interact with peers, but there is reason to think that self–other awareness may relate to different aspects of peer relationships for boys and girls. We hypothesized that boys would express self–other awareness by separating self from other through claiming toys, while girls would express self–other awareness by creating similarities between self and other through use of the duplicate of a partner's toy. For 52 22–26 month olds, self–other awareness was assessed through four tasks: mirror self recognition, perceptual role taking, pronoun recognition and pronoun use. Each child subsequently interacted with a same‐sex peer for 30 min. Girls high in self–other awareness, and their partners were more likely to engage in duplicate toy use than girls low in self–other awareness. No differences in toy claiming were found. Future longitudinal research would clarify how the onset of self–other awareness relates to developments in peer interaction for girls and boys. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Need for Cognition Promotes Adaptive Style of Self‐Focusing with the Mediation of Effortful Control

Previous studies have indicated that “need for cognition” (NfC), which is the tendency to enjoy effortful cognitive activity, affects various cognitive processes and behaviors. However, the effects of NfC on mental adaptation have not been investigated. According to previous studies, it can be hypothesized that NfC decreases maladaptive self‐focusing, which is called self‐rumination, through increasing effortful control (EC); therefore, we hypothesized that NfC would indirectly inhibit self‐rumination through the mediation of EC. As we expected, the results of a cross‐sectional questionnaire study with 152 undergraduate participants indicated a negative indirect association between NfC and self‐rumination through the mediation of EC. Secondarily, the present results revealed a direct positive association between NfC and adaptive type of self‐focusing, which is called self‐reflection. The present study is the first to propose the possible contribution of NfC to mental health through decreasing self‐rumination and increasing self‐reflection.     

Seven Pillars of Defense Mechanism Theory

Defense mechanisms are cognitive processes that function to protect the individual from excessive anxiety or other negative emotions. They also protect the person from loss of self‐esteem and, in the extreme, the loss of self‐integration. Although past critics questioned the existence of defense mechanisms, recent research has supported seven basic tenets regarding defenses. These include: (1) defenses function outside of awareness; (2) there is a chronology of defense development; (3) defenses are present in the normal personality; (4) defense use increases under conditions of stress; (5) defense use reduces the conscious experience of negative emotions; (6) defense function is connected to the autonomic nervous system; (7) excessive use of defenses is associated with psychopathology. Research supporting the seven pillars of defense mechanism theory is described in this essay.     

Does medial prefrontal cortex activity during self‐knowledge reference reflect the uniqueness of self‐knowledge?1

Abstract: For this study, functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to examine whether medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activity during self‐knowledge reference reflects the uniqueness of self‐knowledge. Experiment 1 investigated neural activity during self‐knowledge reference (“Does the word describe you?”) and self‐monitoring (“Does the word make you feel pleasant?”). The results showed that self‐knowledge reference and self‐monitoring activate common neural substrates within the MPFC. Experiment 2 compared neural activity produced by self‐knowledge reference, other‐knowledge (acquaintance‐knowledge) reference (“Does this word describe the person?”), and evaluation (“Is this word socially desirable?”). Results showed no increase in MPFC activity during self‐knowledge reference relative to other‐knowledge reference. Furthermore, self‐knowledge reference and other‐knowledge reference share common neural substrates within the MPFC. The results described indicate that it is unlikely that MPFC activity during self‐knowledge reference reflects the uniqueness of self‐knowledge. The feature, as reflected in MPFC activity, is discussed.     

Individual differences in children's understanding of social evaluation concerns

Recent research suggests that children's understanding of self‐presentational behaviour—behaviour designed to shape social evaluation—is a function of both cognitive and motivational variables. Furthermore, the motivational factors involved are likely to reflect individual differences in the salience of concerns about social evaluation. The present research represents a first effort to determine whether measures of such differences are indeed associated with the understanding of self‐presentational behaviour. In a first experiment, a teacher rating measure of self‐monitoring was found to be positively associated with the understanding of self‐presentational motives. In a second experiment, a more narrowly specified self‐report measure of public self‐consciousness was found to have a similar association with the understanding of self‐presentation, with no such association found for private self‐consciousness. These preliminary results make it clear that our formulations of development in social cognition must indeed include a consideration of individual differences in motivational orientations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Path of Counselor Self‐Awareness

This article explores self‐reflection and self‐awareness from an ethical standpoint, proposing that counselors have a responsibility to themselves, their clients, and the profession to engage in these practices. The authors propose a path to counselor self‐awareness and a 2nd process that assumes counselor mastery.     

Relationship between self‐worrying and self‐critical messages in clients with generalised anxiety engaging in emotion‐focused worry dialogues

Emotion‐focused therapy (EFT) has recently been adapted as a treatment for generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). One intervention used in this adaptation is a worry dialogue, in which the client enacts worry in one chair (“worrier”) and is facilitated to experience the impact of this worry in another chair (“experiencer”). Although not formally studied, anecdotal observations from therapists in the EFT for GAD treatment development study suggested that within worry dialogues there might be a link between client's self‐worrying and self‐critical messages. This study used data from 47 worry dialogues from fourteen study clients who received EFT for GAD. An observation based qualitative analysis of clients' self‐directed messages as present in in‐session worry dialogues was conducted using video/audio recordings of relevant sessions. Results indicate a relationship between self‐worrying and self‐critical messages. A total of 90 paired self‐worry and self‐critic messages across the 47 worry dialogues were logged. Six recurring clusters of themes/relationships were observed: (a) I need to be prepared for future negative events because… I'm weak and a failure; (b) I need to stop worrying… I'm flawed for being a worrier; (c) People will negatively judge me if I engage with them… because I'm not good enough; (d) If I don't worry, there will be negative consequences… and I will be responsible and will be unable to bear it; (e) I worry/ruminate that I cause(d) some damage… because I'm incompetent; and, (f) I must always be prepared against others taking advantage of me… because I'm weak. Given the observed close link between self‐critical and worry processes, it is important that therapists differentiate between these processes and remember to address both in therapy for GAD.     

Effect of self‐construal and threat to self‐esteem on ingroup favouritism: Moderating effect of independent/interdependent self‐construal on use of ingroup favouritism for maintaining and enhancing self‐evaluation

The present study examined the hypothesis that in situations that threaten self‐esteem, people with independent self‐construal show more ingroup favouritism, whereas people with interdependent self‐construal do not. Using a minimal group paradigm, consistent with the hypothesis, the results showed that self‐construal and threats to self‐esteem have an interactive effect on ingroup favouritism. Individuals with independent self‐construal showed more ingroup favouritism when their self‐esteem was threatened than when it was not threatened, whereas individuals with interdependent self‐construal exhibited less ingroup favouritism when their self‐esteem was threatened than when it was not threatened. These findings suggest that independent/interdependent self‐construal moderates the use of ingroup favouritism for maintaining and enhancing self‐evaluation.     

Uncovering the diverse cultural bases of social identity: Ingroup ties predict self‐stereotyping among individualists but not among collectivists

On what basis do people form their social identities? To investigate this issue, the present research investigates cross‐cultural differences in self‐stereotyping, a key outcome of social identification. In particular, the research tests the hypothesis that ingroup ties are a stronger predictor of self‐stereotyping among people from individualist cultures than among people from collectivist cultures. In Study 1, university students (N = 117) completed measures of ingroup ties and self‐stereotyping with respect to an intimacy group (family and friends). Consistent with predictions, ingroup ties significantly predicted self‐stereotyping among individualists but not among collectivists. Study 2 (N = 104) found a similar pattern of results among members of the global internet community who considered either an intimacy group (their friends), a task group (their work group) or a social category (their gender). These results indicate that people in individualist cultures are more likely than those in collectivist cultures to base their social identities on ingroup ties. The implications of these results are discussed in relation to self‐categorization theory's depersonalization account of social identification.     

FIRST PERSON PLURAL: SELF‐UNITY AND SELF‐MULTIPLICITY IN THEOLOGY'S DIALOGUE WITH PSYCHOLOGY

In contradistinction to the contemporary human sciences, recent theological accounts of the individual‐in‐relation continue to defend the concept of the singular continuous self. Consequently, theological anthropology and the human sciences seem to offer widely divergent accounts of the sense of self‐fragmentation that many believe pervades the modern world. There has been little constructive interdisciplinary conversation in this area. In this essay I address the damaging implications of this oversight and establish the necessary conditions for future dialogue. I have three primary objectives. First, I show how the notion of personal continuity acquires philosophical theological significance through its close association with the concept of personal particularity. Second, through a discussion of contemporary accounts of self‐multiplicity, I clarify the extent of theological anthropology's disagreement with the human sciences. Third, I draw upon narrative accounts of identity to suggest an alternative means of understanding the experiential continuity of personhood that maintains the tension between self‐plurality, unity, and particularity and thereby reconnects philosophical theological concerns with human‐scientific analyses of the human condition. Narrative approaches to personhood are ideally suited to this purpose, and, I suggest, offer an intriguing solution to understanding and resolving the problem of self‐fragmentation that has caused recent theological anthropology so much consternation.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

Relevance of social categories,depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self‐categorization theory

Two field studies investigated whether, as predicted by self‐categorization theory (Turner, 1987 ), the relationship between comparative fit of an ingroup‐outgroup categorization and group phenomena is mediated by depersonalization of self‐perception, and moderated by category accessibility. In the first study participants were football fans, and in the second they were employees in an organization. In each study, two experimental conditions were created, whereby the accessibility and salience of the ingroup‐outgroup categorization were varied. New measures of comparative fit and depersonalization were developed, based on meta‐contrast ratios. Outcome variables were ingroup bias (Studies 1 and 2), ingroup entitativity, organizational citizenship behaviours, job satisfaction and turnover intentions (Study 2). Consistent with self‐categorization theory, results showed (a) that comparative fit determined ingroup bias and other criterion variables through the mediating process of depersonalization, and (b) that this process was active only when the category was highly accessible. The moderational role of accessibility concerned the relationship between depersonalization and outcome variables, not the link between fit and depersonalization. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is paranoia a defence against or an expression of low self‐esteem?

Paranoia has been hypothesized to be negatively correlated with self‐esteem. However, hypotheses differ about how low self‐esteem might produce paranoia. The paranoia as defense model views paranoia as a defensive reaction against low self‐esteem. In contrast, the paranoia as expression model views paranoia in part as a reflection of low self‐esteem. In the current study, paranoia was negatively associated with global explicit self‐esteem, self‐competence, self‐liking and self‐serving attributional style, but unassociated with implicit self‐esteem as measured with the Implicit Association Test. In contrast, facets of narcissism, which also have been hypothesized to be associated with defensive self‐processing, were associated with defensiveness. Overall, these results suggest that paranoia is better represented by the expression model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.