RALPH WENDELL BURHOE: HIS LIFE AND HIS THOUGHT

Abstract. This is the first of four installments by the author, presenting an intellectual biography of Ralph Wendell Burhoe. This first segment follows Burhoe from his college years at Harvard through the founding of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in 1954. In this period, after his college and seminary study, Burhoe worked at Harvard's Blue Hill Meteorological Observatory and as executive officer of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Throughout his early life he had been concerned with how religion could maintain its credibility as a bearer of truth vis-à-vis the sciences, which were displacing religion not only among leading intellectuals, but also in other segments of society. The founding of IRAS provided an important instrument for dealing with this concern.     

RALPH WENDELL BURHOE: HIS LIFE AND HIS THOUGHT

Abstract. This third installment in David Breed's intellectual biography of Ralph Wendell Burhoe focuses upon the impact of his thought on the Unitarian Universalist Association and that group's role in Burhoe's career. Dana McLean Greeley, elected president of the American Unitarian Association in 1958, was a key figure in Burhoe's eventual participation in the project, "The Free Church in a Changing World." Burhoe's emphasis on the need for doctrine that could communicate religious wisdom in terms of science stood in tension with free-church tradition. Nevertheless, the section of the project's final report, titled "Theology and the Frontiers of Learning," largely accepted Burhoe's program for a new natural theology based on science. This project brought Burhoe's program to the attention of the denomination and led to the invitation in 1964 from Malcolm Sutherland, on behalf of Meadville/Lombard Theological School in Chicago, of which he was president, for Burhoe to implement his program in the new curriculum of that school. Burhoe accepted.     

RALPH BURHOE: RECONSIDERING THE MAN AND HIS VISION OF YOKING RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Ralph Wendell Burhoe was a leading figure in relating religion and science in the second half of the twentieth century. His autodidactic style and character as a public intellectual resulted in a vision that is comprehensive in its concern for the salvation of society. He does not fit easily into academic frameworks, even though he has been influential upon scholars who work in academia. This article discusses some conundrums posed by his work. There are also brief presentations of the concerns that motivated Burhoe, his style of work, and the content of his vision.     

RALPH WENDELL BURHOE AND THE TWO CULTURES

Abstract. Ralph Burhoe developed his proposals for a social reformation at a time when the “two cultures” debate was still active. It is suggested here that Burhoe, sharing with his contemporaries an understanding of culture that was Western and normative in character, overlooked the distinction between the culture of the elites and popular culture, and consequently between religion as presented by theologians and church officials and popular religion. Therefore, his proposals for the revitalization of traditional religions, even if implemented, would not work. Some contradictions within his own program are pointed out, and the social role of the sciences after World War II, as well as the ambiguities of their presence in the so-called underdeveloped nations, is analyzed. As a positive conclusion, it is suggested that Burhoe's main contribution should be sought, not in his outline for a social reformation, but in his role as an organizer of the dialogue between religion and science.     

The Body in the Psychology of Religion

Hutch's position that psychology of religion has neglected the mortal body is affirmed but reinterpreted. Although it may be true that psychology has adopted as postmodern bias toward defining the human being as primarily cognitive, it is less true that the psychology of religion has been unaware of how religion emerges from the experience of living. Noting that Hutch could be understood as a modern Romantic, I reinterpret, in an alternate frame- work, his contention that reexperiencing the sexuality and mortality of the body will reinstate eros into the psychology of religion. The I story model of Donald McKay and the existential paradigm of Reinhold Niebuhr are of- fered as reconceptions of what Hutch is proposing. These theorists state Hutch's position in ways that allow for a more substantive picture of what religion is and how it emerges from the life process.     

The Heritage of Ralph Wendell Burhoe for the Dialogue between Science and Theology: A German Perspective

This paper begins with some reflections on my personal experiences with Ralph Wendell Burhoe during visits to the Chicago Center for Religion and Science. I learned to know Burhoe as an interested and kind person with enormous intellectual power. In this paper I argue that integration of different concepts was the chief focus of his thinking, expressing both an ethical and a dogmatic concern. If his theory of altruism contributes to the scientific investigations into the problem of trans-kin altruism, then his vision of a scientific theology gains credibility. Such an integration is made plausible through the interpretation of altruism in light of Christian love. In fact, Burhoe's neonaturalistic approach may be a fertile resource for the dialogue between science and theology in Germany, and serve as an exemplar of Burhoe's important impact on this dialogue in general.     

Editor's Note

Based on experiences since the launching of this journal in 2001, the editorial board structure of Identity has being modified to represent the various substantive areas in which identity research and theory is currently being undertaken. Associate Area Editors have been allocated to ten specifically designated substantive areas that are especially active in the identity field. Associate Area Editors will participate in the review process, by recommending potential reviewers to the Chief Editor (from the Board-at-Large, or from scholars in that area), and by providing a recommendation to the Chief Editor regarding publication of a submission on the basis of reviews. As specified in the front matter of this issue, the Editorial Board will now comprise: a Chief Editor, three Regional Associate Editors, an Associate Area Editor for each substantive area, and a Board at Large. The substantive areas are: ?Applied identity issues ?Gender identity & sexuality ?Identity politics and social construction ?Identity and emerging adulthood (including "youth" and the transition to adulthood) ?Identity development in adulthood ?Psychological perspectives on racial & ethnic identity ?Psychosocial, personal, & ego identity ?Self & social identity ?Sociological perspectives on racial & ethnic identity ?Vocational identity The Editors of Identity welcome submissions of research and theory relevant to, but not limited by, these substantive areas.     

BURHOE AND SHAPLEY: A COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. The development of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's philosophy of religion and science occurred in the shadow of the continuing dialogue about the place of science in American society. Like his friend and mentor, Harvard astronomer Harlow Shapley, Burhoe was distressed and intrigued by the troubled postwar relations between science and religion. Unlike Shapley, however, Burhoe sought to create a new modernism, a blend of religion and science that would allow each to develop and complement the other.     

THE THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF RALPH WENDELL BURHOE

Abstract. A central aim of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's scientific theology is to define and interpret the meaning of human existence in relation to “ultimate reality.” As such, it can be understood as an exercise in theological anthropology. For Burhoe, this ultimate reality is “nature,” understood as the total reality system which is studied by the sciences and which the sciences are showing to be the sole determiner of the way things are. This article discusses various aspects of Burhoe's theological anthropology, as well as its value and credibility, and raises questions concerning his understanding of the value of the individual and the problems of evil and human sinfulness.     

RALPH WENDELL BURHOE: HIS LIFE AND HIS THOUGHT

Abstract. This fifth and final installment from the author's book-length study of Ralph Wendell Burhoe's life and thought covers the period 1966–1987, and it concludes with a summary of his thought. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science began publication in March 1966, the same year in which the Center for Advanced Study in Theology and the Sciences (CASTS) was founded. Both the journal and the center were made possible by Meadville/Lombard Theological School. After a brief period of flourishing, CASTS was succeeded in 1972 by the Center for Advanced Study in Religion and Science (CASIRAS). Burhoe married Calla Butler in 1969, two years after his first wife, Frances, had died. He retired from Mead-ville in 1974. The Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion was awarded to Burhoe in 1980. His thought is summarized under the topics of values, thermodynamics, the evolution of religion, the concept of soul, God, enculturation and freedom, and the Lord of History.     

What if there were no psychometrics?: constructs, complexity, and measurement

McGrath (2005/this issue) has published a very significant article; it is significant because it examines the substantive issue of construct validity in a simple and informative way, noting the confusions apparent in how constructs and their variables are defined, used, and interpreted within the domain of personality and individual differences. This is a careful, thoughtful, article that quietly proceeds to outline the problems with current thinking and approaches to defining and using constructs in psychology. McGrath also suggests how some of these problems might be addressed. I note that McGrath appears to miss what might be considered an obvious rejoinder to some of his arguments, that is, the use of latent variable and item response theory. Some consideration is given to these arguments. However, a cursory examination shows that although these new methodologies offer many opportunities for new stochastic questionnaire data modeling and the construction of "instant" latent variables, the same problems caused by lack of attention to measurement and meaning remain. I find I am in agreement with many of the author's views and arguments, but I also find myself wondering whether modern psychometrics and individual differences research methods is now so dominated by psychological statisticians that any thought of substantive scientific innovation in this area that deals more properly with measurement and meaning is long gone. I think the answers to the question "What if there was no psychometrics?" would be most illuminating.     

RALPH WENDELL BURHOE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Abstract. Ralph Burhoe has sought to preserve “traditional religious wisdom,” but he emphasizes science as a new revelation. His relation to philosophical positivism and his insistence on including in a scientific theology only views that reflect the scientific worldview constitute major philosophical and theological problems. This essay considers the influence of several historical precursors—Francis Ellingwood Abbot, George Burman Foster, and Shailer Mathews of the “Chicago School” of theology, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, and, especially, Henry Nelson Wieman—which has contributed to a favorable reception of Burhoe's ideas. Social problems such as the youth revolution of the 1960s and indifference to the lack of intellectual credibility of religious beliefs have, however, hindered reception of his ideas. The conclusion notes some tasks that must yet be accomplished in order to continue Burhoe's work, particularly that of increasing the general level of education in the sciences.     

How residents cope with living near a hazardous waste landfill: An example of substantive theorizing

It is hard to be a community or environmental psychologist and not be interested in newspaper stories on global warming, oil spills, or toxic wastes in your own backyard. To the general public, these issues tend to be viewed as environmental, technological, toxicological, or governmental, but not psychological. As psychologists, we see many ways in which psychology does play a role in understanding these events. We have been engaged in a study of residents living near a hazardous waste landfill in which many subdisciplines of psychology have played an illuminating role. Wicker's (this issue) article on substantive theorizing outlines an approach to theory and research that helps communicate the structure and process of doing research on a complex area. We use his article to help us describe key aspects of our research that are not usually discussed in research articles. We believe that the type of research Wicker describes occurs more often than people realize. Unfortunately, however, journal conventions cause investigators to omit discussions of substantive theorizing aspects of their work. We hope that reading this article increases your understanding of substantive theorizing and our research as much as writing it increased our own.     

The definability of objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime

In his recent article On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future (1991), Howard Stein proves not only that one can define an objective becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime, but that there is only one possible definition available if one accepts certain natural assumptions about what it is for becoming to occur and for it to be objective. Stein uses the definition supplied by his proof to refute an argument due to Rietdijk (1966, 1976), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985, 1988) that Minkowski spacetime leaves no room for objective becoming whatsoever. However, Stein's proof does not seem to go far enough. By considering only what events have become from the standpoint of any given event, Stein's uniqueness proof fails from the outset to allow for a more general kind of becoming whereby it is understood to occur from the standpoint of events on the particular worldlines followed by observers. This suggests that there may, after all, be more than one way to define objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime once each observer's worldline is allowed to figure in the definition. This suspicion is further aroused by two recent proposals for objective, worldline-dependent becoming due to Peacock (1992) and Muller (1992) who advocate ways of defining becoming that are not equivalent to the definition Stein's uniqueness proof delivers. Nevertheless, we show that Stein's uniqueness proofcan be extended in a natural way to cover this more general kind of becoming, provided one does not enrich standard Minkowski spacetime by privileging certain sets of worldlines over others in an unwarranted manner. Thus we aim to reinforce Stein's point that standard Minkowski spacetime does make room for objective becoming, but in essentially only one way, despite arguments and proposals to the contrary.     

Quine on Quantification and Existence

Quine's justly famous paper "On What There Is" introduced a criterion of ontological commitment which has been almost universally accepted by analytic philosophers ever since.In this paper I try to unpack some of the substantive and controversial philosophical commitments that are presupposed by this criterion.The aim is not to show that the criterion is incorrect,but merely that it is not as obvious as it is taken to be by many,and that we might have reasons to explore alternative ways of thinking about ontological commitments.     

Agency,human nature and character in Kantian theory

Conclusion In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's theory, morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case.

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God, Tragedy, and the Near-Death Experience: Evaluating Kushner's Perspectives on Theodicy

This article evaluates Harold Kushner's original and reconstructed perspectives on God and the theodicic problem on the basis of research on the near-death experience (NDE) and related phenomena. In response to a personal tragedy, Kushner reconstructed his thinking about God and tragedy from his original Causation-Power perspective to an Inspiration-Love perspective. The Causation-Power perspective posits that God causes human events and that tragic events do not actually contradict God's purpose or will, although tragic events may result from the human freedom to disobey God and suffer punitive consequences. In the Inspiration-Love perspective, human freedom expands to mean that God does not cause all events: God does not cause tragedy, suffers with the sufferer, and can intervene against tragic events only by inspiring people to cope with tragedy and care for others. Although the research findings are consistent with Kushner's emphasis on love and inspiration, the theme of divine power and purpose is also evident. Hence, Kushner should not have rejected entirely his early (Causation-Power) perspective. Identified in the research are forms of inspiration that Kushner did not take into account in his reconstructed (Inspiration-Love) view. The Causation-Power and Inspiration-Love perspectives seem incompatible and neither alone solves the theodicic problem. Nonetheless, they do complement one another; a resolution would permit an integrative understanding of God and tragedy.     

Freud's "Project": a theory for Studies on Hysteria

The controversy about the place of Sigmund Freud's unfinished draft of 1895, "Project for a Scientific Psychology," in the history of his thought, is addressed. It is argued that the "Project" may be understood as a suppressed response to the theory of hysteria presented by Josef Breuer in his and Freud's joint work, Studies on Hysteria. It is suggested that the "Project" may be read, in part, as a substitute for Breuer's theory. The timing and circumstances of the "Project's" composition are discussed. Its substantive and formal congruence with Studies on Hysteria is brought out. Freud's comments on scientific hypotheses are discussed, and it is shown that they constitute an implicit criticism of Breuer's theory.     

Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God: Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas,Buber, and Rosenzweig

This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God.