Earman on Underdetermination and Empirical Indistinguishability

Earman (1993) distinguishes three notions of empirical indistinguishability and offers a rigorous framework to investigate how each of these notions relates to the problem of underdetermination of theory choice. He uses some of the results obtained in this framework to argue for a version of scientific anti- realism. In the present paper we first criticize Earman's arguments for that position. Secondly, we propose and motivate a modification of Earman's framework and establish several results concerning some of the notions of indistinguishability in this modified framework. Finally, we interpret these results in the light of the realism/anti- realism debate. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Earman on the causal theory of time

Conclusion I have so far ignored Earman's Section IV in which spatiotemporal coincidence is discussed. The answer will be clear from the preceding: the exact definitions and principles of the exact theories we have displayed are to be discussed with reference to the special and not the general theory of relativity. But moreover, Earman's transition from (C) to (1) assumes what we do not grant: that events are causally connectible exactly if the points in the mathematical space-time at which they are located are linked by a causal curve.This captures in a nutshell my own conclusions. The first is that the causal theory, after its success vis-à-vis the STR, must now provide a detailed analysis of spatiotemporal concepts in the GTR. The second is that the points raised by Earman do not provide substantive reasons for doubting the adequacy of the causal theory to this task, because Earman insists in his extrapolations on a much closer relation between the empirical structure of events and the mathematical structures that model it than ought to be assumed.I wish to acknowledge gratefully my debt to Dr. A. Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh, to Dr. C. Glymour, Princeton University, and to the support of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.     

Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability

The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument urges us to place mathematical entities on the same ontological footing as (other) theoretical entities of empirical science. Recently this argument has attracted much criticism, and in this paper I address one criticism due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that mathematical theories cannot share the empirical support accrued by our best scientific theories, since mathematical propositions are not being tested in the same way as the clearly empirical propositions of science. In this paper I defend the Quine-Putnam argument against Sober's objections. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism

A rational reconstruction of James's doctrine of pure experience is attempted, showing how it can be formulated in terms of a Ramsey sentence so that its credibility is comparable to contemporary functionalism about the mind. Whereas functionalism treats only mental predicates as theoretical terms and quantifies over physical objects, Jamesian 'global-functionalism' treats both mental and physical predicates as theoretical terms and quantifies over pure experience. Rehabilitated in this way, the doctrine of pure experience is a fit partner for Jamesian pragmatism. When James says that pragmatism guides us in the course of our experience, this 'experience' must be understood as ultimately pure experience. Pure experience is just what appears , pre-conceptually, and Ramsey-sentence analysis shows how James's employment of the pre-conceptual demonstrative that can refer to pure experience with conditions of identity given by its physical or mental properties, while being itself 'colourless', neither mental nor physical. It is concluded that functionalists about the mind have reason to be global-functionalists about mind and body, in just the way that James's doctrine of pure experience lays out; and Jamesian pragmatists should also accept his radical empiricism.     

Consciousness and Modal Empiricism

David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology, ‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property dualism without the support it needs.

Constructive Empiricism Now

Philosophical Studies -     

Dialogues on Causality and the Limits of Empiricism

This paper presents the main lines of reasoning in the Wittgenstein notes entitled 'Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness,' in the form of a series of dialogues between Wittgenstein, Russell, and a few other philosophical voices. Two of the dialogues relate to what, in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics , Wittgenstein called 'the similarity of my treatment with relativity theory.'     

Empiricism,metaphysics, and voluntarism

This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, I raise doubts about the possibility of defending voluntarism without engaging in the kind of metaphysics Van Fraassen rejects.     

Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.