Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention

Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.

EMPATHY AND THE EXTENDED MIND

I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" characterization of empathy. In support of this characterization, I analyze some narratives of individuals with Moebius syndrome, a kind of expressive deficit resulting from bilateral facial paralysis. I conclude by discussing how a Zen Buddhist ethics of responsiveness is helpful for articulating the practical significance of an extended, body-based account of empathy.     

Has foundationalism been refuted?

Conclusion It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of it must be attacked in its most defensible, not in its most vulnerable, form. Although Will and Lehrer reveal weaknesses in historically important forms of foundationalism, it has been my aim in this paper to show that their arguments leave untouched the more modest and less vulnerable form I have called Minimal Foundationalism, a form approximated to by the most prominent contemporary versions of the position. It is to be hoped that those who are interested in clearing the decks for an epistemology without foundations will turn their critical weapons against such modest and careful foundationalists as Chisholm, Danto, and Quinton     

QUANTUM ASPECTS OF LIFE: RELATING EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY WITH THEOLOGY VIA MODERN PHYSICS

Abstract In the present paper, I shall argue that quantum theory can contribute to reconciling evolutionary biology with the creation hypothesis. After giving a careful definition of the theological problem, I will, in a first step, formulate necessary conditions for the compatibility of evolutionary theory and the creation hypothesis. In a second step, I will show how quantum theory can contribute to fulfilling these conditions. More precisely, I claim that (1) quantum probabilities are best understood in terms of ontological indeterminism, but (2) reflect nevertheless causal openness rather than divine indifference or arbitrariness, and (3) such a genuinely creative universe can be considered as the work of a loving Creator. I ask subsequently whether these necessary conditions are also sufficient for the compatibility of evolutionary theory and the creation hypothesis. Finally, I will show that relating evolutionary biology with theology via quantum theory could also shed some light on the nature of life.     

Scientific Research–Who Should Govern?

I argue that the title question needs to be taken seriously because there are important questions about how the scientific agenda should be set. Natural answers to the question – declarations of the proper autonomy of science or expressions of faith in market forces – are found inadequate. Instead, I propose a form of democracy with respect to scientific research that will avoid the obvious dangers of a tyranny of ignorance. I conclude with some modest proposals about how the ideal of a democratic science might be implemented and with a response to common objections.

How to quantify the evidence for the absence of a correlation

We present a suite of Bayes factor hypothesis tests that allow researchers to grade the decisiveness of the evidence that the data provide for the presence versus the absence of a correlation between two variables. For concreteness, we apply our methods to the recent work of Donnellan et al. (in press) who conducted nine replication studies with over 3,000 participants and failed to replicate the phenomenon that lonely people compensate for a lack of social warmth by taking warmer baths or showers. We show how the Bayes factor hypothesis test can quantify evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, and how the prior specification for the correlation coefficient can be used to define a broad range of tests that address complementary questions. Specifically, we show how the prior specification can be adjusted to create a two-sided test, a one-sided test, a sensitivity analysis, and a replication test.     

The Reflective Epistemic Renegade

Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade.     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

Rationing just medical care

U.S. politicians and policymakers have been preoccupied with how to pay for health care. Hardly any thought has been given to what should be paid for--as though health care is a commodity that needs no examination--or what health outcomes should receive priority in a just society, i.e., rationing. I present a rationing proposal, consistent with U.S. culture and traditions, that deals not with "health care," the terminology used in the current debate, but with the more modest and limited topic of medical care. Integral to this rationing proposal--which allows scope to individual choice and at the same time recognizes the interdependence of the individual and society--is a definition of a "decent minimum," the basic package of medical treatments everyone should have access to in a just society. I apply it to a specific example, diabetes mellitus, and track it through a person's life span.     

Experimental design: Problems in understanding the dynamical behavior-environment system

In this paper, I attempt to describe the implications of dynamical approaches to science for research in the experimental study of behavior. I discuss the differences between classical and dynamical science, and focus on how dynamical science might see replication differently from classical science. Focusing on replication specifically, I present some problems that the classical approach has in dealing with dynamics and multiple causation. I ask about the status and meaning of "error" variance, and whether it may be a potent source of information. I show how a dynamical approach can handle the sort of control by past events that is hard for classical science to understand. These concerns require, I believe, an approach to variability that is quite different from the one most researchers currently employ. I suggest that some of these problems can be overcome by a notion of "behavioral state," which is a distillation of an organism's history.     

成就目标定向在学业自我概念与学业成绩关系中的调节作用:基于内/外参照模型

为了探究成就目标定向在学业自我概念与学业成绩关系中的调节作用,采用语文学业自我概念量表、数学学业自我概念量表和成就目标定向量表对1515名初中生进行测查。结果显示：(1)初中生语文-数学学业自我概念建构过程符合内/外参照模型(Internal/External Frame of Reference Model, I/EM);(2)掌握回避对I/EM的维度比较路径存在调节作用,掌握回避得分越高越易受维度比较效应的影响,该现象对于语文成绩和数学成绩相对差的学生更明显;(3)成绩回避对I/EM的社会比较路径存在调节作用,成绩回避得分越高越不易受社会比较效应的影响,该现象对于语文成绩和数学成绩相对好的学生更明显。本研究揭示了持有不同成就目标定向的初中生在学业自我概念建构过程中的差异,对引导初中生建构积极学业自我概念具有重要启示。     

Emergence of the bipolar cultural complex in Walt Whitman

My main hypothesis in this paper(1) is that America's seminal poet, Walt Whitman, was trapped--like so many of his contemporaries--in 'cultural complexes' (Singer & Kimbles 2004) that he internalized, but that he found a way to transcend the splits inherent in these 'bipolar' (Perry 1970) organizations through his art. One way he accomplished this was through his aesthetic method of 'holding the opposites' between two poles of a slavery is wrong/white supremacy is justified cultural complex. In my paper, I provide evidence for some of the contradictions inherent in Whitman's character by examining the political splits of his times and explore how various Self symbols he produced through his poetry, particularly the figures he called 'Black Lucifer' and the Deus Quadriune--a quaternity symbol--facilitated his personal and cultural transformation. Finally, I demonstrate the relevance of my hypothesis to contemporary racism during the pre-Civil Rights period in the South through a clinical example, and I show how the Jungian method of 'holding the opposites' can be effectively practised in the transference/countertransference field of psychotherapy in general.     

Merleau-Ponty and the Advent of Meaning: From Consummate Reciprocity to Ambiguous Reversibility

The three themes of perception, expression, and history proved to be significant and consistent concerns of Merleau-Ponty from his earliest to his latest writings. In turn, Merleau-Ponty was concerned to discover and show how meaning emerged within the context of each of these themes. My main goal in this essay will be to trace ways that Merleau-Ponty conceived of this emergence, and to how his conceptions underwent increasing sophistication from his earlier to later writings. In section I, I show how a kind of perceptual meaning arises out of an exchange between subject and object, perceived and perceived, and the visible and invisible. In section II, I show how expressive meaning arises out of an exchange between the spoken and speaking word, and the synchronic and diachronic registers of language. In these sections, I also point out that what starts roughly as binary dialogue (characterized by consummate reciprocity) between these matrices of meaning evolves into a more ambiguous interplay (characterized by such later ontological notions as invisibility, reversibility, and the flesh). In section III, I show how meaning arises in history out of an ambiguous interplay between past and present, ideas and institutions, the collective and individual, and the pre-determined and the free; and I suggest ways Merleau-Ponty might have integrated earlier scattered thoughts about meaning's emergence in history with his later ontology, had his work in these directions not been cut short.     

What the State Owes ‘Bastards’: A Modest Critique of Modest One-Child Policies

This essay criticises ‘modest’ one-child policies, which would impose sanctions upon parents who create multiple children. Specifically, this article considers what the state owes individuals who would be born (illegally) beneath restrictive procreative policies and argues that such policies would fail to show due respect to second- or third-born individuals created beneath them. First, I argue that modest procreative restrictions (like sanctions) are likely to generate only modest compliance. I then suggest it is reasonable to think a one-child policy fails to demonstrate due respect to existing second and third children. I argue that such a policy generates an undue burden on any second or third children who would be born beneath them, before concluding by considering whether the state might be able to avoid effectively reinscribing ‘bastardy’ into its law by locating responsibility for the effects of such a policy entirely on the parents, rather than on children.     

The Goldilocks problem and extended cognition

According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), parts of the extrabodily world can constitute cognitive operations. I argue that the debate over HEC should be framed as a debate over the location and bounds of cognitive systems. The “Goldilocks problem” is how to demarcate these systems in a way that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive. I lay out a view of systems demarcation on which cognitive systems are sets of mechanisms for producing cognitive processes that are bounded by transducers and effectors: structures that turn physical stimuli into representations, and representations into physical effects. I show how the transducer–effector view can stop the problem of uncontrolled cognitive spreading that faces HEC, and illustrate its advantages relative to other views of system individuation. Finally, I argue that demarcating systems by transducers and effectors is not question-begging in the context of a debate over HEC.     

CLASSICAL PHYSICS AND EARLY QUANTUM THEORY: A LEGITIMATE CASE OF THEORETICAL UNDERDETERMINATION

In 1912, Henri Poincaré published an argument which apparently shows that the hypothesis of quanta is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of Planck's experimentally corroborated law describing the spectral distribution of radiant energy in a black body. In a recent paper, John Norton has reaffirmed the authority of Poincarés argument, setting it up as a paradigm case in which empirical data can be used to definitively rule out theoretical competitors to a given theoretical hypothesis. My goal is to dispute Norton's claim that there is no theoretical underdetermination problem arising between classical physics and early quantum theory. The strategy I use in defending my view is to adopt a suggestion made by Jarrett Leplin and Larry Laudan on how to assess the relative merits of competing theoretical alternatives, where each alternative has an equal capacity to save the phenomena. In the course of the paper, I distinguish between two branches of classical physics: classical mechanics and classical electromagnetism. The former is claimed by Norton and Poincaré to be determinately ruled out by the black body evidence; and it is the former that I argue is compatible with this evidence.     

Talking lions and lion talk: Davidson on conceptual schemes

This essay is a reconstruction and defense of Davidson's argument against the intelligiblity of the notion of conceptual scheme. After presenting a brief clarification of Davidson's argument in On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, I turn to reconstructing Davidson's argument. Unlike many commentators, and occasionally Davidson, who hold that the motive force of the argument is the Principle of Charity (or the denial of the Third Dogma), I argue that there is a further principle which underlies the argument. This principle I call the Strong Discrimination Principle.But the argument of the paper is not purely exegetical. Not only do I show how the Strong Discrimination Principle meets certain objections to Davidson's argument, but I show how the Principle clarifies the realist position. In particular, I show how a line of argument advanced by Rorty and Putnam against (metaphysical) realism can be rejected.If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations I have a host of friends. I am grateful to Michael Zimmerman for taking the time to read a preliminary draft of this paper, and to Carolyn Morillo for her comments on a central issue in the paper. I am also especially grateful to the relentlessly enthusiastic participants in the Current Research Seminar at Tulane. To mention but a few: Robert Berman, Radu Bogdan, Norton Nelkin, Graeme Forbes, Jim Stone, and again, Michael Zimmerman and Carolyn Morillo. If I have forgotten just whose objection precipitated yet another footnote or modification, I hope they will be as forgiving as they were helpful. I am also grateful to a referee for having pointed out the relevance of Akeel Bilgrami's article.     

Injecting a Woman's Voice: Conservative Women's Organizations,Gender Consciousness,and the Expression of Women's Policy Preferences

Scholars have argued that gender consciousness may be the important link between gender identity and the expression of political interests. Ultimately, however, these studies explain feminist political behavior and leave the impression that only feminist women articulate a woman's perspective on policy issues. In this article I demonstrate the coherence between gender identity and policy preferences for two national conservative women's organizations, the Concerned Women for America and the Independent Women's Forum. I show that conservative women are also gender conscious public-policy advocates. Using data gathered from organizational literature, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with organizational leaders, I show how conservative women have collectively organized as women and framed their policy goals in terms of women's interests. As such, I demonstrate a clear and profound link between gender identity and politicization among conservative women activists, suggesting the need to reconsider how we understand and define gender consciousness and women's policy activism.     

Are moral judgements adaptations? Three reasons why it is so difficult to tell

An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e. that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations has been advocated in various different specificities and scopes, and on various different levels. Second, the three kinds of evidence that have most often been appealed to by discussants of this hypothesis require additional arguments. And third, there is significant reasonable disagreement about what moral judgements essentially are.