Children's reasoning about physics within and across ontological kinds

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

On the relations between action planning, object identification, and motor representations of observed actions and objects

Recent evidence suggests that viewing a static prime object (a hand grasp), can activate action representations that affect the subsequent identification of graspable target objects. The present study explored whether stronger effects on target object identification would occur when the prime object (a hand grasp) was made more action-rich and dynamic. Of additional interest was whether this type of action prime would affect the generation of motor activity normally elicited by the target object. Three experiments demonstrated that grasp observation improved the identification of grasp-congruent target objects relative to grasp-incongruent target objects. We argue from this data that identifying a graspable object includes the processing of its action-related attributes. In addition, grasp observation was shown to influence the motor activity elicited by the target object, demonstrating interplay between action-based and object-based motor coding.     

Expertise and injury experience in professional skiers modulate the ability to predict the outcome of observed ski-related actions

Professional athletes, compared to beginners, can better predict the outcome of sport-related observed movements, via mirror motor-system modulations (motor resonance). Furthermore, motor-system inhibition occurs when observing other people experiencing pain (pain resonance). Here we investigated whether observing sport-related actions, whose outcome can lead or not to a painful experience, results into different prediction performances depending on expertise and history of injury. Experiment 1 revealed that professional skiers, relative to beginners, show greater prediction accuracy but slower reaction times. Experiment 2 revealed that, among professional skiers, those previously injured, compared to uninjured ones, are slower in predicting the outcome of the observed action when it actually leads to an injury. We hypothesize that such results could be explained by an automatic activation of both motor and pain resonance mechanisms in the onlooker, inducing a sort of experience-dependant freezing response while observing actions likely leading to an injury.     

An integrative model of rational imitation in infancy

It has been proposed that infants selectively imitate based on a rational evaluation of an observed action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). This rational-imitation account has been rejected based on findings which suggested that infant imitation depends on: (a) the similarity between the infant's and the model's body posture; and (b) the presence of action effects (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Despite this controversy, we show that both accounts have received empirical support from different fields of research. We propose that both accounts operate on different levels, and we present an integrative model, which combines the two seemingly competing accounts. Motor resonance is perceived as a mechanism that enables infants to imitate, and a rational evaluation of the model's action is conceived as a mechanism that guides infants’ imitative behavior.     

The plurality of concepts

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.     

Kinaesthetic imagery ability moderates the effect of an AO+MI intervention on golf putt performance: A pilot study

BackgroundPrevious research has established that motor imagery (MI) and action observation (AO) independently enhance the performance and learning of motor skills. Recent studies have demonstrated that combining AO and MI (AO + MI) elicits increased activity in motor regions of the brain and enhances performance more than either AO or MI alone. Kinesthetic imagery (KI) ability refers to the ease with which one can sense their own body and imagine how a movement feels during a task (Malouin et al., 2007). KI ability may be of particular importance when engaging with AO + MI as the provision of an external visual stimulus through AO renders the visual component of MI redundant.ObjectiveThe current study aims to add to the emerging body of behavioural evidence demonstrating the performance benefits of AO + MI by exploring the effect of an AO + MI intervention on golf putting performance, as well as exploring the role that KI ability represents in AO + MI effectiveness.MethodRight-handed male golfers (N = 44) of varying skill level performed twenty 15-foot putts before and after a 3.5 min AO + MI intervention (AO + MI group; mean handicap = 7.5, SD = 4.3) or a similarly timed passive reading task (Control group; mean handicap = 11.5, SD = 5.4). Using the MIQ-3 questionnaire, participants in both experimental groups were classified according to kinesthetic imagery ability where: a mean score ≥6 were classified as good imagers. Performance accuracy was measured using mean radial error (MRE), precision was quantified via bivariate error (BVE) and putter kinematics were recorded by SAM Puttlab.ResultsResults from a series of ANCOVAs indicate that good kinesthetic imagers who received the AO + MI intervention were significantly more precise (BVRE) on the putting task than good kinesthetic imagers in the Control group (p = 0.041, d = 0.678). Good kinesthetic imagers in the intervention group also significantly outperformed good kinesthetic imagers in the control group on a measure of speed control (SD of error scores along the axis of progression) in golf putting (p = 0.041).ConclusionsOur results suggest that the presence of AO with MI increases the relevance of kinesthetic cues, that good kinesthetic imagers are able to utilise for subsequent performance benefits during the putting task. We discuss the increased importance of kinesthetic awareness/feel following the intervention as an explanation for such improvements in performance.     

Response preparation with static versus moving hands

This research tested the response inhibition account of the hand-advantage found in the finger pre-cuing task. According to this account, the advantage of preparing two fingers on one hand (represented in one hemisphere) as opposed to preparing two fingers on two hands (represented in two hemispheres) is due, in part, to a response inhibition process that operates more efficiently within than between hemispheres. In this view, supplying extra activation to both hemispheres by moving the hands should decrease the within-hemisphere inhibition advantage. Twelve participants performed the finger pre-cuing task with static and moving hands. As predicted by the response inhibition account, the hand-advantage, present with the hands at rest, decreased with the hands moving.     

Altered attention for stimuli on the hands

Attention operates in the space near the hands with unique, action-related priorities. Here, we examined how attention treats objects on the hands themselves. We tested two hypotheses. First, attention may treat stimuli on the hands like stimuli near the hands, as though the surface of the hands were the proximal case of near-hand space. Alternatively, we proposed that the surface of the hands may be attentionally distinct from the surrounding space. Specifically, we predicted that attention should be slow to orient toward the hands in order to remain entrained to near-hand space, where the targets of actions are usually located. In four experiments, we observed delayed orienting of attention on the hands compared to orienting attention near or far from the hands. Similar delayed orienting was also found for tools connected to the body compared to tools disconnected from the body. These results support our second hypothesis: attention operates differently on the functional surfaces of the hand. We suggest this effect serves a functional role in the execution of manual actions.     

Altered vision near the hands

The present study explored the manner in which hand position may affect visual processing. We studied three classic visual attention tasks (visual search, inhibition of return, and attentional blink) during which the participants held their hands either near the stimulus display, or far from the display. Remarkably, the hands altered visual processing: people shifted their attention between items more slowly when their hands were near the display. The same results were observed for both visible and invisible hands. This enhancement in vision for objects near the hands reveals a mechanism that could facilitate the detailed evaluation of objects for potential manipulation, or the assessment of potentially dangerous objects for a defensive response.     

Imagery ability classification: Commentary on «Kinaesthetic imagery ability moderates the effect of an AO+MI intervention on golf putt performance: A pilot study» by McNeill et al. (2020)

McNeill et al. (2020) recently published a study that first aimed to assess the effect of a combination of motor imagery (MI) and action observation (AO) on golf putt performance and then to determine if the evolution of this performance could be moderated by participants’ kinesthetic imagery ability. To assess golfers’ MI ability, the authors used the third version of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire. Participants notably self-estimated their kinesthetic MI ability by using a Likert-type scale, with scores ranging from 1 “very difficult to feel” to 7 “very easy to feel”. Athletes were categorized as either “poor” or “good” kinesthetic imagers, with mean scores of 4.93 and 6.63, respectively, in the intervention groups. Although a similar categorization procedure had previously been used in the literature for “good imagers”, the mean scores for “poor” imagers were much higher than those noted in previous studies evaluating the effect of MI ability on motor accuracy. Moreover, the low number of participants in the intervention group (n = 22) meant that participants were considered “poor” imagers even though their mean scores corresponded to “quite easy to feel” kinesthetic images of movements. This could notably explain the lack of differences between “poor” and “good” imagers in terms of putting performance in the intervention group. Despite these methodological limitations, the results of McNeill et al.‘s study show promising evidence for the efficacy of an AO plus MI intervention in relation to putting performance and should lead to further investigations. We suggest that research in the area of motor imagery ability include larger samples to explore, in individuals with very low imagery ability scores, the effects of the combination of AO and MI on motor performance.     

Examining intention in simulated actions: Are children and young adults different?

Previous work with adults provides evidence that ‘intention’ used in processing simulated actions is similar to that used in planning and processing overt movements. The present study compared young adults and children on their ability to estimate distance reachability using a NOGO/GO paradigm in conditions of imagery only (IO) and imagery with actual execution (IE). Our initial thoughts were that whereas intention is associated with motivation and commitment to act, age-related differences could impact planning. Results indicated no difference in overall accuracy by condition within groups, and as expected adults were more accurate. These findings support an increasing body of evidence suggesting that the neurocognitive processes (in this case, intention) driving motor imagery and overt actions are similar, and as evidenced here, functioning by age 7.     

Memory for action events in the bottlenosed dolphin

We investigated whether a bottlenosed dolphin’s ability to recall and repeat actions on command would immediately generalize to actions performed with specified objects. The dolphin was tested on her ability to repeat 18 novel behaviors performed with potentially interchangeable objects specified using an artificial gestural language. Such “action events” were correctly repeated at above chance levels, indicating that the dolphin had access to memories of those events. Performance levels were, however, lower than in previous tests. The dolphin appeared to have difficulty recalling which object an action was performed with. Previous research has demonstrated that animals can recall features of their environment and features of their actions independently of one another. The results of this study demonstrate (1) that the dolphin’s concept of repeating extends beyond simply accessing memories of movement patterns, and (2) that dolphins’ memories of past events incorporate representations of both self-performed acts and objects, locations, or gestural instructions. Received:10 October 1998 / Accepted after revision: 22 December 1998     

How equivalent are the action execution,imagery, and observation of intransitive movements? Revisiting the concept of somatotopy during action simulation

Jeannerod (2001) hypothesized that action execution, imagery, and observation are functionally equivalent. This led to the major prediction that these motor states are based on the same action-specific and even effector-specific motor representations. The present study examined whether hand and foot movements are represented in a somatotopic manner during action execution, imagery, and action observation.     

Pictures of you: Dot stimuli cause motor contagion in presence of a still human form

In this study, we investigate which visual cues induce participants to encode a non-human motion stimulus in their motor system. Participants performed reach-to-grasp actions to a target after observing a dot moving in a direct or higher-arcing path across a screen. Dot motion occurred in the presence of a meaningless (scrambled human model) stimulus, a still human model, or a human model performing a direct or exaggeratedly curved reach to a target. Our results show that observing the dot displacement causes motor contagion (changes in the height of the observer’s hand trajectory) when a human form was visually present in the background (either moving or still). No contagion was evident, however, when this human context was absent (i.e., human image scrambled and not identifiable). This indicates that visual cues suggestive of human agency can determine whether or not moving stimuli are encoded in the motor system.     

Studying action representation in children via motor imagery

The use of motor imagery is a widely used experimental paradigm for the study of cognitive aspects of action planning and control in adults. Furthermore, there are indications that motor imagery provides a window into the process of action representation. These notions complement internal model theory suggesting that such representations allow predictions (estimates) about the mapping of the self to parameters of the external world; processes that enable successful planning and execution of action. The ability to mentally represent action is important to the development of motor control. This paper presents a critical review of motor imagery research conducted with children (typically developing and special populations) with focus on its merits and possible shortcomings in studying action representation. Included in the review are age-related findings, possible brain structures involved, experimental paradigms, and recommendations for future work. The merits of this review are associated with the apparent increasing attraction for using and studying motor imagery to understand the developmental aspects of action processing in children.     

Action simulation in the human brain: Twelve questions

Although the idea of action simulation is nowadays popular in cognitive science, neuroscience and robotics, many aspects of the simulative processes remain unclear from empirical, computational, and neural perspectives. In the first part of the article, we provide a critical review and assessment of action simulation theories advanced so far in the wider literature of embodied and motor cognition. We focus our analysis on twelve key questions, and discuss them in the context of human and (occasionally) primate studies. In the second part of the article, we describe an integrative neuro-computational account of action simulation, which links the neural substrate (as revealed in neuroimaging studies of action simulation) to the components of a computational architecture that includes internal modeling, action monitoring and inhibition mechanisms.     

One hand, two objects: emergence of affordance in contexts

Studies on affordances typically focus on single objects. We investigated whether affordances are modulated by the context, defined by the relation between two objects and a hand. Participants were presented with pictures displaying two manipulable objects linked by a functional (knife-butter), a spatial (knife-coffee mug), or by no relation. They responded by pressing a key whether the objects were related or not. To determine if observing other's actions and understanding their goals would facilitate judgments, a hand was: (a) displayed near the objects; (b) grasping an object to use it; (c) grasping an object to manipulate/move it; (d) no hand was displayed. RTs were faster when objects were functionally rather than spatially related. Manipulation postures were the slowest in the functional context and functional postures were inhibited in the spatial context, probably due to mismatch between the inferred goal and the context. The absence of this interaction with foot responses instead of hands in Experiment 2 suggests that effects are due to motor simulation rather than to associations between context and hand-postures.     

Attending to what matters: Flexibility in adults’ and infants’ action perception

Action perception is selective in that observers attend to and encode certain dimensions of action over others. But how flexible is action perception in its selection of perceptual information? One possibility is that observers consistently attend to particular dimensions of action over others across different contexts. Another possibility, tested here, is that observers flexibly vary their attention to different dimensions of action based on the context in which action occurs. We investigated 9.5-month-old infants’ and adults’ ability to attend to drop height under varying contexts—aiming to drop an object into a narrow container versus a wide container. We predicted differential attention to increases in aiming height for the narrow container versus the wide container because an increase in aiming height has a differential effect on success (i.e., getting the object into the container) depending on the width of the container. Both adults and infants showed an asymmetry in their attention to aiming height as a function of context; in the wide container condition increases and decreases in aiming height were equally detectable, whereas in the narrow container condition observers more readily discriminated increases over decreases in aiming height. These results indicate that action perception is both selective and flexible according to context, aiding in action prediction and infants’ social–cognitive development more broadly.