"本质"的双重含义:自然科学与人文科学——黑格尔、狄尔泰、胡塞尔之间的一点链接

Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29     

Poetry as anti-discourse: formalism,hermeneutics, and the poetics of Paul Celan

I argue from a hermeneutic point of view that formal elements of poetry can only be identified because poetry is based on both the phenomenon and the conception of poetry, both of which precede the attempt to identify formal elements as the defining moment of poetry. Furthermore, I argue with Gadamer that poetry is based on a rupture with and an epoche of our non-poetic use of language in such a way that it liberates “fixed” universal aspects of everyday language, and that through establishing itself in a new, self-referential and monologue unity, it individualizes speech. From the hermeneutic position, poetry is a form of speaking rather than a “fixed” object. As such, I will try to make sense of what Paul Celan said in his famous “Meridian” speech: namely, that the poem is “actualized language, set free under the sign of a radical individuation, which at the same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened by language.”     

“The end of history ” and the fate of the philosophy of history

The “end of history” by Fukuyama is mainly based on Hegel’s treatise of the end of history and Kojeve’s corresponding interpretation. But Hegel’s “end of history” is a purely philosophical question, i.e., an ontological premise that must be fulfilled to complete “absolute knowledge.” When Kojeve further demonstrates its “universal and homogeneous state,” Fukuyama extends it into a political view: The victory of the Western system of freedom and democracy marks the end of the development of human history and Marxist theory and practice. This is a misunderstanding of Hegel. Marx analyzes, scientifically, the historical limitation of Western capitalism and maintains, by way of a kind of revolutionary teleology, the expectation of and belief in human liberation, which is the highest historical goal. His philosophy of history is hence characterized by theoretical elements from both historical scientificalness and historical teleology.     

Reproduction,familiarity, love,and humaneness: How did confucius reveal “humaneness”?

This article draws out the subtle connections among the various sorts of categories—“sheng 生 (reproduction),” “qin 亲 (familiarity),” “ai 爱 (love),” and “ren 仁 (humaneness)”—focusing on the following: Confucius found the original significance of “reproduction” to be sympathy between males and females, and upon further study he found it extended to the.affinity of blood relations, namely “familiarity.” From “familiarity” he came to understand “love” that one generates and has for people and things beyond one’s blood relations, in other words, the empathic heart or the feeling of empathy itself. From here he anticipated rende 仁德 (the humane and virtuous) level of “fan’ai zhong 泛爱众 (universal love for all people)” or “fan’ai wanwu 泛爱万物 (universal love for all creatures).” The article further makes the point that in order to meet the conditions for the perfection of “humaneness” which has neither any excesses nor any deficiencies, Confucius ultimately developed a means, that is, “the golden mean,” which indicates that his ancient understanding of life and growth produced in Confucius a profound shift in the focus of human concern from “ming 命 (fate)” to “Dao 道 (the Way).”     

Evald Il’enkov and World Philosophy

To ascertain the context of Il’enkov’s philosophy, the author delves into the history of philosophy since the Sophists and Plato. For Il’enkov, philosophy is not an abstract science “about everything,” but a study of ideas – forms which are identical for thinking and being. These objective and universal forms of thought are explained as products and schemes of human activity creating the world of culture and reified in its “smart” things.     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70     

Teaching the Bible in the schools of the Labor and the Kibbutz Movements, 1921–1953

How the challenge of teaching the Bible was met by educators who were members of the Kibbutz and Labor movements during the years before the establishment of the Israeli State is the subject of the following essay. Years ago, Jacobus Schoneveld, (1976), recently followed by Asher Shkedi (2004) proposed dividing educators of the Labor and Kibbutz movements into three types: those who wished to stress “national reconstruction,” those directed toward teaching a “universal humanism” and those seeking to awaken “moral dialogue” and achieve “personal growth.” In fact, such clear-cut lines of demarcation did not exist. The goals were these, but approaches themselves were always mixed. One distinguishes educational goals better by a more simple division into the questions of what is to be taught (religious versus Secular materials) and through which ancillary disciplines. Doing so has the virtue of highlighting how these educators were animated by their quest after how best to teach Biblical morality with the aim of “shaping” the student or achieving “emulation,” especially by generating a “dialogue” between the pupil and the biblical text, leading to “personal growth.” These emphases tell us much about the pre-State educational mentality and pedagogical ideals.     

Did Kant Respect Persons?

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Predicate abstraction,the limits of quantification,and the modality of existence

For various reasons several authors have enriched classical first order syntax by adding a predicate abstraction operator. “Conservatives” have done so without disturbing the syntax of the formal quantifiers but “revisionists” have argued that predicate abstraction motivates the universal quantifier’s re-classification from an expression that combines with a variable to yield a sentence from a sentence, to an expression that combines with a one-place predicate to yield a sentence. My main aim is to advance the cause of predicate abstraction while cautioning against revisionism. In so doing, however, I shall pursue a secondary aim by conveying mixed blessings to those who hold the view that in the logical sense of “existence” some existing object is such as to exist contingently. Advocates of this view must concede Williamson’s recent contention that the domain of unrestricted objectual quantification could not have been narrower than it is actually, but predicate abstraction affords them some hope of accommodating this concession.     

The Memory Evolutive Systems as a Model of Rosen’s Organisms – (Metabolic,Replication) Systems

Robert Rosen has proposed several characteristics to distinguish “simple” physical systems (or “mechanisms”) from “complex” systems, such as living systems, which he calls “organisms”. The Memory Evolutive Systems (MES) introduced by the authors in preceding papers are shown to provide a mathematical model, based on category theory, which satisfies his characteristics of organisms, in particular the merger of the Aristotelian causes. Moreover they identify the condition for the emergence of objects and systems of increasing complexity. As an application, the cognitive system of an animal is modeled by the “MES of cat-neurons” obtained by successive complexifications of his neural system, in which the emergence of higher order cognitive processes gives support to Mario Bunge’s “emergentist monism.” Dedicated to the memory of Robert Rosen who kindly accepted to come to Amiens while he was very ill.     

命与天命:儒家天人关系的双重视角

As a pair of important categories in traditional Chinese culture, “ming 命 (destiny or decrees)” and “tian ming 天命 (heavenly ordinances)” mainly refer to the constraints placed on human beings. Both originated from “ling 令 (decrees),” which evolved from “wang ling 王令 (royal decrees)” into “tian ling 天令 (heavenly decrees),” and then became “ming” from a throne because of the decisive role of “heavenly decrees” over a throne. “Ming” and “tian ming” have different definitions: “Ming” represented the limits Heaven placed on the natural lives of human beings and was an objective force that men could not direct, but was embodied in human beings as their “destiny”; “Tian ming” reflected the moral ideals of human beings in their self-identification; It originated in man but had to be verified by Heaven, and it was therefore the true ordinance that Heaven placed on human beings. “Ming” and “tian ming” are two perspectives on the traditional relationship between Heaven and human beings, and at the same time Confucians and Daoists placed different emphasis on them. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhongguo zhexueshi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2007, (4): 11–21     

"气"概念几个层次意义的分殊

In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of “qi” has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, “qi” has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, “qi” is similar to “air,” and it is essentially similar to the “matter-energy” or “field” in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the meanings of “qi” in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of “qi” on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about “qi,” such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (9): 34–41     

Disputes over Philosophical Views in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and Development of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy; that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings, exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people. Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1     

先秦儒家美学之"美"的边界

“Beauty” is a very important concept in Pre-Qin Confucian aesthetics. Pre-Qin Confucian aesthetics generally had two viewpoints when defining beauty: Negatively, by stressing that “beauty” in the aesthetic sense was not “good”; and positively, by stressing two factors: one, that beauty was related to “feeling” which was not an animal instinct, the other was that “beauty” was a special texture with a particular meaning. “Beauty” in Pre-Qin Confucian aesthetics may be defined as “texture (or form)” capable of communicating feeling or triggering a reaction of feeling. __________ Translated from Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao 上海师范大学学报 (Journal of Shanghai Normal University), 2007, (7): 80–85     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

Gateways—just as important as standards: How the internet won the “religious war” over standards in Scandinavia

This article concerns the Nordunet project and its “plug.” It is a history about how the Internet “won” the “religious war” about computer communication protocol standards in Scandinavia. It teaches us important lessons about how the Nordic countries (except Denmark) became the leading ones in the adoption and use of the Internet. On a more general level this story also teaches us an important lesson about the importance of gateways in the design and establishment of large scale computer networks and information infrastructures. It is a universal truth that the development of such technologies requires standards. And that gateways are equally important. The main conclusion drawn is that what matters in the development of such technologies is to combine and balance the use of gateways and standards in a proper way. Originally trained as a computer scientist his research focuses mainly on the interplay between social and technical issues in the development and use of large-scale information systems and infrastructures—including their standards. He has worked most of his professional career within applied research institutions and industry and before moving into academia in 1997.     

A new discourse on Xunzi��s philosophy of language

Xunzi’s philosophy of language was mainly unfolded through the “discrimination of ming 名 (names) and shi 实 (realities)” and the “discrimination of yan 言 (words) and yi 意 (meanings).” Particularly, the “discrimination of names and realities” was centered on the propositions that “realities are realized when their names are heard” and that “names are given to point up realities,” including the view on the essence of language such as “names expect to indicate realities” and “conventions established by usage,” the view of development of language such as “coming form the former usage and being newly established,” and the view of functions of language such as “discriminating superiority and inferiority and differentiating identities and differences”; while the “discrimination of words and meanings” mainly contained two aspects: One was that words could completely represent meanings while it could not do so on the other hand, and the other was that the Dao should be grasped through “an unoccupied, concentrated and quiet mind.” Xunzi’s philosophy of language stressed both language’s value attribute and its cognitive attribute, and it is the greatest achievement of pre-Qin dynasty’s philosophy of language.     

Courage in The Analects: A Genealogical Survey of the Confucian Virtue of Courage

The different meanings of “courage” in The Analects were expressed in Confucius’ remark on Zilu’s bravery. The typological analysis of courage in Mencius and Xunzi focused on the shaping of the personalities of brave persons. “Great courage” and “superior courage”, as the virtues of “great men” or “shi junzi 士君子 (intellectuals with noble characters)”, exhibit not only the uprightness of the “internal sagacity”, but also the rich implications of the “external kingship”. The prototype of these brave persons could be said to be between Zengzi’s courage and King Wen’s courage. The discussion entered a new stage of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, when admiration for “Yanzi’s great valor” became the key of various arguments. The order of “the three cardinal virtues” was also discussed because it concerned the relationship between “finished virtue” and “novice virtue”; hence, the virtue of courage became internalized as an essence of the internal virtuous life. At the turn of the 20th century, when China was trembling under the threat of foreign powers, intellectuals remodeled the tradition of courage by redefining “Confucius’ great valor”, as Liang Qichao did in representative fashion in his book Chinese Bushido. Hu Shi’s Lun Ru 论儒 (On Ru) was no more than a repetition of Liang’s opinion. In the theoretical structures of the modern Confucians, courage is hardly given a place. As one of the three cardinal virtues, bravery is but a concept. In a contemporary society where heroes and sages exist only in history books, do we need to talk about courage? How should it be discussed? These are questions which deserve our consideration.     

Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism

Tu Weiming, as a leading spokesman for contemporary New Confucianism, has been reinterpreting the Confucian tradition in the face of the challenges of modernity. Tu takes selfhood as his starting point, emphasizing the importance of cultivating the human mind-and-heart as a deepening and broadening process to realize the anthropocosmic dao. He highlights the concept of a “fiduciary community” and advocates that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive humanism.” Tu’s mode of thinking tallies well with Wilfred C. Smith’s vision of religion, specifically the latter’s exposition of faith as a universal human quality and proposal of “corporate critical self-consciousness.” This article details the theories of both scholars, highlights their similarities, and contrasts their differences. It argues that Smith’s world theology provides a heuristic framework through which one understands how Tu has advanced his Confucian humanism from a Chinese philosophical or cultural tradition to the midst of world religions.