On the relationship between visual imagery and visual perception: Evidence from priming studies

Two priming experiments using a perceptual identification task were conducted to explore the functional and representational overlap between visual imagery and visual perception. The first experiment included a study phase in which primes were either perceived or imaged objects and a perceptual identification test task in which targets were parts of studied and non-studied objects. Imagery primed identification when subjects were instructed to count the parts of the imaged objects in the study phase but not when they were instructed to focus on the global shape of the imaged objects. This result suggests that imagery involves perceptual representations identical to those involved in perception. It also suggests that the representational overlap between imagery and perception depends on the type of images generated, as some images may consist in global shapes only, whereas others may consist in detailed, multi-part shapes. In the second experiment, we used whole objects as target stimuli which provided subjects with more information to identify masked targets and thereby reduced top-down processing. Priming from imagery fell beneath significance, suggesting that this sort of priming is elicited in a large part by a transfer of top-down processes from study to test.     

Effects of perception versus imagery on later recognition of visual patterns.

Three experiments were conducted to determine the role of imagery in aiding memory for visual information and to compare its effectiveness relative to direct perception. Subjects engaged in orienting tasks in which they had to decide whether the second of two sequentially presented meaningless patterns was a part of the first. They later received unexpected recognition tests for the original drawings. Increasing the interval between patterns by adding an extra post-stimulus period for imaginal processing improved later recognition scores. Experiments comparing continued perception with an equal blank interval suggested that periods of direct perception and of imagery are about equally effective in promoting memory. The results are discussed in the frame work of Craik and Lockhart (1972) with regard to type I and type II processing, and in the light of Neisser's (1967) view on imagery and perception.     

Social perception from visual cues: role of the STS region

Social perception refers to initial stages in the processing of information that culminates in the accurate analysis of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals. Single-cell recordings in monkeys, and neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies in humans, reveal that cerebral cortex in and near the superior temporal sulcus (STS) region is an important component of this perceptual system. In monkeys and humans, the STS region is activated by movements of the eyes, mouth, hands and body, suggesting that it is involved in analysis of biological motion. However, it is also activated by static images of the face and body, suggesting that it is sensitive to implied motion and more generally to stimuli that signal the actions of another individual. Subsequent analysis of socially relevant stimuli is carried out in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, which supports a three-structure model proposed by Brothers. The homology of human and monkey areas involved in social perception, and the functional interrelationships between the STS region and the ventral face area, are unresolved issues.     

From elements to perception: local and global processing in visual neurons

Gestalt psychologists in the early part of the century challenged psychophysical notions that perceptual phenomena can be understood from a punctate (atomistic) analysis of the elements present in the stimulus. Their ideas slowed later attempts to explain vision in terms of single-cell recordings from individual neurons. A rapprochement between Gestalt phenomenology and neurophysiology seemed unlikely when the first ECVP was held in Marburg, Germany, in 1978. Since that time, response properties of neurons have been discovered that invite an interpretation of visual phenomena (including illusions) in terms of neuronal processing by long-range interactions, as first proposed by Mach and Hering in the last century. This article traces a personal journey into the early days of neurophysiological vision research to illustrate the progress that has taken place from the first attempts to correlate single-cell responses with visual perceptions. Whereas initially the receptive-field properties of individual classes of cells--e.g., contrast, wavelength, orientation, motion, disparity, and spatial-frequency detectors--were used to account for relatively simple visual phenomena, nowadays complex perceptions are interpreted in terms of long-range interactions, involving many neurons. This change in paradigm from local to global processing was made possible by recent findings, in the cortex, on horizontal interactions and backward propagation (feedback loops) in addition to classical feedforward processing. These mechanisms are exemplified by studies of the tilt effect and tilt aftereffect, direction-specific motion adaptation, illusory contours, filling-in and fading, figure--ground segregation by orientation and motion contrast, and pop-out in dynamic visual-noise patterns. Major questions for future research and a discussion of their epistemological implications conclude the article.     

Selective mechanisms in visual perception

The notion of perceptual tuning is investigated by presenting alternatives either before, after, or both before and after a tachistoscopic stimulus. Study 1 (N = 12) showed that identification accuracy is best with alternatives both before and after the stimulus, poorest with alternatives after the stimulus, and intermediate with alternatives only before the stimulus. Study 2 (N = 3) indicated that performance with alternatives both before and after the stimulus varies according to where S is permitted to fixate prior to each exposure. The possibility of a central tuning mechanism was not strongly supported.     

Processing order in visual perception

Initial increases in the availability of items for report following tachistoscopic presentation of centrally-fixated rows of seven random letters were directly evaluated by measuring report accuracy following exposure durations of 10, 20, 40, 80 and 160 ms. A partial-report technique was used, and each presentation of a letter row was immediately followed by the presentation of a masking stimulus. Each of 10 subjects received 840 trials which reflected 24 trials for each exposure-duration by position-probed combination. The letters at both ends of a row became available for report prior to the centre letters. In addition, report of the left-most letter was consistently better than report of the right-most letter, and report of the centre item at fixation improved at a more rapid rate with increased exposure duration than report of the other centre letters. This pattern of results provides support for certain components of several different previous proposals concerning the order in which individual items from multi-element displays become available for report.     

Attentional episodes in visual perception

Is one's temporal perception of the world truly as seamless as it appears? This article presents a computationally motivated theory suggesting that visual attention samples information from temporal episodes (episodic simultaneous type/serial token model; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009). Breaks between these episodes are punctuated by periods of suppressed attention, better known as the attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). We test predictions from this model and demonstrate that participants were able to report more letters from a sequence of 4 targets presented in a dense temporal cluster than from a sequence of 4 targets interleaved with nontargets. However, this superior report accuracy comes at a cost in impaired temporal order perception. Further experiments explore the dynamics of multiple episodes and the boundary conditions that trigger episodic breaks. Finally, we contrast the importance of attentional control, limited resources, and memory capacity constructs in the model.     

Temporal factors in visual perception as related to aging

Older Ss, in the age range 30–55 years, were compared on certain temporal characteristics of visual perception. Experiment I confirmed a previous finding that older adults required an appreciably longer exposure duration to identify forms, even when equated with younger adults on standard measures of visual acuity. Experiment 2 found that older adults have a longer critical duration over which time-intensity reciprocity holds for form identification. The results were discussed in terms of such concepts of psychological time as the psychological moment.     

A counterexample to the rigidity assumption in the visual perception of structure from motion

It has been proposed that the human visual system prefers perceptions of objects that are rigid or undergo minimum form change. A counterexample is presented in which a rigid two-dimensional figure rotating in the frontal plane is perceived as a distorting three-dimensional shape. It is argued that this perception results from the stimulation of automatic processes for perceiving size change, and that these processes are not subject to a general rigidity assumption.     

Early modulation of visual perception by emotional arousal: Evidence from steady-state visual evoked brain potentials

Allocation of processing resources to emotional picture stimuli was examined using steady-state visual evoked brain potentials (ssVEPs). Participants viewed a set of 60 colored affective pictures from the International Affective Picture System, presented in a flickering mode at 10 Hz in order to elicit ssVEPs. Phase and amplitude of the 10-Hz ssVEP were examined for six picture categories: threat and mutilation (unpleasant), families and erotica (pleasant), and household objects and persons (neutral). Self-reported affective arousal and hedonic valence of the picture stimuli were assessed by means of subjective ratings. Viewing affectively arousing (unpleasant and pleasant) pictures was associated with enhanced ssVEP amplitude at parieto-occipital recording sites, as compared with neutral stimuli. Phase information suggested increased coactivation of right occipitotemporal and frontotemporal sources during processing of affectively arousing stimuli. These findings are consistent with reentrant modulation of early visual processing by distributed networks including subcortical and neocortical structures according to a stimulus's motivational relevance.     

Opposite effects of visual versus imagined presentation of faces on subsequent sex perception

Viewing faces of one sex changes the perception of subsequently seen ambiguous faces. Here we investigate if the mechanisms responsible for this sex aftereffect are also activated during mental imagery of faces. Participants categorized the sex of ambiguous faces after either viewing images of male or female actors' faces or imagining these same faces. As in previous studies, the ambiguous images were categorized as female more often after viewing male faces than after viewing female faces. The opposite effect was found for imagined faces, however; the ambiguous images were categorized as female more often after imagining female faces than after imagining male faces. Although our results are inconsistent with findings that imagined faces cause either no aftereffects or similar aftereffects to visually presented faces, our results are consistent with recent evidence that visual and imagined presentation of faces cause opposite adaptation effects on an early electrophysiological response associated with face processing.     

Erratum to: Voluntary action alters the perception of visual illusions

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics -     

The hare and the snail: Dissociating visual orienting from conscious perception

A method for investigating attentional effects of peripheral visual objects, independently of perceptual identification, is described. We report an experiment using this method which shows that visual processing of peripheral objects differs radically, depending on whether participants move attention in response to an object or consciously perceive that object. When luminance contrast was reduced, conscious perceptual discrimination of peripheral letters was massively slower and less accurate—but both low and high contrast letters elicited rapid attentional orienting effects and these rapid orienting effects were equal in magnitude across low and high contrast. This pattern is consistent with known differences in luminance sensitivity between the dorsal and ventral visual processing streams, and with rapid dorsal–ventral interaction mediated via re-entrant feedback. Our findings show that the control system responsible for rapid movements of attention is exquisitely sensitive to visual form information at low levels of contrast, and involves a different neurocognitive pathway to that which gives rise to conscious perception.     

The right hemisphere as an anomaly detector: evidence from visual perception

V. S. Ramachandran (1998) has suggested that the right hemisphere, which tends to be specialized for the analysis of global-level information, serves as an anomaly detector. Its role is to judge whether a given percept is possible and whether there are elements of that percept that seem incongruent with the other elements. In contrast, the left hemisphere tends to create a "story" to make sense of the incongruities. In the current study, pictures of possible or impossible objects were displayed for brief exposure durations to either the left visual field/right hemisphere or to the right visual field/left hemisphere). The results provide tentative support for the work of Ramachandran. In male participants, the right hemisphere was superior to the left in detecting impossible objects.     

Functional representations common to visual perception and imagination

Subjects determined whether probe dots appearing in component squares of a 5 X 5 grid fell on a figure that, depending on the condition, was (a) visually presented as a pattern of darkened squares, (b) only remembered from a preceding presentation of such a pattern, or (c) imaginally generated from a verbal code. The speed and accuracy of the responses to the probes as well as the functional dependencies of the reaction times on structural variables were essentially the same whether the figural pattern was imagined, remembered, or actually seen. Reaction times averaged between 400 and 500 msec and were consistently faster (a) for on-figure than for off-figure responses, (b) for simpler figures that had fewer squares, (c) for off-figure probes that were more distant from the figure, and (d) for on-figure probes that consisted either of more dots on the figure or of a dot at the intersection of a horizontal and a vertical bar. The reults were consistent with a model in which a subject's perceptual or imaginal representations of these forms contain barlike units that respond independently to the probes.