Visually perceiving distance: a comment on Shebilske, Karmiohl, and Proffitt (1983)

Shebilske, Karmiohl, and Proffitt (1983) interpret their data as showing that (a) the reference tonus level of the extraocular muscles controlling vergence is affected by everyday conditions of close viewing, and (b) this naturally induced phoria affects the visual perception of distance under natural viewing conditions. We note that these interpretations do not fully concur with the data presented--for example, the second conclusion favorably conflates partial results from two separate experiments--and we identify a number of confoundings that reduce the likelihood that the reported inaccuracies in distance judgments were due to variations in efference.     

Learning to walk is still an "old" problem: a reply to Zelazo (1983)

Zelazo (1983) proposes that two cognitive prerequisites are necessary for the development of locomotion: The conversion of neo-natal reflexive stepping into instrumental behavior and a shift from stereotypical to relational play. I argue that these cognitive assumptions are unnecessary. The disappearance of neo-natal stepping can be explained as a result of increasing leg mass, and the retention of this reflex with practice may be simply an exercise effect. Comparative and evolutionary evidence suggests that locomotion is not associated with abstract reasoning ability. Learning to walk is a complex, gradual process of maturation of motivation, the integration of subcortical pattern-generating centers with the neural substrate for control of posture and balance, and important changes in body proportions and bone and muscle strength. The control of walking is likely the province of mechanism phylogenetically more primitive than the human cerebral cortex. There is no need to invoke cortical explanations when more simple ones are sufficient.     

The cognitive model of depression and mood-induction procedures: A reply to Clark (1983)

In a recent article on mood-induction procedures, Clark (1983) concluded that the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) produces a good analog state of mild, naturally occurring, retarded depression that is not explicable in terms of experimental demand characteristics. Clark concluded, however, that it is erroneous to view the relative success of the VMIP in simulating the effects of depression as support for cognitive theories of depression. While we agree with the first of Clark's conclusions, we disagree with his second conclusion that the VMIP is not a cognitive manipulation. The purpose of the present article is to argue that his ideas regarding the impact of the VMIP on mood and behavior are not supported by the existing data. Therefore, the VMIP results can be used to support Beck's (1976) cognitive theory of depression.     

Missing the target: A reply to Koehler & Macchi (2009)

Koehler and Macchi 2009 criticize the experiments presented in Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes 2008 as being “virtually irrelevant” to exemplar cuing theory. This reply addresses that interpretation and argues that the experiments dealt with issues at the heart of the theory and provided evidence highly relevant to understand how people think about low‐probability events. The role of the ‘target’ in probabilistic statements is examined, highlighting the need for further theoretical and empirical clarification of the concept. The remaining specific criticisms raised in the commentary are discussed as well. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and misremembering (Orwellian) accounts of consciousness

It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten, whereas by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters.     

Grammaticality is inferred from global similarity: A reply to Kinder (2010)

Jamieson and Mewhort (2009b) proposed an account of performance in the artificial-grammar judgement-of-grammaticality task based on Hintzman's (1986) model of retrieval, Minerva 2. In the account, each letter is represented by a unique vector of random elements, and each exemplar is represented by concatenating its constituent letter vectors. Although successful in simulating several experiments, Kinder (2010) showed that the model fails for three selected experiments. We track the model's failure to a constraint introduced by concatenating letter vectors to construct the exemplar representation. To fix the problem, we use a holographic representation. Holographic representation not only provides the flexibility missing with the concatenation scheme but also acknowledges variability in what subjects notice when they inspect training exemplars. Armed with holographic representations, we show that the model successfully captures the three problematic data sets. We argue for retrospective accounts, like the present one, that acknowledge subjects' skill in drawing unexpected inferences based on memory of studied items against prospective accounts that require subjects to learn statistical regularities in the training set in anticipation of an undefined classification test.     

Support for the cue-heuristic model is based on suboptimal observer performance: Response to Gilden and Proffitt (1994)

Gilden and Proffitt (1994) have derived support for their updated cue-heuristic model of mass discrimination in observed collisions from two experiments reported by Runeson and Vedeler (1993). However, these experiments are inadequate for theory testing because of confounding and lack of representative variation in parameters. Instead, extended analyses of the third of Runeson and Vedeler’s experiments are presented. It is shown that observers exclusively use collision-axis velocity components in conditions where the heuristic model asserts that only trajectory speeds are available. Moreover, the patterns of error predicted by the heuristic model do not occur. Overall, performance is closer to the ideal than to the predictions from any conceivable model based on elementaristic cues; hence an explanation in terms of advanced informative invariants is the more viable approach. The final discussion concerns the distortion of theory development that might be engendered by empirical data that represent suboptimal observer performance due to unfavorable testing conditions.     

The belief bias effect is aptly named: a reply to Klauer and Kellen (2011)

In "Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect," Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) examined the form of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for reasoning and the effects of belief bias on measurement indices that differ in whether they imply a curved or linear ROC function. We concluded that the ROC data are in fact curved and that analyses using statistics that assume a linear ROC are likely to produce Type I errors. Importantly, we showed that the interaction between logic and belief that has inspired much of the theoretical work on belief bias is in fact an error stemming from inappropriate reliance on a contrast (hit rate-false alarm rate) that implies linear ROCs. Dube et al. advanced a new model of belief bias, which, in light of their data, is currently the only plausible account of the effect. Klauer and Kellen (2011) disputed these conclusions, largely on the basis of speculation about the data collection method used by Dube et al. to construct the ROCs. New data and model-based analyses are presented that refute the speculations made by Klauer and Kellen. We also show that new modeling results presented by Klauer and Kellen actually support the conclusions advanced by Dube et al. Together, these data show that the methods used by Dube et al. are valid and that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect.     

Absolute identification is relative: a reply to Brown, Marley, and Lacouture (2007)

N. Stewart, G. D. A. Brown, and N. Chater presented a relative judgment model (RJM) of absolute identification, in which the current stimulus is judged relative to the preceding stimulus. S. Brown, A. A. J. Marley, and Y. Lacouture found that the RJM does not predict their finding of increased accuracy after large stimulus jumps, except at the expense of other effects. In fact, the RJM does predict both the core effects and increased accuracy after large jumps (although it underestimates this effect) when better constrained parameters are estimated from the trial-by-trial raw data rather than from summary plots. Further, a modified RJM, in which the stimulus from two trials ago is sometimes used as a referent, provides a better fit.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg

According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a property of mental state tokens, and since there are no states to exhibit consciousness, one is not in conscious states in virtue of targetless HOTs. In this paper, I argue that Wilberg's account is problematic and that Rosenthal's version of HOT theory, according to which a suitable HOT is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness, is to be preferred to Wilberg's account. I then argue that Rosenthal's account can comfortably accommodate targetless HOTs because consciousness is best understood as a property of individuals, not a property of states.     

Jealousy reconsidered: A reply to DeSteno (2010)

In a recent commentary, DeSteno (2010) critiqued the work of Levy and Kelley (2010) which investigated the relationship of attachment style to the sex difference in jealousy. This commentary addresses the concerns raised by DeSteno; I briefly review some of the literature that was not addressed by DeSteno's commentary and discuss directions that future research may take.     

Why opening a door is as easy as eating an apple: A reply to Thompson-Schill and Botvinick (2006)

Martin and Cheng (2006) present evidence suggesting that difficulty in verb generation is related to the strength of associative links between nouns and verbs and not to competition from alternative verb responses. Specifically, they show that latencies for verb generation are related to the associative strength of the most frequently produced verb and not to the ratio of the strength of the first to the second most frequently produced verb. Thompson-Schill and Botvinick (2006) have provided modeling results indicating how the findings of Martin and Cheng might be accommodated in a competitive model. Here we discuss how two noncompetitive models account for the findings and why such models should be preferred.     

Encoding specificity: a reply to Croker (1981)

Crocker's (1981) comment on the Lee and Hirota (1980) paper essentially raises two issues. First, objection is made to the applicability of the encoding specificity principle to the resuits found in our study. Second, on a more general level, Crocker questions the heuristic value of utilizing theoretical issues in non-motor domains to guide scientific experimentation in the study of motor behavior. In this reply I posit that Crocker's reservations about encoding specificity are based upon improper theoretical and methodological considerations. Regarding the more philosophical issue however, I argue that Crocker's view may be counterproductive to progress in the area of memory research.     

Psychophysiologic correlates of Type A behavior: Comments on Houston (1983) and Holmes (1983)

On the basis of a literature review, B. K. Houston (1983, Journal of Research in Personality, 17, 22–39) concluded that there is a reliable but relatively weak association between Type A (coronary-prone) behavior and heightened physiologic reactivity. D. S. Holmes (1983, Journal of Research in Personality, 17, 40–47) contends that by failing to take into account dependent measures yielding null results, Houston overestimated the consistency with which A/B differences have been obtained. In the present article, we show that it is critical to take into account the method used to assess Type A behavior. Structured Interview assessments show a more consistent association with reactivity than those based on the Jenkins Activity Survey. We then point out that, for certain physiologic measures, null effects do not necessarily reflect an absence of A/B differences in sympathetic-adrenomedullary activity. Other issues that are discussed include the role of situational parameters in eliciting hyperresponsiveness in Type A's, the problem of evaluating the magnitude and importance of A/B effects, and the need for a more theoretical approach to the study of Type A behavior.     

Effect of field size, head motion, and rotational velocity on roll vection and illusory self-tilt in a tumbling room

The effect of field size, velocity, and visual fixation upon the perception of self-body rotation and tilt was examined in a rotating furnished room. Subjects sat in a stationary chair in the furnished room which could be rotated about the body roll axis. For full-field conditions, complete 360 degrees body rotation (tumbling) was the most common sensation (felt by 80% of subjects). Constant tilt or partial tumbling (less than 360 degrees rotation) occurred more frequently with a small field of view (20 deg). The number of subjects who experienced complete tumbling increased with increases in field of view and room velocity (for velocities between 15 and 30 degrees s-1). The speed of perceived self-rotation relative to room rotation also increased with increasing field of view.