Modeling spatial knowledge

A person's cognitive map, or knowledge of large-scale space, is built up from observations gathered as he travels through the environment. It acts as a problem solver to find routes and relative positions, as well as describing the current location. The TOUR model captures the multiple representations that make up the cognitive map, the problem-solving strategies it uses, and the mechanisms for assimilating new information. The representations have rich collections of states of partial knowledge, which support many of the performance characteristics of common-sense knowledge.     

Measuring Inconsistency

I provide a method of measuring the inconsistency of a set of sentences – from 1-consistency, corresponding to complete consistency, to 0-consistency, corresponding to the explicit presence of a contradiction. Using this notion to analyze the lottery paradox, one can see that the set of sentences capturing the paradox has a high degree of consistency (assuming, of course, a sufficiently large lottery). The measure of consistency, however, is not limited to paradoxes. I also provide results for general sets of sentences.     

Inconsistency in the A-Theory

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less.     

Inconsistency in natural languages

An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.     

Body- and environmental-stabilized processing of spatial knowledge

In 5 experiments, the authors examined the perceptual and cognitive processes used to track the locations of objects during locomotion. Participants learned locations of 9 objects on the outer part of a turntable from a single viewpoint while standing in the middle of the turntable. They subsequently pointed to objects while facing the learning heading and a new heading, using imagined headings that corresponded to their current actual body heading and the other actual heading. Participants in 4 experiments were asked to imagine that the objects moved with them as they turned and were shown or only told that the objects would move with them; in Experiment 5, participants were shown that objects could move with them but were asked to ignore this as they turned. Results showed that participants tracked object locations as though the objects moved with them when shown but not when told about the consequences of their locomotion. Once activated, this processing mode could not be suppressed by instructions. Results indicated that people process object locations in a body- or an environment-stabilized manner during locomotion, depending on the perceptual consequences of locomotion.     

Differences in spatial knowledge acquired from maps and navigation

Models of the spatial knowledge people acquire from maps and navigation and the procedures required for spatial judgments using this knowledge are proposed. From a map, people acquire survey knowledge encoding global spatial relations. This knowledge resides in memory in images that can be scanned and measured like a physical map. From navigation, people acquire procedural knowledge of the routes connecting diverse locations. People combine mental simulation of travel through the environment and informal algebra to compute spatial judgments. An experiment in which subjects learned an environment from navigation or from a map evaluates predictions of these models. With moderate exposure, map learning is superior for judgments of relative location and straight-line distances among objects. Learning from navigation is superior for orienting oneself with respect to unseen objects and estimating route distances. With extensive exposure, the performance superiority of maps over navigation vanishes. These and other results are consonant with the proposed mechanisms.     

Children's spatial knowledge of their neighborhood environment

Six-, eight-, and ten-year-olds' spatial knowledge of their neighborhood was examined. Children initially made bearing and distance estimates from their homes to three distant landmarks in the neighborhood area. They were then asked how far their parents permitted them to travel in the neighborhood with freinds and by themselves and how far they actually traveled. Finally, children described how they found their way from one neighborhood location to another. There were three major findings. First, children at all age levels knew the general direction to distant landmarks, suggesting that children as young as 6-years-old can infer spatial relations in large, familiar environment. Second, activity range increased over age, with boys ranging further than girls. Third, although children took advantage of a wide variety of cues to find their way in their neighborhood, clear developmental patterns of cue utilization and ldway-findingrd strategies were not evident.     

The role of visual experience in knowledge of spatial layout

Adventitiously blinded, congenitally blind, and sighted adults made relative distance judgments in a familiar environment under three sets of instructions—neutral with respect to the metric of comparison, euclidean (straight-line distance between landmarks), and functional (walking distance between landmarks). Analysis of error scores and multidimensional scaling procedures indicated that, although there were no significant differences among groups under functional instructions, all three groups differed from one another under euclidean instructions. Specifically, the sighted group performed best and the congenitally blind group worst, with the adventitiously blind group in between. The results are discussed in the context of the role of visual experience in spatial representation and the application of these methods for evaluating orientation and mobility training for the blind.     

Effect of contextual knowledge on spatial layout extrapolation

Boundary extension (BE) refers to the tendency to remember a previously perceived scene with a greater spatial expanse. This phenomenon is described as resulting from different sources of information: external (i.e., visual) and internally driven (i.e., amodal, conceptual, and contextual) information. Although the literature has emphasized the role of top-down expectations to account for layout extrapolation, their effect has rarely been tested experimentally. In this research, we attempted to determine how visual context affects BE, as a function of scene exposure duration (long, short). To induce knowledge about visual context, the memorization phase of the camera distance paradigm was preceded by a preexposure phase, during which each of the to-be-memorized scenes was presented in a larger spatial framework. In an initial experiment, we examined the effect of contextual knowledge with presentation duration, allowing for in-depth processing of visual information during encoding (i.e., 15 s). The results indicated that participants exposed to the preexposure showed decreased BE, and displayed no directional memory error in some conditions. Because the effect of context is known to occur at an early stage of scene perception, in a second experiment we sought to determine whether the effect of a preview occurs during the first fixation on a visual scene. The results indicated that BE seems not to be modulated by this factor at very brief presentation durations. These results are discussed in light of current visual scene representation theories.     

Inconsistency and rank preservation

Conditions for rank preservation in a positive reciprocal matrix that is inconsistent are provided. Three methods of deriving ratio estimates are examined: the eigenvalue, the logarithmic least squares, and the least squares methods. It is shown that only the principal eigenvector directly deals with the question of inconsistency and captures the rank order inherent in the inconsistent data.     

Pragmatic Inconsistency and Credibility

A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. If so, any such charge seems to be irrelevant. The questions to be answered in this essay are: what, if any, is the dialectical rationale for this type of criticism, and in what situations, if any, is this kind of charge dialectically legitimate? It will be shown that these attacks can be dialectically legitimate, in special circumstances, and that they can be seen as strategic?manoeuvres where a party attempts to reconcile his dialectical and his rhetorical objectives.     

Self-Reported Cognitive Inconsistency in Older Adults

ABSTRACT

Insight into one's own cognitive abilities, or metacognition, has been widely studied in developmental psychology. Relevance to the clinician is high, as memory complaints in older adults show an association with impending dementia, even after controlling for likely confounds. Another candidate marker of impending dementia under study is inconsistency in cognitive performance over short time intervals. Although there has been a recent proliferation of studies of cognitive inconsistency in older adults, to date, no one has examined adults' self-perceptions of cognitive inconsistency. Ninety-four community-dwelling older adults (aged 70–91) were randomly selected from a parent longitudinal study of short-term inconsistency and long-term cognitive change in aging. Participants completed a novel 40-item self-report measure of everyday cognitive inconsistency, including parallel scales indexing perceived inconsistency 5 years ago and at present, yielding measures of past, present, and 5-year change in inconsistency. The questionnaire showed acceptable psychometric characteristics. The sample reported an increase in perceived inconsistency over time. Higher reported present inconsistency and greater 5-year increase in inconsistency were associated with noncognitive (e.g., older age, poorer ADLs, poorer health, higher depression), metacognitive (e.g., poorer self-rated memory) and neuropsychological (e.g., poorer performance and greater 5-year decline in global cognitive status, vocabulary, and memory) measures. Correlations between self-reported inconsistency and neuropsychological performance were attenuated, but largely persisted when self-rated memory and age were controlled. Observed relationships between self-reported inconsistency and measures of neuropsychological (including memory) status and decline suggest that self-perceived inconsistency may be an area of relevance in evaluating older adults for memory disorders.     

An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument

I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeedin showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given thestructure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim thatqualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tensionis that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on theassumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the epiphenomenal characterof qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they are non-physical. Since these two argumentscannot be combined coherently, the most Jackson's argument can establish is thatqualia are non-physical.     

Inconsistency and scientific realism

I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.     

Mantled howler monkey spatial foraging decisions reflect spatial and temporal knowledge of resource distributions

An animal’s ability to find and relocate food items is directly related to its survival and reproductive success. This study evaluates how mantled howler monkeys make spatial foraging decisions in the wild. Specifically, discrete choice models and agent-based simulations are used to test whether mantled howler monkeys on Barro Colorado Island, Panama, integrate spatial information in order to maximize new leaf flush and fruit gain while minimizing distance traveled. Several heuristic models of decision making are also tested as possible alternative strategies (movement to core home range areas instead of individual trees, travel along a sensory gradient, movement along arboreal pathway networks without a predetermined destination, straight-line travel in a randomly chosen direction, and random walks). Results indicate that although leaves are the single most abundant item in the mantled howler monkey diet, long-distance travel bouts target the areas with the highest concentrations of mature fruits. Observed travel patterns yielded larger estimated quantities of fruit in shorter distances traveled than all alternative foraging strategies. Thus, this study both provides novel information regarding how primates select travel paths and suggests that a highly folivorous primate integrates knowledge of spatiotemporal resource distributions in highly efficient foraging strategies.