Change blindness and eyewitness testimony

The authors explored the relevance of research on change blindness to eyewitness identification and testimony under intentional and incidental memory conditions. Participants (N = 80, 40 men and 40 women) viewed a video enactment of a burglary in which the identity of the burglar changed at the halfway point of the film. Half of participants were briefed to remember the content, and the other half were not. All were tested for the recall of the content, awareness of the change, and ability to identify either or both of the burglars. Some 61% of participants did not notice the identity change. Rates of detection were significantly higher in participants in the intentional condition, who also recalled significantly more detail from the film. Awareness of change was also significantly related to content recall scores and accuracy of identification of both burglars. The results illustrate the interrelation between the eyewitness and change blindness literatures.     

Leading questions and the eyewitness report

A total of 490 subjects, in four experiments, saw films of complex, fast-moving events, such as automobile accidents or classroom disruptions. The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the wording of questions asked immediately after an event may influence responses to questions asked considerably later. It is shown that when the initial question contains either true presuppositions (e.g., it postulates the existence of an object that did exist in the scene) or false presuppositions (e.g., postulates the existence of an object that did not exist), the likelihood is increased that subjects will later report having seen the presupposed object. The results suggest that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce new—not necessarily correct—information, which is then added to the memorial representation of the event, thereby causing its reconstruction or alteration.     

The effects of social support on children's eyewitness testimony

Child witnesses often give only short accounts of witnessed events. Part of the reason for this failing centres on the stress present during an interview. The most obvious means of reducing stress in children, through the provision of social support, has typically been neglected in eyewitness research, presumably because of fears over children's excessive suggestibility. Social support is also believed to inhibit children during interviews. However, these fears appear to stem more from general suspicions about children's competencies rather than empirical findings. Studies are described which show that child witnesses express a strong desire for social support, and that support may be provided in a number of different ways, from peers as well as adults. It is argued that social support is one of the most unfairly neglected issues in eyewitness research, and the minimal evidence available suggests that allowing support may have a facilitative effect on task performance, including free-recall memory.     

The influence of the form of the question on the eyewitness testimony of preschool children

Thirty-two preschool children were questioned after viewing four short films. The form of the question (affirmative-negative, definite-indefinite article, some-any quantifier) was systematically varied in a counterbalanced design. The form of the question did not significantly affect answers to questions about entities actually present in the films; however, it did have significant effects on answers concerning entities which were not in the film. Questions such as Did you see the..., Did you see any..., and Didn't you see some... were answered yes more frequently than other question types. Thus young children are aware of the expectation conveyed by certain linguistic forms, such asthe. The results are discussed in the light of current models of constructive memory as well as their implications for accurate questioning of children.An earlier version of this article was delivered to the Stanford Child Language Research Forum, Stanford University, April 1976.     

Age differences in source forgetting: effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses.     

Infants' eyewitness testimony: Effects of postevent information on a prior memory representation

In eyewitness testimony research, postevent information impair retention of the original event and increases the probability that interpolated information will be identified as part:of the original event. The present experiments studied these effects with 3-month-olds. Infants learned to kick to move a particular crib mobile and then were briefly exposed to information about a novel mobile. The novel postevent information impaired recognition of the-original mobile when it immediately followed training but not when it was delayed by 1 day. Like adults, infants treated the postevent information as part of the original training event, continuing to do so for at least 2 weeks. We propose that postevent information displaces conflicting information coactive with it in primary memory and creates a new, updated memory token of the event. Once the new token leaves primary memory, however, it is protected; only a copy can be retrieved and modified in the future.     

Some experimental influences of lawyers' complicated questions on eyewitness confidence and accuracy

Eyewitness evidence and the confidence the eyewitness expresses in such evidence are crucial in many criminal trials. The present study is an examination of the influence of confusing questions often used by attorneys to examine witnesses in court. Participants viewed a videotaped incident and were questioned about the incident 1 week later. Half the participants were asked questions framed in a confusing form; the remaining half were asked the same questions in straightforward language. Confusing questions reduced the participant witnesses' accuracy and suppressed the confidence-accuracy relationships compared with the condition in which simple questions were asked. However, the number of absolutely sure responses was the same in both conditions, although these responses were almost always accurate in the simplified condition, whereas in the confusing question condition, accuracy was comparatively poor. This experiment demonstrates the importance of ensuring that lawyers ask witnesses simple, clear questions.     

Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability before and after Daubert: the state of the law and the science

This article examines the legal and scientific issues inherent in the use of expert psychological testimony on the factors that affect eyewitness reliability. First, the history of the use of such expert testimony is traced. Next, we look at the criteria that state and federal courts have used in determining whether to admit such testimony, as well as the grounds upon which the testimony has been excluded. We then examine the Daubert decision and discuss its implications for the use of expert eyewitness testimony. We conclude by reviewing eyewitness research and research on jury decision-making that is likely to assume new importance in the post-Daubert era.     

The accuracy-confidence correlation in eyewitness testimony: limits and extensions of the retrospective self-awareness effect.

This research extended Kassin's (1985) finding that retrospective self-awareness (RSA) increases the correlation between eyewitness accuracy and confidence. In Experiment 1, 91 mock witnesses saw a crime, answered questions, made an identification decision, and rated their confidence. RSA increased the accuracy-confidence correlation for witnesses who made an identification and for those who were high but not low in public self-consciousness. A 2nd experiment varied accountability and revealed that high accountability increased the accuracy-confidence correlation but that the RSA effect occurred even under low-accountability conditions. In both studies, observers could not distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Together, these findings define the limits of the RSA effect and provide mixed support for a self-perception account of this effect.     

Misinformation and warnings in eyewitness testimony: A new testing procedure to differentiate explanations

Abstract

Although psychologists agree that the presentation of misleading post-event information often results in errant recollections, there is disagreement about the explanation as to why this occurs. Some (cf. Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989) believe this misinformation alters the memory trace created by the original information, whereas others (cf. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) have argued that the data do not necessitate this explanation. An experiment, designed to differentiate the various explanations, was conducted. Its critical elements were: (1) a condition with a specific warning presented immediately after the misleading information; and (2) a ranking procedure used at testing. The results suggest multiple traces may exist for a limited period, but not indefinitely.     

Composite holographic associative recall model (CHARM) and blended memories in eyewitness testimony

The idea that compositing or blending occurs in human episodic memory stems from two sources: (a) distributed memory models and (b) studies on the errors that occur in eyewitness testimony. These two traditions of research--theoretical and empirical--have been independent and distinct. Here, data from the eyewitness testimony paradigm are simulated by the distributed model CHARM (Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model). Of focal concern are Loftus's studies, which have been interpreted in favor of the blending hypothesis, and McCloskey and Zaragoza's studies, which have been interpreted as refuting Loftus's position. Both of these seemingly contradictory results, as well as recent findings with yes/no recognition, fall out of the model. Finally, the model predicts empirically found color shifts and provides specifications for when blends and memory impairments will and will not be expected.     

On the "general acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research. A new survey of the experts

In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the crossrace bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community.     

Lineup administrator influences on eyewitness identification and eyewitness confidence

Lineup administrators were trained to respond to witnesses in such a way as to redirect them from making non-identifications or foil identification responses toward making identifications of the suspect. Compared to a no-influence control condition, suspect identification rates in the influence condition increased substantially and proportionally for guilty and innocent suspects. Administrators steered witnesses more specifically toward the suspect when the suspect was guilty than when the suspect was innocent. Post-identification confidence for correct identifications of the guilty suspect did not differ significantly across the influence and no-influence groups. However, post-identification confidence for false identifications of the innocent suspect was significantly lower for the influence group than for the no-influence group because witnesses who were influenced to make false identifications tended to be those who were less confident prior to the lineup, and also because those witnesses became less confident from pre- to post-identification.     

Effects of prior knowledge and response bias upon recognition memory for a story: Implications for children's eyewitness testimony

Abstract: The present study was designed to evaluate the integration hypothesis and the response bias hypothesis for explaining the fragility of children's eyewitness memory, by varying the plausibility of postevent information and the strength of response bias in recognition tests. Preschool children were told a story in which a boy named Ken saw a housebreaker stealing various objects and the postevent information was also incorporated into the story. The first recognition test was administered immediately following the presentation of an interpolated story, and the second recognition test was administered 10 weeks later. The results indicated that high-plausibility objects tended to be recognized as the stolen objects in the second recognition test, and that recognition accuracy was higher for a new-distractor condition than for a misleading-distractor condition. These findings were interpreted as suggesting that the memory representation of the story might be changed through the integration processes and/or rendered inaccessible in terms of the response bias.     

The impact of expert testimony on trials of battered women who kill their husbands

Increased attention to family violence is reflected, in part, in the growing number of social scientists who have applied the results of their work in trials of battered women who have killed their husbands. Acting as expert witnesses, these individuals detail their knowledge and offer opinions in order to educate jurors about the social and psychological consequences of abuse within marital relationships. Little is known about the actual impact of expert testimony on jury deliberation in cases involving battered women. Those engaged in studying the interface of psychology and criminal justice have relied primarily on anecdotal evidence which suggests that expert testimony shapes jurors' attitudes and their ultimate decisions. (Ellison & Buckhout, 1981). This article summarizes psychological research on how individuals, including battered women, react to victimization and provides a preliminary theoretical formulation of this problem.