Change blindness and eyewitness testimony

The authors explored the relevance of research on change blindness to eyewitness identification and testimony under intentional and incidental memory conditions. Participants (N = 80, 40 men and 40 women) viewed a video enactment of a burglary in which the identity of the burglar changed at the halfway point of the film. Half of participants were briefed to remember the content, and the other half were not. All were tested for the recall of the content, awareness of the change, and ability to identify either or both of the burglars. Some 61% of participants did not notice the identity change. Rates of detection were significantly higher in participants in the intentional condition, who also recalled significantly more detail from the film. Awareness of change was also significantly related to content recall scores and accuracy of identification of both burglars. The results illustrate the interrelation between the eyewitness and change blindness literatures.     

The impact of misleading questions on eyewitness memory in children and adults

The study examined developmental patterns of the negative effect of misleading post‐event information in two different kinds of eyewitness interviews. A total of 284 subjects aged between five and 64 years were shown a short video about a theft and three weeks as well as four weeks later questioned about it. The social pressure in the interview after three weeks was manipulated by asking half of the subjects suggestive and misleading questions. The other half was asked open‐ended and unbiased questions. In the neutral interview four weeks later, all subjects were asked the same set of recognition questions about the event. The results revealed that preschoolers in particular had problems with the interplay between cognitive and social factors (social pressure induced through the wording of the misleading questions) in the interview setting after three weeks. In the neutral recognition test, all age groups were shown to suffer from prior misinformation to about the same extent. However, with an exception in the group of 6‐year‐old children the negative effect of prior misinformation on the accuracy of recognition proved to be due to items that were peripheral to the observed event. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leading questions and the eyewitness report

A total of 490 subjects, in four experiments, saw films of complex, fast-moving events, such as automobile accidents or classroom disruptions. The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the wording of questions asked immediately after an event may influence responses to questions asked considerably later. It is shown that when the initial question contains either true presuppositions (e.g., it postulates the existence of an object that did exist in the scene) or false presuppositions (e.g., postulates the existence of an object that did not exist), the likelihood is increased that subjects will later report having seen the presupposed object. The results suggest that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce new—not necessarily correct—information, which is then added to the memorial representation of the event, thereby causing its reconstruction or alteration.     

The effects of social support on children's eyewitness testimony

Child witnesses often give only short accounts of witnessed events. Part of the reason for this failing centres on the stress present during an interview. The most obvious means of reducing stress in children, through the provision of social support, has typically been neglected in eyewitness research, presumably because of fears over children's excessive suggestibility. Social support is also believed to inhibit children during interviews. However, these fears appear to stem more from general suspicions about children's competencies rather than empirical findings. Studies are described which show that child witnesses express a strong desire for social support, and that support may be provided in a number of different ways, from peers as well as adults. It is argued that social support is one of the most unfairly neglected issues in eyewitness research, and the minimal evidence available suggests that allowing support may have a facilitative effect on task performance, including free-recall memory.     

Beliefs and data on the relationship between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony

Two studies concerned with consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony were conducted. In Study 1 potential jurors indicated the degree to which they considered that various witness on‐stand behaviours indicated testimonial accuracy. Witness statements that were inconsistent with previous statements were considered to be the strongest indicators of inaccuracy. Study 2 examined the relationship between consistency and accuracy of testimony. Witnesses viewed a film of a robbery and were interviewed twice (2 weeks apart) about the crime in a 4 (interview format)×2 (interview occasion) design. Regardless of whether consistency was operationalised in terms of direct contradictions between interviews, or degree of agreement on detail across interviews, no more than 10% of the variance in overall accuracy rate was explained by any individual measure. Number of contradictions and overall agreement between interviews did, however, make additive contributions to prediction of overall accuracy. Also, higher correlations between contradiction‐based consistency measures and interview two accuracy rate were detected. Neither consistency nor accuracy for specific testimonial dimensions were predictive of accuracy on the other dimensions, or overall accuracy. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Speech style and occupational status affect assessments of eyewitness testimony

This study examined how speech style and occupational status affect mock jurors' assessments of eyewitness testimony. Mock jurors (n = 120) watched a video of a man testifying about witnessing an attempted robbery. The eyewitness exhibited either a powerless or powerful speech style and reported either a high or low (or no) status occupation during his testimony. Results indicated that high occupation status and powerful speech style led to more favorable evaluations of the eyewitness's testimony and of the case against the defendant than powerless speech style and low/no occupation status. Implications of these results on considerations of eyewitness testimony and future research are discussed.     

Recall,recognition, and confidence patterns in eyewitness testimony

The diversity of methods, contents and tests used in the study of eyewitness memory may have contributed to discrepancies in results in this field. In this experiment, using incidental or intentional learning, we examine the recall and recognition of actions and details concerning the central and peripheral information of a kidnapping. A similar pattern emerges in free recall, hits and recognition confidence: scores are much higher in actions than in central details and there are almost no differences between peripheral actions and details, showing that the distribution of attentional resources is different for actions and details in central than in peripheral information. Although in recall the degree of error was low, in recognition false alarms, especially those in central actions, reduced the level of accuracy to even lower than chance performance in both incidental and intentional groups, also showing that subjects accept false but plausible contents with a high level of confidence. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of the form of the question on the eyewitness testimony of preschool children

Thirty-two preschool children were questioned after viewing four short films. The form of the question (affirmative-negative, definite-indefinite article, some-any quantifier) was systematically varied in a counterbalanced design. The form of the question did not significantly affect answers to questions about entities actually present in the films; however, it did have significant effects on answers concerning entities which were not in the film. Questions such as Did you see the..., Did you see any..., and Didn't you see some... were answered yes more frequently than other question types. Thus young children are aware of the expectation conveyed by certain linguistic forms, such asthe. The results are discussed in the light of current models of constructive memory as well as their implications for accurate questioning of children.An earlier version of this article was delivered to the Stanford Child Language Research Forum, Stanford University, April 1976.     

The effect of cross‐examination on the accuracy of adult eyewitness testimony

Cross‐examination permits styles of questioning that increase eyewitness error (e.g. leading questions). Previous research has shown that under cross‐examination children change many of their initially accurate answers. An experiment is reported in which the effect of cross‐examination on accuracy of adult eyewitness testimony was investigated. Twenty‐two student witnesses watched a video of a staged theft, either in pairs, or individually. Paired witnesses discussed the video with their co‐witnesses, but did not know they had seen slightly different versions. Participants in the co‐witness condition demonstrated memory conformity and recalled less accurately than witnesses in the control condition. After approximately 4 weeks all participants were cross‐examined by a trainee barrister. Following cross‐examination there was no difference in accuracy between the two experimental groups. Witnesses in both conditions made many changes to their previous reports by altering both initially correct and incorrect answers. The results demonstrate negative effects of cross‐examination on the accuracy of adult eyewitness testimony. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relationship between masculinity-femininity and concession in an experimental collaborative eyewitness testimony

The present study examined the relationships of masculinity and femininity with concession in an experimental collaborative eyewitness testimony task, using the MORI technique. Participants formed same sex or mixed sex pairs and watched a videotaped event. Their eyewitness memories were assessed three times: immediately after watching, after discussing the event together, and individually 1 week later . The participants' self-confidence in their recalled memories and percentages of concessions were also examined. The Masculinity-Humanity-Femininity Scale was administered to the participants at the end of the experiment. The results showed that masculinity negatively correlated with concession, and that both masculinity and femininity were associated with inaccuracy in collaborative memory recall.     

Age differences in source forgetting: effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses.     

Infants' eyewitness testimony: Effects of postevent information on a prior memory representation

In eyewitness testimony research, postevent information impair retention of the original event and increases the probability that interpolated information will be identified as part:of the original event. The present experiments studied these effects with 3-month-olds. Infants learned to kick to move a particular crib mobile and then were briefly exposed to information about a novel mobile. The novel postevent information impaired recognition of the-original mobile when it immediately followed training but not when it was delayed by 1 day. Like adults, infants treated the postevent information as part of the original training event, continuing to do so for at least 2 weeks. We propose that postevent information displaces conflicting information coactive with it in primary memory and creates a new, updated memory token of the event. Once the new token leaves primary memory, however, it is protected; only a copy can be retrieved and modified in the future.     

Some experimental influences of lawyers' complicated questions on eyewitness confidence and accuracy

Eyewitness evidence and the confidence the eyewitness expresses in such evidence are crucial in many criminal trials. The present study is an examination of the influence of confusing questions often used by attorneys to examine witnesses in court. Participants viewed a videotaped incident and were questioned about the incident 1 week later. Half the participants were asked questions framed in a confusing form; the remaining half were asked the same questions in straightforward language. Confusing questions reduced the participant witnesses' accuracy and suppressed the confidence-accuracy relationships compared with the condition in which simple questions were asked. However, the number of absolutely sure responses was the same in both conditions, although these responses were almost always accurate in the simplified condition, whereas in the confusing question condition, accuracy was comparatively poor. This experiment demonstrates the importance of ensuring that lawyers ask witnesses simple, clear questions.     

Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability before and after Daubert: the state of the law and the science

This article examines the legal and scientific issues inherent in the use of expert psychological testimony on the factors that affect eyewitness reliability. First, the history of the use of such expert testimony is traced. Next, we look at the criteria that state and federal courts have used in determining whether to admit such testimony, as well as the grounds upon which the testimony has been excluded. We then examine the Daubert decision and discuss its implications for the use of expert eyewitness testimony. We conclude by reviewing eyewitness research and research on jury decision-making that is likely to assume new importance in the post-Daubert era.     

The accuracy-confidence correlation in eyewitness testimony: limits and extensions of the retrospective self-awareness effect.

This research extended Kassin's (1985) finding that retrospective self-awareness (RSA) increases the correlation between eyewitness accuracy and confidence. In Experiment 1, 91 mock witnesses saw a crime, answered questions, made an identification decision, and rated their confidence. RSA increased the accuracy-confidence correlation for witnesses who made an identification and for those who were high but not low in public self-consciousness. A 2nd experiment varied accountability and revealed that high accountability increased the accuracy-confidence correlation but that the RSA effect occurred even under low-accountability conditions. In both studies, observers could not distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Together, these findings define the limits of the RSA effect and provide mixed support for a self-perception account of this effect.     

Misinformation and warnings in eyewitness testimony: A new testing procedure to differentiate explanations

Abstract

Although psychologists agree that the presentation of misleading post-event information often results in errant recollections, there is disagreement about the explanation as to why this occurs. Some (cf. Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989) believe this misinformation alters the memory trace created by the original information, whereas others (cf. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) have argued that the data do not necessitate this explanation. An experiment, designed to differentiate the various explanations, was conducted. Its critical elements were: (1) a condition with a specific warning presented immediately after the misleading information; and (2) a ranking procedure used at testing. The results suggest multiple traces may exist for a limited period, but not indefinitely.