What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.     

What is so special about embodied simulation?

Simulation theories of social cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear what simulation means and how it works. The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Over the past few years this approach has been hotly debated and alternative accounts have been proposed. We discuss these accounts and argue that they fail to capture the uniqueness of embodied simulation (ES). ES theory provides a unitary account of basic social cognition, demonstrating that people reuse their own mental states or processes represented with a bodily format in functionally attributing them to others.     

Attention and the right-ear advantage: What is the connection?

Dichotic listening originally was a means of studying attention. Half a century ago Doreen Kimura parlayed the dichotic method into a noninvasive indicator of lateralized cerebral language representation. The ubiquitous right-ear advantage (REA) for verbal material was accepted as a concomitant of left-sided language lateralization and preferential conduction of right-ear messages to the left hemisphere. As evidence has accumulated over the past 50years showing the REA to be dynamic and modifiable, the concept of attention has become essential for interpreting the findings. Progress in understanding the role of attention has been manifested as a transition from efforts to document attention effects to efforts to characterize their mechanisms. We summarize the relevant evidence, trace the evolution of explanatory models, and outline contemporary accounts of the role of attention in dichotic listening.     

What is typical about the typicality effect in category-based induction?

Research on category-based induction has documented a consistent typicality effect: Typical exemplars promote stronger inferences about their broader category than atypical exemplars. This work has been largely confined to categories whose central tendencies are also the most typical members of the category. Does the typicality effect apply to the broad set of categories for which the ideal category member is considered most typical? In experiments with natural and artificial categories, typicality and induction-strength ratings were obtained for ideal and central-tendency exemplars. Induction strength was greatest for the central-tendency exemplars, regardless of whether the central tendency or the ideal was rated more typical. These results suggest that the so-called “typicality” effect is a special case of a more universal central-tendency effect in category-based induction.     

What is magic about the magical number four?

Summary Previous studies have shown that the apprehension of number can be represented by three models according to the experimental procedure and the data analysis. The present experiment was designed to test the effect of figural characteristics of pattern on the response time. The subjects were asked to perform a same/different judgment, i.e., they were requested to decide whether a dot pattern, shown on a monitor, equalled a previously defined target number (n=2–6) or not. Different types of pattern were used and learning effects were studied. As was expected, the slopes for random and linear patterns were not so steep when the target number was low. With patterns in the dice mode, however, the slope was zero. Repeated presentations led to a slight reduction in slope for random and linear patterns only. In the case of the patterns in the dice mode, the repeated presentations caused only a change in the absolute reaction times (RTs) but had no effect on the slope. When the target numbers were larger (n=5–6), the repeated presentations led to remarkable reductions in slope for random and linear patterns. The slope discontinuity at n=4 occurred with all types of pattern but it became less pronounced in the course of training at least in the case of random and linear patterns. This result is explained by clustering effects, use of figural cues, and a more efficient scanning process.     

What does distractibility in ADHD reveal about mechanisms for top-down attentional control?

In this study, we attempted to clarify whether distractibility in ADHD might arise from increased sensory-driven interference or from inefficient top-down control. We employed an attentional filtering paradigm in which discrimination difficulty and distractor salience (amount of image “graying”) were parametrically manipulated. Increased discrimination difficulty should add to the load of top-down processes, whereas increased distractor salience should produce stronger sensory interference. We found an unexpected interaction of discrimination difficulty and distractor salience. For difficult discriminations, ADHD children filtered distractors as efficiently as healthy children and adults; as expected, all three groups were slower to respond with high vs. low salience distractors. In contrast, for easy discriminations, robust between-group differences emerged: ADHD children were much slower and made more errors than either healthy children or adults. For easy discriminations, healthy children and adults filtered out high salience distractors as easily as low salience distractors, but ADHD children were slower to respond on trials with low salience distractors than they did on trials with high salience distractors. These initial results from a small sample of ADHD children have implications for models of attentional control, and ways in which it can malfunction. The fact that ADHD children exhibited efficient attentional filtering when task demands were high, but showed deficient and atypical distractor filtering under low task demands suggests that attention deficits in ADHD may stem from a failure to efficiently engage top-down control rather than an inability to implement filtering in sensory processing regions.     

Spatial coding and central patterns: is there something special about the eyes?

In this study we investigated in a Simon-like task whether task-irrelevant spatial information, delivered by centrally presented patterns, interfered with response selection in the same way as laterally presented stimuli. Second, we asked whether such interference was equal for different kinds of stimuli. Participants were required to respond to the colour of two framed squares, two arrows, or two schematic eyes by pressing one of two lateralized response keys. The results consistently show that the Simon effect occurs independently of the nature of the stimulus, as classically reported for lateralized stimuli. Response times were influenced by the direction and frame-relative position of the stimuli, being faster for responses corresponding to the direction indicated by the stimuli than for noncorresponding responses regardless of stimulus types. Contrary to findings with lateralized nondirectional stimuli, such an effect increased with increasing RTs indicating that for centrally presented patterns the extraction of spatial information is time consuming.     

The capacity for music: what is it, and what's special about it?

We explore the capacity for music in terms of five questions: (1) What cognitive structures are invoked by music? (2) What are the principles that create these structures? (3) How do listeners acquire these principles? (4) What pre-existing resources make such acquisition possible? (5) Which aspects of these resources are specific to music, and which are more general? We examine these issues by looking at the major components of musical organization: rhythm (an interaction of grouping and meter), tonal organization (the structure of melody and harmony), and affect (the interaction of music with emotion). Each domain reveals a combination of cognitively general phenomena, such as gestalt grouping principles, harmonic roughness, and stream segregation, with phenomena that appear special to music and language, such as metrical organization. These are subtly interwoven with a residue of components that are devoted specifically to music, such as the structure of tonal systems and the contours of melodic tension and relaxation that depend on tonality. In the domain of affect, these components are especially tangled, involving the interaction of such varied factors as general-purpose aesthetic framing, communication of affect by tone of voice, and the musically specific way that tonal pitch contours evoke patterns of posture and gesture.     

The faculty of language: what's special about it?

We examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic in light of recent suggestions by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific to humans but not to language (e.g. words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g. speech perception). We find the hypothesis problematic. It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments suggesting that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion. The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky's recent approach to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language. The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support claims about evolution. We contest related arguments that language is not an adaptation, namely that it is "perfect," non-redundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems.     

The role of attentional biases in PTSD: is it interference or facilitation?

Although attentional biases have been demonstrated in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the cognitive methodologies used have not allowed for disambiguation of two types of attentional biases. It remains unclear if PTSD involves difficulty disengaging attention from threatening stimuli (interference) or facilitated detection. To differentiate between attentional interference and facilitation, 57 male Vietnam-era veterans (30 High PTSD and 27 Low PTSD) completed a visual search task with a lexical decision component. High PTSD veterans who engaged in the interference task first showed increased interference to threat-relevant words relative to Low PTSD veterans. However, no evidence was found for facilitated detection of threatening stimuli in PTSD.     

Searching for Shereshevskii: What is superior about the memory of synaesthetes?

Some individuals with superior memory, such as the mnemonist Shereshevskii (Luria, 1968), are known to have synaesthesia. However, the extent to which superior memory is a general characteristic of synaesthesia is unknown, as is the precise cognitive mechanism by which synaesthesia affects memory. This study demonstrates that synaesthetes tend to report subjectively better than average memory and that these reports are borne out with objective testing. Synaesthetes experiencing colours for words show better memory than matched controls for stimuli that induce synaesthesia (word lists) relative to stimuli that do not (an abstract figure). However, memory advantages are not limited to material that elicits synaesthesia because synaesthetes demonstrate enhanced memory for colour per se (which does not induce a synaesthetic response). Our results suggest that the memory enhancement found in synaesthetes is related to an enhanced retention of colour in both synaesthetic and nonsynaesthetic situations. Furthermore, this may account for the fact that synaesthetic associations, once formed, remain highly consistent.     

The Nothing and the Ontological Difference in Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?

This essay gives an interpretation of Heidegger's “What is Metaphysics?” lecture in light of passages from his other writings and lecture courses of the period. This exegetical task is important, for interpreters of “What is Metaphysics?” have been confused by puzzling phrases in the lecture without noticing that Heidegger makes the same points in clearer terms elsewhere. In particular, these interpreters ignore Heidegger's crucial distinction between entities and the being of entities. Since Heidegger's “nothing” is an aspect of being, this difference is at the core of Heidegger's lecture. The present interpretation establishes a conditional conclusion: If the ontological difference makes sense, then we have a sound basis for understanding “What is Metaphysics?” and do not need to read Heidegger as an irrationalist who debunks science or rejects the principle of contradiction. This paper does not give independent justification for the ontological difference.