Shadows as sources of cues for distance of shadow-casting objects

Shadows are neglected sources of information about shadow-casting objects' distance (location). In an experiment using real shadows, participants judged the distance of two rods, either with shadows (illumination from the left) or without shadows. Without shadows, a thin rod raised slightly above the surface was incorrectly judged to be more distant than a thick rod, but with shadows the thin rod was accurately judged to be closer. For judgments to be correct, shadows had to overwhelm competing height and stimulus-size cues. Exp. II involved nonoverlapping shadows produced by a light placed in front of the rods. Again, without shadows the thin-elevated rod was incorrectly judged to be more distant, but with shadows it was correctly judged to be closer. Exp. III involved two sets of thick and thin elevated rods and frontal lighting. Judgments were accurate when shadows were present but inaccurate when shadows were absent. Experiments conducted through the American Psychological Society Web-research site replicated results of Exp. I, II, and III. A final Web experiment replicated results of the others, but with shadows produced by illumination from the right. Three properties of shadows--angles, interposition, and positioning--are possible sources of distance information associated with cast shadows.     

Duration judgments in children with ADHD suggest deficient utilization of temporal information rather than general impairment in timing.

Clinicians, parents, and teachers alike have noted that individuals with ADHD often have difficulties with "time management," which has led some to suggest a primary deficit in time perception in ADHD. Previous studies have implicated the basal ganglia, cerebellum, and frontal lobes in time estimation and production, with each region purported to make different contributions to the processing and utilization of temporal information. Given the observed involvement of the frontal-subcortical networks in ADHD, we examined judgment of durations in children with ADHD (N = 27) and age- and gender-matched control subjects (N = 15). Two judgment tasks were administered: short duration (550 ms) and long duration (4 s). The two groups did not differ significantly in their judgments of short interval durations; however, subjects with ADHD performed more poorly when making judgments involving long intervals. The groups also did not differ on a judgment-of-pitch task, ruling out a generalized deficit in auditory discrimination. Selective impairment in making judgments involving long intervals is consistent with performance by patients with frontal lobe lesions and suggests that there is a deficiency in the utilization of temporal information in ADHD (possibly secondary to deficits in working memory and/or strategy utilization), rather than a problem involving a central timing mechanism.     

Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Analyzing distances in a frontal plane

In an exploration of the process whereby horizontal and vertical components are extracted from distances between pairs of points, participants made speeded absolute distance judgments—deciding whether horizontal distances between pairs of points in a frontal plane exceeded a criterion distance. Judgments reflected the horizontal and vertical distances between the points. Three accounts of the results were considered. (1) Only the overall distance between two points was directly available to judgment processes; the horizontal or vertical distance between the points was available only to the extent that the horizontal and vertical positions of the points were differentially weighted prior to the assessment of overall distance. (2) The perceptual effects of positions on the horizontal and vertical dimensions were collapsed onto a composite dimension. (3) The decision criterion for the distance judgment considered both the horizontal and vertical distances between the points. In support of the overall distance account, (1) performance in the distance judgment task was facilitated by repetition of the same overall distance from trial to trial, but not by repetition of the distance on the composite dimension or by repetition of horizontal or vertical distance; (2) differential weighting that the overall distance account predicted for the absolute distance judgments was reflected in concurrent relative distance judgments pitting horizontal against vertical distance, counter to the composite dimension account, which sees the horizontal and vertical dimensions as collapsing onto the composite dimension in balanced, symmetrical fashion, and counter the decisional account, given that no criterion is required for the relative judgment.     

Carryover effects of analytic thought on preference quality

The current study used a novel within-subjects design to test for the effects of analytic thought (reasons analysis) on the quality of the resulting judgments, as well as on subsequent, unanalyzed judgments of the same stimuli. Participants rated eight Olympic dives at two points in time, 30 min apart, under both reasoning and control instructions, which were then correlated with the scores the dives received from the Olympic judges. Results revealed asymmetric effects of reasoning and non-reasoning strategies: reasoning impaired judgments even when the judgments had been previously made under control conditions, and participants’ two sets of ratings were more strongly correlated with each other when made under control conditions than when either set had been reasoned. Analyses of decision times and reason–judgment correlations suggest that the effects of analytic thought in this domain are partially due to a general shift in decision strategy, and not exclusively to biases in the content of generated reasons.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

Use of interreflection and shadow for surface contact

The interaction of light with surfaces results in a number of lighting effects that may serve as valuable visual cues. Previous research on shadows has shown them to be effective in determining the three-dimensional (3-D) layout of a scene, but interreflections have been ignored as cues for spatial layout. Interreflections as well as shadows may help to disambiguate the 3-D layout of objects by providing information about an object's contact with a surface. We generated computer images of a box on an extended textured ground plane that was either in contact with the ground or was slightly above the ground. Images were rendered for four conditions: (1) no shadow + no interreflection, (2) shadow only, (3) interreflection only, and (4) shadow + interreflection. A photometrically incorrect condition was also included. The participants rated the degree of contact for each image on a scale, which was used to generate receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and a measure of sensitivity. In the images with no shadows or interreflections, the participants performed at chance levels. Interreflections, shadows, and a combination of interreflections and shadows all resulted in high sensitivity for judging object contact. More important, information from shadows and interreflections can be combined, resulting in near-perfect judgment of surface contact. Interreflections and shadows can be effective cues for object contact.     

语音回路和视空间模板对音位流畅性和语义流畅性的影响

采用双任务范式,通过四种次任务考察了工作记忆两个子系统－语音回路和视空间模板对音位流畅性和语义流畅性的影响。实验1表明,主动产生系列发音和被动聆听声音判断对音位流畅性影响更大,表明音位流畅性更依赖于语音回路。实验2表明,字形匹配和字形旋转判断对语义流畅性影响更大,表明语义流畅性更依赖于视空间模板。研究还表明,被试完成音位流畅性任务的策略更易受语言的特点影响,完成语义流畅性任务的策略更易受概念系统的特性影响     

Size-distance paradox with accommodative micropsia

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the paradoxical relative distance judgment associated with the size-distance paradox is due to the visual system’s assuming equal linear size and perceiving a smaller angular size for the closer stimulus equal in visual angle. In Experiment I, two different sized coins were presented successively, and 16 Ss were asked to give ordinal judgments of apparent distance and apparent size. When the two coins depicted the same figures, the closer stimulus was judged to be farther and smaller, more frequently, than when two coins depicted different figures. In Experiment II, 48 Ss were asked to give ratio judgments of apparent distance, apparent linear size, and apparent angular size for two stimuli which were presented successively. When the stimuli were of equal shape, the mean ratios of the far stimulus to the near stimulus were smaller for the apparent distance but larger for the apparent linear size and angular size than when the stimuli were of different shape. The obtained distance judgments were consistent with the hypothesis but the obtained judgments of linear size and angular size were not.     

An apparent exception to the extremization of collective judgments

A reanalysis of data obtained by Kogan and Wallach, 1966 is presented. Wherever the original analysis showed the extremity of unanimous group judgments in general not to be different from the average extremity of individual judgments, the present analysis indicates that these group judgments differ from the average of individual judgments: they are significantly more extreme than the average positions of the individuals.     

Perceived size and perceived direction: the interplay of the two descriptors of visual space

The stimulus in the outdoor psychophysical experiment was formed by two rods placed on the ground plane over a range of possible distances and orientations. Observers estimated its size and direction by positioning the third rod in the neighbouring space to form an evenly spaced collinear triple of rods. The data revealed interesting similarities between the profiles of the deviations in both judgments: for size judgments, the variability of the responses was least when the targets were at a frontal orientation and gradually increased as the orientation approached the medial plane. For direction judgments, on the other hand, the variability of the responses was least when the stimuli were aligned with the observer's line of sight and gradually increased as the orientation approached the frontoparallel plane. The finding of inverse relationship between the precision of size and direction judgments is interpreted as a consequence of the unequal precision in localisation between the frontal and in-depth dimensions of visual space. The question of the best parameterisation of the observers' responses is discussed.     

Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice

Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.     

Relative judgment: A phenomenon and a theory

An experiment is described in which it was demonstrated that relative judgments of the more probable of two statements are quicker if the statements are both probable rather than improbable. For judgments of the less probable, the reverse result was obtained. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to various theories of judgment and choice. A theory is presented which assumes that judgment involves a relation between a stimulus and a word and follows Thurstone’s notion that stimuli differ in their discrirninal dispersions. This new theory is shown to be consistent with recent results in psycholinguistics.     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

自我参照和环境参照整合过程中的主方位判断

通过三个实验证明,自我参照和环境参照转化与整合过程中的主方位判断受拍摄方向和目标位置的影响。二者对主方位判断的作用模式不会随主方位判断任务的改变而改变,拍摄方向效表现为：朝北效应（匹配效应）和主方位效应,体现的是自我参照和环境参照整合过程中环境参照对主方位的影响;目标位置效应的认知加工时间模式可表示为：前-后轴<左-右轴<其他位置,体现的是自我参照和环境参照整合过程中自我参照对主方位的影响。本文以规范轴和规范方向为框架对数据结果进行了分析和解释。     

Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side‐effect ( Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side‐effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side‐effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.     

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of hypothetical thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning and judgment are facilitated by the formation of epistemic mental models that are generated one at a time (singularity principle) by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualize problems in such a way as to maximize relevance to current goals (relevance principle). Analytic processes evaluate these models but tend to accept them unless there is good reason to reject them (satisficing principle). At a minimum, analytic processing of models is required so as to generate inferences or judgments relevant to the task instructions, but more active intervention may result in modification or replacement of default models generated by the heuristic system. Evidence for this theory is provided by a review of a wide range of literature on thinking and reasoning.