Remembering kinds: new evidence that categories are privileged in children's thinking

What are the representations and learning mechanisms that underlie conceptual development? The present research provides evidence in favor of the claim that this process is guided by an early-emerging predisposition to think and learn about abstract kinds. Specifically, three studies (N = 192) demonstrated that 4- to 7-year-old children have better recall for novel information about kinds (e.g., that dogs catch a bug called “fep”) than for similar information about individuals (e.g., that a particular dog catches a bug called “fep”). By showing that children are particularly likely to retain information about kinds, this work not only provides a first empirical demonstration of a phenomenon that may be key to conceptual development but also makes it apparent that young children’s thinking is suffused with abstractions rather than being perceptually-based and concrete.     

Color categories: evidence for the cultural relativity hypothesis

The question of whether language affects our categorization of perceptual continua is of particular interest for the domain of color where constraints on categorization have been proposed both within the visual system and in the visual environment. Recent research (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; Roberson et al., in press) found substantial evidence of cognitive color differences between different language communities, but concerns remained as to how representative might be a tiny, extremely remote community. The present study replicates and extends previous findings using additional paradigms among a larger community in a different visual environment. Adult semi-nomadic tribesmen in Southern Africa carried out similarity judgments, short-term memory and long-term learning tasks. They showed different cognitive organization of color to both English and another language with the five color terms. Moreover, Categorical Perception effects were found to differ even between languages with broadly similar color categories. The results provide further evidence of the tight relationship between language and cognition.     

Consistent (but not variable) names as invitations to form object categories: new evidence from 12-month-old infants

Recent research documents that for infants just beginning to produce words on their own, novel words highlight commonalities among named objects and, in this way, serve as invitations to form categories. The current experiment identifies more precisely the source of this invitation. We asked whether applying a consistent name to a set of distinct objects is crucial to categorization, or whether variable names might serve the same conceptual function. The evidence suggests that for 12-month-old infants, consistency in naming is critical. Infants hearing a single consistent novel noun for a set of distinct objects successfully formed object categories. Infants hearing different novel nouns for the same set of objects did not. These results lend strength and greater precision to the argument that naming has powerful and rather nuanced conceptual consequences for infants as well as for mature speakers.     

Emotion words and categories: evidence from lexical decision

We examined the categorical nature of emotion word recognition. Positive, negative, and neutral words were presented in lexical decision tasks. Word frequency was additionally manipulated. In Experiment 1, “positive” and “negative” categories of words were implicitly indicated by the blocked design employed. A significant emotion–frequency interaction was obtained, replicating past research. While positive words consistently elicited faster responses than neutral words, only low frequency negative words demonstrated a similar advantage. In Experiments 2a and 2b, explicit categories (“positive,” “negative,” and “household” items) were specified to participants. Positive words again elicited faster responses than did neutral words. Responses to negative words, however, were no different than those to neutral words, regardless of their frequency. The overall pattern of effects indicates that positive words are always facilitated, frequency plays a greater role in the recognition of negative words, and a “negative” category represents a somewhat disparate set of emotions. These results support the notion that emotion word processing may be moderated by distinct systems.     

Functional categories in agrammatism: evidence from Greek

The aim of this study is twofold. First, to investigate the use of functional categories by two Greek agrammatic aphasics. Second, to discuss the implications of our findings for the characterization of the deficit in agrammatism. The functional categories under investigation were the following: definite and indefinite articles, personal pronouns, aspect, tense, subject-verb agreement, wh-pronouns, complementizers and the mood marker na (=to). Based on data collected through different methods, it is argued that the deficit in agrammatism cannot be described in terms of a structural account but rather by means of difficulties in the implementation of grammatical knowledge.     

Color categories and color appearance

We examined categorical effects in color appearance in two tasks, which in part differed in the extent to which color naming was explicitly required for the response. In one, we measured the effects of color differences on perceptual grouping for hues that spanned the blue-green boundary, to test whether chromatic differences across the boundary were perceptually exaggerated. This task did not require overt judgments of the perceived colors, and the tendency to group showed only a weak and inconsistent categorical bias. In a second case, we analyzed results from two prior studies of hue scaling of chromatic stimuli (De Valois, De Valois, Switkes, & Mahon, 1997; Malkoc, Kay, & Webster, 2005), to test whether color appearance changed more rapidly around the blue-green boundary. In this task observers directly judge the perceived color of the stimuli and these judgments tended to show much stronger categorical effects. The differences between these tasks could arise either because different signals mediate color grouping and color appearance, or because linguistic categories might differentially intrude on the response to color and/or on the perception of color. Our results suggest that the interaction between language and color processing may be highly dependent on the specific task and cognitive demands and strategies of the observer, and also highlight pronounced individual differences in the tendency to exhibit categorical responses.     

Visual detection and identification are not the same: evidence from psychophysics and fMRI

Sometimes object detection as opposed to identification is sufficient to initiate the appropriate action. To explore the neural origin of behavioural differences between the two tasks, we combine psychophysical measurements and fMRI, specifically contrasting shape detection versus identification of a figure. This figure consisted of Gabor elements being oriented differently from those in the background. We equalized performance levels for detection and identification by adjusting orientation differences accordingly for each observer. Hence, stimulus saliency was constant for both tasks allowing a differentiation between the activations specific for detection versus identification processes. Identification yielded higher psychophysical thresholds, slower reaction times and increased hemodynamic activations in the lateral-occipital complex (LOC) and an adjacent area in the collateral sulcus (CoS). Additional analysis using cortex-based alignment revealed four voxel-clusters differentially activated by the tasks, situated in the inferior parietal lobe, the precuneus, the anterior cingulum and the medial frontal gyrus. Our results indicate partly separated cortical mechanisms for object detection and identification.     

The universal psychology of kinship: evidence from language

Kinship is central to social organization in many societies; how people think about kinship should be relevant to social cognition generally. One window onto the mental representation of kinship is afforded by variation and universals in terms for kin. Kin terminologies are commonly organized around binary distinctive features, and terms for some types of kin are consistently linguistically marked. These observations can be formalized in the newly developed framework of linguistic Optimality Theory: permutations in the rank order of a small set of constraints generate basic types of kin terminology without over-generating rare or non-existent types. The result, I argue, is evidence for an innate faculty of social cognition (including several universal schemas of social relationships), apparently shaped by several kinds of genetic kin selection.     

Rimes are not necessarily favored by prereaders: evidence from meta- and epilinguistic phonological tasks

This article explores young children's facility in phonological awareness tasks requiring either the detection or the articulation of head, coda, onset, and rime subsyllabic units shared in word pairs. Data are reported from 70 nonreading children and 21 precocious readers attending preschools. Prereading children were able to articulate shared heads, codas, and onsets, although rimes rarely were articulated. Precocious readers were able to articulate shared rimes, but articulation performance was still most accurate for onsets and codas. Rimes and heads were equally accessible in the detection task and were identified more often than onsets and codas (nonreaders) and codas (readers). It is concluded that the articulation advantage for nonrime units cannot simply reflect early reading instruction. This disjoint pattern of phonological awareness in detection and production tasks does not support Goswami's phonological status hypothesis. Results may instead reflect quite distinct influences on epilinguistic and metalinguistic phonological development.     

Agreement between observers when the categories are not specified in advance

To test the agreement between two observers who categorize a number of objects when the categories have not been specified in advance, Brennan & Light (1974) developed a statistic A′ and suggested a normal approximation for its distribution. In this paper it is shown that this approximation is inadequate particularly when one, or both, of the observers place a fairly equal number of objects in all of their categories. A chi-squared approximation to the distribution of A′ is developed and is shown to work well in a variety of situations. The relative powers of A′ and the ordinary X² test for association are dependent on the type of ‘agreement between the observers’ that is assumed. However a simulation for a fairly general type of agreement indicates that the X² test is more powerful. As the X² test is also much easier to apply, it would seem preferable in most situations.     

To generalize or not to generalize: spatial categories are influenced by physical attributes and language

The current work explored the conditions under which infants generalize spatial relationships from one event to another. English‐learning 5‐month‐olds habituated to a tight‐ or loose‐fit covering event dishabituated to a change in fit during a containment test event, but infants habituated to a visually similar occlusion event did not. Thus, infants’ responses appeared to be driven by the physical nature of the fit rather than visual similarity. This response pattern was replicated with Korean‐speaking adults, but English‐speaking adults showed no sensitivity to change in fit for either event. These findings suggest that language development links linguistic forms to universal, pre‐existing representations of meaning, and that linguistic experience can shape sensitivity to distinctions that are marked in one's native language.     

Unfamiliar faces are not faces: Evidence from a matching task

It is difficult to match two images of the same unfamiliar face, even under good conditions. Here, we show that there are large individual differences on unfamiliar face matching. Initially, we tried to predict these using tests of visual short-term memory, cognitive style, and perceptual speed. Moderate correlations were produced by various components of these tests. In three other experiments, we found very strong correlations between face matching and inverted face matching on the same test. Finally, we examined potential associations between familiar and unfamiliar face processing. Strong correlations were found between familiar and unfamiliar face processing, but only when the familiar faces were inverted. We conclude that unfamiliar faces are processed for identity in a qualitatively different way than are familiar faces.     

When parallel processing in visual word recognition is not enough: new evidence from naming

Low-frequency irregular words are named more slowly and are more error prone than low-frequency regular words (the regularity effect). Rastle and Coltheart (1999) reported that this irregularity cost is modulated by the serial position of the irregular grapheme-phoneme correspondence, such that words with early irregularities exhibit a larger cost than words with late ones. They argued that these data implicate rule-based serial processing, and they also reported a successful simulation with a model that has a rule-based serial component—the DRC model of reading aloud (Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, Langdon, & Ziegler, 2001). However, Zorzi (2000) also simulated these data with a model that operates solely in parallel. Furthermore, Kwantes and Mewhort (1999) simulated these data with a serial processing model that has no rules for converting orthography to phonology. The human data reported by Rastle and Coltheart therefore neither require a serial processing account, nor successfully discriminate among a number of computational models of reading aloud. New data are presented wherein an interaction between the effects of regularity and serial position of irregularity is again reported for human readers. The DRC model simulated this interaction; no other implemented computational model does so. The present results are thus consistent with rule-based serial processing in reading aloud.     

Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory

Recently, there as been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of mindreading. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I offer a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.     

Emotional memories are not all created equal: evidence for selective memory enhancement

Human brain imaging studies have shown that greater amygdala activation to emotional relative to neutral events leads to enhanced episodic memory. Other studies have shown that fearful faces also elicit greater amygdala activation relative to neutral faces. To the extent that amygdala recruitment is sufficient to enhance recollection, these separate lines of evidence predict that recognition memory should be greater for fearful relative to neutral faces. Experiment 1 demonstrated enhanced memory for emotionally negative relative to neutral scenes; however, fearful faces were not subject to enhanced recognition across a variety of delays (15 min to 2 wk). Experiment 2 demonstrated that enhanced delayed recognition for emotional scenes was associated with increased sympathetic autonomic arousal, indexed by the galvanic skin response, relative to fearful faces. These results suggest that while amygdala activation may be necessary, it alone is insufficient to enhance episodic memory formation. It is proposed that a sufficient level of systemic arousal is required to alter memory consolidation resulting in enhanced recollection of emotional events.     

Ontological categories and function: Acquisition of new names

This study asks whether knowledge of the functional properties of a referent for a new name influences children's first guesses about whether that name refers to an object or a substance. Recent work on children's categorization suggests that children differentiate concrete objects from nonsolid substances and that their initial hypotheses about the meanings of new words are affected by this knowledge of ontological categories. In addition, some research has suggested that children approach new words with a set of biases that constrain the possible meanings of those words. Most of this work has presented children with new names in the absence of explicit information about the functional characteristics of new referents. Our hypothesis was that if children are shown the functional properties of referents, they should use that information in making their first guesses about the meanings of new words. Seventy-two 3- and 4-year-olds were shown new items with new names and were tested on their extension of each new name either to a similarly shaped item made of a different material or to a differently shaped item made of the same material. Some subjects were shown a “shape-linked” function, some a “substance-linked” function, and some no function at all. One third of the subjects heard the new names presented with count syntax, one third with mass syntax, and one third with neutral syntax. Results suggest that children do not rely on a single source of information in extending new names, but, rather, draw on various kinds of information, including the perceptual characteristics of the entities themselves and the syntax of the input.     

The family of fundamental social categories includes kinship: evidence from the memory confusion paradigm

Kinship is a fundamental component of human sociality influencing a range of behaviors including altruism, aggression, and mating. Though a central focus in psychology's neighboring disciplines, kinship has been largely neglected within psychology. An illustrative example – and the focus here – is research on social categorization. Researchers investigating the categories into which our mind carves the social world have focused primarily on sex, age, and race. Here we present evidence that kinship belongs in the family of fundamental social categories. In a series of experiments using a memory confusion paradigm, we show that participants implicitly encode the kinship relations of social targets and do so to the same extent as sex and age, two previously established robust dimensions of social categorization. The functional framework applied here provides useful guide‐rails for investigating how the human mind naturally parses the social world, and, more broadly, helps unite psychology with its neighboring disciplines in which kinship is treated as an important conceptual tool. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Classification in well-defined and ill-defined categories: evidence for common processing strategies

Early work in perceptual and conceptual categorization assumed that categories had criterial features and that category membership could be determined by logical rules for the combination of features. More recent theories have assumed that categories have an ill-defined structure and have prosposed probabilistic or global similarity models for the verification of category membership. In the experiments reported here, several models of categorization were compared, using one set of categories having criterial features and another set having an ill-defined structure. Schematic faces were used as exemplars in both cases. Because many models depend on distance in a multidimensional space for their predictions, in Experiment 1 a multidimensional scaling study was performed using the faces of both sets as stimuli, In Experiment 2, subjects learned the category membership of faces for the categories having criterial features. After learning, reaction times for category verification and typicality judgments were obtained. Subjects also judged the similarity of pairs of faces. Since these categories had characteristic as well as defining features, it was possible to test the predictions of the feature comparison model (Smith et al.), which asserts that reaction times and typicalities are affected by characteristic features. Only weak support for this model was obtained. Instead, it appeared that subjects developed logical rules for the classification of faces. A characteristic feature affected reaction times only when it was part of the rule system devised by the subject. The procedure for Experiment 3 was like that for Experiment 2, but with ill-defined rather than well-defined categories. The obtained reaction times had high correlations with some of the models for ill-defined categories. However, subjects' performance could best be described as one of feature testing based on a logical rule system for classification. These experiments indicate that whether or not categories have criterial features, subjects attempt to develop a set of feature tests that allow for exemplar classification. Previous evidence supporting probabilistic or similarity models may be interpreted as resulting from subjects' use of the most efficient rules for classification and the averaging of responses for subjects using different sets of rules.     

Same-gender distractors are not so easy to reject: ERP evidence of gender categorization

Social categorization appears to be an automatic process that occurs during person perception. Understanding social categorization better is important because mere categorization can lead to stereotype activation and, in turn, to discrimination. In the present study we used a novel approach to examine event-related potentials (ERPs) of gender categorization in the “Who said what?” memory paradigm, thus allowing for a more in-depth understanding of the specific mechanisms underlying identity versus categorization processing. After observing video clips showing a “discussion” among female and male targets, participants were shown individual statements, each accompanied by one of the discussants’ faces. While we measured ERPs, participants had to decide whether or not a given statement had previously been made by the person with the accompanying face. In same-person trials, statements were paired with the correct person, whereas in the distractor trials, either a same-gender or a different-gender distractor was shown. As expected, participants were able to reject different-gender distractors faster than same-gender distractors, and they were more likely to falsely choose yes for a same-gender than for a different-gender distractor. Both findings indicate gender-based categorization. ERPs, analyzed in a 300- to 400-ms time window at occipito-temporal channels, indicated more negative amplitudes for yes responses both for the same person and for same-gender distractors, relative to different-gender distractors. Overall, these results show gender-based categorization even when the task was to assess the identifying information in a gender-neutral context. These findings are interpreted as showing that gender categorization occurs automatically during person perception, but later than race- or age-based categorization.