Integration and segregation of prior outcomes in risky decisions

Two experiments were conducted to test if a prior outcome influences the likelihood to accept a current gamble. Undergraduate students participating as subjects imagined that they on a fictitious betting day at a horse-race track did not gamble in the prior race, that they gambled and won, or that they gambled and lost. Subjects rated in one session the likelihood of gambling in the current race. In another session they rated how satisfied they would be with not gambling, with winning, and with losing, respectively. The results of Experiment 1 showed that as compared to no prior outcome the ratings of likelihood of gambling increased after a gain and decreased after a loss. This was explained by the assumption, supported by the ratings of satisfaction, that the prior outcome only affected the satisfaction with the expected loss of the current choice, making it less negative after a gain and more negative after a loss. These results were replicated in Experiment 2. In addition, if subjects did not know with certainty the outcome of a previous choice to gamble, the likelihood to accept the current gamble and the ratings of the satisfaction with its expected outcomes were largely unaffected.     

Investigating the illusion of control in mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals during video-poker play

Cognitive fallacies, such as the illusion of control, and psychological disorders, such as depression, may perpetuate gambling and thus contribute to problem gambling (e.g., R. Ladouceur, C. Sylvan, C. Boutin, & C. Doucet, 2002). Gender differences may exist across these variables (e.g., N. M. Petry, 2005). The authors investigated these possibilities by recruiting mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals to play jacks or better, 5-card draw, video poker. Across three poker sessions, participants were given (a) no choice of which cards to play, (b) information on the best cards to play but control over which cards were played, or (c) no information and complete control over which cards were played. The total amount of money gambled increased as control over the game decreased, but this result correlated with an increase in the rate of play. Depressed and nondepressed participants did not differ in how they gambled, but men gambled significantly more and sometimes made more mistakes during play than did women. These results question the role of the illusion of control and depression in perpetuating gambling. They also suggest that providing players information about which cards to play may indirectly promote gambling and provide insight as to why men are more prone to suffer from gambling problems than are women.     

Gambling as a search for justice: examining the role of personal relative deprivation in gambling urges and gambling behavior

The present article explores the hypothesis that gambling might serve a justice-seeking function for some people, as gambling might offer a means to pursuing desirable outcomes that people feel they deserve but might be unable or unwilling to attain through conventional means. In Study 1, across two separate samples, self-reports of personal relative deprivation predict problem gambling and gambling urges over and above relevant control variables. In Study 2, the authors manipulate personal relative deprivation by informing participants that they have either less or more discretionary income than "similar others." They then give participants $20 and the opportunity to gamble. The results show that a greater percentage of participants who are "relatively deprived" (vs. "not relatively deprived") opt to gamble. Two manipulation validation studies demonstrate that the "relatively deprived" participants are preoccupied with justice during a modified Stroop task and feel resentful. Implications for understanding why people gamble are discussed.     

Expectations and Preferences for Sequences of Health and Money

Three experiments demonstrated that preferences for sequences of money differed from preferences for sequences of health. Undergraduates gave preference ratings for graphs that illustrated how monetary income or health quality might change over time, with total amount of money or health held constant. In Experiment 1, subjects expected to experience health that decreased over a lifetime; they also preferred such a sequence. In contrast, they expected to experience increasing monetary income over their lifetimes and preferred such monetary sequences. Experiment 2 showed that these different preferences for sequences of health and money did not hold true for short, 1-year sequences, where subjects had similar expectations about health and money. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 and showed that expectations mediate the effect on preference of decision domain (health or money) and sequence length. These results point to the importance of expectations in forming preferences for sequences.     

权力不稳定性对权力效应的逆转作用

摘 要 基于权力的趋近-抑制理论，本研究探讨权力不稳定性对权力效应产生逆转作用以及权力动机对这一逆转作用的影响。实验采用角色扮演法和真实任务角色来操纵被试的权力水平和权力不稳定性，以赌博任务中的冒险行为和金钱分配任务中的趋利行为来测量被试的权力趋近/抑制效应。结果发现：权力稳定条件下，高权力被试比低权力被试表现出更多的冒险行为和趋利行为；权力不稳定条件下则相反，低权力被试比高权力被试表现出更多的冒险行为和趋利行为。权力不稳定条件下高权力动机的高权力者相比低权力动机的高权力者倾向给自己分配更少的金额数，表现出更为明显的抑制倾向；而高权力动机的低权力者相比低权力动机的低权力者倾向于提出更高要求的金额数，表现出更为明显的趋近倾向。该研究证实了权力不稳定性对权力效应的逆转作用，而权力动机对这一逆转作用起到增强趋势。     

Erroneous verbalizations and risk taking at video lotteries

This study examined the effect of erroneous perceptions verbalized by a game accomplice on participants' gambling. The sample consisted of 22 men and 10 women, aged 18 and older, who did not show excessive gambling problems, but who had played video lotteries at least once during the last 6 months. The participants were randomly assigned into one of three groups, where they gambled in the presence of an accomplicewho verbalized three types of perceptions: (1) the accomplice emitted erroneous thoughts about gambling,(2) the accomplice verbalized adequate thoughts about gambling, or (3) the accomplice did not speak. Results showed that players exposed to an accomplice's erroneous verbalizations took significantly more risksthan players in the other two groups. Erroneous perceptions appear to be easily transmissible and have impacts on gambling behaviour. The practical and theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Money does not stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making

Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making.     

Too fatigued to care: Ego depletion,guilt, and prosocial behavior

Although guilt feels bad to the individual, it is good for society because guilty feelings can prompt people to perform good deeds. This study tests whether fatigue decreases guilty feelings and subsequent prosocial behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to a depletion condition in which they watched a movie about butchering animals for their meat or skin and were told to express no emotions, or to a no-depletion condition in which they watched the same movie, but could express their emotions. Having participants play a game in which another person was punished for their errors induced guilt. Finally, participants played a dictator game in which they could leave money for the next participant. After the experiment, participants could also anonymously donate money to an anti-AIDS charity. The results showed that depleted participants felt less guilty than did non-depleted participants, and the less guilty participants felt the less helpful they were.     

The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than Probability

Two experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Participants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeledcautious optimism:Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of losing for the same phrases (optimism), while participants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gambling situations, affect condition participants were much less likely to gamble than were controls when a real loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect participants used a betting-decision rule that was different from that of controls: They bet less than controls in gambles where potential losses were large, even though probability of loss was small, and they bet more than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a decision rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in terms of mere response bias.     

Delay discounting by pathological gamblers

Discounting of delayed rewards by pathological gamblers was compared to discounting of delayed rewards by matched control nongambling participants. All participants completed a hypothetical choice task in which they made repeated choices between dollars 1,000 available after a delay and an equal or lesser amount of money available immediately. The delay to the large amount of money was varied from 1 week to 10 years across conditions. Indifference points between immediate money and delayed money were identified at each delay condition by varying the amount of immediate money across choice trials. For the majority of participants, indifference points decreased monotonically across delays. Overall, gamblers discounted the delayed rewards more steeply than did control participants.     

Mood state and gambling: Using mobile telephones to track emotions

Mobile telephones were used to collect data on the relationship between gambling and mood state from gamblers in the field. Seventeen gamblers called an interactive voice response system running on a computer before, during and after a gambling episode. Measures taken in this way included self‐reports of anxiety/arousal, the amount of money gambled, whether the result was a win or loss, the amount won or lost, and the type of gambling engaged in. Other measures were taken during an initial briefing session using conventional questionnaires that included self‐reports of anxiety/arousal taken in a non‐gambling situation, dissociation during gambling, and a measure of degree of impairment of control. The results showed that subjective anxiety/arousal levels were significantly higher during and after gambling than during the urge to gamble or at baselines. Losing was associated with increased subjective anxiety/arousal after play, and winning was associated with a decrease in subjective anxiety/arousal. This suggests that gambling may be a cause of increased subjective anxiety/arousal, rather than functioning to relieve it. A cluster of variables associated with impaired control and subjective anxiety/arousal levels was also identified. The method of collecting data using mobile telephones appears to be a valuable development.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

The effect of knowledge of mathematics on gambling behaviours and erroneous perceptions

This study evaluates the effect of knowledge of mathematics as a protective factor against excessive gambling behaviours and erroneous beliefs. Two groups with different levels of knowledge of mathematics were compared as to their perceptions and behaviours before and during a gambling session. A total of 60 participants (30 men, 30 women) completed a questionnaire evaluating how they perceive the notion of chance and participated in two experimental tasks: the production of a random sequence of heads/tails, and a gambling session on a video lottery terminal. The results show that participants with knowledge of mathematics held more erroneous perceptions of gambling before the experiment whereas both groups showed an equal number of erroneous perceptions and behaviours during gambling. The importance of knowledge of mathematics as a protective factor against excessive gambling is questionable. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed with regard to the prevention of excessive gambling.     

‘Chasing' in gambling behavior: personality and cognitive determinants

The phenomenon of ‘chasing' has been identified as one of the central characteristics of the behavior of pathological gamblers [American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed., DSM IV). Washington, DC: APA]. It consists of more frequent involvement, increased persistence and elevated monetary risk in an effort to recoup money that has been lost. The present research makes a distinction between within- and between-session chasing, and attempts to examine the determinants of within-session chasing in a reasonably valid laboratory analogue. Male college students who gambled (N=248) were given US$10 and an opportunity to gamble. They could: (1) decline to gamble and keep their US$10 (nonplayers); (2) gamble and win even more money by quitting at a more optimal time (nonchasers); or (3) gamble longer than they should, resulting in the loss of all available money (chasers). Zuckerman's impulsivity factor (from the ZKPQ) discriminated chasers from nonchasers. Breen and Zuckerman's Gambling Beliefs and Attitudes Survey (GABS) discriminated players from nonplayers. A sensation-seeking explanation of within-session chasing was not supported. The results are discussed in terms of the impact of impulsivity on within-session chasing. It is suggested that the GABS may serve as a general measure of ‘affinity' to gambling, and could be useful in examining the process of between-session chasing, that is, returning on another day to ‘get even'.     

澳门人的风险知觉与赌博行为

采用匿名问卷法,调查澳门人的风险知觉与赌博行为。结果显示：（1）赌场的劝世文既无劝勉也无劝阻人们赌博的作用;（2）社会关系网的钱财支援不影响实际赌博次数;（3）多次性博弈与一次性博弈所采用的是不同的机制,一次性博弈不是由期望值所决定的;（4）相互监视和制裁系统会影响赌博：受法律制裁约束的职业者比不受法律制裁约束的职业者更不好赌;自估在赌场遇见认识人的机会与赌博次数呈负相关;（5）性别及母语等“本质趋向”差异表明,所谓澳门人不好赌有其渊源并可能是在长期的文化沉淀中形成的;（6）受教育程度是影响赌博的有效预测变量。这些发现的理论含义一并进行了讨论。     

Modulating what is and what could have been: The effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on the evaluation of attained and unattained decision outcomes

The affective evaluation of decision outcomes, whether attained (e.g., disappointment) or based on the conscious realization that a decision made differently would have led to a better or worse outcome (e.g., regret), greatly influence future decisions. Prior research has demonstrated a role of the medial and orbitofrontal cortex (M/OFC) in decision valuation and the experience of regret and relief. Here we examined whether inhibitory transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) could dampen the experience of decision-induced affect, with a focus on regret and relief. Thirty-eight participants completed a previously used gambling task and were asked to rate their happiness with attained outcomes of a chosen gamble before and after being shown unattained, counterfactual outcomes (i.e., what would have happened had they selected the other gamble). The difference in happiness rating before and after revealing these unattained counterfactual outcomes was taken as a measure of regret (negative shift) or relief (positive shift). During this task, 20 participants received 2 mA cathodal tDCS over EEG coordinate Fp1 for 20 minutes, and 18 participants received sham stimulation over the same location. Linear mixed-model results showed that, compared to sham, participants who received cathodal tDCS reported less intense emotions in response to attained as well as counterfactual outcomes. These findings were not due to the groups differing in the gambles they selected or attained monetary outcomes, demonstrating that tDCS can modulate decision-induced (counterfactual) affect. This may have implications for the ability to modulate value-based decision-making using brain stimulation techniques more broadly.     

Customer's perceived value of waiting time for service events

The authors address the effects of money gain and loss on individually perceived value as predicted by prospect theory in a time gain‐and‐loss context. Three experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 results support the prospect theory concept of value function. According to Experiment 2 results, the amount of money involved exerted different impacts on individual perceptions—specifically, study participants preferred gaining $1 on one occasion to gaining 50 cents over two occasions and preferred losing $1 one time to losing 50 cents twice. Further, the combined results indicate that the study participants held different perceptions of the value of “short time” versus “little money”—that is, they preferred saving an extra 2 minutes on one occasion to saving 1 minute on two occasions and preferred waiting an extra 1 minute two times to waiting an extra 2 minutes one time. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of money in the excitement of gambling

Many gamblers claim that gambling is intrinsically exciting, with money playing only a secondary role. To examine the effects of the expectancy of winning money, the authors randomly assigned 243 male college student gamblers to 1 of 6 experimental or 1 of 3 control conditions. Control participants either simply watched a videotaped horse race or they picked a horse, but without wagering; that horse later turned out to be either the winner of the race or the runner-up. Experimental participants wagered $1 on a horse for a chance of winning either USD 2, USD 7, or USD 15, with half winning and half losing their wagers. Wagering led to increased heart rates and subjective excitement as a function of the expected payoff and of winning as opposed to losing the wager. The study was replicated with 200 female college student gamblers with similar results. These findings support the notion that the excitement of gambling is tied to the expectancy of winning money.     

Weighing the past and the future in decision making

Prior irreversible investments of money, time, or effort referred to as sunk costs frequently lead to decisions to continue a chosen course of action despite that this is irrational. With the aim of demonstrating that such escalation of commitment is a special case of a more general phenomenon, two experiments were carried out employing undergraduates as participants. Experiment 1 showed for fictitious personal and business investment scenarios that both prior losses and gains (sunk outcomes) affected choices to continue or discontinue the investment. In Experiment 2 the effect of sunk outcomes was reduced although not eliminated by a monetary bonus that in one condition depended on the future outcomes of the second gamble in two-stage gambles, in another condition on the future returns in personal investment scenarios. In support of a more inclusive theory subsuming escalation of commitment, the decisions were affected by both past and future outcomes and both gains and losses.