婴儿动作意图推理研究及其争论

人类对行为意图的推理有很重要的生存意义,这种能力使我们能够更好地处理和其他个体的社会关系。意图的推理能力早在婴儿半岁时就已经出现,研究者通过习惯化、神经科学等方法对其进行了探讨,但这种能力究竟源于先天遗传,还是后天经验,始终未能得到统一答案。此外,婴儿的意图推理能力与幼儿期心理理论之间存在一定关系,对语言习得的先后天争论也有一定的启示作用。     

从动作模仿到社会认知：自我-他人控制的作用

在社会互动中, 人们具有自动模仿他人动作的倾向。尽管这种自动模仿有利于个体理解他人动作的感受, 但有时也会与自身的动作意图产生冲突。因此我们需要将自身动作意图与他人动作进行区分并调控二者之间的冲突。这种能力被称为自我-他人控制(self-other control, SOC)。与动作模仿控制相同, 心理理论、观点采择和共情等更高级的社会认知同样涉及对自我和他人信息的加工。很多证据表明, SOC可能是一种领域普遍的(domain-general)加工机制, 即在动作模仿控制和其他社会认知中, 大脑对自我和他人双方信息的区分和冲突调控共用同一套SOC系统。最近一些研究发现, 相比于抑制自身优势反应的抑制控制(inhibitory control), SOC是社会认知中一个更为关键的影响因素, 抑制控制对社会认知的作用受到SOC的调节。此外, SOC的领域普遍性提示我们, 未来可以通过简单的动作模仿控制训练, 来为社会认知受损个体(如孤独症和述情障碍者)进行康复训练。     

基础认知与社会认知中内隐过程及其脑机制*

认知过程及其脑机制是心理学研究的重要内容。社会认知是人们在社会生活中对他人行为的意图及情感的认识,是人际互动的重要方面,具有深刻的理论和实践意义。本文全面深入地对社会认知和基础认知中自动加工过程进行了研究综述,对基础认知与社会认知的研究方式进行了比较。自动加工过程是社会认知和基础认知中都存在的重要过程,从脑机制研究角度,相关的电生理学指标(如N400等)都可以作为研究的指标来考察社会认知中的自动加工过程。本文从社会认知与基础认知的比较入手,介绍了各种领域的研究方法,特别是事件相关电位技术等认知神经科学研究方法。     

阴谋论信念的产生机制——社会认知视角的三种解释

社会心理学将阴谋论视作一种意识形态上的信念,并定义为人们将重大的政治或社会事件归因为有权力的群体或个人暗中预谋以达成其目的的解释倾向。社会认知视角为个体这种阴谋论信念的产生提供了三种解释。错觉模式感知导致人们认知上倾向于在不相关的事件之间建立联系;敏感性动因觉察影响人们过度感知并假定事件背后的动因、目的和意图等;投射是将自己愿意参与阴谋的意图归因于事件中的他人。     

冲突情境中青少年的亲社会意图:预期重要他人观点的影响

青少年在特定情境下的亲社会意图受到重要他人的影响,而预期重要他人观点的影响更为明显。本研究借助假设的冲突情境,考查了327名青少年(男生146人,女生181人)对重要他人的观点的预期及其对亲社会意图的影响。结果发现,青少年的亲社会意图与其预期的重要他人观点的偏离程度随着情境的不同而发生变化,在"个人健康—他人健康"、"个人学业—他人学业"、"人际关系—诚实品质"三种冲突情境中,青少年的行为意图分别与预期的父母、教师、同伴的观点偏离度最小。预期重要他人观点对亲社会意图的影响受到青少年对相应观点认可度的调节,在高认可度水平上,预期重要他人观点正向预测亲社会意图;在低认可度水平上,上述预测作用并未显现。该结果表明不同重要他人对青少年的影响是相对独立的,且受到生活事件领域的制约。     

意图、约定与顺应——略论说者意义

不少语言哲学家希望通过分析说者意义的充分必要条件来获得对于意义、语言与交流的深层理解。其中,格赖斯和斯特劳森确立了意图乃至复杂意图在说者意义中的核心地位。路易斯则认为语言通过约定来获得意义,说者意义本质上表现为一种对他人的期望。托马森指出由于人们具有顺应的能力,因而可以在识别对方会话计划的基础上掌握说者意义。那么,从意图到约定,从约定到顺应,说者意义理论的发展经历了怎样的进程?该进程究竟应当被看作是前进式的还是回归式的?这是本文将要讨论的问题。     

婴儿心理理论的发展:表现和机制

婴儿心理理论发展研究是探索人类社会认知起源、发生和发展的重要领域.从联合注意、情绪理解、意图理解、愿望理解和错误信念理解等方面分析了几个月至3岁左右的婴儿心理理论发生和发展的研究现状.为了探讨3岁以下婴儿心理理论的发展过程,研究者发展了一些适合婴儿语言和行为发展特征的非言语和言语测试任务,包括非言语自发—反应错误信念任务、言语自发—反应错误信念任务,同时也采用眼动技术和事件相关电位技术来考察心理理论发展水平和发展机制.婴儿心理理论的发生和发展在不同测试任务上表现出一定的年龄特征.这与认知功能(如语言、执行功能)的发展、环境因素(如家庭、同伴、文化)以及神经系统发育有关.也有一些最新研究从心理理论发生和发展的基因、激素水平进行了探讨.最后提出了该领域未来研究可以进一步探讨的问题.     

人类社会认知的神经机制:来自社会脑研究的证据

社会认知是指从环境互动的过程中推测他人意图、情感和思想等内部状态的心理加工过程。社会脑假说认为,包括人类在内的灵长类大脑内肯定存在着一个旨在认识和理解他人表情的神经机制,在社会交往中通过该中枢迅速处理与他人相互作用的各种信息。本文通过回顾社会脑的构成与基本功能,镜像神经元的发现及功能,以及社会脑、镜像神经元对社会认知影响的相关研究,提出了人类社会认知不同于其他物种的三个主要区别。     

论权力与荣誉

权力和荣誉的涵义 权力,是一种特殊的能力或力量,这种力量的实质是价值控制,即通过控制他人认为有价值的事物以实现对他人的思想和行为的控制。一个人用某种方式控制那些对他人有价值的事物,就足以获得影响他人的权力。在领导工作中,领导者要对被领导者施加影响,必须有牵动被领导者利益的控制力,这种价值性的控制力就是权力。     

身体表达性及其格式塔——从现象学的观点看

主流的社会认知理论对他人身体持有一种观察性立场,并认为他人身体之于他人心灵乃是某种无意义的、因而是待解释的物理现象。本文认为这是一种过于简化的、并且是植根于对象化立场的解释;与之相对,我们需要对他人身体行为的被给予性模式作更精确的刻画。为此,本文重构了胡塞尔关于他人身体与心灵作为"表达之统一体"的格式塔理论,并进一步分析了梅洛-庞蒂有关身体表达的四个操作性概念,从而揭示出身体表达的生发性特征。     

What do infants understand of others’ action? A theoretical account of early social cognition

Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion, making it difficult to assess the meaning and value of such findings. In this paper we set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’. We will show that what is commonly referred to as ‘action understanding’ in fact encompasses various heterogeneous association and prediction mechanisms. In general, these forms of action understanding will not result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By detaching intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, we provide a theoretical framework on early social cognition that allows for better comparison of findings from different experimental paradigms, and better assessment of infant action understanding abilities. Taking into account the plurality of forms that action understanding can adopt will help cognitive neuroscience to gain a full understanding of the early roots of social cognition.     

Feedback and intention during motor-skill learning: a connection with prospective memory

The intention to complete an action in the future can improve the learning of this action, but it is unknown whether this effect persists when feedback is manipulated during encoding. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to learn a motor skill with or without intending to reproduce this learning in the future, and feedback on their movements was administrated by self-decision, that is, participants asked for feedback whenever they wanted it. The results showed that intention increased the frequency with which feedback was requested, but did not improve motor performance. In Experiment 2, participants had to learn the task with high or few feedbacks, which they could not control. In these conditions, intention was beneficial in promoting motor learning only for a low feedback schedule. We suggest that the beneficial effect of intention on learning can be overshadowed or emphasised by the feedback processing during encoding. These findings are discussed in light of theories surrounding prospective memory.     

The Intention–Behavior Gap

Bitter personal experience and meta‐analysis converge on the conclusion that people do not always do the things that they intend to do. This paper synthesizes research on intention–behavior relations to address questions such as: How big is the intention–behavior gap? When are intentions more or less likely to get translated into action? What kinds of problems prevent people from realizing their intentions? And what strategies show promise in closing the intention–behavior gap and helping people do the things that they intend to do?     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

We-intentions, free-riding, and being in reserve

A person can intend to achieve his own personal aims and ends, but he can also intend to promote the goals of his groups or collectives. In many cases of collective action these two types of intention will coincide, but they need not, and when they clash, collective action dilemmas, like free-riderism, will emerge. In this paper we discuss and analyze a central kind of group-intentions termed we-intentions, and distinguish between absolute and conditional we-intentions. The analyses of the latter are then applied to a study of two related social phenomena: the agent's standing in reserve and free-riding.It is our claim that when the agent is intentionally in reserve, this involves his having a specific conditional we-intention to participate in the group's action. On the other hand, if he intends to free-ride, he intends not to participate. We also discuss and analyze different types of free-rider intentions. A person can also have a more complex intention concerning the group's action: He can have a conditional personal intention to free-ride combined with a conditional reserve member's we-intention to participate in the group's action. This may indicate that his motives are confused or mixed, but in most cases it can be taken to express his uncertainty of the fulfillment of the relevant conditions of his actions.A similar uncertainty of other players' actions is also embedded in various game-theoretic settings, and we conclude the paper by representing some free-riding situations in terms of game-theoretic structures. We claim that not only Prisoner's Dilemma but also other games, in particular Chicken, are relevant for studies of free-riding.     

Social mimetic behaviour and social anticipation in dogs: preliminary results

Learning contributes to the development of mutual mimicry in group mates. The aim of our study was to investigate whether dogs would initiate walking a detour if they were repeatedly exposed to the detouring behaviour of their owner. Eight dog owners were asked to modify their usual way of approaching their home at the end of their daily walks, namely, to make a short detour before the entrance. Owners performed the detour at least 180 times, over a period of 3–6 months. During the first 30 detours (trials 1–30) all dogs followed the owner on the new route. Between trials 151 and 180, four dogs started to walk the detour before the owner displayed any intention to walk in that direction in 50–93% of the cases. Further observations that were carried out on one dog showed that the initialisation of the detours manifested sooner if a second familiar person started to walk the detours. Interestingly, the dog persisted in initialising detours long after the owners stopped detouring. We describe the observed phenomenon in the framework of social anticipation that manifests when an animal learns the proper sequence of an act performed by another animal, so that it can (1) predict the action in this sequence, and (2) as a result start either a similar or a complementary action as a response. These observations suggest that the dogs' social anticipation ability contributes to behavioural synchronisation and cooperative processes between dog and owner. Electronic Publication     

场景知觉过程中的动作意图识别

场景即我们生活于其中的真实环境, 社会场景是其重要组成部分。在社会场景知觉的研究中, 动作意图的识别既受场景背景信息的影响, 也与动作的客观对象有关。因此, 研究者可以根据背景-刺激物、刺激物-刺激物关系, 探索动作识别的影响机制; 另一方面, 也可以根据场景的语义约束和物理限制, 依据合理动作原则及其伴随的生理指标检测并识别动作意图。在机器视觉研究领域, 计算机识别模型为社会场景中动作意图的检测和识别提供了新的视角。在未来的研究中, 研究者需要考虑真实场景中动作意图识别能力的发展、动作意图识别的个体差异和文化差异等问题。