失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。     

不作为惯性产生的原因、条件及应用

不作为惯性指如果个体先前已错过了一个更优的机会, 当次一些的类似机会再出现时(但仍好于一般情况), 个体会倾向于继续放弃这一机会。本文首先简要介绍了不作为惯性的概念、操作定义和基本研究方法; 然后着重探讨了导致不作为惯性的原因及相关实证研究, 目前研究者普遍认为后悔情绪和估价是导致不作为惯性的两个主要原因; 随后探讨了不作为惯性产生的条件及在市场营销及股票市场中的应用研究; 最后未来研究需要更加注重研究方法上的改进以及对不作为惰性的原因探讨。     

行为决策中的后悔

后悔是行为决策领域中有关决策情感的最重要研究领域之一.后悔是一种基于认知的消极情感,当个体意识到或者想象出如果先前采取其他的行为,将产生更好的结果时,就会产生后悔情感.许多研究证据表明后悔将会影响人们的行为决策.本文简要回顾了后悔的定义和影响因素,结合研究者提出的不同后悔模型,从作为效应、后悔规避和不作为惯性等方面,具体介绍了后悔对决策行为的作用,并探讨了行为决策中后悔研究的未来发展方向.     

错失选项的积极结果对责任与后悔关系的影响

目前在后悔与责任关系的研究中,错失选项的积极结果通常是已知的。本研究旨在考察在该结果未知的情况下二者关系可能出现的变化,明确结果评价和认知失调在其中所起的作用。结果发现,错失选项的积极结果已知时,责任会放大后悔,此时个体对现有结果低评价、对错失结果高评价,认知失调水平更高;当该结果未知时,个体对现有结果高评价、对错失结果低评价,此时认知失调水平较低,责任对后悔起弱化作用。中介分析表明,认知失调可以在结果评价与后悔间起中介作用。     

不作为惰性的影响机制:有中介的调节模型

本研究旨在考察前后机会比较对不作为惰性的影响,探索社会比较的调节作用以及预期作为后悔和价值评估的中介作用。本研究采用问卷法和实验法,以842名大学生为研究对象进行调查,采用Bootstrap方法对中介效应进行分析。结果显示:(1)社会比较在前后机会比较与不作为惰性之间的调节效应显著;(2)预期作为后悔和价值评估在前后机会比较与不作为惰性之间起中介作用。(3)社会比较的调节效应以预期作为后悔和价值评估为中介变量。     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制：一个有中介的调节模型

当前,选择超载领域研究的焦点已从验证其是否存在,转向至其何时存在,即边界条件的探讨。本研究基于调节模式理论,分别以决策后悔和延迟选择作为选择超载的指标,开展两个实验探查选择超载存在的调节模式条件及所涉及的内在机制。实验1以决策后悔作指标,运用量表测试法操纵调节模式,初步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与决策后悔的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时体验到更强的后悔情绪,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的决策后悔无显著差异;实验2以延迟选择作指标,通过任务启动法操纵调节模式,进一步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与延迟选择的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时更倾向于延迟选择,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的延迟选择偏好无显著差异,进一步有中介的调节模型分析表明选择难度可以部分解释这种效应。总之,通过采用不同方法操纵调节模式,选取不同的选择超载指标,数据结果都一致支持：评估模式的个体比运动模式的个体更容易出现选择超载,选择难度在其中发挥着一定的中介作用。     

错失恐惧对亲社会行为的影响

网络信息的纷繁复杂,让人们担忧因错失信息而导致自身的利益受损,本研究探讨这种现象的加剧对个体的亲社会行为的影响。本研究分别使用问卷法（研究1）和实验法（研究2）,探究错失恐惧对亲社会行为的影响以及在其过程中人际安全感的中介作用和基本心理需要满足的调节作用。结果发现：（1）个体的错失恐惧程度负向预测了其亲社会行为;（2）人际安全感在错失恐惧对亲社会行为的影响中起中介作用,高的错失恐惧水平会降低个体的人际安全感,从而减少个体的亲社会行为;（3）基本心理需要满足在错失恐惧对亲社会行为的负向预测作用中起调节作用,当个体的基本心理需要满足程度低的时候,错失恐惧对亲社会行为的消极影响显著增强。     

调节模式与社会参照点对延迟选择的影响

为进一步探讨延迟选择的影响因素,基于自我调节模式理论,以132名大学生为研究对象,通过问卷法和行为实验法探讨了预期后悔在调节模式对延迟选择影响的中介作用及社会参照点的调节效应.结果 显示:(1)不同调节模式个体的延迟选择倾向不同,相比于运动模式,评估模式的个体延迟选择倾向更高;(2)预期后悔在调节模式和延迟选择之间发挥...     

认知闭合需要与预期后悔对个体职业决策过程的影响

本研究旨在探讨认知闭合需要(NFCC)与预期后悔(AR)对个体职业决策过程的影响。基于两种预期后悔启动方式,采用2(高NFCC,低NFCC)×2(不启动AR,启动AR)的两因素被试间设计完成了两个单独实验。结果表明:(1)不同NFCC个体的职业决策过程存在显著差异,NFCC高的个体付出的认知努力更少;(2)预期后悔显著影响个体的职业决策过程,启动预期后悔条件下个体表现出更为谨慎的决策过程;(3)预期后悔能有效缓冲高NFCC个体的认知闭合过程。     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

Multiple options in the past and the present: The impact on inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the effect that people do not act on an attractive opportunity only because they previously missed a more attractive opportunity. We investigated the effect of the presence of alternative options on the occurrence of this effect. We hypothesized and found that the likelihood to act on a current opportunity increases when evaluated in the context of another current option compared to when it is presented separately (Experiments 1 and 2). Likelihood of action decreases when the missed opportunity is presented next to another missed opportunity (Experiment 3). We conclude that when multiple options are currently present, the impact of the missed opportunity as a point of reference decreases, and that when multiple options are missed, the impact of these missed opportunities as a point of reference increases. These results are discussed in light of the literatures about inaction inertia and multiple options. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How consumers respond to the behavior of missing a free gift promotion: inaction inertia effect on products offered as free gifts

Inaction inertia describes the phenomenon that an individual is unlikely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive one. The results of two experiments indicate that after missing an initial opportunity to obtain a product as a free gift during a promotional period, the inaction inertia effect reduces the likelihood of consumers buying the product at a discounted price (second, inferior opportunity), particularly if the free gift has a high regular price. Additionally, according to the results of Experiment 2, those consumers are less likely to buy a product that has been offered previously as a free gift when a greater total quantity of the free gift is offered during a promotional period. Moreover, the mediation analysis results indicate that anticipated regret and valuation significantly impact the mediating role of inaction inertia.     

The effects of social comparison on inaction inertia

In this paper, we examine inaction inertia in a social context where the decision-maker is among others who are faced with similar current and past opportunities. We specifically investigate whether the likelihood of taking advantage of a current opportunity after having missed a previous, relatively superior opportunity depends on whether a referent other did or did not take advantage of the previous opportunity. We report results from three studies that provide evidence for the interplay between the past actions and inactions of a referent other and the extent of inaction inertia displayed by a focal decision-maker. We also show that the proximity of the other and the valence of the relationship between the decision-maker and the other influence the extent to which the decision of the other impacts the likelihood to take action. And, finally, we show that regret mediates the relationship between the decision of the other with respect to the past opportunity and the decision-maker's likelihood of taking advantage of the current opportunity.     

Dealing with missed opportunities: Action vs. state orientation moderates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia refers to the effect that missing a more attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood to act on an attractive current opportunity in the same domain. We studied the influence of how people cope with negative decision outcomes (i.e., action vs. state orientation) on this inaction inertia effect. Experiment 1 used an experimental induction of action vs. state orientation and confirmed our prediction that state oriented people showed more inaction inertia than action oriented people. Experiment 2 replicated these results with a measure of chronic action orientation and showed a mediating effect of valuation of the current opportunity. Experiment 3 showed that temporal segregation of the current from the missed opportunity decreased inaction inertia effects for state oriented, but not for action oriented people. We discuss the implications of these results for the inaction inertia and action vs. state orientation literatures.     

To accept or not to accept a job offer: Examining inaction inertia in an organizational context

The purpose of this research was to investigate inaction inertia in a job offer context. Across two studies, we examined the influence of two situational factors (Study 1) and one dispositional factor (Study 2) on inaction inertia in a job offer context. Participants were asked to imagine they had to pass up an initial offer in which they were interested, but that they received a similar but less attractive offer (lower salary) later. Study 1 findings revealed participants in the loss‐framed condition were more likely to accept the second offer than participants in the neutral condition only when they were asked to imagine they were switching careers, versus being laid off. Study 2 results showed that maximizing tendency significantly and negatively predicted the likelihood to accept the second job offer. Exploratory analyses revealed that anticipated regret did not mediate the relationships between any of the factors and inaction inertia, suggesting that anticipated regret was not the causal mechanism underlying the occurrence of inaction inertia in the current research. Overall, this research shed light on the ways inaction inertia may be experienced in a job offer context.     

Inaction inertia,regret, and valuation: A closer look

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. So far, all published work has assumed a causal role for the emotion regret in this effect. In a series of 5 experiments we found no support for this regret explanation. In these experiments factors that influenced regret did not influence inaction inertia, and factors that influenced inaction inertia did not influence regret. In addition, in two experiments we found evidence that missing the initial opportunity leads to a devaluation of the later offer. We propose that, in some cases, regret may be a by-product of this devaluation, rather than a cause of inaction inertia.     

The effects of action,normality, and decision carefulness on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating role of decision justifiability

Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this context than does norm theory.