Genetics and human agency: comment on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) decried genetic essentialism without denying the importance of genetics in the genesis of human behavior, and although I agree on both counts, a deeper issue remains unaddressed: how should we adjust our cognitions about our own behavior in light of genetic influence, or is it perhaps not necessary to take genetics into account at all? I suggest that the genetics of behavior does have important implications for how we understand ourselves, the differences among us, and the ethical implications of our actions, but that the usual metric for these considerations, the heritability coefficient, is not the correct one. I propose an alternative.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

Nature vs. nurture is nonsense: On the necessity of an integrated genetic,social, developmental,and personality psychology

The field of behavioural genetics unambiguously demonstrates that heritable individual differences exist and are important in explaining human behaviour. Despite this, some psychological perspectives ignore this research. If we wish to comprehensively understand the impact of parenting, the environment, or any social factor, however, we must engage with genetics. In this article, I review research that reveals that genes affect not only our personalities, but the way that we understand and react to the social world. Studies further reveal that notable life events are in part explained by genetic variance. I detail how this could be the case through active, evocative, and passive genetic correlations, and go on to argue that all complex psychological traits are likely the result of multifaceted gene by environment interactions. A mistaken belief that genetic influence implies genetic essentialism, and is therefore tantamount to prejudice, is raised as possible reason why heritability is often ignored in the social sciences. The article concludes with practical suggestions for how we can embrace behavioural genetics as our methods struggle to match the divine complexity of human existence.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

What Malapropisms Mean: A Reply To Donald Davidson

In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speaker means and what his words mean, even while retaining the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional.     

Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations.     

What Sermons Can Tell Us

In this I essay I analyse four sermons delivered at Shan festivals that celebrates the end of the Rains Retreat (Waa). I first argue that sermons in general are important sources of information about lived Buddhism. I next provide background information necessary to understand the sermon events and the sermons. In conclusion, I compare the sermons and discuss what laypeople can learn from sermons and what we, as academics, can learn from them.     

Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.

     

Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

Problems with Norms of Assertion

In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.     

A defense of middle knowledge

Conclusion Adams has not demonstrated that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false, just as I have not demonstrated that they are possibly true. According to Adams, we have good reason to think that they are not possibly true because we do not know what it is for them to be true. This is basically the claim that we cannot explain conditionals of freedom without reference to what would happen in certain situations. I argued that similar considerations apply to propositions about future free choices. We cannot explain propositions about future free choices without reference to what will happen. Neither conditionals of freedom nor propositions about future free choices are true in virtue of corresponding to actual states of affairs or any states of affairs that are necessitated by certain other states of affairs. In both instances we must appeal to states of affairs that are not determined to be actual by either the present states of affairs or the antecedent of the counterfactual. I do not consider this difficulty with propositions about future free choices to be a sufficient reason to reject the possibility of them being true. They are true because they correspond to what will happen. But then I also do not believe that Adams' reasons are sufficient to reject the possibility of true conditionals of freedom. They are true because they correspond with what would happen in certain counterfactual situations. Hence it is no more difficult to understand what it is for conditionals of freedom to be true than it is to understand what it is for propositions about future free choices to be true. I conclude that, contrary to Adams, it is possible for God to have middle knowledge.     

Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle

According to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of the evidence, and therefore it doesn't always entitle one to ignore it. I also explain in what kind of cases and to what degree such knowledge allows one to ignore evidence. Hopefully, through the discussion, we can not only understand better where the dogmatism puzzle goes wrong, but also understand better in what sense rational believers should rely on their evidence and when they can ignore it.     

Personalized Genomic Results: Analysis of Informational Needs

Use of genomic information in healthcare is increasing; however data on the needs of consumers of genomic information is limited. The Coriell Personalized Medicine Collaborative (CPMC) is a longitudinal study investigating the utility of personalized medicine. Participants receive results reflecting risk of common complex conditions and drug—gene pairs deemed actionable by an external review board. To explore the needs of individuals receiving genomic information we reviewed all genetic counseling sessions with CPMC participants. A retrospective qualitative review of notes from 157 genetic counseling inquiries was conducted. Notes were coded for salient themes. Five primary themes; “understanding risk”, “basic genetics”, “complex disease genetics”, “what do I do now?” and “other” were identified. Further review revealed that participants had difficulty with basic genetic concepts, confused relative and absolute risks, and attributed too high a risk burden to individual single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Despite these hurdles, counseled participants recognized that behavior changes could potentially mitigate risk and there were few comments alluding to an overly deterministic or fatalistic interpretation of results. Participants appeared to recognize the multifactorial nature of the diseases for which results were provided; however education to understand the complexities of genomic risk information was often needed.     

Distributive justice and rural healthcare: a case for e-health

People living in rural areas make up 20 percent of the U.S. population, but only 9 percent of physicians practice there. This uneven distribution is significant because rural areas have higher percentages of people in poverty, elderly people, people lacking health insurance coverage, and people with chronic diseases. As a way of ameliorating these disparities, e-health initiatives are being implemented. But the rural e-health movement raises its own set of distributive justice concerns about the digital divide. Moreover, even if the digital divide is overcome, e-health services may be of an inferior quality compared to face-to-face medical encounters. In this paper, I argue that before we can fully understand the distributive justice implications of e-health, we must first understand what distributive justice means. I argue that five elements--fairness, quality, accessibility, availability, and efficiency--constitute a general conception of justice and that all of these elements must be considered when evaluating e-health for rural health profession shortage areas. In doing so, it may be necessary to make important tradeoffs among these elements. I then examine the development of e-health programs in light of Rawls's principle of equal opportunity and Daniel's notion of species-typical functioning. I conclude that in the context of e-health, Rawls's principle should be expanded to include geography as a prima facie morally relevant criterion for allocating healthcare benefits. I also conclude that Daniel's notion of species-typical functioning provides grounds for thinking of health and some healthcare services as special goods.     

Communitarianism 'Social Constitution,' and Autonomy

Communitarians defend what we may call the 'social constitution thesis,' that participation in society makes us what we are. This claim, however, is ambiguous. In an attempt to shed some light on it and to better understand the impact its truth would have on our beliefs regarding autonomy, I offer four possible ways it could be understood and four corresponding senses of individual independence and autonomy. I also indicate what senses liberals can accept that we are socially constituted and in what sense I take communitarians to argue we are socially constituted.     

Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives.

     

Asymmetries between victims' and transgressors' perspectives following interpersonal transgressions

When interpersonal transgressions occur, the involved parties try to understand what occurred and how justice should be restored. However, research has documented that victims and transgressors often diverge in their accounts of what transpired. In this paper, I review and summarize empirical research on victims' and transgressors' asymmetric perceptions of interpersonal transgressions and the different justice‐restoring responses each party subsequently desires. By conceptualizing transgressions in terms of the social roles of victim and transgressor, I contend that justice responses can be thought of as attempts to correct inequitable distributions of material and symbolic resources. This social exchange perspective enables us to understand each party's motives and how various justice responses might satisfy them. I argue that because of these asymmetric perspectives, reconciliation is difficult, and conflict is liable to be perpetuated rather than resolved.     

Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry Argument

Abstract: Most commentators have assumed that Lucretius's symmetry argument against the fear of death is flawed. There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis.