得失程数的变化: 损失规避现象的新视点

损失规避是预期理论的核心部分之一, 指等量的损失和获得产生的心理效用并不相同, 前者大于后者。大量研究从生理、认知、情感等角度探讨损失规避的内在机制和规律, 以期认识、预测并控制损失规避导致的偏差。本研究假设损失规避与获得或损失的“程数”(route)有关, 以往研究发现了损失规避现象, 是由于其采用的“双程损失-单程获得”典型情境中, 损失程数多于获得程数。为检验该假设, 本研究设计了不同于传统范式的“获得和损失程数相等”的镜像情境、“单程损失－双程获得”及“三程获得”三种不同的得失情境。研究结果支持本假设: 当损失的程数等于或少于获得的程数时, 损失规避现象消失; 获得或损失的程数越多, 个体对其的心理感受强度趋于越高。建议未来研究进一步检验心理感受强度在程数和损失规避行为之间的中介作用。     

Risk seeking for losses modulates the functional connectivity of the default mode and left frontoparietal networks in young males

Value-based decision making (VBDM) is a principle that states that humans and other species adapt their behavior according to the dynamic subjective values of the chosen or unchosen options. The neural bases of this process have been extensively investigated using task-based fMRI and lesion studies. However, the growing field of resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) may shed light on the organization and function of brain connections across different decision-making domains. With this aim, we used independent component analysis to study the brain network dynamics in a large cohort of young males (N = 145) and the relationship of these dynamics with VBDM. Participants completed a battery of behavioral tests that evaluated delay aversion, risk seeking for losses, risk aversion for gains, and loss aversion, followed by an RSFC scan session. We identified a set of large-scale brain networks and conducted our analysis only on the default mode network (DMN) and networks comprising cognitive control, appetitive-driven, and reward-processing regions. Higher risk seeking for losses was associated with increased connectivity between medial temporal regions, frontal regions, and the DMN. Higher risk seeking for losses was also associated with increased coupling between the left frontoparietal network and occipital cortices. These associations illustrate the participation of brain regions involved in prospective thinking, affective decision making, and visual processing in participants who are greater risk-seekers, and they demonstrate the sensitivity of RSFC to detect brain connectivity differences associated with distinct VBDM parameters.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.     

Loss-aversion or loss-attention: The impact of losses on cognitive performance

Losses were found to improve cognitive performance, and this has been commonly explained by increased weighting of losses compared to gains (i.e., loss aversion). We examine whether effects of losses on performance could be modulated by two alternative processes: an attentional effect leading to increased sensitivity to task incentives; and a contrast-related effect. Empirical data from five studies show that losses improve performance even when the enhanced performance runs counter to the predictions of loss aversion. In Study 1–3 we show that in various settings, when an advantageous option produces large gains and small losses, participants select this alternative at a higher rate than when it does not produce losses. Consistent with the joint influence of attention and contrast-related processes, this effect is smaller when a disadvantageous alternative produces the losses. In Studies 4 and 5 we find a positive effect on performance even with no contrast effects (when a similar loss is added to all alternatives). These findings indicate that both attention and contrast-based processes are implicated in the effect of losses on performance, and that a positive effect of losses on performance is not tantamount to loss aversion.     

Power and loss aversion

Four experiments tested the prediction that power reduces loss aversion by increasing the anticipated value of gains and shrinking the negative anticipated value of losses. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the prediction that those in power are less loss averse by replicating a classic paradigm of loss aversion in riskless choice and demonstrating moderation by power. Experiments 2 and 3 expanded on this finding by breaking apart the components of loss aversion to determine how power may reduce it: via gains, losses, or both. Across two scenarios and two different measures of anticipated value, power reduced the anticipated threat associated with a loss. However, the prediction that power increases the anticipated value of gains was not supported. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiments 2 and 3 in the context of a choice with real consequences for the participants. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

基于预期理论的风险决策的神经机制

预期理论基于对期望效用理论的批判与发展,提出了价值函数与权重函数,对以往风险决策研究中所发现的现象进行了很好的预测与解释。预期理论的核心概念包括参照依赖、损失规避与权重函数。基于预期理论的一些决策偏差包括框架效应、禀赋效应和默认偏差也部分揭示了与人们风险决策有关的脑区。近年来,通过采用功能性核磁共振等脑成像手段对预期理论的一些核心成分进行的研究表明,涉及到人们风险决策的脑区主要有前额叶、纹状体、脑岛与杏仁核。未来的研究可以从预期理论的产生根源、个体发展以及遗传基因等角度进行进一步的探讨。     

行为经济学中的损失规避

损失规避是指,人们总是强烈倾向于规避损失：一定数额的损失所引起的心理感受,其强烈程度约相当于两倍数额的获益感受。这种强烈的心理与行为倾向广泛存在于风险与非风险领域,在该两个领域中损失规避的研究范式也不同。损失规避常见于经济和消费等领域,可用于解释行为决策中有悖于规范化理论的诸多现象,如禀赋效应、现状偏差、股权溢价之迷和赢者的诅咒等。然而,损失规避的机制研究还存在许多尚未解决的问题,如损失规避的本质以及适用条件。今后的研究不仅要注重认知角度和情感依恋,还要结合认知过程来研究损失规避的性质和内在机制,以期帮助人们认识、预测及干预由损失规避造成的经济损失和非理性决策。     

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility—people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning—the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within‐group and between‐group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice by value encoding and value construction: processes of loss aversion

Loss aversion and reference dependence are 2 keystones of behavioral theories of choice, but little is known about their underlying cognitive processes. We suggest an additional account for loss aversion that supplements the current account of the value encoding of attributes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, introducing a value construction account. Value construction suggests that loss aversion results from biased evaluations during information search and comparison processes. We develop hypotheses that identify the influence of both accounts and examine process-tracing data for evidence. Our data suggest that loss aversion is the result of the initial direct encoding of losses that leads to the subsequent process of directional comparisons distorting attribute valuations and the final choice.     

Predicting the intensity of losses vs. non-gains and non-losses vs. gains in judging fairness and value: A test of the loss aversion explanation

Three studies examined the predictions that in the context of evaluation of fairness and concessions in negotiations, losses would be perceived as more intensely negative than non-gains, and that non-losses would be perceived as more positive than gains. Extant studies tested only the first of these predictions. These predictions derive from the principle of loss aversion (LA), according to which losses are experienced more intensely than gains of similar objective magnitude. In this view, losses and non-losses are measured against the steep loss part of the value curve, whereas gains and non-gains are measured against the shallow part of the value curve. Our studies replicated extant studies in confirming the first prediction but failed to confirm the second prediction. Specifically, opposite to the prediction of LA, gains were perceived as more intensely positive than non-losses. It seems, therefore, that LA is not a sufficient explanation of why losses are perceived as more averse than gains. Feature positive and regulatory focus effects are discussed as additional potential contributors to the phenomenon.     

Dissociable effects of basolateral amygdala lesions on decision making biases in rats when loss or gain is emphasized

Individuals switch from risk seeking to risk aversion when mathematically identical options are described in terms of loss versus gains, as exemplified in the reflection and framing effects. Determining the neurobiology underlying such cognitive biases could inform our understanding of decision making in health and disease. Although reports vary, data using human subjects have implicated the amygdala in such biases. Animal models enable more detailed investigation of neurobiological mechanisms. We therefore tested whether basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesions would affect risk preference for gains or losses in rats. Choices in both paradigms were always between options of equal expected value—a guaranteed outcome, or the 50:50 chance of double or nothing. In the loss-chasing task, most rats exhibited strong risk seeking preferences, gambling at the risk of incurring double the penalty, regardless of the size of the guaranteed loss. In the betting task, the majority of animals were equivocal in their choice, irrespective of bet size; however, a wager-sensitive subgroup progressively shifted away from the uncertain option as the bet size increased, which is reminiscent of risk aversion. BLA lesions increased preference for the smaller guaranteed loss in the loss-chasing task, without affecting choice on the betting task, which is indicative of reduced risk seeking for losses, but intact risk aversion for gains. These data support the hypothesis that the amygdala plays a more prominent role in choice biases related to losses. Given the importance of the amygdala in representing negative affect, the aversive emotional reaction to loss, rather than aberrant estimations of probability or loss magnitude, may underlie risk seeking for losses.     

Economic decision biases and fundamental motivations: how mating and self-protection alter loss aversion

Much research shows that people are loss averse, meaning that they weigh losses more heavily than gains. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that although loss aversion might have been adaptive for solving challenges in the domain of self-protection, this may not be true for men in the domain of mating. Three experiments examine how loss aversion is influenced by mating and self-protection motives. Findings reveal that mating motives selectively erased loss aversion in men. In contrast, self-protective motives led both men and women to become more loss averse. Overall, loss aversion appears to be sensitive to evolutionarily important motives, suggesting that it may be a domain-specific bias operating according to an adaptive logic of recurring threats and opportunities in different evolutionary domains.     

Positive and Negative Affect in Loss Aversion: Additive or Subtractive Logic?

Previous studies explain loss aversion as the result of a situation in which the expected negative emotions derived from a potential loss exceed the expected positive emotions derived from a potential gain (subtractive logic). We questioned this view and proposed additive logic, in which a linear combination between negative and positive emotions can be used as summed anticipatory affect intensity (SAAI) to explain loss aversion. By disproving two implicit hypotheses of subtractive logic, Study 1 showed that the additive logic of expected positive and negative affect was more effective than the subtractive logic in predicting loss aversion. Study 2 used real monetary gains and losses to verify the conclusion in Study 1. Using state‐trait theory to comprehensively consider the state and trait aspects of affect intensity, we further deduced that the immediate expected affect intensity might originate from the difference of an individual trait in affect intensity. Study 3 proved this hypothesis and showed that SAAI plays an intermediary role between affect intensity and loss aversion. Furthermore, Study 4 used real gamblers in casinos in Macau as its sample and obtained the same conclusion regarding loss aversion in real life as was found in the laboratory. Finally, we explained the effect of SAAI on loss aversion and indicated the contribution and significance of this study. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators,But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated

Loss aversion, the principle that losses impact decision making more than equivalent gains, is a fundamental idea in consumer behavior and decision making, though its existence has recently been called into question. Across five unique samples (N_total = 17,720), we tested several moderators of loss aversion, which supported a preference construction account. Across studies, more domain knowledge and experience were associated with lower loss aversion, though people of all knowledge and experience levels were loss averse. Among car buyers, those who knew more about a particular car attribute (e.g., fuel economy) were less loss averse for that attribute but not other attributes (e.g., comfort), consistent with the idea that people with less attribute knowledge are more likely to construct preferences, thereby increasing loss aversion. Additionally, older consumers were more loss averse across different loss aversion measures and studies. We discuss implications for several accounts of loss aversion, including accounts rooted in status quo bias, emotion, or ownership. In addition to discovering loss aversion moderators, we cast doubt on recent claims that loss aversion is a fallacy or is fully explained by status quo bias, risk aversion, or the educated laboratory samples often used to study loss aversion.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

社会价值取向对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制

以往关于为自己和代他人决策的冒险行为研究结果不一致, 这可能是因为以往的研究没有考虑决策情境和决策者人际特质等因素对于决策行为的影响。社会价值取向(social value orientation, SVO)是一种典型的人际特质, 是个体在对自我和他人资源分配时所表现出的社会偏好, 通常分为亲社会者和亲自我者。为探究SVO对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制, 采用为自己和陌生人分别完成多轮混合赌博游戏的任务。结果发现亲自我比亲社会者代他人决策更冒险。用模型量化的损失厌恶和对潜在损失的敏感度部分中介了自我-他人风险决策差异, 但只有对他人潜在损失的敏感度部分中介自我-他人决策的SVO效应。说明SVO会影响自我-他人风险决策, 且该效应可以通过对他人利益的关心程度起作用, 所以在自我-他人风险决策的研究中应将SVO这一决策者的人际特质因素考虑在内。     

Hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for cumulative prospect theory

Cumulative prospect theory (CPT Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) has provided one of the most influential accounts of how people make decisions under risk. CPT is a formal model with parameters that quantify psychological processes such as loss aversion, subjective values of gains and losses, and subjective probabilities. In practical applications of CPT, the model’s parameters are usually estimated using a single-participant maximum likelihood approach. The present study shows the advantages of an alternative, hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation procedure. Performance of the procedure is illustrated with a parameter recovery study and application to a real data set. The work reveals that without particular constraints on the parameter space, CPT can produce loss aversion without the parameter that has traditionally been associated with loss aversion. In general, the results illustrate that inferences about people’s decision processes can crucially depend on the method used to estimate model parameters.     

Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: A method for improving legislative outcomes

Policies that would create net benefits for society that contain salient costs frequently lack enough support for enactment because losses loom larger than gains. To address this consequence of loss aversion, we propose a policy-bundling technique in which related bills involving both losses and gains are combined to offset separate bills’ costs while preserving their net benefits. We argue this method can transform unpopular individual pieces of legislation, which would lack the support for implementation, into more popular policies. Study 1 confirms that bundling increases support for bills with costs and benefits and that bundled legislation is valued more than the sum of its parts. Study 2 shows this finding stems from a diminished focus on losses and heightened focus on gains. Study 3 extends our findings to policies involving costs and benefits of the same type (e.g., lives) generated by different sources (e.g., food vs. fire safety).     

Loss Aversion,Intellectual Inertia,and a Call for a More Contrarian Science: A Reply to Simonson & Kivetz and Higgins & Liberman

Higgins and Liberman (2018) and Simonson and Kivetz (2018) offer scholarly and stimulating perspectives on loss aversion and the implications for the sociology of science of its acceptance as a virtual law of nature. In our view, Higgins and Liberman (2018) largely complement our conclusion that the empirical evidence does not support loss aversion. Moreover, in alignment with our call for a contextualized perspective, they provide an excellent discourse on how a more nuanced view of reference points and consumers’ regulatory focus enriches our understanding of the psychological impact of losses and gains. Simonson and Kivetz (2018) approached our perspective with skepticism, and, while they retain some skepticism, they express agreement on the larger point that loss aversion has been accepted too uncritically. Both commentaries point to a need for a critical reevaluation of prevailing paradigms. Here, we build on these perspectives, as well as our experience working on the topic of loss aversion, to call for structural changes to facilitate scholarly debate on science's status quo.     

Loss aversion in the eye and in the heart: The autonomic nervous system's responses to losses

The common view in psychology and neuroscience is that losses loom larger than gains, leading to a negativity bias in behavioral responses and Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) activation. However, evidence has accumulated that in decisions under risk and uncertainty individuals often impart similar weights to negative and positive outcomes. We examine the role of the ANS in decisions under uncertainty, and its consistency with the behavioral responses. In three studies, we show that losses lead to heightened autonomic responses, compared to equivalent gains (as indicated by pupil dilation and increased heart rate) even in situations where the average decision maker exhibits no loss aversion. Moreover, in the studied tasks autonomic responses were not associated with risk taking propensities. These results are interpreted by the hypothesis that losses signal the subjective importance of global outcome patterns. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.