The origin and virulence of the 1918 "Spanish" influenza virus

The "Spanish" influenza pandemic of 1918-19 caused acute illness in 25-30 percent of the world's population and resulted in the death of up to an estimated 40 million people. Using fixed and frozen lung tissue of 1918 influenza victims, the complete genomic sequence of the 1918 influenza virus has been deduced. Sequence and phylogenetic analysis of the completed 1918 influenza virus genes shows them to be the most avian-like among the mammalian-adapted viruses. This finding supports the hypotheses that (1) the pandemic virus contains genes derived from avian-like influenza virus strains and that (2) the 1918 virus is the common ancestor of human and classical swine H1N1 influenza viruses. The relationship of the 1918 virus with avian influenza viruses is further supported by recent work in which the 1918 hemagglutinin (HA) protein crystal structure was resolved. Neither the 1918 hemagglutinin (HA) nor the neuraminidase (NA) genes possess mutations known to increase tissue tropicity that account for the virulence of other influenza virus strains like A/WSN/33 or the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 or H7 viruses. Using reverse genetics approaches, influenza virus constructs containing the 1918 HA and NA on a modern human influenza virus background were lethal in mice. The complete 1918 virus was even more virulent in mice. The genotypic basis of this virulence has not yet been elucidated. The complete sequence of the non-structural (NS) gene segment of the 1918 virus was deduced and also tested for the hypothesis that enhanced virulence in 1918 could have been due to type I interferon inhibition by the NS1 protein. Results from these experiments suggest that in human cells the 1918 NS1 is a very effective interferon antagonist, but the 1918 NS1 gene does not have the amino acid change that correlates with virulence in the H5N1 virus strains identified in 1997 in Hong Kong. Sequence analysis of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus is allowing us to test hypotheses as to the origin and virulence of this strain. This information should help elucidate how pandemic influenza virus strains emerge and what genetic features contribute to virulence in humans.     

Mutual Vulnerability: Intimacy,Psychic Collisions,and the Shards of Trauma

In this paper, I explore the profound potential, and the challenges, of mutual vulnerability in psychoanalysis. I describe ways in which analysts are penetrated by shards of our patients’ trauma, and how this interpenetrates with our own vulnerabilities and ungrieved losses (Harris, 2009; Levine, 2016). In my patient Lisa’s fierce determination to come into being, and in our mutual efforts to survive each other’s ruthlessness (Winnicott, 1969) we each struggle to recognize and own malignant “not-me” versions of ourselves (Bromberg, 1998), as we reach toward reparation, mutual recognition, and healing.     

Why Should I Respect You? A Critique and a Suggestion for the Justification of Mutual Respect in Contractualism

Contractualism is a normative theory which characterizes principles of right in terms of the idea of mutual respect. In this theory, mutual respect is regarded as having deliberative priority over other values. This essay aims to examine how contractualists can provide a satisfactory justification for prioritizing mutual respect. I will argue that the “value of mutual respect argument,” which is a justification commonly adopted by contractualists, is inadequate because an unconditional priority of mutual respect cannot be grounded on the desirability of a relationship of mutual respect. Then, I will suggest that a “consistency argument” can provide a better justification of why the idea of mutual respect should have priority. Mutual respect is of special importance, not because it is highly desirable, but rather because it is required by an a priori guiding principle of consistency. Individuals become inconsistent if they ask others to respect them as reason-assessing individuals, while at the same time refusing to respect others in the same way.     

The play's the thing how the essential processes of therapy are seen most clearly in child therapy

Analytic child therapy techniques developed as modifications of techniques from adult psychoanalysis. Child therapy continues to be regarded as an adaptation of adult analysis and to give a central place to the methods and conditions of adult analysis, such as interpretation, in its understanding of how therapy heals. I propose that child therapy is not a modified form of therapy and that the essential processes of therapy are fully present in child therapy. In fact, they often may be seen more clearly there than in adult therapy. I suggest two interrelated processes as the essential ones in all analytic therapy. The first is play. I examine several interrelated aspects of play, specifically as they occur in child therapy. These include the emergence and integration of dissociated self‐states, symbolization, and recognition. The second process I propose as essential in analytic therapy is the renegotiation of self—other relationships through action. This renegotiation is what can help patients become able to play in therapy when they have difficulty doing so. Since I suggest that action is at the heart of analytic therapy, I go on to consider the role of talking in an action therapy. Finally, I explore the dimensions of mutuality in the relationship between child and therapist, including mutual influence and regulation, mutual recognition, and mutual regression. The intersubjective nature of psychotherapy, which is increasingly appreciated in adult analytic therapy but not in child therapy, provides a fertile context for the evolution of play and for the productive renegotiation of self—other relationships.     

The Compatibility of Hegelian Recognition and Morality with the Ethics of Care

I draw connections between Hegel’s concepts of recognition and morality and demonstrate how they are compatible with an ethic of care. I explore Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and demonstrate the role that intersubjective recognition plays in the development and sustainment of ethical communities. I demonstrate how his emphasis on the community and interpersonal relationships play an important role in his moral theory. I then contrast Hegelian and Kantian views of morality and argue that Hegel’s account places greater emphasis on attending to the needs of others and showing genuine concern for their well-being. By highlighting the intersubjective nature of recognition between self-consciousnesses, and the interconnectedness of agents in an ethical community, I maintain Hegel’s morality is compatible with an ethic of care because it emerges out of intersubjective mutual recognition and its foundation is built upon responding to the needs of particular others and protecting the bonds of the community.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?

Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre‐theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.     

Russia and the West: The Root of the Problem of Mutual Understanding

I examine issues tied to the allegeddifficulties of mutual understanding betweenRussia and the West. I show that some of thebackground to these issues lies in thedifference of culturally grounded differencesin perceptual and conceptual schemata. In theWest, a broadly understood Aristotelianism andin Russia Neoplatonism designate dominantattitudes to the world. The Russian `lunar'consciousness, in comparison with the `solar'consciousness of the West, tends by and largeprecipitously to totalize the world, and theexperienced multiplicity of the real isreferred to its imagined center. The differencebetween Russia and the West, limited to somedegree by mutual similarities, can become thebasis of an axiological and intellectualdialogue important for one side and theother.     

Ways of desiring mutual sympathy in Adam Smith's moral philosophy

In this paper, I address the question of what we are really after when we seek Smithian mutual sympathy; I also show how the answer I propose can be used to illuminate a crucial feature of Smith's moral philosophy. The first section develops a Smithian response to egoistic interpretations of the desire for mutual sympathy. The second section identifies a number of different self- and other-relevant ways in which one could desire mutual sympathy. Some of these different ways of desiring mutual sympathy comprise a spectrum of degrees of self-centredness; others comprise a spectrum of degrees of other-centredness. The third section shows that the spectra of ways of desiring mutual sympathy can be used to explain the kind of sincere, motivating attachment to morality characteristic of fully developed Smithian moral agents.     

Turning the Things That Divide Us into Strengths That Unite Us

This paper focuses on the interaction of my anti-racist work with my presonal experience of sexism, ageism, and anti-Semitism, and how it informs and is informed by the theory and practice of feminist therapy. Using myself as an example, I draw attention to some aspects of the process of building bridges across the chasms that divide us, looking at the internal and external forces that would keep us divided and at the goals that motivate us toward mutual and collective empowerment.     

The Relevance of Tillich for the Theology and Science Dialogue

This paper explores the relevance of the theology of Paul Tillich for the contemporary dialogue with the natural sciences. The focus is on his Systematic Theology , volume I. First I discuss the general relevance of Tillich's methodology (namely, the method of correlation) for that dialogue, stressing that a genuine dialogue requires cognitive input from both sides and that both sides find "value added" according to their own criteria (or what I call the method of "mutual creative interaction"). Then I move specifically to a Tillichian theological analysis of twentieth-century theoretical science and its empirical discoveries, including Big Bang, inflationary, and quantum cosmologies, quantum physics, thermodynamics, chaos and complexity, and molecular and evolutionary biology, suggesting how they relate to such Tillichian themes as finitude and the categories of being and knowing (time, space, causality, and substance) and to Tillich's understanding of such symbols as God, freedom and destiny, creation, and estrangement. In doing so, my intention is to provide a point of departure for further extended analyses of Tillich's theology in relation to contemporary natural science.     

Why are we fighting? A view of the “great war” from across the ocean

This article examines the dispute concerning the meaning of World War I among leading American intellectuals in the period 1915–1918. Taking center stage here are the views of one of the founding fathers of American pragmatism, John Dewey (1859–1952), on the causes of the “Great War,” its higher meaning and goals which led to America’s entry into the War and also its influence on the social reconstruction of American society and the post-War world order. The final section of the article is devoted to a critique of Dewey’s position towards American participation in the War by another famous American intellectual, Randolph Bourne (1886–1918), who laid the foundations for a tradition of social criticism in the U.S. in the twentieth century.     

A Mutual Survival of Destructiveness and Its Creative Potential for Agency and Desire

In this paper, I explore ways in which a mutual survival of destructiveness became a source of agency, passion, and creative change for both analyst and patient. I describe how my patient, Jack pushed me to the brink, to the edge of my capacity as an analyst, and how each of us needed to free ourselves from old identifications and constraints in order to have the courage to swim together in dangerous, deadly waters. This deep mutual vulnerability helped us envision a sense of psychic future (Cooper, 2010; Loewald, 1960), allowing for catastrophic change (Bion, 1970/1984) and creative transformation.     

Rational Choice Virtues

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness.     

Forebrain circuits and control of feeding by learned cues

Professor Richard F. Thompson and his highly influential work on the brain substrates of associative learning and memory have critically shaped my research interests and scientific approach. I am tremendously grateful and thank Professor Thompson for the support and influence on my research and career. The focus of my research program is on associative learning and its role in the control of fundamental, motivated behaviors. My long-term research goal is to understand how learning enables environmental cues to control feeding behavior. We use a combination of behavioral studies and neural systems analysis approach in two well-defined rodent models to study how learned cues are integrated with homeostatic signals within functional forebrain networks, and how these networks are modulated by experience. Here, I will provide an overview of the two behavioral models and the critical neural network components mapped thus far, which include areas in the forebrain, the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, critical for associative learning and decision-making, and the lateral hypothalamus, which is an integrator for feeding, reward and motivation.     

A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge

Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge‐how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so‐called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.     

Integrating African heritage studies as a new terrain of African philosophy

One of the innovative features of post-apartheid scholarship in Africa is the emergence of African heritage studies, an inter-disciplinary field concerned with the study of the collection, conservation and interpretation of historical, archaeological and anthropological artefacts of African cultural heritage. However, despite the preoccupation with questions about the value of African heritage in African philosophy, the imperative and benefits of integrating African heritage studies and contemporary African philosophy have largely been ignored by both fields. In this article, I argue for the integration of African heritage studies and African philosophy by showing their inherent symbiosis and the potential mutual benefits of their integration. By highlighting the mistaken assumption that critics of ethnophilosophy reject the centrality of the study of African heritage in African philosophy, I show how criticisms of ethnophilosophy, in fact, provide not only the rationale for African heritage studies, but also the most promising theoretical direction for how African philosophy could draw on African heritage studies, for its object of analysis and how African heritage studies can, in turn, benefit conceptually and methodologically from integrating itself with African philosophy.     

WRITING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIED THOUGHT

Abstract: In Historied Thought, Constructed World , Joseph Margolis identifies the philosophical themes that will dominate philosophical discussions in the twenty-first century, given the recognition of the historicity of philosophical thought in the twentieth century. In what follows I examine these themes, especially cognitive intransparency, and the arguments presented in favor of them, noting the extent to which they rest on a view of language that takes a written text, and not speech, as the paradigm of language. I suggest if one takes speech as a mutual embodied action in a shared space as a model for language, the theme of cognitive intransparency—and the problems it brings in its wake—does not loom so large for those of us working in the history of philosophy. I conclude by showing that if we adopt this suggestion in relation to early Greek philosophy, that is, the period in the history of historied thought in which philosophy itself emerges as a linguistic and intellectual activity, we can better understand how and why philosophy emerged as it did—in the form of dialogues by Plato.     

The Role of Evil in Kant's Liberalism

Carl Schmitt distinguishes between political theories in terms of whether they rest on the anthropological assumption that man is evil by nature or on the anthropological assumption that man is good by nature, and he claims that liberal political theory is based on the latter assumption. Contrary to this claim, I show how Kant's liberalism is shaped by his theory of the radical evil in human nature, and that his liberalism corresponds to the characterization of liberalism that Schmitt himself offers. My discussion of this issue will be shown to have certain implications with respect to the view that for Kant evil is the product of society. I show that this view is mistaken insofar as it fails to recognize that Kant's political philosophy implies that human beings require the type of society that best suits their radically evil natures, namely, a commercial one in which the “vices of culture” largely have free play, while the state's role is limited to that of preventing the antagonisms found in society leading to the mutual destruction of its members.