Do I belong?: it depends on when you ask

A feeling of belonging to an academic context is a critical determinant of academic achievement and persistence, particularly for students of color. Despite the fact that students of color are generally more susceptible to fluctuations in belonging uncertainty than White students, survey design can unintentionally mask this reality. We investigated whether context effects undermine the accurate assessment of belonging uncertainty in junior high and high school students (Study 1) and college students (Study 2). Considering one's ethnic identification (Study 1) and personal experiences with discrimination (Study 2) threatens sense of belonging in students of color, but not White students. Researchers should consider question order within surveys so as not to artificially mask belonging uncertainty in students of color.     

Would you be happier if you moved more? Physical activity focusing illusion

Current Psychology - Research shows that individuals who are more physically active also report greater happiness. However, subjective well-being is prone to cognitive biases. For instance, people...     

How can you resist? Executive control helps romantically involved individuals to stay faithful

In the present research, we examined why some people have more difficulty than others in staying faithful to their romantic partners. Three studies supported our main prediction that executive control is associated with romantically involved individuals' ability to stay faithful. Study 1 showed that participants with a higher level of executive control reported less difficulty in staying faithful to their partners than did those with lower levels of executive control. In Study 2, romantically involved male participants were placed in a waiting room together with an attractive female confederate. Results showed that participants with a higher level of executive control showed less flirting behavior with the confederate than did those with lower levels of executive control. Study 3 demonstrated that a higher level of executive control was related to a lower expressed desire to meet an attractive other, but only for romantically involved participants. Together, these studies showed that executive control helps romantically involved individuals to deal with the lure of attractive alternatives.     

How do I remember that I know you know that I know?

Communication is aided greatly when speakers and listeners take advantage of mutually shared knowledge (i.e., common ground). How such information is represented in memory is not well known. Using a neuropsychological-psycholinguistic approach to real-time language understanding, we investigated the ability to form and use common ground during conversation in memory-impaired participants with hippocampal amnesia. Analyses of amnesics' eye fixations as they interpreted their partner's utterances about a set of objects demonstrated successful use of common ground when the amnesics had immediate access to common-ground information, but dramatic failures when they did not. These findings indicate a clear role for declarative memory in maintenance of common-ground representations. Even when amnesics were successful, however, the eye movement record revealed subtle deficits in resolving potential ambiguity among competing intended referents; this finding suggests that declarative memory may be critical to more basic aspects of the on-line resolution of linguistic ambiguity.     

Would I lie to you? “leakage” in deceptive facial expressions relates to psychopathy and emotional intelligence

This was the first investigation of individual differences in adopting deceptive universal emotional expressions. We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would lead to a heightened ability to suppress emotional expressions and exhibit less “leakage” of inconsistent emotions during deceptive displays. Further, we predicted that emotional intelligence (EI) would lead to a heightened ability to simulate emotional expressions. Participants (N = 100) viewed emotionally arousing (happy, sad, fearful, disgusting) images, responding to each with a genuine or deceptive expression. Each video frame (30/sec) was coded for emotion (in)consistent with the intended expression (365,550 frames coded for 2437 expressions). As predicted, psychopathic traits - specifically, high levels of interpersonal manipulation - were related to shorter durations of unintended emotional “leakage” during deceptive expressions. In contrast, the erratic lifestyle element of psychopathy predicted greater emotional inconsistency during deceptive displays. Individuals higher in EI - specifically, the ability to perceive and express emotion - feigned emotions more convincingly than others but were not more immune to emotional leakage.     

Tell me who you are,and I will tell you how you feel?

Surprisingly little is known about the suggested mediator role of emotional intelligence and mood‐regulation regarding the relationship between personality and subjective well‐being. Three independent samples were administered to investigate whether EI and mood‐regulation served as mediators for subjective well‐being beyond personality. Using structural equation modelling, the authors demonstrated the superior role of extraversion and neuroticism in explaining satisfaction with life, happiness, positive and negative affect. Consistent mediation effects were found for the trait meta‐mood of repair. Contrary to expectations, the remaining variables (attention, clarity, self‐efficacy of affect regulation) did not mediate the relationship between personality and well‐being; neither did they show substantial incremental validity in explaining variance in SWB. Results are discussed with regard to methodological issues and practical implications. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can you forgive? It depends on how happy you are

This paper examined how individual group status and happiness influence forgiveness. In Study 1, happiness was treated as a trait difference: highly happy people, compared with very unhappy people, were found to be more willing to forgive murderers. More important, an interaction effect between happiness and group status on forgiveness was found, that is, highly happy people tended to be more forgiving when either ingroup or outgroup members were killed; unhappy people, however, tended to be less forgiving about murder when ingroup rather than outgroup members were killed. In Study 2, happiness was treated as an emotional state difference: happiness, rather than sadness, was found to bring greater forgiveness. Moreover, consistent with the interaction effect displayed in Study 1, happy participants tended to forgive more when ingroup or outgroup members were hurt; sad participants tended to forgive less when ingroup members rather than outgroup members were hurt. Implications for connections between happiness, group membership, and forgiveness are discussed.     

Would you rather teleport or spend some time commuting? Investigating individuals’ teleportation preferences

The “teleportation test” is a unique question—used in some travel behavior research since the 2000s—to examine individuals’ perceptions towards travel time and affinities for travel. It gives people a hypothetical choice between teleporting or spending some time traveling. All studies (using different methods, including focus groups, interviews, and questionnaires) have consistently reported high teleportation preferences (about 70%). Yet, few correlates of teleportation preferences (especially sociodemographic and perceptual characteristics) have been investigated. Using data from an online questionnaire of 648 commuters in Portland, Oregon, this study investigated factors affecting individuals’ teleportation preferences. While generally representative of the area’s commuters, the sample did have higher shares of high-income workers and people using active modes or transit. Overall, 62% of respondents preferred to teleport than to spend some time commuting. Results from binary logit models identified actual commute duration, typical mode of travel, and “ideal” travel time (but no demographic attributes) as major predictors of preferences to teleport. As expected, people with longer commute durations had a greater desire to teleport, whereas bicyclists and pedestrians more often preferred to commute. People with longer ideal travel times had a greater affinity to commute and were less keen to teleport. Analysis of follow-up questions exploring reasons for respondents’ answers suggested that most “teleporters” were motivated by saving time to do other things, while most “commuters” found parts of their commutes to be enjoyable or productive. Findings from this study are consistent with related studies in implying that a teleportation preference does not necessarily represent zero ideal travel time or viewing travel time as wasted. Finally, this study discusses several travel behavior policy implications of the teleportation test, along with limitations and areas for future research.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

If I want you to like me,should I be like you or unlike you? The effect of prior positive interaction with the group on conformity and distinctiveness in consumer decision making

The extant research points to conflicting results regarding social influence in consumer decision making. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that suggests that people conform to other members of their groups. On the other hand, several studies demonstrated the opposite pattern, namely, that individuals seek distinctiveness from others in the group. The goal of the present research is to reconcile these contradictory findings. To this end, I propose that whether a person will conform to or seek distinctiveness from others in a particular consumption situation is contingent on the absence or presence of one's prior positive interaction with the group. I also suggest that this effect will occur in a public context, that is, when an individual's choice is visible to other group members. The results of experiment supported these propositions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do people bet on their selves? The role of global self-concepts in decision making

Previous research suggests that behavior is generally predicted by specific self-concepts but not global self-concepts. A study was conducted to examine the conditions under which global conceptions of self are predictive of decision-making. Participants were given the opportunity to bet lottery tickets on their performance in the “Utah Challenge” competition. Both global and specific self-concepts independently predicted betting on specific known contests and betting on a contest that was unknown. Global but not specific self-concepts independently predicted betting on a multi-faceted contest. Mediation analyses suggest that self-concepts guide decisions by influencing the perceived likelihood of success. Participants’ were more overconfident about their chances of winning when a task was unknown rather than familiar.     

Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.     

Would you Value a few More Hours of work? Underemployment and Subjective Well-Being Across Chilean Workers

Underemployment has gained attention in recent years because of its effects on health and well-being (life satisfaction), it is a widespread phenomenon in the labor force that affects not only workers, but also households, companies and governments. This paper explores the relationship between underemployment and subjective well-being for a representative sample of Chilean workers using an ordered probit model. Also, by using different underemployment definitions and a latent class ordered probit model we analyze the observed and unobserved heterogeneity in this relationship. Finally, we assess the monetary valuation of well-being costs by estimating the amount of money that a worker is willing to accept in order to bear the potential negative effects of underemployment on well-being. Our results find a negative relationship between underemployment and subjective well-being, as the average worker is willing to accept an increase of CLP$64,009 (roughly 30.5% of the minimum wage) in her/his monthly wage for being underemployed. If we take into account the observed and unobserved heterogeneity, our results identify a group that is not sensitive to underemployment, while others are willing to accept an increase of CLP$146,622 in her/his monthly wage for being underemployed. Our work highlights the importance of well-being in the workplace and has implications for labor flexibility legislation and the empowerment of workers. Heterogeneous responses to underemployment imply that one-size-fits-all policies to regulate working hours might not suffice.

     

Who do you think I think I am? Accuracy in perceptions of others’ self-esteem

This study was conducted to assess the accuracy of perceptions of others’ self-esteem and to examine the potential moderating variables of target gender, perceiver gender, and degree of acquaintance. Degree of acquaintance was the only hypothesized moderator reliably related to accuracy. An overall tendency to overestimate targets’ self-esteem was evinced, but was not related to any of the hypothesized moderators. The data suggested that perceivers are influenced by a false consensus effect when estimating others’ level of self-esteem, independent of their degree of acquaintance with targets. Implications of the findings and directions for future investigation are discussed.     

Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading

Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand our accounts of how we understand others in order to accommodate these data and explain how such profound disagreements arise amongst informed, rational, well-meaning individuals.