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1.
Gabbay  Dov  Woods  John 《Synthese》2001,127(1-2):161-186
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2.
M. Ruffino 《Erkenntnis》2000,52(2):239-252
Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim.  相似文献   

3.
Everett  Theodore J. 《Synthese》2002,130(2):303-315
In this paper I provide some formal schemas for theanalysis of vague predicatesin terms of a set of semantic relations other thanclassical synonymy, includingweak synonymy (as between ``large' and ``huge'),antonymy (as between ``large'and ``small'), relativity (as between ``large'and ``large for a dog'), and a kind ofsupervenience (as between ``large' and ``wide'or ``long'). All of these relationsare representable in the simple comparativelogic CL, in accordance with the basicformula: the more something is F, the more(or less) it is G. I use Carnapianmeaning postulates to define these relationsas constraints on interpretations of theformal language of CL.  相似文献   

4.
In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 Kearns, J. 2007. ‘An illocutionary logical explanation of the Liar Paradox’. History and Philosophy of Logic, 28: 3166. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ‘clear sense’ (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ‘Benedict XVI was born in Germany’ lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 Bremer, M. 2005. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics, Bern: Lang.  [Google Scholar], pp. 27–28): ‘(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies’. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well.  相似文献   

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7.
Blackburn  Patrick 《Synthese》2001,127(1-2):57-93
The title reflects my conviction that, viewed semantically,modal logic is fundamentally dialogical; this conviction is based on the key role played by the notion of bisimulation in modal model theory. But this dialogical conception of modal logic does not seem to apply to modal proof theory, which is notoriously messy. Nonetheless, by making use of ideas which trace back to Arthur Prior (notably the use of nominals, special proposition symbols which name worlds) I will show how to lift the dialogical conception to modal proof theory. I argue that this shift to hybrid logic has consequences for both modal and dialogical logic, and I discuss these in detail.  相似文献   

8.
This paper studies the relationship between Argumentation Logic (AL), a recently defined logic based on the study of argumentation in AI, and classical Propositional Logic (PL). In particular, it shows that AL and PL are logically equivalent in that they have the same entailment relation from any given classically consistent theory. This equivalence follows from a correspondence between the non-acceptability of (arguments for) sentences in AL and Natural Deduction (ND) proofs of the complement of these sentences. The proof of this equivalence uses a restricted form of ND proofs, where hypotheses in the application of the Reductio of Absurdum inference rule are required to be “relevant” to the absurdity derived in the rule. The paper also discusses how the argumentative re-interpretation of PL could help control the application of ex-falso quodlibet in the presence of inconsistencies.  相似文献   

9.
Krister Segerberg 《Erkenntnis》1999,50(2-3):333-352
Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is used in connexion with theories of belief revision. Here we try to show that languages of DDL are suitable also for discussing aspects of default logic. One ingredient of our analysis is a concept of coherence-as-ratifiability.  相似文献   

10.
Patrick Allo 《Studia Logica》2013,101(5):933-958
Modal logics have in the past been used as a unifying framework for the minimality semantics used in defeasible inference, conditional logic, and belief revision. The main aim of the present paper is to add adaptive logics, a general framework for a wide range of defeasible reasoning forms developed by Diderik Batens and his co-workers, to the growing list of formalisms that can be studied with the tools and methods of contemporary modal logic. By characterising the class of abnormality models, this aim is achieved at the level of the model-theory. By proposing formulae that express the consequence relation of adaptive logic in the object-language, the same aim is also partially achieved at the syntactical level.  相似文献   

11.
This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.  相似文献   

12.
Marta Bunge 《Topoi》1984,3(1):13-22
The purpose of this paper is to justify the claim that Topos theory and Logic (the latter interpreted in a wide enough sense to include Model theory and Set theory) may interact to the advantage of both fields. Once the necessity of utilizing toposes (other than the topos of Sets) becomes apparent, workers in Topos theory try to make this task as easy as possible by employing a variety of methods which, in the last instance, find their justification in metatheorems from Logic. Some concrete instances of this assertion will be given in the form of simple proofs that certain theorems of Algebra hold in any (Grothendieck) topos, in order to illustrate the various techniques that are used. In the other direction, Topos theory can also be a useful tool in Logic. Examples of this are independence proofs in (classical as well as intuitionistic) Set theory, as well as transfer methods in the presence of a sheaf representation theorem, the latter applied, in particular, to model theoretic properties of certain theories.  相似文献   

13.
In a recent paper Johan van Benthem reviews earlier work done by himself and colleagues on ‘natural logic’. His paper makes a number of challenging comments on the relationships between traditional logic, modern logic and natural logic. I respond to his challenge, by drawing what I think are the most significant lines dividing traditional logic from modern. The leading difference is in the way logic is expected to be used for checking arguments. For traditionals the checking is local, i.e. separately for each inference step. Between inference steps, several kinds of paraphrasing are allowed. Today we formalise globally: we choose a symbolisation that works for the entire argument, and thus we eliminate intuitive steps and changes of viewpoint during the argument. Frege and Peano recast the logical rules so as to make this possible. I comment also on the traditional assumption that logical processing takes place at the top syntactic level, and I question Johan’s view that natural logic is ‘natural’.  相似文献   

14.
The working assumption of this paper is that noncommuting variables are irreducibly interdependent. The logic of such dependence relations is the author's independence-friendly (IF) logic, extended by adding to it sentence-initial contradictory negation ¬ over and above the dual (strong) negation . Then in a Hilbert space turns out to express orthocomplementation. This can be extended to any logical space, which makes it possible to define the dimension of a logical space. The received Birkhoff and von Neumann quantum logic can be interpreted by taking their disjunction to be ¬(A & B). Their logic can thus be mapped into a Boolean structure to which an additional operator has been added.  相似文献   

15.
We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions.  相似文献   

16.
In this paper we show the embedding of Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs into the rather general framework of Residuated Logic Programs, where the main results of (definite) logic programming are validly extrapolated, namely the extension of the immediate consequences operator of van Emden and Kowalski. The importance of this result is that for the first time a framework encompassing several quite distinct logic programming semantics is described, namely Generalized Annotated Logic Programs, Fuzzy Logic Programming, Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs, and Possibilistic Logic Programming. Moreover, the embedding provides a more general semantical structure paving the way for defining paraconsistent probabilistic reasoning with a logic programming semantics.  相似文献   

17.
18.
This paper investigates a generalized version of inquisitive semantics. A complete axiomatization of the associated logic is established, the connection with intuitionistic logic and several intermediate logics is explored, and the generalized version of inquisitive semantics is argued to have certain advantages over the system that was originally proposed by Groenendijk (2009) and Mascarenhas (2009).  相似文献   

19.
Frege's Logic     
MEDIEVAI AND RENAISSANCF LOGIC

WILLIAM OFOCKHAM, Ockham's theory of propositions. Part I1 of Summa logicae. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Henry Schuurman, with an introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso. University of Notre Dame Press, 1980. viii + 212 pp. £ 12.00.

WILHELM RISSE, Bibliagraphia Logica. Verzeichnis der Handschriften zur Logik. Band IV. Hildesheim, New York: Georg 0lm.s Verlag, 1979. vii + 390pp. DM 98.

G. W .F. H EGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive Logic (l812/1813) (Gesammelte Werke, Hand 11) Herausegeben von F. Hogemannund W. Jaeschhc. Hamburg: Felix hleiner Verlag, 1978. xii + 441 S. DM 118.

G.W.F. HEGEI., Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjektive Logik (1816). (Gesammelte Werke, Band 12.) Herausgegeben von F. Hogemann und W. Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981. viii + 358 S. DM 122.

G. GUNTHER, Idee und Grundriss einer nicht-aristotelischen Logik. Die Idee und ihre philosophischen Voraussetzungen. Appendix by R. Kaehr. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,1978,xxx + 417 + 117 pp. DM 84.

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY

BFN-AMI SCHARFSTEI N, The philosophers: their lives and the nature of their thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 486 pp. £18.00.

DESMONDLEE (ed.), Wittgenstein's lectures: Cambridge 1930 - 1932. From the notes of John King and Desmond Lee. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. xix + 124 pp. £7.95.

0. HANFLING, Logical positivism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. viii + 181 pp. £14.00 (cloth)/£5.50 (paper).

0. HANFLING(ed.),Essenliai readings in iogicai podivihrn. Oxford: Basil Biackwell, 1981. viii + 248 pp. £5.95(paper).  相似文献   

20.
The purpose of this paper is to define a new logic ${\mathcal {SI}}$ called semi-intuitionistic logic such that the semi-Heyting algebras introduced in [4] by Sankappanavar are the semantics for ${\mathcal {SI}}$ . Besides, the intuitionistic logic will be an axiomatic extension of ${\mathcal {SI}}$ .  相似文献   

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