Order Effects in Preference Judgments: Evidence for Context Dependence in the Generation of Preferences

This paper explores the cognitive processes at work in preference generation. It tests the hypothesis that the evaluation process relies on a comparative context of alternatives. Participants in two experiments reviewed pairs of options that included one superficially attractive option and another that was normatively superior in some way but superficially unattractive. Experiment 1 (N= 116) found that when the superficially attractive option was rated first, reported preferences for both options were higher than when the less attractive alternative was rated first. Experiment 2 (N= 177) replicated this order effect on preferences using six pairs of options. I obtained process measures that suggest the effect is attributable to the process by which people generate judgments of preference. Options are rated more positively to the extent that they compare favorably to other real or imagined alternatives; options are rated more negatively to the extent that they compare poorly to their alternatives. These two experiments contribute to the literature on preference generation by specifying a process by which people generate preferences.     

Male more than female infants imitate propulsive motion

Few experimental studies investigate the mechanisms by which young children develop sex-typed activity preferences. Gender self-labeling followed by selective imitation of same-sex models currently is considered a primary socialization mechanism. Research with prenatally androgenized girls and non-human primates also suggests an innate male preference for activities that involve propulsive movement. Here we show that before children can label themselves by gender, 6- to 9-month-old male infants are more likely than female infants to imitate propulsive movements. Further, male infants’ increase in propulsive movement was linearly related to proportion of time viewing a male model’s propulsive movements. We propose that male sex-typed behavior develops from socialization mechanisms that build on a male predisposition to imitate propulsive motion.     

Evidence of System Justification in Young Children

The near ubiquity of ingroup preference is consistent with the view that it is an automatic consequence of social categorization, possibly a basic foundation of intergroup relations. However, research with adults has demonstrated that automatic ingroup preference is notably absent among less dominant, less advantaged groups, an outcome predicted by System Justification Theory ( Jost & Banaji, 1994 ). How basic is this tendency to justify existing social arrangements? Data from young children are crucial in addressing whether such an opposing orientation is itself a fundamental feature of intergroup social cognition. The developmental data summarized here suggest that knowledge about the relative status of one’s ingroup is absorbed and internalized sufficiently early in life, revealing system‐justifying tendencies by age 5, the earliest age such questions have been examined to date. Across several studies summarized here young children from non‐dominant groups failed to show an implicit ingroup preference, similar to their adult counterparts. We conclude that from an early age intergroup preferences are constrained by knowledge, implicit or explicit, about the relative status differences among groups and may suggest an orientation toward supporting existing social and political structures. The possibility that system‐justifying tendencies may exist in even younger children remains open for future tests.     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.     

Children discard a resource to avoid inequity

Elucidating how inequity aversion (a tendency to dislike and correct unequal outcomes) functions as one develops is important to understanding more complex fairness considerations in adulthood. Although previous research has demonstrated that adults and children reduce inequity, it is unclear if people are actually responding negatively to inequity or if people dislike others getting more than them (motivated by social comparison) and like to share maximal resources, especially with those who have few resources (motivated by social welfare preferences). In order to evaluate if children are truly averse to inequity, we had 3- to 8-year-old children distribute resources to 3rd parties and found that 6- to 8-year-old children would rather throw a resource in the trash than distribute unequally, suggesting that concerns with equity can trump concerns with maximal sharing. We also demonstrated that children's reactions were not based on wanting to avoid upsetting the recipients or based on a preference for visual symmetry and that children will even throw away a resource that could have gone to themselves in order to avoid inequity. These results demonstrate the existence of inequity aversion in children, provide a new method for studying inequity aversion specifically, and suggest the need for new models to explain why inequity aversion may have evolved.     

The development of concern for others in children with behavior problems

The development of concern for others and externalizing problems were examined in young children with normative, subclinical, or clinical levels of behavior problems. There were no group differences in observable concern for others at 4-5 years of age. Children with clinical behavior problems decreased significantly in their concern by 6-7 years of age and were reported to have less concern at 6-7 years by mothers, teachers, and the children themselves, relative to other groups. Boys with clinical problems were more callous to others' distress at both time points. Girls showed more concern than boys across risk, time, and measures. Greater concern at 4-5 years predicted decreases in the stability and severity of externalizing problems by 6-7 years, and greater concern at 6-7 years predicted decreases in the stability of problems by 9-10 years. Finally, maternal socialization approaches predicted later concerned responding.     

Does colour preference have a role in colour term acquisition?

A developmental association exists between colour preference and emerging colour term acquisition in young children. Colour preference might influence colour term acquisition by directing attention towards or away from a particular colour, making it more or less memorable. To investigate the role that colour preference may have in the acquisition of colour terms, experimental tasks of colour preference, discrimination, attention, memory, and new colour term learning, were given to three groups of participants (preschool children; primary school children; and adults). Each task utilized the same colour stimuli, which were four computer‐simulated colours, matched perceptually to four different Munsell chips, drawn from the same colour category. Three colours varied systematically from an anchor colour (10PB 4/8) only in saturation (10PB 4/4), luminance (10PB 6/8), or hue (5P 4/8). Results showed that within‐category colour preferences emerged with age, and that when established within individuals, most preferred colours were named significantly more accurately than least preferred colours, although this association did not appear to be mediated directly by attention or memory. Rather, perceptual saliency was shown to have a mediating role, to some extent, in determining the relationship between colour preference and the cognitive processing of colour.     

Men's strategic preferences for femininity in female faces

Several evolutionarily relevant sources of individual differences in face preference have been documented for women. Here, we examine three such sources of individual variation in men's preference for female facial femininity: term of relationship, partnership status and self‐perceived attractiveness. We show that men prefer more feminine female faces when rating for a short‐term relationship and when they have a partner (Study 1). These variables were found to interact in a follow‐up study (Study 2). Men who thought themselves attractive also preferred more feminized female faces for short‐term relationships than men who thought themselves less attractive (Study 1 and Study 2). In women, similar findings for masculine preferences in male faces have been interpreted as adaptive. In men, such preferences potentially reflect that attractive males are able to compete for high‐quality female partners in short‐term contexts. When a man has secured a mate, the potential cost of being discovered may increase his choosiness regarding short‐term partners relative to unpartnered men, who can better increase their short‐term mating success by relaxing their standards. Such potentially strategic preferences imply that men also face trade‐offs when choosing relatively masculine or feminine faced partners. In line with a trade‐off, women with feminine faces were seen as more likely to be unfaithful and more likely to pursue short‐term relationships (Study 3), suggesting that risk of cuckoldry is one factor that may limit men's preferences for femininity in women and could additionally lead to preferences for femininity in short‐term mates.     

Fairness in Children's Resource Allocation Depends on the Recipient

ABSTRACT— Sixty-six children between 4.5 and 6 years of age were tested in a resource-allocation game with three different recipients. When the recipient was a friend, children made equitable decisions and shared as much when there was a cost to themselves as when there was no cost. When the recipient was another familiar child who was not a friend, children were less likely to allocate resources to that child. When the recipient was a stranger, children allocated resources as much as with a friend and more than with a nonfriend when there was no cost to themselves. However, when there was a cost to themselves, children treated strangers like nonfriends. These results show that resource-allocation decisions made by young children depend on the recipient. Young children prefer equitable division of resources with friends, treat nonfriends less well, and make prosocial moves with strangers when the cost to self is not high.     

Path dependent preferences: The role of early experience and biased search in preference development

What is the role of early experiences in shaping preferences? What are the mechanisms by which such early encounters influence the way preferences are formed? In this research, we examine the impact of the entry position and favorability of initial (and ongoing) experiences on preference development. We predict that the starting point will heavily influence which particular region people select from initially, and favorableness of early experiences and myopic search will both limit their search to that particular region. Across four studies, we find that when the initial experiences are favorable, subjects engage in lower levels of search, experience only a narrow breadth of possible alternatives, demonstrate less ongoing experimentation, and have a reduction in the amount of preference development.     

Defining reward value by cross-modal scaling

Researchers in comparative psychology often use different food rewards in their studies, with food values defined by a pre-experimental preference test. While this technique rank orders food values, it provides limited information about value differences because preferences may reflect not only value differences, but also the degree to which one good may “substitute” for another (e.g., one food may substitute well for another food, but neither substitutes well for water). We propose scaling the value of food pairs by a third food that is less substitutable for either food offered in preference tests (cross-modal scaling). Here, Cebus monkeys chose between four pairwise alternatives: fruits A versus B; cereal amount X versus fruit A and cereal amount Y versus fruit B where X and Y were adjusted to produce indifference between each cereal amount and each fruit; and cereal amounts X versus Y. When choice was between perfect substitutes (different cereal amounts), preferences were nearly absolute; so too when choice was between close substitutes (fruits); however, when choice was between fruits and cereal amounts, preferences were more modest and less likely due to substitutability. These results suggest that scaling between-good value differences in terms of a third, less-substitutable good may be better than simple preference tests in defining between-good value differences.     

Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot

People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not others. This divergence did not arise simply from differences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and action—and thereby about the fallibility of introspection—did participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.     

Sensitivity of passive approach during preference and reinforcer assessments for children with severe and profound intellectual disabilities and minimal movement

We evaluated the use of passive approach to assess preferences of two children, with severe and profound intellectual disabilities. Both children had physical challenges and exhibited minimal physical movement. We also compared the relative reinforcing effects of the identified high and low preference stimuli for a switch pressing response, and for a more passive looking response. High and low preference stimuli were identified for both children. Moreover, the high preference stimulus maintained higher rates of responding than the low preference stimulus for both children for the passive looking response, but not for switch pressing. The study extended the use of passive approach to assess preferences and identified the choice of target response as a potential limiting factor during reinforcer tests for these children. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Variation of Preference Inconsistency When Applying Ratio and Interval Scale Pairwise Comparisons

Several studies on numerical rating in discrete choice problems address the tendency of inconsistencies in decision makers' measured preferences. This is partly due to true inconsistencies in preferences or the decision makers' uncertainty on what he or she really wants. This uncertainty may be reflected in the elicited preferences in different ways depending on the questions asked and methods used in deriving the preferences for alternatives. Some part of the inconsistency is due to only having a discrete set of possible judgments. This study examined the variation of preference inconsistency when applying different pairwise preference elicitation techniques in a five‐item discrete choice problem. The study data comprised preferences of five career alternatives elicited applying interval scale and numerically and verbally anchored ratio scale pairwise comparisons. Statistical regression technique was used to analyse the differences of inconsistencies between the tested methods. The resulting relative residual variances showed that the interval ratio scale comparison technique provided the greatest variation of inconsistencies between respondents, thus being the most sensitive to inconsistency in preferences. The numeric ratio scale comparison gave the most uniform preferences between the respondents. The verbal ratio scale comparison performed between the latter two when relative residual variances were considered. However, the verbal ratio scale comparison had weaker ability to differentiate the alternatives. The results indicated that the decision recommendation may not be sensitive to the selection between these preference elicitation methods in this kind of five‐item discrete choice problem. The numeric ratio scale comparison technique seemed to be the most suitable method to reveal the decision makers' true preferences. However, to confirm this result, more studying will be needed, with an attention paid to users' comprehension and learning in the course of the experiment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism

Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for all actions of an agent, Lucky, who luckily has preferences that accord with P, and I extend the argument to all citizens of a land, Luckyland, who are like Lucky. I argue the citizens of Luckyland have free will but lack moral responsibility because of the connection between moral responsibility, reactive attitudes and future action. Furthermore, the presence of CI and his plan P may allow free will but is incompatible with freedom of preference. Preference concerns alternatives excluded by CI. I argue that a special higher order preference for the preference structure, a power preference, ends the regress of higher order preference and explains the first order preference. Causal determinism is compatible with freedom of preference explained by a power preference when a power preference would also explain an alternative preference. The remoteness argument for incompatibility fails because of a lack of transitivity causal explanation. The power preference is the self-explained source of freedom of preference. That basic freedom may be limited by government knowledge of our preferences, even if, like Lucky, our preferences do not provoke intervention and we conform of our own free will.     

The varying value of a friendly face: Experimentally induced stress is associated with higher preferences for friendship with people possessing feminine versus masculine face traits

Social support can provide a buffer to the negative consequences of stress. Previous research suggests that stress can promote affiliative and cooperative behaviours in those who are stressed. Here we examined how stress might influence who we choose to affiliate with. We measured preferences for friendships with friendly appearing feminized faces versus less friendly appearing masculinized faces after individuals undertook a stressful laboratory task. Stressed individuals had increased preferences for friendships with people with feminine faces. These data demonstrate that individuals prefer more friendly appearing feminine faced people as friends when stressed than when not stressed. This preference is likely adaptive in directing individuals towards others who are most likely to provide social support when it is needed and so reflect strategic friendship preferences.     

Social class differences produce social group preferences

Some social groups are higher in socioeconomic status than others and the former tend to be favored over the latter. The present research investigated whether observing group differences in wealth alone can directly cause children to prefer wealthier groups. In Experiment 1, 4–5‐year‐old children developed a preference for a wealthy novel group over a less wealthy group. In Experiment 2, children did not develop preferences when groups differed by another kind of positive/negative attribute (i.e. living in brightly colored houses vs. drab houses), suggesting that wealth is a particularly meaningful group distinction. Lastly, in Experiment 3, the effect of favoring novel wealthy groups was moderated by group membership: Children assigned to a wealthy group showed ingroup favoritism, but those assigned to a less wealthy group did not. These experiments shed light on why children tend to be biased in favor of social groups that are higher in socioeconomic status.     

The Development of Social Exclusion Detection in Early Childhood: Awareness of Social Exclusion Does Not Always Align with Social Preferences

ABSTRACT

Starting in the preschool years, children show socially exclusive behaviors, such as intentionally leaving out another child from a ball game. Prior research investigating social exclusion understanding in preschoolers primarily used interview methods and it is clear that the verbal and cognitive skills necessary to identify and reason about social exclusion become more sophisticated with age. Yet it is unknown how children’s ability to identify social exclusion relates to their own behavior, such as their social preference for socially inclusive or exclusive individuals. Further, whether such social preferences remain stable or change across development is an open question. Thus, the current study investigated whether the ability to identify social exclusion develops in tandem with social preference behavior by assessing 3- to 6-year-old children’s (N = 256) identification of social exclusion and preferences between socially exclusive and inclusive agents. Five- to six-year-old children correctly identified social exclusion and preferred inclusive agents over exclusive agents across two experiments. Three- to four-year-old children could correctly identify social exclusion, but did not show evidence of a preference for inclusive agents over exclusive agents. Children were also able to detect implicit, nonverbalized social exclusion equally well as explicit, verbalized social exclusion across development. These findings suggest that young children’s social preferences are not wholly dictated by their ability to identify socially exclusive agents. This divergent pattern of social preference from identification has implications for interpreting social preference behavior in young children.