Global behavioral variation: A test of differential-K

Despite Rushton’s path-breaking work into evolutionary forces affecting life history traits, not many attempts at operationalizing the differential-K spectrum at the level of countries or racial groups have been made so far. We report the construction of a “national K” factor from country-level behavioral variables. This K factor is closely related to country-level intelligence (“g”), operationalized by a composite score of IQ and scholastic achievement. We further demonstrate relationships of both g and K with measures of current environment and hypothesized evolutionary antecedents. Whereas K is predicted most powerfully by intelligence, log-transformed GDP (lgGDP) and skin reflectance, g is predicted by skin reflectance, lgGDP, cranial capacity, and a measure of evolutionary novelty.     

Chinese children's evaluations of white lies: weighing the consequences for recipients

This research examined how Chinese children make moral judgments about lie telling and truth telling when facing a “white lie” or “politeness” dilemma in which telling a blunt truth is likely to hurt the feelings of another. We examined the possibility that the judgments of participants (7-11 years of age, N = 240) would differ as a function of the social context in which communication takes place. The expected social consequences were manipulated systematically in two studies. In Study 1, participants rated truth telling more negatively and rated lie telling more positively in a public situation where telling a blunt truth is especially likely to have negative social consequences. In Study 2, participants rated truth telling more positively and rated lie telling more negatively in a situation where accurate information is likely to be helpful for the recipient to achieve future success. Both studies showed that with increased age, children’s evaluations became significantly influenced by the social context, with the strongest effects being seen among the 11-year-olds. These results suggest that Chinese children learn to take anticipated social consequences into account when making moral judgments about the appropriateness of telling a blunt truth versus lying to protect the feelings of another.     

When is it wrong to eat animals? The relevance of different animal traits and behaviours

Research suggests that animals’ capacity for agency, experience, and benevolence predict beliefs about their moral treatment. Four studies built on this work by examining how fine‐grained information about animals’ traits and behaviours (e.g., can store food for later vs. can use tools) shifted moral beliefs about eating and harming animals. The information that most strongly affected moral beliefs was related to secondary emotions (e.g., can feel love), morality (e.g., will share food with others), empathy (e.g., can feel others' pain), social connections (e.g., will look for deceased family members), and moral patiency (e.g., can feel pain). In addition, information affected moral judgements in line with how it affected superordinate representations about animals’ capacity for experience/feeling but not agency/thinking. The results provide a fine‐grained outline of how, and why, information about animals’ traits and behaviours informs moral judgements.     

Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms

Public outrage is often triggered by “immaterially” harmful acts (i.e., acts with relatively negligible consequences). A well-known example involves corporate salaries and perks: they generate public outrage yet their financial cost is relatively minor. The present research explains this paradox by appealing to a person-centered approach to moral judgment. Strong moral reactions can occur when relatively harmless acts provide highly diagnostic information about moral character. Studies 1a and 1b first demonstrate dissociation between moral evaluations of persons and their actions—although violence toward a human was viewed as a more blameworthy act than violence toward an animal, the latter was viewed as more revealing of bad moral character. Study 2 then shows that person-centered cues directly influence moral judgments—participants preferred to hire a more expensive CEO when the alternative candidate requested a frivolous perk as part of his compensation package, an effect mediated by the informativeness of his request.     

Unable to resist temptation: How self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior

Across four experimental studies, individuals who were depleted of their self-regulatory resources by an initial act of self-control were more likely to “impulsively cheat” than individuals whose self-regulatory resources were intact. Our results demonstrate that individuals depleted of self-control resources were more likely to behave dishonestly (Study 1). Depletion reduced people’s moral awareness when they faced the opportunity to cheat, which, in turn, was responsible for heightened cheating (Study 2). Individuals high in moral identity, however, did not show elevated levels of cheating when they were depleted (Study 3), supporting our hypothesis that self-control depletion increases cheating when it robs people of the executive resources necessary to identify an act as immoral or unethical. Our results also show that resisting unethical behavior both requires and depletes self-control resources (Study 4). Taken together, our findings help to explain how otherwise ethical individuals predictably engage in unethical behavior.     

The effects of justice motivation on memory for self- and other-relevant events

We examined whether people might distort and selectively remember the past in ways that enable them to sustain a belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press). In Study 1, recall of a lottery prize reflected participants’ justice concerns, such that the average lottery amount recalled was lowest when a “bad” versus “good” person won. In Study 2, an unrelated experience of just world threat (versus affirmation) enhanced biased recall of the lottery prize when the winner was undeserving. In Study 3, participants who experienced a fortuitous bad break selectively remembered more bad deeds from their recent past, whereas participants who experienced a good break selectively remembered more good deeds. Study 4 demonstrates that such selective memory biases specifically serve to portray chance outcomes as more fair. Taken together, these findings offer support for the notion that reconstructing and selectively recalling the past can serve to sustain a BJW.     

Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

Prototypes of race and gender: The invisibility of Black women

Research on racial and gender stereotyping typically focuses on the role of one of these social categories at a time rather than race/gender combinations. We suggest that the relative non-prototypicality of Black women’s race and gender results in their “invisibility” relative to White women and to Black and White men ( [Fryberg and Townsend, 2008] and [Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach, 2008]). Two studies address whether Black women go “unnoticed” and their voices “unheard,” by examining memory for Black women’s faces and speech contributions. We found that photos of Black women were least likely to be recognized (Study 1), and statements said by a Black woman in a group discussion were least likely to be correctly attributed (Study 2) compared to Black men and White women and White men. The importance and implications of invisibility as a unique form of discrimination are discussed.     

Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes

Commentators have noted that the issue stands taken by each side of the American “culture war” lack conceptual consistency and can even seem contradictory. We sought to understand the psychological underpinnings of culture war attitudes using Moral Foundations Theory. In two studies involving 24,739 participants and 20 such issues (e.g. abortion, immigration, same-sex marriage), we found that endorsement of five moral foundations predicted judgments about these issues over and above ideology, age, gender, religious attendance, and interest in politics. Our results suggest that dispositional tendencies, particularly a person’s moral intuitions, may underlie, motivate, and unite ideological positions across a variety of issues and offer new insights into the multiple “moral threads” connecting disparate political positions.     

The role of cognitive resources in determining our moral intuitions: Are we all liberals at heart?

Recent research provides evidence that one important difference between liberals and conservatives is their basic moral intuitions. These studies suggest that while liberals and conservatives respond similarly to considerations of harm/care and fairness (what Graham and Haidt call the “individualizing” foundations), conservatives also respond strongly to considerations of in-group, authority, and purity (the “binding” foundations) while liberals do not. Our study examined two alternative hypotheses for this difference—the first being that liberals cognitively override, and the alternative being that conservatives cognitively enhance, their binding foundation intuitions. Using self-regulation depletion and cognitive load tasks to compromise people's ability to monitor and regulate their automatic moral responses, we found support for the latter hypothesis—when cognitive resources were depleted/distracted, conservatives became more like liberals (de-prioritizing the binding foundations), rather than the other way around. This provides support for the view that conservatism is a form of motivated social cognition.     

The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations

We investigated the interactive effects of regulatory focus priming and message framing on the perceived fairness of unfavorable events. We hypothesized that individuals’ perceptions of fairness are higher when they receive a regulatory focus prime (promotion versus prevention) that is congruent with the framing of an explanation (gain versus loss), as opposed to one that is incongruent. We also hypothesized that these effects are mediated by counterfactual thinking. Three studies revealed that primed regulatory fit (promotion/gain or prevention/loss) led to higher levels of justice perceptions than regulatory misfit (promotion/loss or prevention/gain). Additionally, “could” and “should” counterfactuals partially mediated the relationship between regulatory fit and interactional justice (Study 3).     

Informational length and order of presentation as determinants of persuasion

The present paper explores the notion that an important difference between prior operational definitions of “cue” or “heuristic” information versus “message argument” information has to do with differential processing difficulty, and relative ordinal position of these two information types. In previous work, “cue/heuristic” information typically differed from “message argument” information not only in its contents, but also in it being (1) briefer, and (2) presented prior to the message information. We find that it is relative brevity and ordinal position rather than contents that ultimately explain the differences in persuasive impact between “cue/heuristic” versus “message argument” information. In so far as both “cues” and “message arguments” can vary in brevity and order with which they are presented, these findings are consistent with the view that these two information types do not necessarily differ in their persuasive impact.     

Profiles of career adaptivity and their relations with adaptability,adapting, and adaptation

Career adaptivity is the first factor in a chain of putative effects posited in the career construction theory (CCT): Adaptivity → Adaptability → Adapting → Adaptation. Hitherto, research on adaptivity has chiefly used variable-centered strategies to investigate the independent effects of adaptivity-related traits on adaptability, adapting, and adaptation averaged over all individuals constituting a sample. The present research, comprising two studies, seeks to extend this work by using person-centered analytic strategies to identify distinct profiles of adaptivity based on combinations of the Big-Five personality dimensions. We also examine the associations of profile membership with adaptability, adapting, and adaptation from the CCT perspective. Latent profile analyses revealed that a comparable 3-profile solution, comprising so-called “adaptive ready”, “ordinary”, and “rigid” adaptivity profiles, fit best in both studies using distinct measures of the Big-Five. Furthermore, across both studies, the latent subgroups were found to differ on levels of adaptability measured using two distinct instruments. Adaptability was highest in the “adaptive ready” subgroup followed by the “ordinary” and “rigid” subgroups, respectively. Finally, Study 2 showed that the adaptivity profiles differed with respect to indices of adapting (viz., organized study behaviors) and adaptation (viz., academic and career-choice satisfaction) in line with expectations from the CCT. The present findings constitute the first evidence showing that career adaptivity can be adequately represented via trait interactions. The findings also add to the empirical literature underpinning the CCT. Furthermore, this research is an informative demonstration of the utility of finite mixture analyses.     

Decoding the implicit association test: Implications for criterion prediction

The implicit association test (IAT) is believed to measure implicit evaluations by assessing reaction times on two cognitive tasks, often termed “compatible” and “incompatible” tasks. A common rationale for studying the IAT is that it might improve our prediction and understanding of meaningful psychological criteria. To date, however, no clear psychometric theory has been advanced for this measure. We examine the theory, methods and analytic strategies surrounding the IAT in the context of criterion prediction to determine measurement and causal models a researcher embraces (knowingly or unknowingly) by using the test. Our analyses reveal that the IAT revolves around interpretation of two distinct relative constructs, one at the conceptual level and one at the observed level. We show that interest in relative implicit evaluations at the conceptual level imposes a causal model that is restrictive in form. We then examine measurement models of the IAT and show how computing a difference score at the observed level may lack empirical justification. These issues are highlighted in a study replicating an effect established in the literature (Study 1). We then introduce a new variant of the IAT and use it to evaluate the reasonableness of traditional IAT methods (Study 2).     

Creatures of the night: Chronotypes and the Dark Triad traits

In this study (N = 263) we provide a basic test of a niche-specialization hypothesis of the Dark Triad (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism). We propose that in order to best enact a “cheater strategy” those high on the Dark Triad traits should have optimal cognitive performance and, thus, have a night-time chronotype. Such a disposition will take advantage of the low light, the limited monitoring, and the lessened cognitive processing of morning-type people. The Dark Triad composite was correlated with an eveningness disposition. This link worked through links with the “darker” aspects of the Dark Triad (i.e., Machiavellianism, secondary psychopathy, and exploitive narcissism); correlations that were invariant across the sexes. While we replicated sex differences in the Dark Triad, we failed to replicate sex differences in chronotype, suggesting eveningness may not be a sexually selected trait as some have argued but is a trait under natural selective pressures to enable effective exploitations of conspecifics by both sexes.     

Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature

The paper is concerned with whether the reductio of the natural-harm-argument can be avoided by disvaluing non-human suffering and death. According to the natural-harm-argument, alleviating the suffering of non-human animals is not a moral obligation for human beings because such an obligation would also morally prescribe human intervention in nature for the protection of non-human animal interests which, it claims, is absurd. It is possible to avoid the reductio by formulating the moral obligation to alleviate non-human suffering and death with two constraints: The first concerns the practicability of intervention and establishes a moral obligation to intervene only in cases where this is humanly possible. The other constraint acknowledges that lack of competence in humans can risk producing more harm than good by intervening. A third way of avoiding the problematic version of the natural-harm-argument considers whether human and non-human suffering and death are sufficiently different to allow different types of responses. I argue that the attempt to avoid the reductio of the natural-harm-argument by disvaluing non-human death can only work with an anthropocentric bias, which accords to non-human suffering and death a fundamentally different value and that it fails to dismiss the moral obligation created by the harm that non-human animals face in the wild.     

Perspective et actualité de Pierre Janet sur les possessions et les extases mystiques

Pierre Janet (1859–1947), a professor of psychology at the collège de France (1901–1934) and the founder of the French Psychological Society in 1901, took interest in the psychology of religion very young and then all along his career. At age 15, a painful crisis of doubts changes him: he becomes atheistic and above all, gains a passion for the psychology of belief (Prévost, 1973). After his “aggregation” degree, he starts examining and curing people with mental diseases at the hospital in Le Havre. Within six years, his works would build the reference synthesis on the “dissociation of the personality”. But the dissociation process is tightly bounded to the properties of belief (L’automatisme psychologique, 1889). The presentation of his famous case “Achille” (1891–1898) possessed “by the devil” will stand for Janet as a textbook case about religious dissociation, and he will consider his successful treatment of this patient as a “modern exorcism” (Névroses et idées fixes, 1898). The famous mystic “Madeleine” who suffered from psychasthenia provided him the opportunity to precise the links between religious phenomena and the properties of belief. Madeleine's oscillations between torture, void and ecstasy, pertain to “tension” variations that directly impact her belief according to their stage – asseritive or reflected – on the Janetian hierarchy ( Janet, 1926–1928). In the second part of his life and career, where Janet takes time to think about his models and practice, he paints a large picture of the evolution of the “self” (L’Évolution psychologique de la personnalité, Janet, 1929) and extends his analysis to traditional cultures where the bounds of the self is more variable, the personality being able to include spirits within itself. The inclusion in the DSM III, of “dissociative troubles” in 1980, for its first atheoretic release, is visibly drawn upon Janet's English writings ( 0175, 0215 and 0070). Following this introduction, a great body of international studies took Janet's modelization and results into consideration (except in France). In 1994, the DSM-IV also adds the dissociative transe disorder category (DTD), which includes religious possession by demons or spirits: this leads to the development of international studies on the psychology of religion within a transcultural frame. After being forgotten for years, the experimental results of Pierre Janet currently undergo an important excavation thanks to recent psychological research, and prove their relevance to contribute to contemporary debates.     

A media analysis of a sport celebrity: Understanding an informal “team cancer” role as a socio-cultural construction

Objectives

Negative informal roles in sport such as a “team cancer” warrant further attention because of the association with athletes’ negative psychological experiences, impaired team processes, and reduced performance. The purpose of the current study is to extend understandings of the team cancer role by analyzing the socio-cultural context (i.e., sport media narratives surrounding a sport celebrity and key media incident) within which one “team cancer” was constituted in a professional sport context.

Method

National Hockey League (NHL) star Sean Avery was the sport celebrity of interest. The key media incident was the “sloppy seconds” comment made by Avery regarding his former girlfriend. The comment was an attack towards the opposing team’s defenseman, who was dating her. Newspaper representations of the comment (n = 62) were explored via ethnographic content analysis (see Altheide, 1996).

Results

It was found that the depiction of the team cancer emerged differently depending on two paradoxical discourses found within the media: a hockey moral code as truth vs. a hockey moral code as hypocrisy. This paradox surrounding the morality of sport was exemplified within the two hockey moral code discourses surrounding the personification of Avery’s team cancer identity and the “sloppy seconds incident”.

Conclusions

This study adds to our understanding regarding how the media influences the construction of an informal team cancer role from one professional sport incident. This focus opens up a window of new understandings and possibilities for research and application beyond current theories and understandings of negative informal team roles in sport psychology.     

The paradox of moral focus

When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our (non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when we judge an agent to have acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces another agent (“forcee”) to act either immorally or morally. The structure of this relationship allowed us to ask questions about both the “forcer” and the “forcee.” Paradoxically, participants judged that the “forcer” forced the “forcee” to act immorally (i.e. X forced Y), but that the “forcee” was not forced to act immorally (i.e. Y was not forced by X). This pattern obtained only for human agents who acted intentionally. Directly changing participants’ focus from one agent to another (forcer versus forcee) also changed the target of moral evaluation and therefore force attributions. The full pattern of judgments may provide a window into motivated moral reasoning and focusing bias more generally; participants may have been motivated to attribute greater force to the immoral forcer and greater freedom to the immoral forcee.     

The contextual and systematic nature of life satisfaction judgments

Five studies were conducted to examine the nature of life satisfaction judgments. When the category of “excitement” was made accessible experimentally, individuals based their life satisfaction judgments more heavily on the frequency of excitement, in comparison to a “peaceful” condition in Study 1 and to both “neutral priming” and “no-priming” conditions in Study 2. A 7-day diary study (Study 3) showed that as “excitement” became naturally more accessible on weekends, the correlations between excitement and daily satisfaction also increased significantly. Study 3 thus illustrated a systematic contextual shift in the bases of life satisfaction judgments. Study 4 showed that high sensation seekers, for whom “excitement” should be chronically accessible, based their life satisfaction judgments more heavily on the frequency of excitement than did low sensation seekers. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that the chronic accessibility of “excitement” measured at Time 1 predicted the degree to which individuals based their life satisfaction judgments on the frequency of excitement at Time 2. Altogether, these five studies highlight the contextually sensitive, yet systematic nature of life satisfaction judgments.