No difference between conscious and nonconscious visuomotor control: evidence from perceptual learning in the masked prime task

Negative compatibility effects (NCEs) in the masked-prime paradigm are usually obtained when primes are masked effectively. With ineffective masks-and primes above the perceptual threshold-positive compatibility effects (PCEs) occur. We investigated whether this pattern reflects a causal relationship between conscious awareness and low-level motor control, or whether it reflects the fact that both are affected in the same way by changes in physical stimulus attributes. In a 5-session perceptual learning task, participants learned to consciously identify masked primes. However, they showed unaltered NCEs that were not different from those produced by participants in a control group without equivalent perceptual learning. A control experiment demonstrated that no NCEs occur when prime identification is made possible by ineffective masking. The results suggest that perceptual awareness and low-level motor control are affected by the same factors, but are fundamentally independent of each other.     

Skating down a steeper slope: fear influences the perception of geographical slant

Previous studies have shown that conscious awareness of hill slant is overestimated, but visually guided actions directed at hills are relatively accurate. Also, steep hills are consciously estimated to be steeper from the top than the bottom, possibly because they are dangerous to descend. In the present study, participants stood at the top of a hill either on a skateboard or a wooden box of the same height. They gave three estimates of the slant: a verbal report, a visually matched estimate, and a visually guided action. Fear of descending the hill was also assessed. Those participants who were scared (by the skateboard) consciously judged the hill to be steeper than unafraid participants. However, the visually guided action measure was accurate across conditions. These results suggest that explicit awareness of slant is influenced by the fear associated with a potentially dangerous action that could be performed on the hill.     

Conscious awareness of motor fluidity improves performance and decreases cognitive effort in sequence learning

Motor skill learning is improved when participants are instructed to judge after each trial whether their performed movements have reached maximal fluidity. Consequently, the conscious awareness of this maximal fluidity can be classified as a genuine learning factor for motor sequences. However, it is unknown whether this effect of conscious awareness on motor learning could be mediated by the increased cognitive effort that may accompany such judgment making. The main aim of this study was to test this hypothesis in comparing two groups with, and without, the conscious awareness of the maximal fluidity. To assess the possible involvement of cognitive effort, we have recorded the pupillary dilation to the task, which is well-known to increase in proportion to cognitive effort. Results confirmed that conscious awareness indeed improved motor sequence learning of the trained sequence specifically. Pupil dilation was smaller during trained than during novel sequence performance, indicating that sequence learning decreased the cognitive cost of sequence execution. However, we found that in the group that had to judge on their maximal fluidity, pupil dilation during sequence production was smaller than in the control group, indicating that the motor improvement induced by the fluidity judgment does not involve additional cognitive effort. We discuss these results in the context of motor learning and cognitive effort theories.     

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months (+/-3 months).     

Impact of Parkinson’s disease and dopaminergic medication on adaptation to explicit and implicit visuomotor perturbations

The capacity to learn new visuomotor associations is fundamental to adaptive motor behavior. Evidence suggests visuomotor learning deficits in Parkinson’s disease (PD). However, the exact nature of these deficits and the ability of dopamine medication to improve them are under-explored. Previous studies suggested that learning driven by large and small movement errors engaged distinct neural mechanisms. Here, we investigated whether PD patients have a generalized impairment in visuomotor learning or selective deficits in learning from large explicit errors which engages cognitive strategies or small imperceptible movement errors involving primarily implicit learning processes. Visuomotor learning skills of non-medicated and medicated patients were assessed in two reaching tasks in which the size of visuospatial errors experienced during learning was manipulated using a novel three-dimensional virtual reality environment. In the explicit perturbation task, the visuomotor perturbation was applied suddenly resulting in large consciously detected initial spatial errors, whereas in the implicit perturbation task, the perturbation was gradually introduced in small undetectable steps such that subjects never experienced large movement errors. A major finding of this study was that PD patients in non-medicated and medicated conditions displayed slower learning rates and smaller adaptation magnitudes than healthy subjects in the explicit perturbation task, but performance similar to healthy controls in the implicit perturbation task. Also, non-medicated patients showed an average reduced deadaptation relative to healthy controls when exposed to the large errors produced by the sudden removal of the perturbation in both the explicit and implicit perturbation tasks. Although dopaminergic medication consistently improved motor signs, it produced a variable impact on learning the explicit perturbation and deadaptation and unexpectedly worsened performance in some patients. Considered together, these results indicate that PD selectively impairs the ability to learn from large consciously detected visuospatial errors. This finding suggests that basal ganglia-related circuits are important neural structures for adaptation to sudden perturbations requiring awareness and high-cost action selection. Dopaminergic treatment may selectively compromise the ability to learn from large explicit movement errors for reasons that remain to be elucidated.     

Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming

Recent results from “subliminal priming” experiments have shown that masked prime stimuli which can not be consciously perceived can trigger response activation processes, but that these response activations can later be subject to inhibition. Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition were investigated by manipulating the visibility of masked prime stimuli, from clearly visible primes to prime stimuli that were inaccessible to conscious perception. Response inhibition was observed with unperceived prime stimuli, but not for suprathreshold primes. Correlations between individual prime identification thresholds and the onset of response inhibition indicate that the absence or presence of conscious awareness can predict whether or not response inhibition is elicited. These results demonstrate qualitative differences in the effects of conscious and unconscious information. It is argued that response facilitation produced by consciously available perceptual information can counteract automatic effects of self-inhibitory motor control circuits.     

Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness

Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). Given that a later event (i.e., conscious awareness) cannot cause an earlier one (i.e., decision-related brain activity), such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously (e.g., Libet, 1985). We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in which conscious awareness of the decision to move develops gradually up to the level of a reporting criterion. Under this interpretation, the early brain activity reflects sub-criterion levels of awareness rather than complete absence of awareness and thus does not suggest that decisions are made unconsciously.     

Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient

Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as intentional mental action. I suggest that this change of focus, from the interpretation of motor behaviour as intentional bodily action to the interpretation of neural activity as intentional mental action, raises philosophical issues that affect the interpretation of the neuroimaging data.     

Unconscious processing embedded in conscious processing: evidence from gaze time on Chinese sentence reading

The current study aims to separate conscious and unconscious behaviors by employing both online and offline measures while the participants were consciously performing a task. Using an eye-movement tracking paradigm, we observed participants' response patterns for distinguishing within-word-boundary and across-word-boundary reverse errors while reading Chinese sentences (also known as the "word inferiority effect"). The results showed that when the participants consciously detected errors, their gaze time for target words associated with across-word-boundary reverse errors was significantly longer than that for targets words associated with within-word-boundary reverse errors. Surprisingly, the same gaze time pattern was found even when the readers were not consciously aware of the reverse errors. The results were statistically robust, providing converging evidence for the feasibility of our experimental paradigm in decoupling offline behaviors and the online, automatic, and unconscious aspects of cognitive processing in reading.     

The Neural Basis of Motor-Skill Learning

Recent work indicates that motor-skill learning is supported by four processes: a strategic process that selects new goals of what to change in the environment, a perceptual-motor integration process that adjusts to new relationships between environmental stimuli and the appropriate motor response, a sequencing process that learns sequences of motor acts, and a dynamic process that learns new patterns of muscle activations. These four processes can operate in one of two modes: an unconscious mode, in which one is aware only of the goal of the movement, or a conscious mode, in which one consciously controls detailed aspects of the movement. This article provides an overview of these four processes and two modes, and describes their neural bases.     

Strategic control in AGL is not attributable to simple letter frequencies alone

In Norman, Price, and Jones (2011), we argued that the ability to apply two sets of grammar rules flexibly from trial to trial on a “mixed-block” AGL classification task indicated strategic control over knowledge that was less than fully explicit. Jiménez (2011) suggested that our results do not in themselves prove that participants learned – and strategically controlled – complex properties of the structures of the grammars, but that they may be accounted for by learning of simple letter frequencies. We first explain why our main conclusions regarding strategic control and conscious awareness are a separable issue to this criticism. We then report additional data which show that our participants’ ability to discriminate between the two grammars was not attributable to differences in simple letter frequencies.     

Unawareness is more than a chance event: comment on Lovibond and Shanks (2002)

P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that expectancy of the unconditional stimulus and emotional ratings are valid indexes of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning and that participants are aware if they can discriminate the conditional stimuli. However, research suggests that processes that are irrelevant to awareness affect these measures. Further, as awareness refers to conscious experience, a valid measures needs to index subjective state rather than discrimination ability. In support, research using subjective measures has demonstrated qualitatively different effects depending on whether participants reported being aware or unaware of the stimuli. In this research, participants reported being unaware of the stimuli even though they were clearly able to discriminate the stimuli. These findings question the validity of Lovibond and Shanks' concept of awareness and their suggestion of a close association between conditioning and awareness.     

Learning,awareness, and instruction: Subjective contingency awareness does matter in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm

In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often in a particular target print colour (e.g., “month” most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not (control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of implicit learning.     

The motivational unconscious

Motives may be said to be unconscious in a variety of ways. They may be automatically and unconsciously elicited by consciously perceptible situational cues; they may be instigated by cues that are themselves excluded from conscious awareness, as expressions of implicit perception or memory; or the person may be consciously unaware of his or her actual motivational state. The paper reviews the evidence pertaining to all three aspects of unconscious motivation, with emphasis on conceptual and methodological questions that arise in the study of motives which are not accessible to phenomenal awareness or voluntary control but nonetheless influence the individual's experience, thought, and action.     

Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses

Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction (attended), or while distracted by a visual task to remove awareness of the rule (unattended). A test phase included occasional violations of the rule. Only participants attending the sounds reported awareness of violations and only they showed significantly greater SCR for noise occurring in violation, vs. accordance, with the rule. Our results establish theoretically significant dissociations between conscious and unconscious processing and furnish new opportunities for clinical assessment of residual consciousness in patient populations.     

Judgments of learning are significantly higher following feedback on relatively good versus relatively poor trials despite no actual learning differences

Studies have consistently shown that prospective metacognitive judgments of learning are often inaccurate because humans mistakenly interpret current performance levels as valid indices of learning. These metacognitive discrepancies are strongly related to conditions of practice. Here, we examined how the type of feedback (after good versus poor trials) received during practice and awareness (aware versus unaware) of this manipulation affected judgments of learning and actual learning. After each six-trial block, participants received feedback on their three best trials or three worst trials and half of the participants were made explicitly aware of the type of feedback they received while the other half were unaware. Judgments of learning were made at the end of each six-trial block and before the 24-h retention test. Results indicated no motor performance differences between groups in practice or retention; however, receiving feedback on relatively good compared to relatively poor trials resulted in significantly higher judgments of learning in practice and retention, irrespective of awareness. These results suggest that KR on relatively good versus relatively poor trials can have dissociable effects on judgments of learning in the absence of actual learning differences, even when participants are made aware of their feedback manipulation.     

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness.     

Surfing the implicit wave

Implicit learning was investigated in two experiments involving a complex motor task. Participants were required to balance on a stabilometer and to move the platform on which they were standing to match a constantly changing target position. Experiment 1 examined whether a segment (middle third) that was repeated on each trial would be learned without participants becoming aware of the repetitions (i.e., implicitly). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine the relative effectiveness of explicit versus implicit learning. Here, two identical segments were presented on each trial (first and last thirds), with participants only being informed that one segment (either first or last) was repeated. The acquisition results from both experiments indicated large improvements in performance across 4 days of practice, with performance on the repeated segments being generally superior to that on the non-repeated segment. On the retention tests on Day 5, errors on the repeated segment(s) were smaller than those on the random segment(s). Furthermore, in Experiment 2, the errors on the repeated-known segment, although smaller than those on the random segment, were larger than those on the repeated-unknown segment. Interview results indicated that participants were not consciously aware that a segment was repeated unless they were informed. These results suggest that implicit learning can occur for relatively complex motor tasks and that withholding information concerning the regularities is more beneficial than providing this information.     

The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness

The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance.     

Implicit and Explicit Learning in Individuals with Agrammatic Aphasia

Implicit learning is a process of acquiring knowledge that occurs without conscious awareness of learning, whereas explicit learning involves the use of overt strategies. To date, research related to implicit learning following stroke has been largely restricted to the motor domain and has rarely addressed implications for language. The present study investigated implicit and explicit learning of an auditory word sequence in 10 individuals with stroke-induced agrammatic aphasia and 18 healthy age-matched participants using an adaptation of the Serial Reaction Time task. Individuals with aphasia showed significant learning under implicit, but not explicit, conditions, whereas age-matched participants learned under both conditions. These results suggest significant implicit learning ability in agrammatic aphasia. Furthermore, results of an auditory sentence span task indicated working memory deficits in individuals with agrammatic aphasia, which are discussed in relation to explicit and implicit learning processes.