Atypical shape bias and categorization in autism: Evidence from children and computational simulations

The shape bias, a preference for mapping new word labels onto the shape rather than the color or texture of referents, has been postulated as a word‐learning mechanism. Previous research has shown deficits in the shape bias in children with autism even though they acquire sizeable lexicons. While previous explanations have suggested the atypical use of color for label extension in individuals with autism, we hypothesize an atypical mapping of novel labels to novel objects, regardless of the physical properties of the objects. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate this phenomenon in some individuals with autism, but the novelty of objects only partially explains their lack of shape bias. In a second experiment, we present a computational model that provides a developmental account of the shape bias in typically developing children and in those with autism. This model is based on theories of neurological dysfunctions in autism, and it integrates theoretical and empirical findings in the literature of categorization, word learning, and the shape bias. The model replicates the pattern of results of our first experiment and shows how individuals with autism are more likely to categorize experimental objects together on the basis of their novelty. It also provides insights into possible mechanisms by which children with autism learn new words, and why their word referents may be idiosyncratic. Our model highlights a developmental approach to autism that emphasizes deficient representations of categories underlying an impaired shape bias.     

7～10岁自闭症谱系障碍儿童对情绪面孔的觉察与加工

为了考察自闭症谱系障碍(autism spectrum disorder,ASD)儿童对不同情绪面孔的觉察和加工情况,设计两个眼动实验任务,要求14名7～10岁ASD儿童和20名同年龄正常儿童观看图片。实验一采用将情绪面孔嵌入风景图片中引起语义不一致的刺激;实验二采用含有情绪面孔的无意义背景乱序图片刺激。结果发现:(1)ASD儿童对不同情绪面孔的觉察时间都显著长于正常儿童;(2)与正常儿童一样,ASD儿童表现出对恐惧面孔的注意偏向;(3)实验二中,ASD儿童对不同情绪面孔内部特征区的注意分配与正常儿童不同;正常儿童能注意最能展示该类情绪特征信息的区域,如恐惧的眼睛、愉快的嘴巴,而ASD儿童对三类情绪面孔特征区的注意分配方式相似;(4)两个实验条件下,ASD者对不同情绪面孔的觉察、加工模式与正常儿童相似。     

Persistent overconfidence despite practice: The role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions

In three experiments, preschoolers’ ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child’s performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers’ overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.     

Semantic detail in the developing verb lexicon: An extension of Naigles and Kako (1993)

Verbs are often uttered before the events they describe. By 2 years of age, toddlers can learn from such an encounter. Hearing a novel verb in transitive sentences (e.g. The boy lorped the cat), even with no visual referent present, they later map it to a causative meaning (e.g. feed) (e.g. Yuan & Fisher, 2009 ). How much semantic detail does their verb representation include on this first, underinformative, encounter? Is the representation sparse, including only information for which they have evidence, or do toddlers make more specific guesses about the verb's meaning? In two experiments (N = 76, mean age 27 months), we address this using an event type studied by Naigles and Kako ( 1993 ); they found that when toddlers hear a novel transitive verb while simultaneously viewing a non‐causative referent—a contact event such as patting—they map the verb to the contact event. In Experiment 1 we replicated this basic result. Further, toddlers’ representations persisted over a 5‐minute delay, manifesting again during a retest. In Experiment 2, toddlers heard the verbs while watching two actors converse instead of while seeing contact events. At test, they showed no evidence of mapping the verbs to contact events, either initially or after a 5‐minute delay, despite that in prior work they mapped verbs to causative events under identical circumstances. We infer that on hearing a novel verb in a transitive frame, absent a relevant visual scene, toddlers posit a more specific representation than the evidence requires—one that incorporates causative semantics. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/aRCqSTbr6Bw     

Syntactic priming in 3- and 4-year-old children: evidence for abstract representations of transitive and dative forms

The current studies used a syntactic priming paradigm with 3- and 4-year-old children. In Experiment 1, children were asked to describe a series of drawings depicting transitive and dative relations to establish baseline production levels. In Experiment 2, an experimenter described a similar series of drawings using one of two syntactic forms (i.e., active/passive for transitive; double-object/prepositional for dative). Children were then asked to describe pictures identical to those shown in the corresponding baseline procedure. In both transitive and dative conditions, 4-year-old children were more likely to use a particular syntactic form if it had been used by the experimenter. Three-year-old children did not show priming effects, but their production of transitive sentences was higher following transitive primes than in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, an additional group of 3-year-olds participated in a procedure in which they repeated the experimenter's sentences before describing the pictures. This procedure yielded significant priming effects for transitive and dative forms. These results indicate that very young children possess abstract syntactic representations, but that their access to these representations is sensitive to task demands.     

Children with autism's perception and understanding of ambiguous figures: Evidence for pictorial metarepresentation,a research note

A large body of autism research over the last 20 years has shown that people with autism have difficulties understanding mental states. This has been conceived of as a metarepresentational deficit. An open question is whether people with autism's metarepresentational deficit is limited to the mental domain. This research explores individuals with autism's understanding of the representational nature of pictures. With the use of ambiguous figures, where a single stimulus is capable of representing two distinct referents, we compared metarepresentational abilities in the pictorial and mental domains and the perception of pictorial ambiguity. Our findings indicate that individuals with autism are impaired in mental metarepresentation but not in pictorial metarepresentation. These findings suggest that children with autism understand the representational nature of pictures. We conclude that children with autism's understanding of the representational nature of pictures is in advance of their metarepresentational understanding of mind. Their perception of figure ambiguity is comparable to the typical population.     

孤独症个体的谎言理解及其与对自我/他人错误信念理解的关系

选取言语智力匹配的孤独症个体（19名）、典型发展个体（20名）、智力迟滞个体（19名）为被试,动画呈现以言语和非言语信息为线索的两个谎言情景,考察了孤独症个体谎言理解中的谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别、谎言意图理解及其与自我/他人错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：（1）孤独症个体能够进行谎言行为判断,其困难主要表现在辨别真假信息及对谎言意图的理解上;（2）孤独症个体对他人错误信念理解越好,对真假信息辨别也越准确,而谎言意图理解则与对自我错误信念的理解有关;（3）谎言线索以言语或非言语方式呈现对孤独症谎言理解并无影响。     

Orthographic facilitation in oral vocabulary acquisition

An experiment investigated whether exposure to orthography facilitates oral vocabulary learning. A total of 58 typically developing children aged 8–9 years were taught 12 nonwords. Children were trained to associate novel phonological forms with pictures of novel objects. Pictures were used as referents to represent novel word meanings. For half of the nonwords children were additionally exposed to orthography, although they were not alerted to its presence, nor were they instructed to use it. After this training phase a nonword–picture matching posttest was used to assess learning of nonword meaning, and a spelling posttest was used to assess learning of nonword orthography. Children showed robust learning for novel spelling patterns after incidental exposure to orthography. Further, we observed stronger learning for nonword–referent pairings trained with orthography. The degree of orthographic facilitation observed in posttests was related to children's reading levels, with more advanced readers showing more benefit from the presence of orthography.     

Self-attributed body-shadows modulate tactile attention

Our body-shadows are special stimuli in the visual world. They often have anatomical resemblance with our own body-parts and move as our body moves, with spatio-temporal correlation. Here, we show that self-attributed body-shadows cue attention to the body-part they refer to, rather than the location they occupy. Using speeded spatial discrimination for tactile or visual targets at the hands, or for visual targets delivered near the hand-shadows, we demonstrate that mere viewing of task-irrelevant shadows can selectively facilitate tactile discrimination at the body-part casting the shadow (Experiment 1). In addition, such facilitation only develops through time for cast-shadows that have no resemblance with the body-part, but move in spatio-temporal correlation with it (Experiment 2). Conversely, facilitation fades away rapidly for shadow-like images that resemble the stimulated body-part, but are in fact static pictures (Experiment 3). Thus, recognising oneself as the owner of a shadow affects distribution of tactile attention.     

Color-object interference: Further tests of an executive control account

Young children are slower in naming the color of a meaningful picture than in naming the color of an abstract form (Stroop-like color-object interference). The current experiments tested an executive control account of this phenomenon. First, color-object interference was observed in 6- and 8-year-olds but not in 12- and 16-year-olds (Experiment 1). Second, meaningful pictures did not interfere in 5- to 7-year-olds’ manual sorting of objects on the basis of color (Experiment 2) or in their naming the number of colored objects in the display, that is, subitizing (Experiment 3). These findings provide support for the view that color-object interference results from the children’s immature inhibition of the prepotent but irrelevant task of object naming.     

When a Picasso is a “Picasso”: The entry point in the identification of visual art

We investigated whether art is distinguished from other real world objects in human cognition, in that art allows for a special memorial representation and identification based on artists’ specific stylistic appearances. Testing art-experienced viewers, converging empirical evidence from three experiments, which have proved sensitive to addressing the question of initial object recognition, suggest that identification of visual art is at the subordinate level of the producing artist. Specifically, in a free naming task it was found that art-objects as opposed to non-art-objects were most frequently named with subordinate level categories, with the artist’s name as the most frequent category (Experiment 1). In a category-verification task (Experiment 2), art-objects were recognized faster than non-art-objects on the subordinate level with the artist’s name. In a conceptual priming task, subordinate primes of artists’ names facilitated matching responses to art-objects but subordinate primes did not facilitate responses to non-art-objects (Experiment 3). Collectively, these results suggest that the artist’s name has a special status in the memorial representation of visual art and serves as a predominant entry point in recognition in art perception.     

Two-year-olds use artist intention to understand drawings

Adults appreciate that an abstract visual representation can be understood through inferring the artist's intention. Many investigators have argued that this capacity is a late-emerging developmental accomplishment, a claim supported by findings that preschool children ignore explicit statements about intent when naming pictures. Using a simplified method, we explored picture naming in 2-year-olds. Experiment 1 found that when an adult artist drew an object, children later mapped a novel name for the drawing to the object that the adult had been looking at. Experiment 2 suggests that this response was not merely because there was more attention given to that object. These findings are consistent with the view that children are naturally disposed to reason about artifacts, including artwork, in terms of inferred intention.     

Not Propositions

Current computational accounts of meaning in the cognitive sciences are based on abstract, amodal symbols (e.g., nodes, links, propositions) that are arbitrarily related to their referents. We argue that such accounts lack convincing empirical support and that they do not provide a satisfactory account for linguistic meaning. One historic set of results supporting the abstract symbol view has come from investigation into comprehension of negated sentences, such as “The buttons are not black.” These sentences are presumed to be understood as two propositions composed of abstract symbols. One proposition corresponds to “the buttons are black,” and it is embedded in another proposition corresponding to “it is not true.” Thus, the propositional account predicts (a) that comprehension of negated sentences should take longer than comprehension of the corresponding positive sentence (because of the time needed to construct the embedding), but (b) that the resulting embedded propositions are informationally equivalent (but of opposite valence) to the simple proposition underlying the positive sentence. Contrary to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrates that negated sentences out of context are interpreted as situationally ambiguous, that is, as conveying less specific information than positive sentences. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrates that when negated sentences are used in an appropriate context, readers do not take longer to understand them. Thus, difficulty with negation is demonstrated to be an artifact of presentation out of context. After discussing other serious problems with the use of abstract symbols, we describe the Indexical Hypothesis. This embodied account of meaning does not depend on abstract symbols, and hence it provides a more satisfactory account of meaning.     

Is anyone looking at me? Direct gaze detection in children with and without autism

Atypical processing of eye contact is one of the significant characteristics of individuals with autism, but the mechanism underlying atypical direct gaze processing is still unclear. This study used a visual search paradigm to examine whether the facial context would affect direct gaze detection in children with autism. Participants were asked to detect target gazes presented among distracters with different gaze directions. The target gazes were either direct gaze or averted gaze, which were either presented alone (Experiment 1) or within facial context (Experiment 2). As with the typically developing children, the children with autism, were faster and more efficient to detect direct gaze than averted gaze, whether or not the eyes were presented alone or within faces. In addition, face inversion distorted efficient direct gaze detection in typically developing children, but not in children with autism. These results suggest that children with autism use featural information to detect direct gaze, whereas typically developing children use configural information to detect direct gaze.     

Full naming with bi-dimensional abstract stimuli in six-year-old children

The aim of this study was to evaluate a procedure to reveal the emergence of full naming in typically developing children. In Experiment 1, five 6-year-old children (a) learned tacts of pictures and the emergence of the selection of these pictures upon hearing their names was tested; and (b) the selection of other pictures was taught and the emergence of the tacts was tested. All children showed the emergence of picture selection and 3 children showed the emergence of the tacts. In Experiment 2a, the children's correct repetition of the names of 3 pictures was verified first, then the experimenter presented the pictures with their names without requiring any behavior other than attending. Finally, the emergence of picture selection and the tacts was tested. Experiment 2b replicated Experiment 2a with words that were easier to pronounce. Picture selection and the tacts emerged; this performance documented full naming for the first time with typically developing children. These procedures can be used to induce naming capacity in children who lack it; hence, they can be applied to teach children with learning delays.     

The eyes are right when the mouth is wrong

When describing visual scenes, speakers typically gaze at objects while preparing their names. In a study of the relation between eye movements and speech, a corpus of self-corrected speech errors was analyzed. If errors result from rushed word preparation, insufficient visual information, or failure to check prepared names against objects, speakers should spend less time gazing at referents before uttering errors than before uttering correct names. Counter to predictions, gazes to referents before errors (e.g., gazes to an axe before saying "ham-" [hammer]) highly resembled gazes to referents before correct names (e.g., gazes to an axe before saying "axe"). However, speakers gazed at referents for more time after initiating erroneous compared with correct names, apparently while they prepared corrections. Assuming that gaze nonetheless reflects word preparation, errors were not associated with insufficient preparation. Nor were errors systematically associated with decreased inspection of objects. Like gesture, gaze may accurately reflect a speaker's intentions even when the accompanying speech does not.     

The colors of the alphabet: naturally-biased associations between shape and color

Many letters of the alphabet are consistently mapped to specific colors in English-speaking adults, both in the general population and in individuals with grapheme-color synaesthesia who perceive letters in color. Here, across six experiments, we tested the ubiquity of the color/letter associations with typically developing toddlers, literate children, and adults. We found that pre-literate children associate O with white and X with black and discovered that they also associate I and ameboid nonsense shapes with white; Z and jagged nonsense shapes with black; and C with yellow; but do not make a number of other associations (B blue; Y yellow; A red; G green) seen in literate children and adults. The toddlers' mappings were based on the shape and not the sound of the letter. The results suggest that sensory cortical organization initially binds specific colors to some specific shapes and that learning to read can induce additional associations, likely through the influence of higher order networks as letters take on meaning.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Training class inclusion responding in individuals with autism: Further investigation

Class inclusion (CI) requires responding to an item simultaneously as a member of both a class and a more inclusive class that contains that class. This study extends previous research by Ming et al. (2018) who trained CI responding in typically developing children and individuals with autism using a Relational Frame Theory (RFT) approach according to which CI involves responding in accordance with relations of containment and comparison. In Ming et al., participants experienced multiple exemplar training in which class containment relations were represented by placing pictures (of subclasses of animals) within nested transparent boxes. In the current study, 3 adult males with autism and moderate learning disability were not able to learn CI responding using contingent feedback alone. However, an intervention involving nonarbitrary guidance facilitated the repertoire. Implications and future directions are discussed.