Human nature and cognitive–developmental niche construction

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as a radical departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche.     

认知神经心理学简介

认知神经心理学是认知心理学的一个分支。它的目的是探讨当人们执行认知活动的时候,心理信息加工过程是怎样的,所采用的手段是研究这些认知功能受损的病人。它与认知神经科学的不同在于：认知神经心理学关注的是心理（mind）,而认知神经科学关注的是大脑（特别是关注与认知有关的大脑机制）。研究认知神经心理学的方法也可以用于研究发展性认知障碍,如阅读障碍,或者特殊的语言损伤,这就是发展性认知神经心理学。这些方法还可以用于高级认知发面的研究,如信念形成和心理理论。这些高级认知方面的障碍是精神病学的范畴,因此这类研究错觉、幻想或虚构等的认知神经心理学叫做认知神经精神病学。认知神经心理学的典型特征有：1）研究症状,而不是并发症;2）采用个案研究,而不是群体研究;3）主要数据来源是症状间的双分离;4）致力于模块化认知模型的建立。     

Measurement of cognitive functions in experts and elite athletes: A meta‐analytic review

An extraordinary physiological capacity combined with remarkable motor control, perception, and cognitive functioning is crucial for high performance in sports. Tests that assess the physical abilities are already well established. Moreover, a growing area of research evolved in the recent past that is particularly concerned with the basic cognitive functions by means of neurocognitive tests in experts and elite athletes. The aim of this meta‐analysis (k = 19) is to quantify differences among experts and nonexperts as well as elite athletes and non‐elite athletes. In addition, it aims to assemble and compare previous research and analyze possible differences in cognitive functions depending on age, skill level, and used cognitive tasks. Overall, the mean effect size was small to medium (r = 0.22), indicating superior cognitive functions in experts and elite athletes. The factor of skill definition significantly differentiates the cognition–expertise relationship. In contrast, differences in age groups and cognitive areas appeared but were not significant. Future research should prefer the elite rather than the expert definition and distinguish between high‐performance and amateur athletes. Furthermore, the findings suggest that it can be beneficial for coaches and sport clubs to integrate cognitive tests as an additional tool for scouting and for optimizing the athletic development of their players.     

Thomason’s Paradox for Belief,and Two Consequence Relations

Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain ‘natural assumptions’, then it implies that the subject is inconsistent if the beliefs include arithmetic. I challenge the result by insisting that the motivation for Thomason’s principle (ii), via Moore’s Paradox, leads to a more complex representation, in which stating the facts and expressing one’s beliefs are treated differently. Certain logical connections among expressions of assent, and between expression and statement, are a matter of consequence on pain of pragmatic incoherence, not consequence on pain of classical logical inconsistency. But while this salvages the possibility that a modification of the above sort of representation could be adequate, Thomason’s devastating conclusion returns if the scientist identifies himself as the subject of that representation, even when paying heed to the requirement of pragmatic coherence of the sort highlighted by Moore’s Paradox.     

认知心理学的实用性转向

认知心理学实用性转向的根本涵义在于强调认知对于行动的效用与价值。传统认知心理学视认知系统的主要工作是怎样精确地 “表征” 世界，以便在大脑中建立一个外部世界的心理模型。实用性转向则强调认知系统的主要工作不是 “表征” 或 “反映”，而是指导有机体更有效地行动，认知是有 “效用” 的，它的效用就在于指导有机体适应和改造环境的活动。认知产生于行动、服务于行动，与行动水乳交融。这些理论观点来源于实用主义哲学。詹姆斯、杜威等人的经典实用主义对行动和效果的强调深刻影响了部分认知心理学家，促使他们放弃表征为中心的认知观而转向行动导向的认知观。在作者看来，由于这种转向强调了认知的 “效用”，因而对于认知心理学的健康发展将产生积极影响。     

Shanahan on Symbolization

In his article ‘A New View of Language, Emotion and the Brain,’ Dan Shanahan claims that the post-war Cognitive Turn focused mainly on information processing and that little attention was paid to the dramatic role played by emotion in human cognition. One key argument in his defence of a more comprehensive view of human cognition rests upon the idea that the process of symbolization—a unique capacity only developed by humans—combines, right from the start, information processing and feelings. The author argues that any theory ignoring this fact would miss the whole point, just as mainstream cognitive science has done since Noam Chomsky published Syntactic Structures, exactly 50 years ago.

生成认知与具身机能主义的比较——表征的取舍

在具身认知不同的思潮中，生成认知以其激进的观点反对表征和计算主义，可以称之为是具身认知思潮中的最为激进的一部分。另一方面，由于标准认知中表征和计算的解释力和影响力，具身认知诞生出各种不同程度上的“妥协”性理论，其中，以克拉克为代表的具身的“机能主义”为目前具身认知的主流观点。表征尽管在当前阶段中表现出强大的生命力，但依然无法在所有领域中都得到运用。随着表征的改造与发展，未来的激进具身认知工作者应该将更多的精力投入到具身认知与更多学科的融合研究中。     

Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple—green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond—sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane—noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.     

Heidegger’s Temple: How Truth Happens When Nothing is Portrayed

In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain, and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to ‘nothing’, which is a key term in Heidegger’s essays leading up to The Origin of the Work of Art. This paper extends a similar analysis to the Greek temple as a way of offering an exposition of Heidegger’s concerns in the essay. It begins by briefly outlining Thomson’s argument that Heidegger relates Van Gogh’s painting to ‘nothing’, and indicating the way this argument can be extended to the Greek temple. It then discusses three ways in which ‘nothing’ can open up the significance of the temple as a work of art in which truth happens: (1) it is not concerned with objective representation; (2) it depicts the primal strife of earth and world, concealing and unconcealing; (3) it is fundamentally historical.