Human self-control and the density of reinforcement

Choice responding in adult humans on a discrete-trial button-pressing task was examined as a function of amount, delay, and overall density (points per unit time) of reinforcement. Reinforcement consisted of points that were exchangeable for money. In T 0 conditions, an impulsive response produced 4 points immediately and a self-control response produced 10 points after a delay of 15 s. In T 15 conditions, a constant delay of 15 s was added to both prereinforcer delays. Postreinforcer delays, which consisted of 15 s added to the end of each impulsive trial, equated trial durations regardless of choice, and was manipulated in both T 0 and T 15 conditions. In all conditions, choice was predicted directly from the relative reinforcement densities of the alternatives. Self-control was observed in all conditions except T 0 without postreinforcer delays, where the impulsive choices produced the higher reinforcement density. These results support previous studies showing that choice is a direct function of the relative reinforcement densities when conditioned (point) reinforcers are used. In contrast, where responding produces intrinsic (immediately consumable) reinforcers, immediacy of reinforcement appears to account for preference when density does not.     

Stimulus Equivalence: Effects Of A Default-response Option On Emergence Of Untrained Stimulus Relations

Human subjects were exposed to a concurrent-chains schedule in which reinforcer amounts, delays, or both were varied in the terminal links, and consummatory responses were required to receive points that were later exchangeable for money. Two independent variable-interval 30-s schedules were in effect during the initial links, and delay periods were defined by fixed-time schedules. In Experiment 1, subjects were exposed to three different pairs of reinforcer amounts and delays, and sensitivity to reinforcer amount and delay was determined based on the generalized matching law. The relative responding (choice) of most subjects was more sensitive to reinforcer amount than to reinforcer delay. In Experiment 2, subjects chose between immediate smaller reinforcers and delayed larger reinforcers in five conditions with and without timeout periods that followed a shorter delay, in which reinforcer amounts and delays were combined to make different predictions based on local reinforcement density (i.e., points per delay) or overall reinforcement density (i.e., points per total time). In most conditions, subjects' choices were qualitatively in accord with the predictions from the overall reinforcement density calculated by the ratio of reinforcer amount and total time. Therefore, the overall reinforcement density appears to influence the preference of humans in the present self-control choice situation.     

Token reinforcement, choice, and self-control in pigeons.

Pigeons were exposed to self-control procedures that involved illumination of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) as a form of token reinforcement. In a discrete-trials arrangement, subjects chose between one and three LEDs; each LED was exchangeable for 2-s access to food during distinct posttrial exchange periods. In Experiment 1, subjects generally preferred the immediate presentation of a single LED over the delayed presentation of three LEDs, but differences in the delay to the exchange period between the two options prevented a clear assessment of the relative influence of LED delay and exchange-period delay as determinants of choice. In Experiment 2, in which delays to the exchange period from either alternative were equal in most conditions, all subjects preferred the delayed three LEDs more often than in Experiment-1. In Experiment 3, subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of food more often if the choices also produced LEDs than if they did not. In Experiment 4, preference for the delayed three LEDs was obtained when delays to the exchange period were equal, but reversed in favor of an immediate single LED when the latter choice also resulted in quicker access to exchange periods. The overall pattern of results suggests that (a) delay to the exchange period is a more critical determinant of choice than is delay to token presentation; (b) tokens may function as conditioned reinforcers, although their discriminative properties may be responsible for the self-control that occurs under token reinforcer arrangements; and (c) previously reported differences in the self-control choices of humans and pigeons may have resulted at least in part from the procedural conventions of using token reinforcers with human subjects and food reinforcers with pigeon subjects.     

Choice between single and multiple delayed reinforcers.

Pigeons chose between alternatives that differed in the number of reinforcers and in the delay to each reinforcer. A peck on a red key produced the same consequences on every trial within a condition, but between conditions the number of reinforcers varied from one to three and the reinforcer delays varied between 5 s and 30 s. A peck on a green key produced a delay of adjustable duration and then a single reinforcer. The green-key delay was increased or decreased many times per session, depending on a subject's previous choices, which permitted estimation of an indifference point, or a delay at which a subject chose each alternative about equally often. The indifference points decreased systematically with more red-key reinforcers and with shorter red-key delays. The results did not support the suggestion of Moore (1979) that multiple delayed reinforcers have no effect on preference unless they are closely grouped. The results were well described in quantitative detail by a simple model stating that each of a series of reinforcers increases preference, but that a reinforcer's effect is inversely related to its delay. The success of this model, which considers only delay of reinforcement, suggested that the overall rate of reinforcement for each alternative had no effect on choice between those alternatives.     

Humans' sensitivity to variation in reinforcer amount: Effects of the method of reinforcer delivery

Two experiments examined human subjects' sensitivity to variation in reinforcer amount under different methods of reinforcer delivery. Subjects chose between schedules varying in terms of amount and/or delay of reinforcement, the reinforcer being points exchangeable for money. In Experiment 1, reinforcer amount was manipulated by varying the monetary value of the points across conditions while the number of seconds of access to a consummatory response remained constant. Choice was strongly sensitive to reinforcer amount and indicative of self-control, as in previous experiments. In Experiment 2, reinforcer amount was manipulated by automatically delivering different numbers of points during the amount period, and the consummatory response was eliminated. Sensitivity to variation in reinforcer amount was significantly lower than in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the subjects in Experiment 2 exhibited significantly less self-control than did the subjects in Experiment 1. Humans' sensitivity to variation in reinforcer amount appears to be affected by factors that enhance the discrimi-nability of the consequences of responding.     

Temporal discounting and preference reversals in choice between delayed outcomes

Subjects chose between pairs of hypothetical amounts of money available after different delays. When smaller, more immediate amounts were selected over larger, more delayed amounts, the addition of a constant delay to both outcomes resulted in reversals of preference, contrary to the standard discounted utility model of economics. The delays at which preference reversed were determined for three pairs of amounts ($20 vs. $50, $100 vs. $250, and $500 vs. $1,250). The relation between the delay to the larger amount and the delay to the smaller amount at preference reversal was well fit by both linear and quadratic functions. Intercepts increased with amount, strongly suggesting that rate of discounting decreases with amount. The presence of significant negative curvature in the data from the majority of individual subjects poses problems for exponential and hyperbolic models of temporal discounting in self-control, both of which predict a linear relation between the delays to the larger and smaller amounts.     

Time preferences in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and humans (Homo sapiens)

Rosati et al. (Curr Biol 17(19):1663–1668, 2007) found in a self-control test in which choice was between a smaller, immediately delivered food and a larger, delayed food, that chimpanzees preferred the larger reward (self-control); humans, however, preferred the smaller reward (impulsivity). They attributed their results to a species difference in self-control. In Experiment 1, monkeys (long-tailed macaques) were exposed to a self-control task in two conditions: where the food was hidden under differently colored bowls and where it was visible. When these two conditions were compared, choice shifted from greater preference for the impulsive alternative in the hidden condition to greater preference for the self-control alternative in the visible condition. Additionally, in both conditions, preference shifted from self-control to impulsivity over sessions. These results were explained in terms of the reversed-contingency effect (a propensity to reach for more over less when rewards are visible) and not to a capacity for self-control. In Experiment 2, humans that demonstrated preference for more over less in choice preferred the impulsive alternative when choice to either alternative was followed by the same intertrial interval—a preference that accelerates trial rates relative to preference of the self-control alternative. When trial rates were equated so that neither choice accelerated session’s end, humans demonstrated self-control. These results suggest that Rosati et al.’s demonstration of impulsivity in humans was due to participants’ desire to minimize session time.     

Determinants of pigeons' choices in token-based self-control procedures

Four pigeons were exposed to a token-based self-control procedure with stimulus lights serving as token reinforcers. Smaller-reinforcer choices produced one token immediately; larger-reinforcer choices produced three tokens following a delay. Each token could be exchanged for 2-s access to food during a signaled exchange period each trial. The main variables of interest were the exchange delays (delays from the choice to the exchange stimulus) and the food delays (also timed from the choice), which were varied separately and together across blocks of sessions. When exchange delays and food delays were shorter following smaller-reinforcer choices, strong preference for the smaller reinforcer was observed. When exchange delays and food delays were equal for both options, strong preference for the larger reinforcer was observed. When food delays were equal for both options but exchange delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the larger reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays were equal. When exchange delays were equal for both options but food delays were shorter for smaller-reinforcer choices, preference for the smaller reinforcer generally was less extreme than under conditions in which both exchange and food delays favored smaller-reinforcer choices. On the whole, the results were consistent with prior research on token-based self-control procedures in showing that choices are governed by reinforcer immediacy when exchange and food delays are unequal and by reinforcer amount when exchange and food delays are equal. Further, by decoupling the exchange delays from food delays, the results tentatively support a role for the exchange stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer.     

Subjective probability and delay.

Human subjects indicated their preference between a hypothetical $1,000 reward available with various probabilities or delays and a certain reward of variable amount available immediately. The function relating the amount of the certain-immediate reward subjectively equivalent to the delayed $1,000 reward had the same general shape (hyperbolic) as the function found by Mazur (1987) to describe pigeons' delay discounting. The function relating the certain-immediate amount of money subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic $1,000 reward was also hyperbolic, provided that the stated probability was transformed to odds against winning. In a second experiment, when human subjects chose between a delayed $1,000 reward and a probabilistic $1,000 reward, delay was proportional to the same odds-against transformation of the probability to which it was subjectively equivalent.     

Choice between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules requiring forceful responding.

This experiment measured pigeons' choices between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules in which a force of approximately 0.48 N was needed to operate the response key. In ratio-delay conditions, subjects chose between a fixed-ratio schedule and an adjusting delay. The delay was increased or decreased several times a session in order to estimate an indifference point--a delay duration at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Each ratio-delay condition was followed by a delay-delay condition in which subjects chose between the adjusting delay and a variable-time schedule, with the components of this schedule selected to match the ratio completion times of the preceding ratio-delay condition. The adjusting delays at the indifference point were longer when the alternative was a fixed-ratio schedule than when it was a matched variable-time schedule, which indicated a preference for the matched variable-time schedules over the fixed-ratio schedules. This preference increased in a nonlinear manner with increasing ratio size. This nonlinearity was inconsistent with a theory that states that indifference points for both time and ratio schedules can be predicted by multiplying the choice response-reinforcer intervals of the two types of schedules by different multiplicative constants. Two other theories, which predict nonlinear increases in preference for the matched variable-time schedules, are discussed.     

Preference reversals with food and water reinforcers in rats

Rats were given a choice between a smaller, immediately available reward and a larger reward available after a delay. In one phase, the reward was food and in another phase, the reward was water. Constant delays were added between the choice presentation and the delivery of the reward alternatives. As the time between choice and reward delivery increased from 0 to 25 s, all rats (except one in the water phase) reversed their preference from the smaller, sooner alternative to the larger, later alternative. These findings extend the generality of the preference-reversal animal model to qualitatively different reinforcers. Furthermore, the presence of both impulsive and self-control choices within the same animal is consistent with the view that self-control may be understood as choice behavior, and that species differences in self-control may be differences in degree, not kind.     

Enhancing tolerance to delayed reinforcers: the role of intervening activities

Three participants with moderate to profound mental retardation were exposed to choices between an immediate small amount and a delayed larger amount of a preferred reinforcer. All participants initially showed a relatively high preference for the smaller reinforcer, suggesting impulsive choice making. However this preference reversed, suggesting self-control, when the larger reinforcer was available immediately and, over time, its delay was gradually increased. Results highlight the potential utility of incorporating concurrent activities into self-control training paradigms.     

Self-control and choice in humans: Effects of video game playing as a positive reinforcer

Participants chose between reinforcement schedules differing in delay of reinforcement (interval between a choice response and onset of a video game) and/or amount of reinforcement (duration of access to the game). Experiment 1 showed that immediate reinforcement was preferred to delayed reinforcement with amount of reinforcement held constant, and a large reinforcer was preferred to a small reinforcer when both were obtainable immediately. Imposing a delay before the large reinforcer produced a preference for the immediate, small reinforcer in 40% of participants. This suggested a limited degree of “impulsivity.” In Experiment 2, unequal delays were extended by equal intervals, the amounts being kept equal. Preference for the shorter delay decreased, an effect that presumably makes possible the “preference reversal” phenomenon in studies of self-control. Overall, the results demonstrate that video game playing can produce useful, systematic data when used as a positive reinforcer for choice behavior in humans.     

Delay discounting by pathological gamblers

Discounting of delayed rewards by pathological gamblers was compared to discounting of delayed rewards by matched control nongambling participants. All participants completed a hypothetical choice task in which they made repeated choices between dollars 1,000 available after a delay and an equal or lesser amount of money available immediately. The delay to the large amount of money was varied from 1 week to 10 years across conditions. Indifference points between immediate money and delayed money were identified at each delay condition by varying the amount of immediate money across choice trials. For the majority of participants, indifference points decreased monotonically across delays. Overall, gamblers discounted the delayed rewards more steeply than did control participants.     

Fixed-interval performance and self-control in children.

Operant responses of 16 children (mean age 6 years and 1 month) were reinforced according to different fixed-interval schedules (with interreinforcer intervals of 20, 30, or 40 s) in which the reinforcers were either 20-s or 40-s presentations of a cartoon. In another procedure, they received training on a self-control paradigm in which both reinforcer delay (0.5 s or 40 s) and reinforcer duration (20 s or 40 s of cartoons) varied, and subjects were offered a choice between various combinations of delay and duration. Individual differences in behavior under the self-control procedure were precisely mirrored by individual differences under the fixed-interval schedule. Children who chose the smaller immediate reinforcer on the self-control procedure (impulsive) produced short postreinforcement pauses and high response rates in the fixed-interval conditions, and both measures changed little with changes in fixed-interval value. Conversely, children who chose the larger delayed reinforcer in the self-control condition (the self-controlled subjects) exhibited lower response rates and long postreinforcement pauses, which changed systematically with changes in the interval, in their fixed-interval performances.     

A comparison of delays and ratio requirements in self-control choice.

In a discrete-trial procedure, pigeons could choose between 2-s and 6-s access to grain by making a single key peck. In Phase 1, the pigeons obtained both reinforcers by responding on fixed-ratio schedules. In Phase 2, they received both reinforcers after simple delays, arranged by fixed-time schedules, during which no responses were required. In Phase 3, the 2-s reinforcer was available through a fixed-time schedule and the 6-s reinforcer was available through a fixed-ratio schedule. In all conditions, the size of the delay or ratio leading to the 6-s reinforcer was systematically increased or decreased several times each session, permitting estimation of an "indifference point," the schedule size at which a subject chose each alternative equally often. By varying the size of the schedule for the 2-s reinforcer across conditions, several such indifference points were obtained from both fixed-time conditions and fixed-ratio conditions. The resulting "indifference curves" from fixed-time conditions and from fixed-ratio conditions were similar in shape, and they suggested that a hyperbolic equation describes the relation between ratio size and reinforcement value as well as the relation between reinforcer delay and its reinforcement value. The results from Phase 3 showed that subjects chose fixed-time schedules over fixed-ratio schedules that generated the same average times between a choice response and reinforcement.     

Commitment, choice and self-control

When offered a choice (Choice Y) between a small immediate reward (2-sec exposure to grain) and a large reward (4-sec exposure to grain) delayed by 4 sec, pigeons invariably preferred the small, immediate reward. However, when offered a choice (Choice X) between a delay of T seconds followed by Choice Y and a delay of T seconds followed by restriction to the large delayed reward only, the pigeon's choice depended on T. When T was small, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to Choice Y (and then chose the small, immediate reward). When T was large, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to the large delayed reward only. The reversal of preference as T increases is predicted by several recent models for choice between various amounts and delays of reward. The preference for the large delayed alternative with long durations of T parallels everyday instances of advance commitment to a given course of action. Such commitment may be seen as a prototype for self-control.     

Response patterns and cardiovascular effects during response sequence acquisition by humans.

The effects of temporal delays imposed between successive responses and of vitamin C administration were examined on the acquisition of response sequences and on cardiovascular reactivity during sequence acquisition. Thirteen adult subjects (6 female, 7 male), in good health, gave written consent prior to participating in 12 weekly 45-min sessions. Points, exchanged for money after each session, were presented when subjects completed 15-response sequences on a touch-sensitive three-response keypad. A position counter increased from 0 to 14 as subjects emitted correct responses in the sequence. Four novel 15-response sequences were presented each session. No delays were imposed between successive responses during the acquisition of one sequence; delays were imposed immediately following each response during the acquisition of a second sequence, thereby delaying response feedback; delays were imposed following feedback during acquisition of a third sequence, resulting in the removal of the stimulus correlated with sequence position; and, as a control condition, delays were imposed following feedback, but stimuli correlated with sequence position were reinstated prior to the next response during acquisition of a fourth sequence. Subjects were exposed to one of two delay durations (0.2 and 0.5 or 0.5 and 1.0 s) each session, and delay durations alternated every session. During Weeks 5 to 8, subjects received 3 grams of vitamin C per day, whereas during Weeks 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, subjects received placebo under single-blind conditions. All subjects acquired the sequences, as evidenced by decreasing percentages of incorrect responses across trials. When temporal delays were imposed between successive responses during sequence acquisition, acquisition efficiency was enhanced. Examination of response latencies suggested that the status of preceding responses (i.e., correct or incorrect) rather than the status of the position counter influenced subsequent responding. Cardiovascular effects were inversely related to the length of the temporal delay. Neither cardiovascular reactivity or sequence acquisition were related to vitamin C administration.     

Negative reinforcement and choice in humans

Participants chose between reinforcement schedules differing in delay and/or duration of noise offset. In Experiment 1 it was found that (1) immediate reinforcement was preferred to delayed reinforcement when amounts (durations) of reinforcement were equal; (2) a relatively large reinforcer was preferred to a smaller one when both reinforcers were obtained immediately; and (3) preference for an immediate, small reinforcer versus a delayed, large reinforcer increased as the delay preceding the large reinforcer increased, a sign of “impulsivity”. In Experiment 2, the schedules differed in amount or delay and equal intervals were added either to the constant parameter or the varied parameter. A shift from virtually exclusive preference to indifference occurred in the latter case but not the former, a result supporting a model of self-control that assumes that the value of a schedule depends on the ratio of amount and delay, and that choice between schedules depends on the ratio of these values.